METHOD IN THE STUDY OF VICTORIAN PROSE: ANOTHER VIEW

In "Method in the Study of Victorian Prose," an address delivered at the 1955 meeting of English X and later published in the Victorian Newsletter, Professor A. Dwight Culler has raised questions of the first importance to all of us which have long been overdue for serious discussion. In brief he argues that the study of what he calls "non-imaginative" or non-creative literature has tended to disappear from our reviews and our courses, and this primarily because for dealing with the work of philosophers, divines, historians, and essayists, we lack an appropriate method such as the "new criticism" has provided for the study of poems. Mr. Culler then examines and terms incomplete and reductive and wrong the type of approach illustrated by John Holloway's The Victorian Sage. And finally he offers suggestions toward and a plea for the construction of a "broadly humanistic" method of analysis steering a middle course between "the bald paraphrase of doctrine," which he says was the older method of criticism, and the "empty analysis of form," which he considers the chief failing of the new. As it happens, I find myself in disagreement with Mr. Culler at various points in his argument, and I have misgivings about the general approach to a solution of the problem that he has outlined. Nevertheless, with his serious concern for improving the study of prose and with the humanistic intent of his remarks, I feel sure that most of us deeply sympathize; and I hope that what follows may serve to promote, if only in the manner of Hegelian dialectic, the aim he has so well described. In any event, I would much rather agree than disagree with Mr. Culler, from whose fine book on Newman I have greatly profited. [Reviewed p. 22, infra.]

Though I am not convinced that the situation of non-imaginative prose in our college courses is quite as dark as Mr. Culler paints it, still it must be admitted that the student (in many schools a sophomore non-specialist) who once worked his way through a book of essays described as ranging from Bacon to James Thurber does seem to be a dying species; and I think it is a fact that even the English major or minor, though he is probably reading substantially the same material as his predecessor of twenty years ago, has been unfavorably affected in his response to the prose works by the lack of a commonly accepted procedure capable of lending to the study of the essay the intellectual stimulation and the sense of reward which the new critics often gave to the analysis of poems. The question is, can we come to an agreement on anything like such a procedure and so begin to redress the balance of our present situation?

Solutions to the problem like that offered by Mr. Holloway in The Victorian Sage—involving merely the analysis of imagery, of devices for controlling tone and creating a persona, and of forms of argument—will not do, says Mr. Culler. His main objection is that by treating such techniques and devices independently of the truth or falsehood of the opinions they are employed to express, Mr. Holloway has relegated to a secondary status what should be the major province of rhetoric, which lies in "a metaphysical rather than a verbal world." Holloway is not only incomplete, however. Mr. Culler feels, if I understand his words, that in giving the impression that the sages need not always have been sincere in their methods, or believed in what they were saying—that somehow their significance does not depend upon
their truth, Holloway has lessened the stature of the writers he is discussing. Despite its general freshness and attractiveness, his book is reductive, in other words; and it is, no, says Mr. Culler, "because his method is wrong."

Now I wonder if Mr. Holloway deserves quite this. His book is not exactly what we are looking for here, I suppose, since it does not analyze particular texts as wholes. But that it is incomplete in Mr. Culler's sense, Holloway would surely be the first to agree, and tell us (see, e.g., pp. 8-10) that he is dealing with an "organic thinking" in which exposition and proof become uniquely one, but that before one can consider the question of the fallacy or validity of such thinking, one must first discover the methods "whereby the sage gives expression to his outlook." In other words, his book on these writers is offered largely as prolegomena to what he calls on page ten "their proper stance in the old tradition of literature," which clearly includes the techniques of Winston Churchill's wartime rhetoric without being any the less moved and persuaded by it.

Good rhetorical works hand in hand with logic and with style in the narrower sense—the persuasive depends on all three. All three factors, therefore, should be considered in our discussion and no one of them dismissed as a process of reducing literary criticism to "strategic." After all, with the possible exception of the Nichomachean Ethics, there was hardly a more important book in the old Oxford curriculum than the Rhetoric of Aristotle, which exerted a profound influence on some of the greatest Victorian writers. We might do much to improve the reading and writing of our students today, I have often felt, if we still required them to read this book with care.

At the same time, however, I would certainly agree with Mr. Culler that our interest in the great Victorians stems chiefly from our feeling that these writers have something of continuing value to say about the problems of modern life. Whatever the deficiencies of Ruskin's aesthetics, we are probably more inclined to accept his belief about the relation of great art to the notion of Whistler or Wilde that in art subject matter is nothing and technique everything. The question remains, how do we talk about the "substantive truth" of an essay? No more than Mr. Culler do I have a method of analysis completely formed; but in the process of saying why I find his suggestions unsatisfactory, I will hazard a few of my own.

The first is that since we are looking for a method of analyzing particular prose works for their substance, whatever it may reveal to us, we should be wary of Holloway the question of the fallacy or validity of such thinking, one must first discover the methods "whereby the sage gives expression to his outlook." In other words, his book on these writers is offered largely as prolegomena to what he calls on page ten "their proper stance in the old tradition of literature," which clearly includes the techniques of Winston Churchill's wartime rhetoric without being any the less moved and persuaded by it.

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Ruskin's "Traffic"? Whatever their stylistic differences, are they not all, in fact, works of argument which require initially the same kind of analysis? Even if Mr. Culler's historical formula were developed to a point where it more nearly corresponded with the complexities of reality, it is not clear how it would help us to analyze any of these essays. Indeed, I fear, it might have a tendency to make us read an essay not primarily in its own terms but rather as a sign of the assumed historical pattern. Even before our students start worrying about the patterns of history, they must learn to read the serious prose which helps to establish them; and unless my own experience has been singular, they need a good deal of help in reading people like the great Victorians.

Professor Culler takes a more direct road to our common goal, it seems to me, when he says of the critical essay that it "both exists as a formal structure and it refers to something which exists independently of that structure." But is it true, as he goes on to say, that "what Ruskin believed about economics, architecture, and morals constitutes the totality of his essay, both its substance and its form"? If it is true, of course, you will not have any formal analysis to bother about but, having placed Ruskin in his proper class among the three main types, you can devote yourself to a more or less elaborated summary and criticism of what appear to be his views, being careful all the while not to make your summary too bold, lest it seem indistinguishable from the "older method" of criticism. But I think that in any sense which is not the barest truism, it is decidedly not true; and this is my second and chief objection to Mr. Culler's method of approach.

No text that involves argument can be comprehended simply in terms of its author's beliefs considered apart from the rational structure of the argument which justifies them. If I wish to talk about an essay as a whole and not merely as a totality, I have to seek out the factors which articulate and integrate the assumptions about the nature of the good life or of poetry or what have you from which the argument starts out but which may be only implicit in the essay to be analyzed. Many a dispute, for example, about Arnold's ranking of Chaucer below Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth in "The Study of Poetry" might have been quickly resolved if the debaters had realized that given Arnold's conception of the nature and end of poetry, the ranking of Chaucer was inevitable and even irrefutable.

We must also discover the places to which and the order in which the argument moves. Carlyle's "Characteristics," for example, moves from a statement of the ideal harmony through a description of the actual dissonance to the indication of a program for restoring harmony. The same thing is true of Ruskin's "Traffic." In fact their similarity in this respect may be another instance of the older man's pervasive influence on the younger. Emerson's Divinity School address illustrates the same kind of movement. It is, indeed, a frequent pattern in essays whose philosophic orientation is Platonic.

We should know, too, the mode of reasoning by which the essay gets from place to place. For example, the study of Arnold's works, like "The Study of Poetry," is a result of a dialectic constructed by analogy with Aristotle's definition of virtue in the Nichomachean Ethics: i.e., two extremes of some kind are set up—in this case, an historical estimate of poetry and a personal estimate. A mean is then established and illustrated—here a real estimate—which avoids the errors of the extremes. Again, the argument of Ruskin's "Traffic" is controlled by a dialectic opposing the spiritual to the earthbound, the heroic to the selfish, which Ruskin owed ultimately, it would seem, to Plato, a significant passage from whose Critias concludes his essay.

Finally, all of these factors are governed by the specific purpose and problem of the essay in question, as the writer conceives it. The analyst of "The Study of Poetry," for instance, would do well to remember that it was originally written to justify Arnold's selections for an anthology.

If what I have been saying makes sense, it should be clear that a student might list every opinion which Ruskin expresses about economics, architecture, and morals in the essay "Traffic" and still not perceive the structure or form of the whole—still not understand, much less be in a position to evaluate the truth of, the argument of the essay. If you want him to do that, try asking him first, not whether he thinks Ruskin was a Romantic or a Utilitarian, nor even what Ruskin believed about English church architecture; but simply ask him, "Into how many parts does the essay appear to fall—and why?" The rest should gradually follow if the why is fully explored. In attempting to justify his answer, he will be led to reconstruct it easily, and decide what value it still has for his own life.

In the summer of 1985, at Indiana's School of Letters, Mr. Philip Rahv contended that we need a distinctive method for criticizing works of fiction, not one borrowed from the new critics' models for poetry, and not one exploiting technique at the expense of the more deeply human values. More recently, Mr. Culler has said much the same thing regarding works of critical
TENNYSON AND THE HUMAN HAND

Willa Cather, in one of her most delightful stories, "Neighbor Rosicky," gives considerable attention to farmer Rosicky's hands. His was a "warm, broad, flexible brown hand," with perhaps a touch of the gipsy in it, "alive and quick and light in its communications." There was cleverness in it and a great deal of curiosity. But most important of all there was love in it. It expressed Rosicky's special gift for loving people, "something that was like an ear for music or an eye for color." It was quiet, unobtrusive, and always there.

Such a treatment of the human hand is by no means typical of modern literature. Miss Cather, we say, was a traditionalist among modern writers of prose fiction, somewhat inclined to deal in the sugary beautiful and the almost unbelievably admirable and good. We turn away from her to a writer who, we believe, is one of us, living in our world in our way. And the hands which we find in Hemingway are likely to be either rapacious hands, hotly clutching a woman's body, or the hands of soldiers, hunters, and fishermen, hands which have learned to adjust themselves to the contours of guns and the bars of giant fish-hooks. Or perhaps we may prefer the marvellously skillful, dexterously mechanical, dehumanized hands grasping the test-tubes in science fiction or, even more horribly, in documentary scientific pictures. But if we wish to consider some hands which will be completely adequate in representing our age, we may turn to those which T. S. Eliot's J. Alfred Prufrock speaks of wishfully:

I should have been a pair of ragged claws
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas.

Borrowing from the New Critics the techniques of explication which are almost guaranteed to draw rich clusters of meanings from certain poetic contexts, let us briefly interpret these lines from Eliot in terms of what is characteristic of our age. First, Prufrock thinks that he should have been an animal which has virtually become all hands, with no soul, no mind, and almost no body except for hands. He lives in a dynamic age of mighty events, when much is done and little is understood, when, as Einstein has said, the means have been perfected but the ends are confused. Second, the claws of the animal are extremely ugly and a striking symbol of what is inhuman. Third, the claws "scuttle," that is, they rush about hither and thither. Being the claws of a crab or lobster, furthermore, they dart backward more often and in a greater hurry than they move forward; and, whatever the direction, they are guided only by uncertainties and the improvised decisions of the moment as they proceed by zig-zag paths. And fourth, they live in darkness on the floors of seas which permit their existence but tell them nothing.

Now Eliot himself, we know, in in considerable part a traditionalist fully aware of what human life and literature have been in past centuries. If he considers ragged claws the best symbol for Prufrock and for us, we must, I fear, assume that he has chosen the symbol knowingly and deliberately. The human hand has always been a mighty instrument and a powerful symbol, lending itself to many various situations, purposes, and needs. Chaucer's references to it are numerous and highly interesting to study. Shakespeare's plays have many references to hands. Lady Macbeth grieves because all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten her little hand. Hamlet, borrowing a phrase from the Church Catechism, speaks of his hands as pickers and
stealers. He also tells the players not to saw the air too much with their hands but to use all gently. Emilia in Othello would

Put in every honest hand a whip
To lash the rascals naked through the world.

