METHOD IN THE STUDY OF VICTORIAN PROSE

I should like to begin by reminding you of a situation which obtained in most of our colleges and universities about fifteen years ago. This was the use, in elementary courses in literature, of an anthology of essays beginning with Bacon "Of Truth," running down through the 18th-century essayists to Hazlitt and Lamb, drawing heavily upon the great Victorian critics, and concluding with the lighter fare of Max Beerbohm and James Thurber. And I think I speak for more persons than myself when I say that those of us who began our teaching with such an anthology felt that we were confronted with a problem — the problem, namely, as to what it was that we were supposed to be teaching. If the assignment of the day was Ruskin's "Traffic," were we teaching Ruskin or traffic? Was it the organization of the essay and its literary style that we were concerned with, or was it economics? If the latter, we felt that we were unqualified, and we felt also that this was not what we had dedicated our lives to doing. But if it were the former, if we tried to abstract from the essay its purely literary elements and teach those, then we found a difficulty in doing so. For we found that if our students were interested in the essay at all, it was the ideas they were interested in, and it may be that we had a sneaking suspicion they were right, that there was something unreal and empty about our purely formal approach. And yet, we could not bring ourselves to teach economics.

Before I, at least, had a chance to solve this problem to my satisfaction, the war came along and with it the revolution of the New Criticism which, at least in the university in which I was employed, swept these anthologies right out of the curriculum and introduced in their stead a selection of purely imaginative literature. Here, of course, the dilemma which had troubled us with Ruskin did not exist. Form was substance and substance was form, and what is more the New Criticism had provided a method for dealing with this literature which was precisely what had been wanting under the old dispensation. Then, our attention had been diverted from the text into extraneous problems, and presumably the reason for this diversion was that we did not know what the text was or how to deal with it. Now we knew, and in the excitement of this knowledge there was a tendency to push aside, into the background, those forms to which the method did not seem to apply and which we still did not know how to handle. As a result a whole body of literature which once occupied an important place in our thinking has almost dropped out of sight.

I do not think anyone can doubt that this is a fact. Writers who formed the core of our conception of literature a quarter of a century ago are today hardly on the periphery. When Newman in the 1850's drew up a course in English Literature for the Catholic University of Ireland, he included not only Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, and Pope but also Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Clarendon, Swift, Addison, Hume, Gibbon, Johnson, Burke, and Bentham. Who would dream of revising such a course today? Who would dream of revising even such a course as was common two decades ago? I notice that Professors Welleck and Warren in their Theory of Literature actually restrict the scope of the word "literature" to imaginative writing, so that Newman himself belongs to this subject only by virtue of his novels and poems and not at all by virtue of works which are actually superior to these in merit. I do not wish to quarrel with the authors of this definition, for I think that their work is so thoroughly representative of its time that what they say is little more than an acknowledgement of the real fact of our situation. Writers of non-imaginative prose are still studied by scholars, but they do not figure in our reviews, and what is worse, for it concerns the future, they do not figure very largely in our courses.

Surely this is a great loss. One has only to call to mind the riches of sixteenth-century humanism, of the seventeenth-century divines and essayists, of the philosophers and historians of the eighteenth century, and the great Victorian critics of our own concern to realize how staggering this loss would be. It is due, of course, to several causes, among them the reluctance of our students to grapple with anything which presents intellectual difficulty and does not afford a surface appeal, but primarily, I think, it is due to the lack of an appropriate method for dealing with writing of this kind. For imaginative literature we have this method, but for non-imaginative or non-creative literature we do not.
I hope that at this moment you do not expect me to produce a method fully formed out of some magical hat, for I must tell you frankly that I am unable to do so. The most I hope to accomplish is to draw attention to the problem before us, to review one recent attempt to solve it, and to offer some suggestions about the form which a solution ought to take when it comes.

The one recent attempt to solve the problem which I would like to review is that made in John Holloway's book, *The Victorian Sage*. Let me say at once that I consider this book to be one of the freshest and most attractive studies which I have seen in some time, and therefore if in my remarks I am critical of it, I would not have it supposed that I am trying to do justice to the work as a whole. I am merely evaluating its contribution to the problem of method, and I think it would be fair to say, quite shortly, that this consists in applying methods drawn partly from the New Criticism and partly from the English analytic school of philosophy, to a kind of literature to which these methods have not heretofore been widely applied. The analysis of imagery, of devices for controlling tone and creating a persona, of value frames and forms of argument — these are the techniques employed, and the question is, how far is this a real attempt to study the art of critical prose?