Othello declares Desdemona's hand "a good one, a frank one"; and she replies prettily:

You may, indeed, say so;
For 'twas that hand that gave away my heart.

And Othello does not wish to be

The fixed figure for the time of scorn
To point his slow and moving finger at.

Gloucester begs to kiss King Lear's hand, and the old King replies: "Let me wipe it first, it smells of mortality." When King Lear finally wakes from his long, confused, and troubled sleep, he will not swear that his hands are his own and pricks them with a pin to make sure. In Milton there are comparatively few references to hands, and these tend to be rather general. In Sonnet 22, for instance, he will not argue against Heaven's hand or will; and at the end of Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve

Hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.

Boswell tells us that Dr. Johnson, even though he lived in the age of Garrick and Siddons, detested gesticulation in ordinary talk and once actually reached out, caught, and firmly held the hands of a man who would not keep them still. Keats, with a somewhat different idea in mind, tells us to imprison the soft hand of our beauty and let her rave. The references to hands in Wordsworth are rich and various. Coleridge's Ancient Mariner grips the wedding guest with a skinny hand. Rossetti places three lilies in the hand of the Blessed Damozel. A minor poet of the nineteenth century declares that

Nature's own Nobleman, friendly and frank,
Is a man with his heart in his hand.

Another minor poet of that century is equally sure that "The hand that rocks the cradle is the hand that rules the world." Walter Savage Landor, who was not a minor poet or a restrained one, warmed both hands before the fire of life.

Among the greatest English poets, Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Wordsworth have given most attention to hands. And the hands in their poetry are not like the ragged claws in Eliot's poem. In their writings the hands, even when covered with blood or smelling of mortality, reflect the broad, deep, and warm humanity of the poets themselves. These were poets who had faith in human nature and even some critical affection for it. To their tradition belongs the poetry of Tennyson, whose treatment of the hand is possibly the most ingenious and delightfully various of any poet in our language. A brief examination of selected passages from his works may reflect credit on the art of a poet who today is too often associated with rose-water and sugar.

Let us omit the hundreds of lines in which Tennyson uses the word hands idiomatically, as he does when he tells Lady Clara Vere de Vere that if time be heavy on her hands she might do something about the beggars at her gates and the poor on her lands. Yet these lines are not unimportant, for a poet's command of idiom is not unimportant. It is more interesting, however, in the work of a poet famous for his verbal pictures to study Tennyson's use of the hand for the purposes of description.

In "The Princess" we see King Gama "Airings a snowy hand and signet gem." In the same poem we have in an amusing context the Amazon bodyguard of Princess Ida:

Those eight mighty daughters of the plow...
On my shoulders hung their heavy hands,
The weight of destiny.

In "The Princess" we also find this picture:

Then took the King
His three broad sons; with now a wandering hand
And now a pointed finger, told them all.

After the battle in "The Princess" the wounded are taken care of in a place where

Low voices with the ministering hand
Hung round the sick.

When we go from this poem to "The Eagle," a bird which "claps the crag with crooked hands," we are struck by the contrast between Eliot's Prufrock and Tennyson's eagle. In the one a man feels that he should be claws; in the other even an eagle has hands. Perhaps we had better close our
eyes to the grim implications of the contrast. In “Maud” Tennyson speaks of the “mattock-hardened hand” of the laborer. In “Merlin and Vivien” Merlin makes the big mistake of teaching Vivien his mighty charm, “Of woven paces and of waving hands.” Then there is the last wish which Elaine, in “Lancelot and Elaine,” expresses to her brothers:

   Lay the letter in my hand
   A little ere I die, and close the hand
   Upon it; I shall guard it even in death.

In “Guinevere” King Arthur’s hands play a part in expressing the forgiveness which he bestows upon the contrite Queen:

   And while she grovell’d at his feet
   She felt the King’s breath wander o’er her neck,
   And in the darkness o’er her fallen head,
   Perceived the wavin’ of his hands that blest.

In “Queen Mary” Cramer remembers the dying King Edward with

   His frail transparent hand,
   Damp with the sweat of death, and grippin’ mine.

Frequently, however, the hands in Tennyson’s poetry are not merely pictorial but are primarily intended to communicate or suggest emotion, either lyric or dramatic. It is here, to be blunt, that we may encounter Tennyson at his worst. We may encounter pretty-pretty verses which are nothing if not silly, as in the early “Lilian”:

   Airy, fairy Lillian,
   Flitting, fairy Lillian,
   When I ask her if she love me,
   Claps her tiny hands above me,
   Laughing all she can;
   She’ll not tell me if she love me,
   Cruel little Lillian.

Not much better than the hand-clapping of airy, fairy Lillian is the unmitigated bathos in another early poem, “My life is full of weary days”:

   And now shake hands across the brink
   Of that deep grave to which I go;
   Shake hands once more; I cannot sink
   So far — far down, but I shall know
   Thy voice, and answer from below....

   Then let wise Nature work her will,
   And on my clay her danel grow;
   Come only when the days are still,
   And at my headstone whisper low,
   And tell me if the woodbines blow.

We are more inclined to laugh than to weep when we encounter the sentimentality in the following passage from “The May Queen”:

   But sit beside my bed, mother, and put your hand in mine,
   And Effie on the other side, and I will tell the sign.

Nevertheless, when the lady-proprietor of “The Palace of Art” claps her hands with delight as she gazes upon the glories of the place, cultured people can share her feelings. In many contexts the feeling may be Tennyson’s own, as it is in “The Bridesmaid” (1872), recording his experience when he attended Emily Sellwood at the wedding of her sister to his brother in 1836. She was her sister’s bridesmaid.

   And all at once a pleasant truth I learn’d,
   For while the tender service made thee weep,
   I loved thee for the tear thou couldst not hide,
   And prest thy hand, and knew the press return’d,
   And thought, “My life is sick of single sleep:
   O happy bridesmaid, make a happy bride!”

Many of the references to hands in “In Memoriam” are, as we shall see, intensely personal ones based on actual experiences with Arthur Hallam. But the emotions conveyed or suggested by the hands in Tennyson’s poetry are often dramatic and are highly varisous in the wide range which they cover. In “Hands All Round,” a drinking song, the hands upon the wine-glasses pledge their
loyalty to the Queen and their belief in Imperialism. In “Dora” when William refuses to marry Dora, his old father is “wrath” and doubles up his hands. Another old man, the fierce one in “Aylmer’s Field” in uncontrolled anger

Under his own lintel stood
Storming with lifted hands.

The cynical old man in “The Vision of Sin” thinks of the time of youth:

When thy nerves could understand
What there is in loving tears,
And the warmth of hand in hand.

In “Edwin Morris” a lover is confronted with “hands of wild rejection.” And after the lover in “Maud” has struck down Maud’s brother, he gazes down with remorse at his “guilty hand.” One of the most effectively dramatic scenes in Tennyson is that where Guinevere, jealous because she fears that Lancelot has found a new mistress in Elaine, flings herself down upon the King’s great couch,

And clench’d her fingers till they bit the palm,
And shriek’d out “Traitor” to the unhearing wall.

Particularly interesting is the use of hands to express various emotions in “Enoch Arden.” When Enoch leaves his home for the long voyage, he does not linger or draw out the farewell but

hastily caught
His bundle, waved his hand, and went his way.

He fails to return after a long time, and his old rival Philip generously offers to put Annie’s boy and girl in school.

She rose, and fixt her swimming eyes upon him,
And dwelt a moment on his kindly face,
Then calling down a blessing on his head
Caught at his hand, and wrung it passionately.

Convinced that Enoch will never return, she finally marries Philip. But she is not happy and cannot throw off her uneasiness and misgivings:

But never merrily beat Annie’s heart.
A footstep seem’d to fall beside her path,
She knew not whence; a whisper on her ear,
She knew not what; nor loved she to be left
Alone at home, nor ventured out alone.
What a’l’d her then, that ere she enter’d, often
Her hand dwelt lingeringly on the latch,
Pearing to enter.

The hands in Tennyson’s poetry may also indicate character. The idle, frustrated, unsuccessful poet in “Will Waterproof” sits with his

empty glass revers’d,
And thrumming on the table.

In “Edwin Morris” we have these lines:

I call’d him Crichton, for he seem’d
All-perfect, finish’d to the finger-nail.

And here is how Tennyson deals with a boring, self-satisfied orator whom he had known in the Cambridge Union:

With a sweeping of the arm,
And a lack-luster dead-blue eye,
Devolved his rounded periods.5

He gives similar treatment to a fanatical preacher in “Sea Dreams”:

A heated pulpiter
Not preaching simple Christ to simple men,
Announced the coming doom, and fulminated
Against the scarlet woman and her crew;
For sideways up he swung his arms, and shriek’d.

Then there is the horrible new doctor of “In the Children’s Hospital”:

Fresh from the surgery-schools of France and of other lands —
Harsh red hair, big voice, big chest, big merciless hands!
Wonderful cures he had done, O yes, but they said too of him
He was happier using the knife than in trying to save the limb.6
We may remember, too, that the "grim Earl," husband of Tennyson's Godiva, has a heart "as rough as Esau's hand." Tennyson's Isolt of the White Hands is quiet, lovely, and submissive, very much as he had found her in medieval romance. But his treatment of some of the other characters in The Idylls of the King shows a real talent for characterization in which his interest in the human hand may play its part. There is a delightful passage, for instance, in which Lancelot rebukes Sir Kay, who has been mistreating Gareth, for not knowing how to tell a good man when he sees one:

A horse thou knowest, a man thou dost not know:
Broad brows and fair, a fluent hair and fine
High nose, a nostril large and fine, and hands
Large, fair and fine.

And certainly we all remember how the dying King Arthur, his strength almost spent, says to Bedivere after he had twice failed to throw Excalibur back into the lake that if he fails again "I will arise and slay thee with my hands." The style here has something of the Biblical in it, something of an epic ring, and something that echoes King Lear's invincible "I kill'd the slave that was a-hanging thee."

To our age, however, with its delight in the metaphysical poetry of Donne, Hopkins, Eliot, and Yeats, probably the most interesting use to which Tennyson puts the human hand is as an image to express concepts, ideas, and abstract entities which may appear to be inexpressible. And here is precisely where Tennyson's chief strength lies. He had his metaphysic, not an original one perhaps but one which has proved itself to be of universal significance throughout many centuries and which has always had a marked affinity for new facts, problems, and ideas. Complementing this metaphysic in Tennyson is a marked instinct and respect for the concrete, the physical, the intimate, and the human. He is, like Wordsworth's skylark, true to the kindred points of heaven and home. The hand image, therefore, serves him well here. In his well-known early poem "The Poet," he tells us, for instance, as he echoes Shelley:

No sword
Of wrath her right arm whirl'd,
But one poor poet's scroll, and with his word
She shook the world.

In "A Dream of Fair Women," the poem which gave us the phrase "The spacious times of great Elizabeth," we have these lovely lines:

In every land
I saw, wherever light illumineth
Beauty and anguish walking hand in hand
The downward slope to death.

Princess Ida tells women students under her, as women students should be told by their deans today, that she does not want them to be

Laughing-stocks of Time
Whose brains are in their hands and in their heels.

And there is a more general philosophy in "The Princess":

This fine old world of ours is but a child
Yet in the go-cart. Patience! give it time
To learn its limbs: there is a hand that guides.

In "The Lover's Tale" folded hands become an ironic symbol of the futile advice which the smugly successful are ready to give to those who have met bitter failure:

Like a vain rich man,
That, having always prosper'd in the world
Folding his hands, deals comfortable words
To hearts wounded forever.

In "Lucretius," in which the philosopher had thought that there would be

Nothing to mar the sober majesties
Of settled, sweet, Epicurean life,

the hand image is one of great power:

But now it seems some unseen monster lays
His vast and filthy hands upon my will
Wrenching it backward into his; and spoils
My bliss in being.
In the lines "To the Queen" at the end of The Idylls of the King we have this well-known passage:

Or him
Of Geoffrey’s book, or him of Malleor’s, one
Touch’d by the adulterous finger of a time
That hover’d between war and wantonness,
And crowning and dethronements.