I should say that they are always appropriate, for form is the language which an author speaks and we must be able to read his language before we can do anything further with him, but that they are sometimes disappointing and, used by themselves, are actually reductive of the literature they attempt to serve. To show how they are disappointing I take the example of imagery. One great value of the analysis of image-patterns in poetry is that it reveals to us themes which are not presented explicitly either by direct statement or by overt dramatic action; but in substantive literature these themes, being the very subject of discussion, often are presented with a precision and clarity which the rather primitive language of imagery could never attain. Thus, when Holloway analyzes the nature images in the *Idea of a University* and concludes from his examination that there is a naturalistic vein in Newman's thought, I am tempted to reply, "But, of course! This is what Newman has been saying all along!" One does not need by indications to find directions out when he has these directions plainly before him in the most supple, precise, and articulate prose of the century. In other words, methods devised to translate the symbolistic and suggestive language of poetry into the abstract and explicit language of criticism are less useful in the case of a literature which, being itself a form of criticism, is already written in that language.

I now turn to a more radical difficulty in Mr. Holloway's method which arises from the fact that, employed upon writing of this kind, it tends to assume a rhetorical character. It is concerned with techniques of persuasion, and I have always felt that a study of these techniques implies an intimate knowledge of the character of the minds to be persuaded. Now, of course, is a point of information and can only be established, if at all, by historical research. But most of the critics who employ these techniques do not undertake to establish it — they regard an apriori to the study of critical prose?

Mr. Holloway even praises Newman for so exactly calculating, in his *Discourses on University Education*, the temper of the Irish mind in 1832, and then illustrates this skill from a text which Newman revised extensively so as to remove from it the marks of its original occasion and fit it for an English audience in 1859. This, of course, is simply a lapse of scholarship, but even if Mr. Holloway, in his usual English manner, were not inclined to rely on *Everyman* editions, there is doubt whether he could have achieved his purpose. For we know that Newman himself, when he prepared these lectures for delivery in Dublin, did not know and could not find out what the character of his audience would be, and that he felt to be all wrong and that he would be false for this reason. But could anyone today discover enough about his original audience to be of use in so delicate and subtle a matter as the analysis of a work of art?

One may perhaps reply that Holloway was wrong in attempting to establish an original audience, that he should have forgotten about an historical rhetoric and concerned himself simply with that timeless rhetoric which appeals to a body of readers in any age. And this doubtless is a good advice, but it creates another problem which seems to me of even greater difficulty than the one we have just examined. This is that the critic who analyzes means of persuasion is obliged to assume that everyone else in the world will be persuaded by things to which he alone is immune. In his clear, piercing intelligence he sees through what the author is doing, but it must be presumed that no one else does or the rhetoric would be unsuccessful. Indeed, I arise from the perusal of these rhetorical studies with the impression that Newman and Arnold were addressing audiences so naive and ingenuous that they were susceptible to any kind of emotional appeal. Throw them an image and they would join the Catholic Church. Assume a bland, sophisticated demeanor and they will send their children to Oxford. But surely we are not reduced to stratagems like this in order to engage in literary criticism. Surely we know that when people go to lectures they carry with them their experience from the
outside, their partial knowledge of the subject, their canons of judgment and sense of logic, and they demand that these be satisfied or they go home unpersuaded. They do not so lose themselves in the world of discourse that they have no substantive standards by which to judge.

I think, in other words — and this brings me to my final point against Mr. Holloway — that the major province of rhetoric lies in the area of substantive truth, in a metaphysical rather than a verbal world. I believe that people are normally convinced by a statement which is true rather than by one which is adroit, and I think a critic ought to take account of this fact. In so saying I am not, I hold, falling into the error of considering all rhetoric to be a species of deception. I know that rhetorical devices can be employed by one who is sincere on behalf of propositions which are true as well as by one who is insincere on behalf of propositions which are false. But the fact remains that a critic who treats these devices independently of their truth or falsehood and of their sincerity or insincerity tends to elevate the wrong uses of them to a par with the right and so to relegate the question of their substantive value to a secondary status. At the very least such a criticism is incomplete, and it seems to me that it is also reductive. For if it is consistent with an interpretation of these writers as if we suppose that they may either have believed or not believed what they were saying and also that it may either have been true or not true, then I confess that my interest in them is diminished. And this is the effect which Mr. Holloway's book has upon me. It lessens, rather than increases, the stature of the writers with whom it deals, and it does so, I believe, because its method is wrong.

We can devise a true method only by understanding the nature of the literature with which we have to deal, and for myself I find I can do this most easily by considering its position in early nineteenth-century England. As I survey that scene, I see three great ways of life contending with each other: the Romantic, which is the way of poetry; the Utilitarian, which is the way of science; and the Christian-humanist, which is the way of practical wisdom. That these three ways are not peculiar to the 19th century but are permanent and universal I gather from the fact that they correspond to the three great aspects into which the universe has traditionally been divided: Man, Nature, and God. Indeed, they are but attempts to solve the human problem by the development or elaboration of one of these aspects at the expense of the other two. Thus, Romanticism, believing in the intrinsic goodness of man, seeks a freedom for the individual ego to create about it its own subjective world. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, impressed by the degree to which man is conditioned by his environment, turns to the objective world of nature, which it seeks to understand and ultimately to control. Both these attitudes are of course naturalistic, in that they posit the existence of no reality above and beyond man's nature and the natural world in which he lives, and it is in this respect that the Christian-humanist tradition is opposed to both. For it does posit the existence of such a reality, either in God or in reason, and it solves the human problem by finding its root in the imperfect nature of man, who needs to be rectified in the light of this transcendent reality. All this we know, but what is to our present purpose is that each of these three ways produces a characteristic mode of expression. That of Romanticism is poetry, the creation by means of words of an interior world of meaning in which the human spirit finds a willingness to dwell. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not create an inner world of meaning but analyzes and describes an external world which is given, and thus its characteristic mode of expression is scientific prose. But just as all science tends toward the language of mathematics, so the Utilitarians speak most naturally through the hedonic calculus, the Malthusian law, and other quantitative formulations. And ultimately they speak not through symbols at all but through the practical activities whereby they changed the face of England in the 19th century.

Is it not striking that the Christian-humanist tradition, which is that of the great Victorian critics, found its characteristic expression neither in poetry nor in science but in the mediatorial form of critical prose? For this form precisely expresses what the Christian-humanist was attempting to do. He was not concerned simply with creating an inner world of value nor simply with ascertaining an external world of fact, but with bringing fact and value into some kind of meaningful relation. Hence he created a form of discourse which bears in all its lineaments both the pressure of reality and the pressure of an individual soul. Its words are both emotive and referential. If it is true that a poem should not mean but be, it is equally true that a scientific treatise should not be but mean. And critical prose does both simultaneously. It both exists as a formal structure and it refers to something which exists independently of that structure. To a degree it calls attention to itself and asks the reader to rest in the detachment of poetic contemplation, and to a degree it calls attention to something outside of itself and prompts the reader not to rest but to act in an appropriate manner.

Thus, if I were to answer the question with which I began about the assignment in my anthology, I should say that what I ought to have been teaching was neither Ruskin nor traffic but the relation between the two. And if I were asked what, precisely, I mean by this relation,
would I not have to employ in my answer the word "belief"? What Ruskín believed about economics, architecture, and morals constitutes the totality of his essay, both its substance and its form. For the writer of critical prose is characterized by the fact that he believes. The scientist, as C. S. Lewis has recently pointed out, does not properly believe: he knows. And the poet does not necessarily believe: he envisions. But the writer of critical prose stands in just that indirect and probable relation with his object which we call belief. Whether belief is a species of knowledge or a species of desire we do not know. It is an impassioned form of knowledge, and if in our criticism we would both feel the passion and gain the knowledge, we need to avoid both the bald paraphrase of doctrine, which was the older method of criticism, and also the empty analysis of form, which is the newer method. We need a broadly humanistic method which will involve, not that momentary suspension of disbelief which constitutes poetic faith, but that deliberate activation of real belief which constitutes a critical life.