In "The Higher Pantheism," a poem almost ruined by Swinburne’s parody, we have this perfect line:

Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

Tennyson’s skill in using the human hand for the purposes of poetry cannot, however, be adequately demonstrated by references to lines from many widely scattered contexts. To see how variously, extensively, and ingeniously Tennyson uses the human hand for the purposes of achieving continuity, development, artistic unity, and accumulated power, let us therefore make a rapid examination of two of his most substantial poems, "In Memoriam" and "The Passing of Arthur."

In a sense the whole of "In Memoriam" is an expansion and development of the fine lines in "Break, Break, Break": But 0 for the touch of a vanish’d hand,
And the sound of a voice that is still.

Behind both of these poems dealing with the death of Arthur Hallam, were a real hand and voice, specific and individual, and actual experiences associated with these, remembered and cherished. Tennyson could not forget, and did not want to forget, the qualities of Hallam’s hand-clasp—quick, direct, masculine, vigorous, firm, affectionate, warm and human, the clasp of a man who was in every respect manly and who had been touched by no ascetic gloom. The man whom Tennyson admired and loved most was no Galahad. Yet "In Memoriam" is not merely a personal poem but one which, though always consistently human, has universal elements and metaphysical ideas. The hand thus may serve well here to express the personal and particular and to embody ideas which require an appropriate image for their expression. It may also bind all these component elements into one whole. As we work rapidly through the poem we find:

But who shall so forecast the years
And find in loss a gain to match?
Or reach a hand thro’ time to catch
The far-off interest of tears?

The reaching hand provided Tennyson with one of his favorite images, as it did his contemporary who wrote:

Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what’s a heaven for?

Early in Tennyson’s poem, also, Sorrow, a priestess in the vaults of death, is represented as a hollow form with empty hands. Farther along a little way we find these lines:

Dark house, by which once more I stand
Here in the long unlonly street,
Doors, where my heart was used to beat
So quickly, waiting for a hand.
A hand that can be clasped no more.

In lyric 10 the poet’s morbid and grotesque imagination places Hallam’s corpse at the bottom of the sea:

And hands so often clasp’d in mine
Should toss with tangle and with shells.

In lyric 13 the bereaved one finds
Where warm hands have prest and clos’d,
Silence, till I be silent too.

A little later, he conceives an idea which, though impossible, has a gleam of cheerfulness in it:

And if along with these should come
The man I held as half-divine;
Should strike a sudden hand in mine,
And ask a thousand things of home; ... I should not feel it to be strange.
In lyric 21 we have some familiar lines on science:

When Science reaches forth her arms
To feel from world to world, and charms
Her secret from the latest moon.

In number 33 we have praise for what embodies the ideal in human form:

Her faith thro' form is pure as thine,
Her hands are quicker unto good;
Oh. sacred be the flesh and blood
To which she links a truth divine!

In number 40:

But thou and I have shaken hands,
Till growing winters lay me low.

In lyric 55 Tennyson's desperate search for spiritual strength is near its nadir:

I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope thro' darkness up to God,
I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope.

In lyric 69, after the poet questions whether the springtime of his soul will ever return, an angel of the night "reach'd the glory of a hand" that seemed to touch his nature "into leaf."

In number 70, full of ghostly details, a mysterious "hand that points" directs the poet's eyes to where, beyond a confused jumble of spectral faces, they come to rest upon the fair face of Hallam. Grim also is lyric 72:

When the dark hand struck down thro' time,
And cancell'd nature's best.

In number 75 more than a spark of faith and courage appears:

But somewhere, out of human view
Whate'er thy hands are set to do
Is wrought with tumult of acclaim.

In lyric 80:

Unused example from the grave
Reach out dead hands to comfort me.

Number 84:

And He that died in Holy Land
Would reach us out the shining hand
And take us as a single soul.

Number 85 has the familiar lines on Hallam's death:

In Vienna's fatal walls
God's finger touch'd him, and he slept.

The same lyric touches upon the difficult problem of uniting the ideal with the practical:

Yet none could better know than I,
How much of act at human hands
The sense of human will demands
By which we dare to live or die.

In lyric 87 Tennyson revisits Hallam's old room at Cambridge, where the joyful noises of young students strike upon his ears with a pathetic irony:

Another name was on the door;
I linger'd; all within was noise
Of songs, and clapping hands, and boys
That crash'd the glass and beat the floor.

And in the great New Year lyric the poet prays:

Ring in the valiant man and free,
The larger heart, the kindlier hand.

Hallam is praised thus in lyric 109:

And manhood fused with female grace
In such a sort, the child would twine
A trustful hand, unsack'd in thine,
And find his comfort in thy face.
In lyric 119 the memory is one that emphasizes the warm intimacy of Hallam's hand clasp:

Thy lips are bland,
And bright the friendship of thine eye;
And in my thoughts with scarce a sigh
I take the pressure of thine hand.

In 124 we have these famous lines:

And out of darkness came the hands
That reach thro' nature, molding man.

And finally in lyric 129 we find these lines reassuring:

Known and unknown; human, divine;
Sweet human hand and lips and eye;
Dear heavenly friend that cannot die,
Mine, mine, for ever, ever mine.

Much of the essential thought of "In Memoriam" is gathered into these lines and finds its fitting sign and token in a hand which is known and unknown, human and divine, lost and found, dead and immortal.

Even more memorable and vividly, hauntingly imaginative is the use of hands in "The Passing of Arthur" (1869), which, we know, incorporates most of the lines of the "Morte D'Arthur" (1812). Tennyson owes something, of course, to his sources here; but his images far surpass anything to be found in any source. This idyll begins with King Arthur's last great battle in the west in which he slays Modred but receives from him the wound from which he later dies. The battle had taken place beside the sea, and many of the slain are in the surf up and down the beach. Atmosphere counts for much:

Only the wan wave
Brake in among dead faces, to and fro
Swaying the helpless hands.

King Arthur, attended by Sir Bedivere, thinks of his good sword Excalibur and recalls the way in which the sword came to him in happier days:

For thou remembrest how
In those old days, one summer noon, an arm
Rose up from out the bosom of the lake.
Clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful,
Holding the sword.

Then follows the familiar scene in which Bedivere has to be commanded three times to throw the sword back into the lake. When he fails the first time and lies about what he had done and seen, the King is disappointed and suspicious:

For surer sign had follow'd, either hand,
Or voice, or else a motion of the mere.

After the command is given the second time, the intensity of the debate in Bedivere's mind over whether he should obey it is indicated in part by the behavior of his hands:

But when he saw the wonder of the hilt,
How curiously and strangely chased, he smote
His palms together, and he cried aloud:

"The King is sick, and knows not what he does."

After Bedivere's second failure, the King threatens, as we have already seen, to rise and slay him with his hands if he fails again. All of this, of course, is excellent dramatic build-up for the third try, which is successful; and Tennyson meets the dramatic expectation of the reader with a picture which is completely adequate and satisfying. Bedivere, running and leaping lightly down the ridges, plunges into the bulrush-beds. He clutches the sword; he gets a strong grip on it with both hands; he wheels like a Greek champion throwing the hammer; and he flings the sword out into the space over the lake. As Sir Bedivere says, "Then with both hands I flung him, wheeling him." And the mysterious hand clothed in white samite receives the sword just before it descends into the water:

So flash'd and fell the brand Excalibur:
But ere he dipt the surface, rose an arm
Clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful,
And caught him by the hilt, and brandish'd him
Three times, and drew him under in the mere.

But this is by no means the last we hear of hands in the poem. Bedivere lifts the wounded, dying King to carry him through the place of tombs:

Kneeling on one knee,
O'er both his shoulders drew the languid hands.
When the two reach the sea, they find a black funeral barge and on it three Queens dressed in black waiting for the King:

There those three Queens
Put forth their hands, and took the King, and wept.
But she that rose the tallest of them all
And fairest, laid his head upon her lap.
And loosed the shatter’d casque, and chafed his hands,
And called him by his name, complaining loud,
And dropping bitter tears against his brow
Striped with dark blood.

In his famous farewell words, Arthur admonishes human beings to pray:

For what are men better than sheep or goats
That nourish a blind life within the brain,
If, knowing God, they lift not hands of prayer
Both for themselves and those who call them friend.

He also suggests that he is going a long way to the island-valley of Avalon where he hopes to be healed of his grievous wound. As the barge moves farther and farther out to sea until it is merely a “black dot against the verge of dawn,” Sir Bedivere stands gazing intently upon it from the highest point along the beach. As he grieves for the departing King and longs for his return, the position of his hand here helps to provide a perfect ending for the poem:

And saw,
Straining his eyes beneath an arch of hand,
Or though he saw, the speck that bare the King.

The implications of this evidence from many poems are so clear that few comments are needed, and these may be brief. We should certainly not assume that Tennyson had an obsession for the human hand. There is plenty of evidence, even in the quotations above, that he does not neglect the other parts of the body—the tongue, the lips, the ears, the hair, the knees, the feet, and so on. A paper could be written to show that the connotation of voice in “The sound of a voice that is still” is almost as rich and significant as that of hand in “But 0 for the touch of a vanish’d hand.” Tennyson works in the humanistic tradition which gives the whole human body due respect and adequate attention. On the other hand we must not dismiss the many references to the human hand in his poetry as merely casual or as details introduced incidentally as he concentrates his talent upon other matters. The abundance and nature of the evidence will not permit such a conclusion. Tennyson was an artist, conscious of his craftsmanship, much greater and more deserving of serious study than Swinburne, or the art-for-art’s-sake school at the end of the nineteenth century, or the Edwardians at the beginning of this, or even some critics of our own day have been willing to allow. He was capable of writing passages and poems of much haunting power and beauty that, once we have read them, they remain with us the rest of our lives. He was, moreover, a master spirit, if not a respectable philosopher. Certainly we should not reject him entirely because he liked sweet melody or even because he occasionally lapsed into sentimentalism. But the point is that we are giving too little consideration to the remarkable quality of Tennyson’s imagination and to the artistic gifts and the insight into life which are related to it. Only when we learn again to do this will we be able to judge such an important work as The Idylls of the King with some degree of validity, or even read it with pleasure. Our brief examination of the human hand in Tennyson’s poetry has provided us with a simple device by which we may get glimpses into the workings of that imagination, assaying some of its products, discover some of the springs from which life flows into Tennyson’s poetry, realize more fully the extensive range of experience, thought, and feeling from which he wrote, and reconsider an idealism which whether embodied in the laboring hand, the praying hand, or the Divine Hand reaching downward, may still give comfort to the human body and strength to its spirit. Perhaps we may have been also led into a clearer apprehension of the brooding sense of humanity, with all its tangibilities and all its mysteries, that gives a peculiar value to his poetry.

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1Wordsworth gives us, for instance, “A sleepy hand of negligence,” the “kindly warmth from touch of fostering hand,” and a careful hand, wilful hand, eager hand, lavish hand, ventureous hand, dutiful and tender hand, practiced hand, dying hand, sparing hand, industrious hand, slack hand, unknown hand, modesting hand, tremulous hand, and withered hand. In Tennyson as in Wordsworth this eye for the human hand is related to an ear for the “still sad music of humanity.”

2Martin Tupper, “Nature’s Nobleman.”

Compare these lines from "The Sisters":

Till that dead bridesmaid, meant to be my bride,
Put forth cold hands between us.

From "A Character."

The lines suggest Henley's "In Hospital" and his good luck in being saved by Dr. Lister from the hands of such a doctor as Tennyson describes. They also suggest that Henley's fiction is not one whit firmer or more realistic than Tennyson's here.

A figurative application of the concept of "what does little birds say?"—that much maligned poem that has been derided as serious poetry intended for adults although Tennyson introduces it as a cradle song in "Sea Dreams."

Note these fragmentary lines from Tennyson's notebook, winter, 1833-34, concerning Hallam:

Where is the voice I loved? ah where
Is that dear hand that I would press?