Let me pause for a moment on the relation between poetry and belief. This has recently come in for some discussion, and we have observed writers like T. S. Eliot, who formerly denied that there was any relation, modifying their position. Moreover, we have seen André Malraux pointing out what happened to medieval art when it was moved out of the church into the museum. Paintings which were originally Christ became a picture, and sculptures which were originally angels became a statue. And although one result of this move was to intensify our apprehension of these objects as formal structures, another was to reduce their import by denying them depth in reality. They were expressive of nothing but their own empty form. And likewise, in literary criticism in the past few years we have seen a remarkable transformation in the kind of work we have produced. The formal verbalistic approach associated with the first days of the New Criticism has given way to an interest in myth, archetype, ritual, and religion, which, whether we know it or not, is essentially an attempt to reassert the existence of a spiritual reality of which the work of art is expressive. Hence Professor Wheelerwright has described poetry as "expressive statement," and we see how the contemplation of these statements has actually created new beliefs among our more ardent colleagues. To put it briefly and I hope without blasphemy, those who began by finding Christ images in every poem have ended by finding Christ outside of the poem, and that simply because it makes it a better poem if He really was our Lord.

I do not mean to scoff at this party, with which I feel some sympathy, but merely, by means of it, to construct an a fortiori argument. For if poetry, which may be pure form, finds a formalistic approach reductive, what will criticism do? It never pretended to be such, but, on the contrary, always rested its claim for our attention upon its ability to place us in a wise and meaningful relation with a real world. And this is why we go to these writers at all. If we read Arnold today, it is not to see how he can adopt a bland and persuasive manner but because he and his contemporaries did some hard thinking about problems which lie at the roots of modern thought. And we want to know what the answers were and whether they were true — not whether they were rhetorically effective. We want to do this the more urgently because it is in this mediatorial realm that the world's troubles lie. There is no ultimate difficulty for the scientist in finding out what the world is like and no prime difficulty for the poet in envisioning it otherwise. The difficulty lies in accommodating the vision to the fact, and the study of this accommodation is the province of mediatorial prose.

University of Illinois

RUSKIN'S MORAL ARGUMENT

It is not fashionable to assert that Ruskín is the greatest art theorist who has written in English, but, on the other hand, one scarcely dares to suggest a candidate to measure against those thirty-seven formidable volumes. Ruskín's reputation has suffered for too many years from three accusations. He has been charged with the moral fallacy, he has been indicted for the heresy of conceptualism, and he has been convicted of a certain lack of bedroom derring-do. The latter charge I leave to his biographers, the second I have dealt with in another place, and the first, that Ruskín is guilty of the moral fallacy, I take for the subject of this paper.

Let us face Ruskín's proposition it its bluntest terms. He argues, from his first book to his last one, that an immoral man cannot produce a great work of art. This is the hard saying which has been to his critics foolishness, and to his friends a stumbling block. It is Ruskín's unique contribution to the history of aesthetics, but still it is necessary to emphasize that it was an inevitable proposition. If he had not said this, someone else would have. It is tempting to dismiss Ruskín's central thesis as a croquet of his Evangelical mother, but that is to miss the point entirely. Ruskín's doctrine is the logical result of a century and a half of speculation in which the problems of aesthetics, as Lovejoy has pointed out,
were never very far removed from those of psychology and ethics. He is in the line of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Hogarth, Alison, and Burke. It is a tradition in which the central problem of aesthetics is to locate the love of beauty in the human personality. As Brett truly says, "the development of critical theory throughout the eighteenth century was determined by [the] question of whether the faculty of aesthetic judgment is the reason or the feelings. It is a question that is always in the background and . . . the history of eighteenth-century aesthetics is the chronicle of the attempts made to answer it." (The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, p. 136)

This is the problem with which Ruskin begins, and when aesthetics turned from a consideration of beautiful objects to a consideration of the appetites which beauty satisfies, someone had ultimately to ask what kind of internal development is necessary for an artist. Ruskin asked the question, and he answered it—a moral development. I shall want to urge that the answer was as inevitable as the question, and that it flowed from the same speculative tradition.

The fundamental assumption that underlies everything Ruskin ever wrote is the unity and indivisibility of man. In this he is at one with Matthew Arnold and with Newman. This is the link that binds his economic and social doctrines to his aesthetic theories. He understood man as a being composed of three parts: of intellect, of senses, and of another faculty, non-rational and non-sensory, which he designates as the feelings, or the heart, or the soul. This faculty includes what moralists call the will, although Ruskin prefers to designate it under its active mode as the resolution, and under its passive, appetitive mode as the feelings. His terminology is loose but he tells us that he means by this non-rational, non-sensory part of man "the moral and responsible part of being." (IX, 445) His fundamental proposition is the unity and simultaneity of these three faculties. The whole man looks at a picture and the whole man paints a picture. A picture must satisfy (and I follow Ruskin's terminology) the feelings and the senses by being beautiful, and it must satisfy the intellect by being true. So Ruskin's first proposition flows from a consideration, not of art, but of the nature of man and his faculties. A picture must delight the feelings by being beautiful while it speaks to the intellect by being true.