Tennyson could be almost theatrical in the significance which he attached to the handshake: "I would pluck my hand from a man even if he were my greatest hero, or dearest friend, if he wronged a woman or told her a lie."


There are two wheelings here: Bedivere wheels his whole body as he throws the sword, and the sword wheels through the air after it leaves his hands,

Tennyson as to Browning, the ideal was not spirit discarding body but spirit and body joined. Hence Tennyson's praise of Hallam as

High nature amorous of the good,

But touch'd with no ascetic gloom.

The character of Galahad, therefore, confronted him with a formidable artistic problem. Galahad, the ideal knight of medieval asceticism, never really won Tennyson's sympathy: and he should be studied in conjunction with "St. Simeon Stylites," in which the poet condemns an arrogant, smugly asceticism.

The Round Table is destroyed by corruption of the flesh on one hand, and by an impractical, inhuman, impossible ascetic idealism on the other. See Hallam Tennyson, op. cit., 265.

Tennyson's friend Bakyns, we are told, always stressed "the width of his humanity," Tennyson and His Friends, ed. Hallam Tennyson (London: Macmillan, 1911). p. 202. And Sir Charles Tennyson wisely concludes his recent biography of his grandfather with the opinion of "an acute young critic" of our time that Tennyson is "the most human of the great poets," Alfred Tennyson (New York: Macmillan, 1949). p. 541. This sense of humanity, which we too often think of merely in its emotional manifestations, is one of the chief bonds connecting such major Victorian writers as Dickens, Carlyle, Tennyson, Thackeray, Trollope, George Eliot, Ruskin, Arnold, and Hardy.

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THE ENGLISH RECESSION OF HEINE

The present year [Paper read at 1956 meeting of M.I.A], the centenary of Heine's death, has witnessed intensified interest of this German poet throughout the world. Stress has been laid upon his timeliness, the meaningfulness of his life, the beauty of his lyrics, the importance of his ideas.

Heine is one of the few German poets who has made a deep impress upon the English mind. His reception by the English has been almost uniformly favorable throughout the past century. While in Germany the Heine-controversy between his admirers and his detractors has raged on and on, in England this controversy came to an end about the time of his death. But even before 1856 the voices of his English detractors, who had echoed conservative German critics in pre-Victorian days, were already muted.

It is true that in the 1820's and 1830's there was an anti-Heine attitude among English reviewers who took their cue from Wolfgang Menzel but, as early as 1826, the Quarterly Review and the Athenaeum, prominent organs of opinion, were prophesying Heine's coming greatness. The Athenaeum even contracted to publish a series of articles by him. But when these articles arrived, it found them sarcastic, appalling, unpublishable. It informed its readers that Heine was undoubtedly a genius but a satanic genius, a creator of perfect works of art and immorality, a singer of songs simple in texture but harboring subtle poison. Other journals of the pre-Victorian decade depict him as an apostate, a Jacobine propagandist, a blasphemous unbeliever, a literary outlaw, a hyper-ultra-revolutionist. Carlyle, who was in the 1830's the chief English interpreter of German letters, refused to rank him with Jean Paul or Novalis, and berated visitors who dared to plead Heine's cause. Carlyle throughout his long life remained the English champion of the Weimar tradition and the foe of Young Germany. Once he called Heine a blackguard. On another occasion he referred to him as a filthy sausage of spoiled victuals. He raged at Matthew Arnold for esteeming obscene, impudent, untruthful Heine the continuator of
Goethe. Under Carlyle’s influence, Charles Kingsley speaks of Heine as “that wicked man.”

The early hostile approach ebbed after Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837. It ebbed but it did not disappear. There were three distinct avenues through which Heine’s influence made itself felt. In the first place, there were the English reviews and English translations, which increased in number and depth of insight from year to year. In the second place, there were Englishmen, such as George Meredith and Julian Pame, who studied or travelled in Germany at a time when Heine’s literary star was in the ascendency and his songs were captivating the hearts of his countrymen. In the third place, there were Englishmen, such as Colonel John Mitchell and Richard Monckton Milnes, Lord Houghton, who stayed in France and who came in contact with the exiled German poet and his circle of Parisian admirers. By 1847 Heine had become the living shade of the Champs Elysées. In that year the false rumor of his death went the rounds of the press, and the premature obituaries were not unfriendly. His long illness and the fortitude with which he bore his misfortunes won him much sympathy in England. If the Reisebilder and the political tracts of young Heine had outraged English public opinion, Romantero and the Confessions of the dying Heine effected a lasting reconciliation. The martyr of Montmartre spoke to the hearts of readers who had failed to react to the political pamphleteer.

George Eliot's apotheosis of Heine in 1856 ushered in the mid-Victorian era of Heine-worship in England. With the poet's death in that year, the tradition of Heine as the brilliant continuator of Goethe gained a lasting foothold. Arnold's essay of 1863, followed by his Heine-poem, was the highest crest of the wave of adoration that surged over England. To Arnold, Heine was the most important successor of Goethe, the critically-minded Goethe, the liberator from ancient dogmas and inherited traditions, the dissolvent of the old European system, the awakener of the modern spirit, the enemy of Philistinism—a term which Arnold took over from Heine and popularized in England.

According to Arnold, Heine sought to rouse Germany from the drowsiness of Philistinism. He did not shrink to the lure of medievalism as did his Romantic contemporaries who came to ruin, dreaming vainly of renewing the past. He did for German letters what Byron and Shelley had attempted for English letters; he was more successful than they, because of his greater creative ability.

By 1870 the battle for Heine had been won. He had entered into the English cultural stream. He had become as much a part of Western literary tradition as had Voltaire or Goethe or Byron. His authority was frequently quoted in justification of certain ideas or in opposition to others. Thackeray enjoyed him in translation, while John Addington Symonds and Havelock Ellis gained mastery of German by becoming absorbed in him in the original. Maurice Hewlett, A. E. Houseman, and Robert Bridges echoed him in their verses. Heine's Hellenism influenced Walter Pater and Robert Buchanan, James Thomson and Swinburne. His authority was frequently quoted in the struggle between Christ and the Gods of Greece, a struggle which led, on the one hand, to a revival of religious mysticism and, on the other hand, to a poetic idealization of ancient paganism during late Victorian decades. Heine's study of the Gods in Exile is the basis for several of Walter Pater's best essays, beginning with Pico della Mirandola in 1871. The re habilitation of the old gods was a passion with Pater as it had been with Pico and with Heine. In Apollo in Picardy, 1893, Pater told of the reappearance of the sun-god in medieval disguise on a monastic farm in France. Pater in Acassin and Nicolette also coupled the Heloise and Abelard story with the legend of Venus and Tanhäuser, as told by Heine. The goddess who was once the world's delight again charmed the imagination of poets—and not she alone. Christ, "the leavings of racks and rods," was contrasted with Apollo, the lord of light. As in ancient days there had reverberated the lament that the great god Pan was dead, so in late Victorian days there often arose in literary circles the triumphant shout of the coming end of the Nazarene's rule. Under the influence of Heine, James Thomson called for the overthrow of the celestial dynasty that had ruled for eighteen hundred years. Heine, the cultural pessimist, appealed to the darker side of Thomson. Heine, the spiritual brother of Leopardi and the scoff er at all things traditional, confirmed the gloomy English bard in his despair and disgust amidst the noisy solitude of London. Heine, the sardonic seer of a coming apocalypse, supplied literary weapons to Thomson, the political nihilist. Heine, the modern satyr who gloated because the death of all the gods was at hand, spurred the English radical and atheist on to greater extremes of blasphemy. Seeking solace in drink and in poetry, Thomson often quoted the martyr of Montmartre who questioned fate and who finally concluded that the only answer which ever came was a handful of earth that stopped up the mouth of the questioner.

Emphasis upon Heine's Hellenism added lustre to his kaleidoscopic personality as reinterpreted by the late Victorians, but there was also emerging at the turn of the century an equally important evaluation of Heine as the champion of democracy. The Irish poet William Sharp depicted him in 1888 as a fighter for the liberation of humanity, as a drummer for a new democratic order, wakening Europe out of its sleep. Havelock Ellis hailed him as the brilliant
leader of a revolutionary movement aiming at world-wide emancipation. His vision was directed towards a democracy of gods, all equally holy, blessed, and glorious. Others might be content with simple clothing, ascetic morals, unsalted enjoyments. Heine desired for all mankind nectar and ambrosia, purple robes, costly perfumes, pleasures and splendor. To the English of the early twentieth century, such as Edward Dowden, H. W. Nevinson, Arthur Ransom, Heine was the aristocrat of democracy, a European cosmopolitan. On the eve of 1914, his popularity exceeded that of Goethe. During the First World War, Heine did not suffer from the hostility directed at all things German. There was general disapproval of a proposal in 1917 to remove the Heine tablet in London, since he was a pioneer of the democratic tradition for which young English and American idealists were dying on the battlefields of Europe. Between the two World Wars nine full-length biographies of Heine appeared—so great was his vogue in England.

Since the Second World War, the aspect of Heine which has been most stressed in England and America as well as in Russia and on the European Continent has been that of Heine as a Citizen of the World, as a prophet of the unity of man when all national boundaries will have lost their exaggerated importance and the oneness of humanity will have been proclaimed.

In the past decade Heine has been rehabilitated in Germany, a rehabilitation which reached its climax in the Heine Congress at Weimar in October 1956, when scholars of Eastern Germany and Western Germany joined hands with scholars of sixteen nations in honoring his memory. Amends were made for all the filth with which he had been besmirched during the preceding years and a definitive, critical edition of all his works was projected as a common venture of scholars the world over and as a tribute to his enduring vitality. In England no amends were necessary, for England has throughout the past century granted his spirit and his ideas refuge and hospitality, warmth and fruition, understanding and affection. Heine has definitely entered into the cultural stream which irrigates England's intellectual life.

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VICTORIAN SHAW

In studying St. John Ervine's Bernard Shaw: His Life, Work and Friends (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1956) and Archibald Henderson's George Bernard Shaw: Man of the Century (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), one is struck anew by the number of Shaw's activities, by the distinction he attained in each, and by the fact that he reached full expression by 1901 in some of them—as a Fabian thinker, art critic, music critic, and drama critic. Shaw's prophetic seriousness, his iconoclastic view of current social modes, his vitalistic philosophy, his didactic theory of art, and his concept of the drama as intellectual discussion had achieved definition before Man and Superman (1903), though that play is unique both in summing up the Shaw of the thirty years preceding and in indicating Shaw's course in the forty some years to follow. One half of the space in each of these centenary biographies and much of the new material in them concerns the Shaw who lived during Victoria's reign. Through access to the shorthand notebooks of the late eighties and nineties, Mr. Ervine has fully presented Shaw's love affairs in these years and made more vital the writer who, at that time, was chiefly the dynamic socialist and critic. Other new items in this book comprise letters to the Charringtons and to the Ervines themselves. In Mr. Henderson's book, documentation in detail of Shaw's activities in the Shelley, Browning, Shakespeare, and Hampstead Historical Societies is especially valuable in revealing Shaw's protean interests during the eighties and nineties. Other hitherto unused sources in Mr. Henderson's book—the letters to the Webbs, to the Mansfields, and to Mrs. August Belmont, and the materials on the Shaw-Wells controversy—deal in part with the nineteenth-century Shaw, though more fully with the Edwardian and later Shaw.

As Shaw recedes into the past, what he owes both to the forces which shaped the Victorian Period and to Victorian criticisms of these forces becomes steadily more apparent. In prose and drama down to Man and Superman (1903)—and after—Shaw revealed a vibrant interest in all that went on in "that benighted period" of the nineteenth century: the expansion of industry, the agrarianization of capital, the poverty and insecurity of Labor, the domination by the middle class of business and social morality, the widespread demands for political freedom and social improvement, the unsettling of belief in moral and religious absolutes, the revolutionary effect of Darwinism upon the bases of thought, the impact of Manchester laissez-faire upon economics and politics, the restrictive influence of evangelicism, and the transcendentalist and aesthetic reaction against a rationalism based upon science and utilitarianism. On the one hand, while protesting at the Browning Society in 1888 over the easy optimism expressed in "Saul" ("All's love and all is law"), Shaw could call the nineteenth century "the most desperately mean, sordid, selfish, rascally, and bastardy century that any one could wish to live in"; on the other hand, he could not have become so imbued with the idealism of most Victorian
artists and social critics—which was expressed not only as moral indignation toward a constricting materialism in philosophy and present social injustices but also as a confident affirmation of the reality of man's spirit—if he had not been so immersed in the culture of the age.

In the conflict between the rationalistic and the transcendental approach to reality, Shaw was on both sides. If in origin Shaw's basic values were intuitive, he also emphasized the importance of a clear intelligence. As a playwright, Shaw became a "scientific natural historian," aiming to arrive experimentally at ethical principles instead of a moralist arguing from already deduced principles. Through his early association with the Zetetic Society, this "rationalist" Shaw was formed by the influences of Mill, Walras, Ingersoll, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, and George Eliot; he remained faithful, until its last days, to the Dialectical Society founded by John Stuart Mill; with Sidney Webb and other Fabians. He embraced the graduallist socialism envisaged by Mill and the inductive approach to social questions enjoined by Bentham. Among other influences upon the Fabians and Shaw were Comte, Cairnes, Ricardo, Buckle, and Proudhon. Shaw's common sense led him, moreover, to distrust as impractical the visionary socialism of Owen, Fourier, Comte, Tolstoi, and even of Morris. In his own social philosophy, Shaw was essentially pragmatic and revealed his affinity with the Victorian spirit of compromise, the hypocritical manifestations of which, however, Shaw continually attacked. His practicality made him impatient of the unrealities which obscured social institutions at the same time that it made him reluctant to discard them, once needed reforms had been secured. In The Quintessence of Ibsenism (1891) and in Getting Married (1908), for example, Shaw held that marriage was necessary to insure "the continuity of society" because sexual love is too unstable to bind society together. As well as from Plato—Shaw derived his pragmatic view that truth emerges from the interplay of conflicting points of view, a concept underlying the dialectical ingenuity of most of his plays.

With Shaw, thought became a passion and more, therefore, than an intellectual process; he was one for whom "subjective volition, passion, will make intellect the merest tool." In The Quintessence of Ibsenism, he declared that "materialistic" science had only "isolated the great mystery of consciousness" just as rationalism had only "isolated the great mystery of the will to live." Like Arnold in his humanism, Shaw thought that right reason is indispensable as the critical faculty but that it does not give us that insight into ultimate reality provided by the naked consciousness. Like Butler and Meredith, Shaw started with the Darwinian hypothesis, but modified it—with help from Schopenhauer—into a philosophy of evolutionary dynamism, with its prime emphasis upon the individual's creative energies. In conceiving life to be "the satisfaction of a passion in us of which we can give no account whatsoever," Shaw rejected the materialistic implications of much popular Darwinism and the Utilitarian emphasis upon the logical intellect, and became—with Carlyle, Arnold, Ruskin, and the Pre-Raphaelites—one of the most trenchant critics of Victorian rationalism as it expressed itself in the ethics of the "moral calculus," in the soulless scientific treatise, in the "liberal" political economy of Cobden and Bright, and in the Philistine devaluation of the arts, of culture, and of the religious impulse.

"Metaphysical vitalism," so strongly a part of Shaw's philosophy, underlay his political and social thinking. References to Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris are far more frequent in Shaw than those to Mill, Ricardo, and Bentham. Carlyle's concepts of hero as vital leader and of society as organically cohesive, Morris's concentrated fervor, and Ruskin's "vital economy" appealed to Shaw's imagination far more than did the dry logic of the Utilitarians. Ruskin was the chief influence. More than any other nineteenth-century thinker, Ruskin gave to politics and economics a humane relevance, Shaw maintained, by insisting that its basis become moral rectitude rather than commercial expediency. Like Ruskin, Shaw repudiated Manchester laissez-faire and urged that cooperation rather than competition be made the chief operative principle in economics. With Ruskin, Shaw felt that the great economic and social problem was to improve methods in the consumption of wealth rather than in the production of it. Shaw also embraced the Toryism of Ruskin in declaring that Ruskin—like Dickens—believed in government of the people for the people but not by the people. That the captain of industry—or "boss"—had to be a responsible social servant rather than "a hopelessly private person" exploiting society for his own advantage, Shaw, like Ruskin in "The Roots of Honor," emphasized from the beginning. Most elaborately, this concept was developed in Shaw's late play, The Millionaire (1936). Like Ruskin in Fors Clavigera, Shaw believed that the manifestations of man's mind and spirit were social wealth just as much as the goods for which a cash return could be expected. The revolution of Marx and Morris—held in abeyance in Shaw until after World War I—exerted greatest ultimate pressure upon Shaw, however, than did the aristocratic feudalism of Ruskin. After the first World War, Shaw reached the dubious conclusion that the "leader" may have to impose a new social order through force and that catastrophic revolution may at first be necessary to inaugurate the socialist bureaucracy. In the 1940's, Shaw recognized the superiority of
the upper five per cent to the great man *per se*, and called for a democratic aristocracy culled from all the classes—a modern version of Arnold's "saving remnant." Another parallel between Arnold and Shaw suggests itself: both were critical of the middle class yet both felt that in the awakening of this class lay the hope for the future.

Shaw's emphasis upon vitality determined his views upon Victorian social morality. For the conventional, tepid thinking of the age, Shaw had the same scorn as Carlyle, declaring in *The Quintessence of Ibsenism* that the human artist always penetrates to "the reality beneath the clothes." "Laws, religions, creeds, systems of ethics," Shaw declared in *The Society of Art,* are too often out of date and must be altered to ensure the health of society. Shaw, like Carlyle, was impatient with the mistaken illusions which impede clear thinking, and condemned the hypocrisy of a "bourgeois morality" which was, he felt, "a system of making cheap virtue a cloak for expensive vices." Anathema then to Shaw were those popular playwrights who poured water "on the exhausted tea-leaves of idealism and romanticism." In wishing comedy to be a means for "the destruction of old-fashioned morals," Shaw wrote out of the same anxious impulse which caused Carlyle to expose bourgeois complacency in *Sartor Resartus* and *Past and Present.*

Along with Ruskin and Carlyle, *Shaw was iconoclastic rather than anarchistic; and along with Matthew Arnold, he preferred the solidarity conferred by culture to the irresponsible individualism encouraged by modern libertarian movements in politics.* For telling the unillusioned truth about the Victorian Age, Shaw praised Thackeray, though, as an "insider," he did not fully attain, Shaw felt, the outsider's dispassionate view of his own society; as Dickens was to do in his great "three manner." The debt to Dickens was aesthetic as well, for Shaw admits to "lifting characters bodily out of the pages of Charles Dickens" and refers to him more than to any other novelist, despite the fact that he was no "artist-philosopher." An even stronger realist is Ibsen, who, in his plays, Shaw held, "exalts not the ideal at the expense of life, but life at the expense of the ideal."

Philosophically, Shaw is typical of the Victorian Age, revealing the conflicts between the absolute and the relative points of view. Typical absolutes from tradition like "honor, duty, justice," Shaw in *Man and Superman* called "the seven deadly virtues" and asserted that "all the wickedness on earth is done in their name." Like Pater, Shaw wished to undermine absolute categories in speculative and ethical thinking; and like another Victorian modernist, Samuel Butler, Shaw tried to discredit entities he thought outworn by inverting their accepted valuation. Under some circumstances, Shaw maintained that selfishness could become virtue and apparent goodness a vice—thus Don Juan's egocentric quest for self-realization is heroic, whereas Don Ana's chastity on earth lacked the vital warmth to become true virtue. In *The Quintessence of Ibsenism,* Shaw presented Ibsen in his own image as an ethical relativist who attacked as "man-eating idols red with human sacrifice" abstractions like Society, the People, Democracy, "the compact Liberal Majority," "the Authority of the Law," Womanly Duty, Self-sacrifice, Goodness and so on. In his own plays, Shaw shows that completely good and bad men are rare: in *Widower's Houses* (1892), *Sartorius is an opportunist with some intelligence while Harry Trench is a high-principled youth without moral courage; in Captain Brassbound's Conversion* (1899), the Captain is an mistaken in pursuing a vengeance for lofty reasons as his antagonist, Hallam, is in literally interpreting the law as a retributive agency.

If Shaw looked beyond the Victorian Age in his iconoclasm, he was yet of this period in his affirmations. Like the other critics of the Victorian social scene, Shaw felt that "the man of letters...is a prophet or nothing" and proclaimed, accordingly, his own vitalist faith which recognized an ultimate reality in the spirit and its attributes. Like Shelley, Shaw was responsive to "beautiful idealisms of moral excellence," and spoke in "The Preface" to *The Doctor's Dilemma* (1906) of "the great vital dogmas of honor, liberty, courage, the kinship of all life," and in "The Impossibilities of Anarchism" (1893) of "Justice, Virtue, Truth, Brotherhood, the highest interests of the people," as the concern of all political parties. In other words, absolutes can secure men's allegiance, so long as they are more than mere words and remain vitally infused with spirit.

Shaw's views on art illustrate the provenance of the absolute and the relative in his thought. Granted that a dramatist is to be a natural historian analyzing with his intelligence the hypocrisies of his age, he ought also to regard himself as, potentially, a powerful ethical force. To Shaw, the theater was to become a Church, "a temple of the Ascent of Man," and to Shaw, as to Arnold, the greatest art was a force religious in its ultimate influence. As a result, Shaw regarded modern European literature and music as a Bible surpassing, in immediacy to the modern spirit, the importance of the Hebrew scriptures. That great art induces such spiritual exaltation was a view previously set forth by Carlyle, Ruskin, and Arnold, among others. Accordingly, Shaw agreed with Carlyle that art can excite to spiritual heroism, with Arnold that "the noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of
poetic greatness," with Ruskin that the greatest art "conveys...the greatest number of the greatest ideas," with Ruskin and Morris that the quality of a nation's art determines its degree of civilization, and with Pater that "great art" surpasses "good art" by bearing upon "the great structure of human life":

art, should refine our sense of character and conduct, of justice and sympathy, greatly heightening our self-knowledge, self-control, precision of action, and considerateness, and making us intolerant of ballyhoo, frivolity, injustice, and intellectual superficiality or vulgarity. The worthy artist or craftsman is he who serves the physical and moral sense by feeding them with pictures musical compositions, pleasant houses and gardens, good clothes and fine implements, poems, fictions, essays, and dramas which call the enlightened sense and ennobled faculties into pleasurable activity. The great artist is he who goes a step beyond the demand, and, by supplying works of a higher beauty and a higher interest than have yet been perceived, succeeds after a brief struggle with its strangeness, in adding this fresh extension of sense to the heritage of the race. This is why we value art: this is why we feel that the iconoclast and the Philistine society: Pinero—like missing made hollow, by solid usefulness, than their own theories of purity and practicality: this is why art has won the privileges of religion...

The originality of Pre-Raphaelitism and French Impressionism Shaw appreciated and defended against Nordau and other conservatives. Shaw felt, however, that ethical content made Morris, especially in his prose work, a greater writer than Swinburne, who, once a diabolian, ended as a "Shakespeare-fearing man." Though undoubtedly influenced by the emphasis upon wit, paradox, starting statement, and self-advertisement in the 1890's, Shaw, as befitted a Puritan in art, condemned art for art's sake ("for art's sake alone I would not face the toil of writing a single sentence"). In "The Preface" to Three Plays for Puritans (1901) he declared that were the arts to become "instruments of a systematic idolatry of sensuousness," and to interfere with "intellectual activity and honesty," he would have less compunction than Cromwell in eradicating them. "An artist to his finger-tips," Shaw yet believed that art should disseminate the higher propaganda.

In the drama, Shaw broke with the fashionable theater of the day which featured extrapolated Shakespeare and the "well-made" plays of Sardou, Augier, and their imitators. The latter works, Shaw held, were morally frivolous, exalting adultery, for example, at the same time that they failed to deal honestly with sex. Idealism and romance pervaded the stage, and had to be supplanted, Shaw insisted, by realistic drama which would use the techniques of "rhetoric, irony, argument, paradox, epigram, parable, the re-arrangement of haphazard facts into orderly and intelligent situations." Discussion was to become an organic part of the play, even pervade the whole play if necessary, as in Shaw's Getting Married and Heartbreak House. Henry Arthur Jones in the English theater—like Dickens in the novel—approximated such a healthy realism in being a critical outsider in his relation to society: Pinero—like Pinero—was an insider who lacked critical power to deal quite objectively with his milieu.

Shaw appreciated the originality of Wilde and Gilbert, who saw convention from a new angle, but he felt that they were temperamentally too superficial to have lasting influence in the theater.

Beneath his surface iconoclasm, the prevalence of Victorian attitudes in Shaw is marked. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in his ethical seriousness and in his consciously proclaimed spiritual dedication as a writer. In 1905 Shaw was to describe himself in these terms: "I have honour and humanity on my side, wit in my head, skill in my hand, and a higher life for my aim"; and in 1910, he declared that "conscience is the most powerful of all instincts and the love of God the most powerful of all the passions." What do such assertions reveal but the moral idealism of the great Victorians expressed in scarcely different terms from their own? It was Shaw's great distinction to make assertions like these once more meaningful by clearing away their frequent basis in hypocrisy or in devitalized abstractions.

State University of Iowa

LEslie Stephen's Statue as a Literary Critic

Leslie Stephen wished that "injudicious admirers might always abstain from acting as resurrection-men" (Hours in a Library, I, 177). Mr. Ullmann (in Leslie Stephen, Men, Books and Mountains. Essays. Collected, and with an Introduction, by S. O. A. Ullmann. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956) is such a "resurrection-man." He has collected eleven essays which Stephen never reprinted. Most of them should have been left in their burial places: a trivial essay on "Vacations," some sensible reflections on national prejudices, a squib suggesting that Shakespeare wrote Bacon, some commonplace remarks on biography, an easy demolition of Bulwer-Lytton's novels and a descriptive piece about Mont Blanc from the Alpine Journal. Still,
students of criticism will be grateful to Mr. Ullmann for the careful checklist of Stephen's books and articles and for the reprinting of three essays: a lecture on "The Study of Literature" (1867), a review of Taine's Histoire de la littérature anglaise (1873), and an essay "Thoughts on Criticism, by a Critic" (1876) which is the fullest statement of his critical creed.

Inevitably, Mr. Ullmann's collection of gleanings raises the question of Stephen's stature as a literary critic. There can be no doubt of his general distinction in various fields: as a mountaineer, I presume, as the first editor of the Dictionary of National Biography who alone contributed 378 articles, as a biographer who wrote five volumes (Johnson, Pope, Swift, George Eliot, Hobbes) for the English Men of Letters series, as a moral philosopher who expounded agnosticize and an evolutionary Science of Ethics (1882), and finally and most eminently as an intellectual historian whose History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876) and the English Utilitarians (1900) put him possibly first among the neglected band of Victorian intellectual historians: Buckle, Lecky, John Morley, Flint, Mertz, Adamson, to name only a few.

But strictly from the point of view of literary criticism Stephen's position and importance are more debatable. Desmond MacCarthy in a lecture on Leslie Stephen (1937) called him "the least aesthetic of noteworthy critics" and complained that he is "deficient in the power of transmitting emotions he had derived himself from literature: he seldom, if ever, attempted to record a thrill." Q. D. Leavis, in an article in Scrutiny (Vol. 7, 1939), on the other hand, thought such deficiency an asset as criticism is "not a mystic rapture but a process of intelligence". Stephen for her is a great critic precisely because he is a sturdy materialist, the true "Cambridge critic", presumably a spiritual ancestor of her husband. Noel G. Annan, in his excellent general book on Stephen (1952), tried to strike a balance. He admits Stephen's limitations but still claims him as "Arnold's disciple" who "did for English fiction what Arnold has tried to do for poetry" (p. 256).

The comparison with Arnold will not, however, withstand inspection. Stephen does not share his faith in classical humanism, either ancient or Goethean. He does not advocate culture, criticism, or an opening of doors to Continental winds of doctrine and he does not believe in the future of poetry. As the review of Taine shows, he doubts the value of racial types, Celtic, Teutonic and Latin, so prominent in Arnold's criticism. He never uses touchstones. In a lecture on Arnold (1889) Stephen himself says that Arnold's intellectual type was different from his own. "Had Arnold been called upon to pronounce judgment upon me, he must, however reluctantly, have put me down as a Philistine" (Studies of a Biographer, 2, 79). Philistinism surely means here Stephen's own basic Utilitarianism which he tried elaborately to reconcile with Darwinian evolutionism. It means, in literary criticism, a frank intellectualism and moralism.

The essay on "Wordsworth's Ethics" begins characteristically: "Under every poetry, it has been said, there lies a philosophy. Rather it may almost be said, every poetry is a philosophy" (HL 2, 250). Anticipating the very phrasing of A. O. Lovejoy's statement that "ideas in literature are philosophical ideas in dilution", Stephen studies literature because "it holds a number of intellectual dogmas in solution" (HL 2, 253). He tries to extract from Wordsworth's poetry an ethics which, he confidently believes, will "spontaneously fall into a scientific system of thought" (HL 2, 256).

Stephen, however, is well aware of the difference between a philosophical treatise and a piece of imaginative literature. The whole aesthetic doctrine seems to him "a misstatement of the very undeniable and very ancient truth, that it is the poet's business, for example, and not to give bare psychological theory" (SB 2, 90). The poet must incarnate his thought in concrete imagery. "The morality, for example, of Goethe and Shakespeare appears in the presentation of such characters as Iago and Mephistopheles" (HL 2, 187). The role of criticism, or, at least one of its roles, will be a translation into intellectual terms of what the poet has told us by characters and events. The title of one of Stephen's essays "Pope as a Moralist" could analogously be given to almost all of his other articles.

But of course Stephen is not content with this role of translator; he judges and ranks his authors according to their implied moral philosophies. The standard is that of a secular, social morality which teaches us to recognize the "surpassing value of manliness, honesty, and pure domestic affection" (HL 2, 159) but still has a sense of evil, and a feeling for man's impotence and of the mystery around him. Shakespeare, Wordsworth, George Eliot, Scott meet these specifications and of all writers Dr. Johnson appeals to Stephen most by his morality and his sense in his personal dooms. On a lower level are the good commonsense moralists such as Pope and Fielding who have their limitations. "We scarcely come into contact with man as he appears in the presence of the infinite" (HL 2, 173). And then there are the writers whom Stephen usually calls "morbid", great and bitter men such as Swift, warped, protesting women such as Charlotte
Brontë, extravagant cynics such as Balzac, cloudy idealists such as Shelley and insincere buffoons such as Sterne.

This is, no doubt, moralistic criticism but it is literary criticism because it is concerned with the “world” of the poet, with his characters and events as they affect the characters, and with the literary value of the books, for Stephen is convinced of the basic identity of moral and aesthetic value. “The highest poetry must be that which expresses not only the richest but the healthiest nature, and which finds its essential condition in the higher poetical excellence” (HL 2, 254-5). Within the limits of this conception Stephen analyzes the psychology of characters and the implicit morality of the chief English novelists from Defoe to Stevenson and applies the same procedure to dramatists such as Shakespeare or Massinger, to poets such as Pope, Gray or Shelley and to essayists such as De Quincey or Hazlitt. The criticism of books quite naturally passes into biography, into a judgment of the man rather than the work, for Stephen does not believe in the distinction. He can say that “the whole art of criticism consists in learning to know the human being who is partially revealed to us in his spoken or his written words” (HL 2, 3). He can identify the study of the life of Charlotte Brontë with the study of her novels (HL 3, 6) and he can become involved in the most awkward conundrums about Pope’s “sincerity”, since he admires him as a moralist and still has to accept the evidence, accumulated by Elwin, of his “lying on the most stupendous scale” (HL 1, 98).

Though Stephen has a professional grasp of British empirical philosophy he shies away from an analysis of the metaphysics, ontology or even theory of knowledge of the writers he discusses. He brushes off Wordsworth’s “mysticism”, sneers at Coleridge’s philosophy and treats Shelley’s Godwinian sensationalism and Platonic idealism as mere romantic moonshine. Nor do we get, of course, any analysis of technique, language or composition, whether in poetry or in fiction. He does on occasion recognize that “the technical merits of form can hardly be separated from the merits of substance” (HL 3, 110) but usually he “leaves such points to critics of finer perception and in a greater command of such subtleties” (HL 3, 334 cf. HE 2, 61).

The essay on Sterne has nothing whatever to say about Tristram Shandy as a novel: its parody of the novel-form, its handling of time, etc. The essays on Shelley and Coleridge shirk any discussion of the poetry. When Stephen recommends the address to Chaos from The Dunciad (Pope, 131-2) he quotes other people’s opinions but carefully refrains from endorsing their praise. Occasional comments on Defoe’s devices to enhance credibility (HL 1, 8ff.) or Richardson’s difficulties with the epistolary form (HL 1, 64 f.) or Massinger’s prosaic blank verse (HL 2, 144) are no more than that MacCarthy’s conclusion about Stephen’s criticism as the “least aesthetic” seems amply justified.

The moralistic point of view overrides also the historical and social point of view in Stephen. At first sight, he seems imbued with the historical method of his time. Certainly English Thought in the Eighteenth Century contains passages which define the character of imaginative literature as a “function of many forces” (2, 330): the current philosophy, the inherited peculiarities of the race, its history, its climate, its social and political relations. The late lectures English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century (1904) treat literature as a particular function of the whole social organism” (p. 14), and Stephen’s biographer, F. W. Maitland, reports that “I have heard him maintain that philosophical thought and imaginative literature...are but a sort of by-product of social evolution, or, as he once put it, ‘the noise that the wheels make as they go round’” (p. 283). But however closely Stephen studies the relations between literature and history or of literature and the audience to which it was addressed, he is never willing to embrace the consequences of a sociological method: its complete determinism, its moral indifference, its relativistic suspension of judgment, its elimination of the individual. He complains that the “exaltation of the historical method threatens to become a part of our contemporary cant” (HL 2, 26), and ridicules the historical method if it means “accepting beliefs as fact without troubling about their reasons” (SB 2, 137). Even while he strongly recommends the study of English history and intellectual currents to the student of English literature, he recognizes that there is “a vast difference between what is called knowing a thing’s history and really knowing the thing itself” (Men, Books, and Mountains, p. 220). He holds firmly to a fixed standard of morality which alone lifts him above the flux of history and allows him to judge literature, even though he himself, paradoxically enough, in his Science of Ethics tried to explain even ethics as a result of the process of evolution.

But apart from morality and truth Stephen has no standards or theory for literature. He expressly denies that there can be a science of aesthetics, or any general rules or principles
of criticism even though he recommends that the critic proceed in a scientific spirit, with due regard to facts, dispassionately, with "a certain modesty and diffidence in forming opinions" (MBM, p. 232). At most he grants "that there is surely no harm in a man's announcing his individual taste if he expressly admits that he is not prescribing to the taste of others" (Ib. 217). It seems significant that we hear nothing of ugliness or bad art. He can even say that "all criticism is a nuisance and a parasitic growth upon literature" (ELS, p. 6). "The one great service a critic can render is to keep vice, vulgarity, or stupidity at bay." (MBM, 231).

Ultimately Stephen simply distrusts art. Like his Utilitarian and Evangelical friends he concedes that "there is a good deal to be said for the thesis that all fiction is really a kind of lying, and art in general is a luxurious indulgence to which we have no right whilst crime and disease are rampant in the outer world" (HL 3, 143). He defends the author's comments in the novels of Fielding and Thackeray with an argument which makes him hardly a safe guide to fiction. "A child dislikes to have the illusion broken and is angry if you try to persuade him that Giant Despair was not a real person like his favourite Blunderburs. But the attempt to produce such illusions is really unworthy of a work intended for full-grown readers" (HL 3, 197).

This basic scepticism and even nihilism about the value of literature and the rights of criticism, rather than the modest self-disparagement which Mr. Ullmann considers so damaging, are the reasons for the present neglect of Stephen as a critic. His certainties are purely moral, not metaphysical or aesthetic, and even his acute moralistic criticism will be felt today narrowly circumscribed by his view of human nature and history. His moral vision, earnest, public-spirited, upright as it is, seems cramped by the complacencies and facile assumptions of his positivistic and utilitarian creed. We can fully recognize his great historical merits, especially in his defense of the kindred values of eighteenth-century literature. We can admire the sober analytical skill of many of his essays (especially in Hours in a Library, a collection greatly superior to the Studies of a Biographer). But we must admit the grave limitations of a sensibility which treats literature either as a moral statement in disguise or as a social and psychological document. It is hard to believe that Stephen's criticism can be made to speak to our time.

Yale University

Rene Wellek

NEWMAN AND THE PROBLEM OF CRITICAL PROSE

The Imperial Intellect (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) is unquestionably the finest study of Cardinal Newman's educational ideas which has ever appeared. But despite the importance of A. Dwight Culler's achievement, his book suggests certain fundamental limitations of present scholarly and critical methods as applied to non-fiction prose, and of modern criticism and scholarship generally.

In tracing the genesis of Newman's The Idea of a University Professor Culler has divided his book into three parts: the first, an account of Newman's educational theories up to the time of the Dublin lectures; the second, an account of the circumstances surrounding the Dublin lectures themselves; and the last, an examination of the Idea of a University, which draws heavily upon Newman's past and the situation in Ireland as he saw it when he composed what many regard as his masterpiece. In his account of Newman's educational theory up to 1850 Culler has gone so far as to examine the textbooks with which Newman worked as an undergraduate and as a Fellow and tutor. Few Victorians can read this first portion of The Imperial Intellect without learning a great deal about education at Oxford in the early nineteenth century. It seems to me that Culler must have checked every book which Newman mentions in the Apologia and every teacher to whom he refers, so that the first hundred-odd pages of The Imperial Intellect are as much a background for the Apologia as for the work toward which it is specifically directed.

In the second part of his book he has relied heavily on Pergal McGrath's Newman's University, Idea and Reality. For the Dublin background of the lectures and for the actuality of Newman's Catholic University of Ireland as distinct from the theory, McGrath's book remains the standard authority, as Culler would be the first to concede. What McGrath did and what Culler emphasizes is to show the difference between Newman as a theorist of education and Newman as the Rector of a University. People used to talk of Newman as an impractical idealist who conceived of a University as a priest-ridden seminary dominated by theology. According to such talk, insofar as he allowed any concern with the world in his university, he allowed only the introduction of the liberal arts, provided they were sufficiently impractical. The truth is exactly the opposite. Newman as a Rector established a medical school which had had a distinguished record, concentrated on an engineering curriculum, and emphasized research. The remainder of his meager resources he devoted to the liberal arts.

In the last portion of his book Culler examines the educational ideal of Newman carefully, pointing out that it is an expression of the light that never was on land or sea, that Newman knew it was an impossibility, but that he also knew it was the kind of impossibility
which man must try to realize. What he was aiming at was the definition of the quality which distinguishes a university education from the education given by special schools, special interests, and special curricula. And in this aim Newman succeeded so well that he is a great deal clearer than Professor Culler, who obscures the aerial clarity of Newman's work by raising objections and suggesting alternatives which Newman sometimes mentioned, sometimes ignored, and sometimes knew nothing about. Culler's erudition is apparent, and he rehearses most effectively the Victorian arguments for and against certain educational theories, as in Chapter 11, "The Uses of Knowledge," where he concisely summarizes the great debate of 1808-1811 between Richard Payne Knight and Sydney Smith on the one side, and Edward Copleston and John Davison on the other. Nevertheless the third part of The Imperial Intellect is occasionally irritating.

The trouble is, Culler wrestles with many inconsistencies which are not inconsistencies at all. For example, he is dismayed because Newman, having successfully defended Knowledge as its own end, and Philosophy as the good which a liberal education procures for its students, insists that such an education is useful. "Would that he had not gone on, in the seventh discourse, to reinforce a good argument with a bad by telling us that the knowledge which he had just recommended as 'not useful' was actually, if we considered the matter closely, more useful than 'useful knowledge' itself" (p. 219). And Culler continues, "In other words, he has done precisely what Bentham said that every opponent of the utilitarian philosophy must do, he has combated the principle of utility with reasons drawn "from that very principle itself" " (p. 222).

There is no difficulty at all in Newman's position, nor need it dismay the defender of liberal education. Newman's words are perfectly clear and his argument as suave as usual. Certainly it is specious to contend that nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; and that life is not long enough to expend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles. Nay, in one sense, I will grant it is more than specious, it is true; but, if so, how do I propose directly to meet the objection? Why, Gentlemen; I have really met it already, viz., in laying down, that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also, I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke's question; for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were merely and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature? (The Idea of a University, ed. C. F. Harrod, p. 143)

There is little to improve in the conduct of this passage, or of the whole argument of Discourses V-VIII. Culler's protracted wrestling has the effect of smearing Newman's page with sweat.

Culler is not at his best in his commentary on Newman's Idea of a University, because, as he himself has pointed out (VNI, April, 1956), a great expository work is in its own best exposition. Any exposition of Sartor Resartus is less coherent than the work itself. A great essay defies exegesis, though it is certain to attract exegeses. But after any given century has put its gloss in the margin, the succeeding century finds that it can get illumination only by sweeping aside the gloss and going back to the text itself.

The grand Victorian essay is the attempt of a writer to fix, once and for all, his human attitude toward some problem of human existence, and when the attempt is successful, that attitude is fixed beyond change. True, in his own life the essayist may advance beyond this point, as Newman frequently advanced past the work which is taken by the dilettante as the final expression of his thought, but his great essays fix once and for all the attitude of a complex human being in all its complexity at the moment of expression.

Of course it will be observed that what I am saying about the essay is what modern criticism has said of the creative work, poetry, fiction, and drama. But as the New Criticism recedes into the past, I believe it is demonstrable that its canons, considered apart from its practice, are perhaps more applicable to the essay than to poetry, since the widespread application of its methods to poetry has yielded an enormous divergence of opinion on even small poems. On the other hand, the essay, so denigrated by modern critics, is the literary form which actually defies exposition because it does verily carry its own meaning, as a poem is said to do but does not. It is impossible to convey any other meaning into the essay or out of it, if it is read carefully.

But the diversity of response to poetry is easily explainable, if we study poetry in the light of the grand work of exposition. The essayist observes the mass of material which the
world outside presents to him and defines his attitude toward that material by means of care-
fully selected and brilliantly ordered references to it. He absorbs external reality and gives it
a subjective form. Once formulated, this view—to employ one of Newman's favorite words—
this view will color his opinions of life, it will to some extent govern his actions until the
view itself changes, but even then the essay will remain as the record of the view as it once
was, and the greater the complexity of the materials and the more perfect the synthesis in the
mind of the essayist, the more lasting is the fascination of the essay.

If we now proceed to poetry, we have a fair means of seeing how we in fact distinguish
between a major poet and a minor poet. A major poet is a poet who has completed the process of
internal formulation with which the essayist stops, but who has now taken a further step.
Having formulated his view he issues it forth embodied in an imitation of external reality, an
imitation which is constructed by the light of the internal view. His reference is not to the
real world, but to his created world. A minor poet is a poet whose technique is adequate, but
who proceeds directly from external material to external form, omitting the internal formula-
 tion which is the business of the essayist.

Every great poem is a concealed essay which has been given external form, and the ulti-
mate greatness of that external form must be sought not in the mechanical manipulations of
rhetoric, but in the correspondence between that form and the unwritten essay. Consequently,
the value of a poem depends, to a considerable extent, on the complexity, the consistency, and
the maturity of the unwritten essay on which the poem rests.

Turning now to a critic who, as we have recently been assured, is really a good critic
after all, namely Matthew Arnold, perhaps we can see a little more of what he meant when he
said that the Romantic poets, for all their greatness, did not know enough. "The Function of
Criticism at the Present Time" makes the point I have been laboring at. In back of every
beautiful poetic object there lies a great critical effort, or a great internal synthesis.
Sometimes the poet composes his own unwritten essay: in happier times the age does it for him,
as the Renaissance did for Shakespeare. The Romantic poets were not the inheritors of an un-
written essay, neither did they compose it, except for Wordsworth, and it is precisely Words-
worth's superiority in this respect which makes him a better poet than Keats, who from the
standpoint of mere form was a more accomplished poet than Wordsworth. What everyone knows on
reading Wordsworth's poetry is that for all its defects it is informed by a profound and con-
sistent view of the world, whether we agree with that view or not, and this is the "something
integral" which Eliot finds in Wordsworth.

Because the poet expresses his view by creating a microcosm in imitation of nature, his
work will be susceptible of multiple interpretations, one apparently as sound as the other. In
the presence of external reality intelligent men arrive at different conclusions; therefore it
is a mark of a great poem that it will so recreate external reality as to recreate the varied
reactions of intelligent human beings to the world itself. Consequently the most careful study
of the form of a poem apart from its biographical and social content will not lead us to an
understanding of what the poem is really about. It will only lead us to an appreciation of a
form, and this appreciation is at bottom what Pater said it was, the critic's examination of
the state of his particular set of atoms in the face of a work of art. The business of the
scholar in the face of a poem is to write the unwritten essay which lies behind it; by lifting the
external materials which confronted the poet, he provides the internal formulation which
the poet seldom makes explicit. The business of the critic is to examine the correspondence
between the unwritten essay and the created form.

Modern criticism has developed remarkable techniques for analyzing the form of the
creative work. Nevertheless, when we have analyzed the form of a Hemingway novel, when like
Omar we have talked about it and about, we wonder if the form reflects an adequate view of
life. When the cavalry has ridden by, Milton's form will still hold the field, yet a certain
critic has wondered if Milton's theology was sound enough to support great poetry, and a cer-
tain other critic wondered about Chaucer's lack of high seriousness. It has been said that in a
poem the form is the meaning, or the substance, or the subject, but that is verbal trickery.
In the final judgment of a poem, if there is such judgment, much will depend on the same quali-
ties which determine the greatness of an essay.

But the fascination of the microcosm and the exhilaration of tracing its reflection of the
creative mind protect the poem from rash detraction. One man finds himself repelled by
Eliot's Anglo-Catholicism, another by Faulkner's habitat, but both accept the poetry and the
fiction by a suspension of belief. The essay has no such defense, because its reference is
directly to reality. The veriest tyro can tell that Newman's form leads to Catholicism and any-
one can pronounce on that; most undergraduates suspect that laissez-faire economics has its
drawbacks, so they know what to do with Macaulay. The wild, living intellect of man does not
attract them. What they want is a story.
In the face of the essay, the scholar can trace the development of the internal formulation; this is his proper work. By showing the roots of an essayist’s thought in the events of his life and the circumstances of the society around him, by demonstrating the human drama of the essayist’s struggle to comprehend the world about him, the scholar can win for his subject the tolerance of readers and perhaps, eventually, the respect and admiration that the Victorian sage deserves.

Florida State University

FRANCIS G. TOWNSEND

JOHN STUART MILL: THE SECOND GREATEST INFLUENCE

Hopefully, the recent publication of Iris Wessel Mueller’s John Stuart Mill and French Thought (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956) is a sign of the times. The publication of F. A. Hayek’s John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (1951), R. P. Anschutz’ The Philosophy of J. S. Mill (1953), Karl Britton’s John Stuart Mill (1953), Michael St. John Packe’s The Life of John Stuart Mill (1954), and in 1956 of Mrs. Mueller’s book all point to a renewed interest in the “saint of rationalism.” Surely we need Mill’s clarity of thought, his defense of liberty, his reasoned faith in the possibilities of democratic progress, and his appeal to the rational in man. We are reminded all too frequently by the events of our own savage and cruel century that man is irrational, capable of terrifying acts that harm both himself and others. But Mill appeals to the best in us; he assumes his readers capable of the kind of thought and discussion that civilizes the individual—that releases him to decide what is good for him and hence, Mill would say, good for mankind.

In his belief that man not only should but could develop to the utmost of his capacity—a belief that Mrs. Mueller traces with great care—Mill appears at times to be naive, especially when he so obviously relied on the simplicities of associational psychology for his concept of human nature. But if in some ways Mill was naive, in other ways he was exceedingly sophisticated and complex in his thought. Moreover, after his mental crisis he was ever willing to learn, to modify his ideas, and to develop them further.

In this development the most important influence, beyond that of the utilitarianism that was thrust upon him as he crawled out of the cradle, was unquestionably that of France and of French thought. And it is this influence that Mrs. Mueller traces in her book, which she divides into seven chapters, six of them concerned with Mill’s reaction to a particular event in France or to a particular mode of French thought. Specifically Mrs. Mueller discusses in detail the following: Mill’s sojourn in France in 1820, when he was a boy of fourteen; the impact of the French revolution of 1830 and its aftermath; the influence of the Saint-Simonians, of Auguste Comte, and of Alexis de Tocqueville; and the re-assessment in his ideas caused by the French revolution of 1848. In the final chapter, “The Later Years,” Mrs. Mueller demonstrates how these influences worked out in Mill’s most important writings. By presenting her material in great detail, Mrs. Mueller has indeed proved her main thesis: “the influence of the French school was second only to that Benthamite training from which he learned to desire the reformation of the world” (p. 259).

With this judgment there can be no quarrel, but in leading to this main thesis, Mrs. Mueller has made a point, repeated a number of times in different ways, that greatly over-simplifies and distorts Mill’s final position on liberty. In one summation of her point, she states it in this way:

If there were any question that Mill’s purpose when writing On Liberty was not to defend the individual in acts of an economic or political nature that could in any way affect the lives of others but to defend the individual only in his exceptionally important but greatly limited right of complete freedom of thought, it becomes inescapable that by the time he wrote On Social Freedom in 1873 he had reached this position. (p. 252)

In the first place, On Liberty is addressed to societies of people capable of self-development, menaced by the “tyranny of the majority,” not ruled by despots, and not inhabited by barbarians. Surely the political organization of such a society is clear; it must be that of a representa-tive government, and the right to hold opinions and to publish opinions is a political right. The very publishing of opinions is a political act. Second, by insisting that Mill restricted the right of the individual to thinking as he pleased and to publishing his opinions, Mrs. Mueller left unclear the problem that Mill was striving to solve: the point at which an act crosses the boundary between the “self-regarding” and the “social.” In any tyrannical organization of society every act of man, except the most elementary, is a social one.

Perhaps Mrs. Mueller was led into making this overstatement by the ideas developed in On Social Freedom, an essay not published until 1897. Those, puzzled by the concept that perhaps-
free will is an illusion—the concept developed in the introductory section of On Social Freedom—and by other concepts contradictory to those in On Liberty may now at least give up the puzzles arising out of these particular contradictions. In 1956, too late for Mrs. Mueller's purpose, Professor J. C. Rees of the University College of Swansea published a pamphlet entitled Mill and His Early Critics (University College, Leicester). In the final section of that pamphlet, Professor Rees proves as conclusively as careful scholarship permits that Mill did not write On Social Freedom. He explains how he was first puzzled by the contradictions mentioned above, then led to an examination of the rest of Mill's writings in relation to On Social Freedom, and finally convinced by a careful analysis of the original manuscript that Mill could not have written the essay. Among his arguments Professor Rees makes two especially salient points: the handwriting of the original manuscript is neither Mill's nor Harriet Taylor's, and on its margin is a note indicating that the author was considering writing a volume that would cover the very same subjects that Mill had already discussed in Political Economy.

Even so, Mrs. Mueller's overstatement contains an element of truth. Under the influence of French thought Mill modified many of the ideas that he had once cherished, and he was certainly aware, as Mrs. Mueller indicates, that man sometimes must be interfered with so that he will act in the best interests of society. In reaching this conclusion, Mill had modified a number of his beliefs, and these modifications Mrs. Mueller has traced to their French sources. For one, Mill became convinced that history taught man a lesson in relativity: what was good for one society at one time was not necessarily good for another society at another time. This concept Mill became convinced of by the Saint-Simonians and by Comte, and Mrs. Mueller demonstrates how importantly it figured in the ideas set forth in his later writings, especially in Considerations on Representative Government. For another, Mrs. Mueller shows how Mill developed a plan for the organization of government that was a compromise of three elements: the expertness in government inspired upon by the Saint-Simonians and Comte, the wariness of democracy learned from de Tocqueville, and the need of self-development of the individual—a need terribly impressed upon Mill during his mental crisis. And so Mrs. Mueller takes up and discusses the effect of French thought on Mill's ideas on government, on capitalism and socialism, and on topics related to these: the secrecy of the ballot, the systems of proportional representation and of plural voting, the possibilities of workers' cooperatives, and the right to regulate the ownership of the land.

In the course of demonstrating how Frenchmen and events in France worked upon Mill, Mrs. Mueller keeps, and rightly so, her focus on Mill. For example, in Chapter II, "The French Revolution of 1830," Mrs. Mueller discusses in great detail Mill's series of articles, published in the Examiner, on French life and politics. We learn, virtually issue by issue, how distressed Mill became because of the reactionary policies of the post-revolutionary French Chamber of Deputies. There is no doubt justification for following Mill thus closely, for at that time he was just beginning to break away from utilitarianism and to begin his own considerations of the problems of society. And, generally speaking, Mrs. Mueller supplies enough material on the thinker or the event to which Mill is reacting to allow the reader to follow her argument.

More than once, however, Mrs. Mueller oversimplifies or distorts the ideas that Mill is considering. On page 121, she makes this statement:

As has been seen, the Saint-Simonians did not repudiate the principle of property as such but only the method by which it passed from one generation to the next in their particular age....

True, the Saint-Simonians considered property in its historical context, but they considered it to pros that point; that private property should eventually disappear through confiscation at the time of death. They looked forward to an era when property would be held by the state and distributed to individuals in accord with their contributions to the state. (See the "Septième Séance" of Doctrine de Saint-Simon, edited by C. Bouglié and Elie Halévy, Paris, 1924.)

It is fair to say that Mrs. Mueller is more successful in explaining the developments in Mill's ideas than she is in describing the ideas that affected his.

Mrs. Mueller's book is a useful one for those interested in Mill and in the intellectual history of the nineteenth century. Hopefully, it will awaken even more interest in Mill than there is at present and gain for his ideas new receptiveness and consideration. In this bad time, when the best indeed lack all conviction, we cannot do much better than to reconsider Mill.

A final word: surely both Mrs. Mueller and Mill deserve better than the brilliant lilac of the cover, the black end papers, and the black borders with which the University of Illinois press saw fit to embellish John Stuart Mill and French Thought.

Hamilton College

Dwight M. Lindley
ENGLISH X NEWS
THE MADISON MEETING

1. THE PROGRAM

Chairman, JEROME H. BUCKLEY, Columbia University
Secretary, AUSTIN WRIGHT, Carnegie Institute of Technology

I. Papers and Discussion.
1. "Schopenhauer and Hardy's 'food for final Hope' in The Dynasts," Carl J. Weber, Colby College. (15 min.)

II. Business.

Advisory and Nominating Committee: Chairman, Francis E. Mineka, Cornell University, (1957-1958); *Jerome H. Buckley, ex officio; Carl Woodring, Lionel Stevenson (1956-1967); George Ford, Edgar P. Shannon (1957-1958); Bernard Schilling, Francis G. Townsend (1958-1959).

1957 Program Committee: Chairman, William E. Buckler, New York University, Ada Niibet, A. Dwight Culley.

Bibliography Committee: Chairman, Francis G. Townsend, Florida State University; William D. Templeman; Robert Donovan; Robert C. Slack; Oscar E. Maurer; Charles T. Dougherty.


1958 Officers: Chairman, Austin Wright, Carnegie Institute of Technology; Secretary, Edgar Johnson, City College of New York.

2. THE LUNCHEON

The Victorian Luncheon will be held in the Wisconsin Union at 12:45 on Monday, 9 September. The cost will be $2.75. Reservations should be made in advance of the meeting with Professor Carl R. Woodring, Bascom Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wisconsin.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS: A SELECTED LIST
(Compiled by Oscar Maurer, University of Texas)

GENERAL


BIBLIOGRAPHY. Austin Wright, ed. Bibliographies of Studies in Victorian Literature, 1965-1964. Univ. of Illinois Press. Indispensable! The previous volume, edited by Templeman and covering the years 1932-1944, should now be reprinted; copies are difficult to find.


Wayne Burns, "The Genuine and Counterfeit: A Study in Victorian and Modern Fiction." CL (Dec.), pp. 143-50. Will provoke discussion and disagreement. Trollope's Karsen, for example, is "counterfeit" art because it provides "insulation rather than illumination."


On obliquity or ambiguity of point of view, personal or dramatic, in Tennyson and others.


**ECONOMICS AND POLITICS.** Allan Bullock and Maurice Shook, *The Liberal Tradition: Fox to Keynes*. Black.


**PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY.** Winthrop S. Hudson, "Survey of Recent Literature: British Church History." *Church History* (Sept.), pp. 258-61. "After long neglect," says Mr. Hudson, "the nineteenth century is beginning to receive serious attention from historical scholars."


**PUBLISHING AND BOOKSELLING.** George Sims, "Leonard Smithers: A Publisher of the Nineties." *London Mag.* (Sept.), pp. 33-40. The friend and publisher of Beerbohm, Beardsley, Wilde, and others.


**AUTHORS**


**ARNOld.** J. B. Broadhurst, "Milton and Arnold." *Essays in Criticism* (Oct.), pp. 404-17. A good example of how the persistence of the pejorative meaning of "Victorian" can close a critic's eyes and ears. A study of the similes in *Paradise Lost* and *Sohrab and Rustum*. A quotation will illustrate Broadhurst's position: "Shelley and Tennyson are constantly describing watered and forested ravines: for Tennyson they are just scenery; for Shelley they do have a personal symbolic value; but for Milton in, say, Book IV of *Paradise Lost*, that kind of description is dramatically symbolic."


Lawrence Perrine, "Arnold's The Scholar-Gypsy and Thyrsis." *Explicator* (Feb.), item 33. Effective defense of Arnold against the charge that the Gypsy Scholar symbolizes escape from responsibility.

G. H. M. Huxley, "T. H. Huxley's Treatment of 'Nature'." JHE (Jan.), pp. 120-27. The change in Huxley's concept of Nature, from a romantic personification to a scientific "sum of phenomena," may have been influenced by Mill's essay on "Nature" (published 1874).


Newman. Autobiographical Writings, Shend and Ward. Prepared for publication by Henry Tristram, with additional editorial work by Stephen Dessain. Includes Newman's journal, and the memoir which he drew up from it at the end of his life.


S. A. L'Hospital, "Joseph Miland, commentateur de Ruskin." Revue d'Esthétique (Jan.-March, 1956), pp. 55-70. On Miland's L'esthétique anglaise (1864), which first introduced Ruskin's theories to France. Miland also helped make Browning, Tennyson and Carlyle known in France.


Noticed in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Dec.), p. 238.

Richard Foster, "Wilde as Parodist: A Second Look at The Importance of Being Earnest." CE (Oct.), pp. 18-23. Wilde's play is at least in part an elaborate literary lampoon.

Morse Peckham, "What Did Lam Windermae Learn?" CE (Oct.), pp. 11-14. A well-reasoned analysis showing that Lady Windermere learns nothing but continues to live in a world of illusion.


Projects — Requests for Aid

Max Beethoven. Lord David Cecil has been commissioned by Lady Beethoven, in accordance with Sir Max's wishes, to write a biography. TLS (Oct. 26), p. 665.


Ernest Dowson. Christopher Bean is collecting material for a biography. TLS (Aug. 31), p. 511.

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