Our problem is to understand how Ruskin can say that the perception of beauty by the feelings and the perception of truth by the intellect both depend upon the morals of the individual perceiving. The proposition that only a moral man can perceive beauty is a hard saying only as long as we assume that by morals Ruskin means something about exposed ankles and unchaperoned buggy rides. But that is not what Ruskin is talking about when he speaks of a moral man. It is clear to him that the love of beauty is not intellectual. The love of beauty is a passion, an appetite, an affair of the will—and therefore, because it is not rational, and not sensory, it is moral. "Idea of beauty," he writes, "are the subjects of moral, but not of intellectual perception." (III, 111) By the moral perception of beauty Ruskin means that man as God made him likes certain things when he sees them. We can notice empirically, for example, that for most people the qualities of simplicity of form and brightness of effect are pleasing. This pleasure, developed and not perverted, is what Ruskin calls taste. He calls it part of our "moral nature" to distinguish it on the one hand from those instincts and disgusts which normal men share at the sense level, like a liking for sugar, and to distinguish it from an intellectual judgment on the other. He says, "But all these exertions of the intellect are totally distinct from taste, properly so called, which is the instinctive and instant preferring of one material object to another without any obvius reason, except that it is proper to human nature in its perfection so to do." (III, 110)

Taste is a mark of human nature "in its perfection." It is a mark of unfallen man, or of man redeemed. This is not to say that a depraved taste implies actual, personal guilt, for Ruskin believed that the taste of Europe had been seduced by the temptations of the Renaissance. Rather, a perverted taste is a kind of original sin inherited from our Renaissance parents; that is why Ruskin sub-titled Volume III of The Stones of Venice "The Fall." But a depraved taste is still a moral fault. Taste is not intellectual and it is not sensory. It is moral because it is a result of a right ordering of the will. And thus the perception of beauty depends upon taste, which is a moral quality.

However the burden of Modern Painters is a discussion of truth in art, not of beauty. There are two reasons for this. One is that the truth of Turner was the immediate occasion of Modern Painters; the other is that truth is discursive and demonstrable, while beauty, by definition, eludes intellectual action. The dialectic by which Ruskin maintains that only a moral man can know Truth is particularly the argument of Modern Painters.

We have seen that in Ruskin's thinking taste is a moral quality. But in a broader sense, what is a moral man? Ruskin says that a moral man is one who loves something outside himself. The opposite to love is pride, or self-love. And just as pride is the root of all evil, so is
love the root of all good. This doctrine may be traced in theological terms from the Gospel of St. John ("God is Love"), through St. Augustine ("Love God and do what you will"), and into a substantial Anglican tradition. George Herbert calls sin and love the "two vast, spacious things."

But we need not seek a theological framework for Ruskin's moral doctrine. The primacy of love is an ethical doctrine which came to Ruskin from Frances Hutcheson, Hume, and Bishop Butler. It walked hand in hand with the aesthetics and psychology of the British Enlightenment. In Hume the question of the inter-relations of feeling and reason is fundamental in his ethics, as it is in his general philosophy. The aesthetic and moral sentiments are defined alike in his elaborate scheme as examples of the calm, secondary impressions, or the calm, direct secondary passions. (And Hume distinguishes between pride and love as Ruskin does, according to their objects. "It is always self," writes Hume, "which is the object of pride . . . " and "the object of love is some other person."") (Treatise, II, i. 3 and II, ii. 1)

It is useful to recount these passages from Hume to emphasize once more that Ruskin can best be understood as the product of an eighteenth century philosophic tradition in which the relation between the reason and the feelings is a central question; moral and aesthetic sentiments are regarded alike as forms of approval and disapproval, and love and pride are the great poles which distinguish the other-regarding and the self-regarding man. When Ruskin says that acute sensibility to the attributes of external objects "may be entirely resolved into the acuteness of bodily sense... associated with love," (III. 143) he may be understood in terms of a long Christian tradition, but we will do better to read him in an eighteenth century speculative context. We can understand Ruskin by analogy by reading St. Augustine, but we can understand him directly by reading Shelley. In A defence of Poetry Shelley writes, "The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own!" And that is an exact statement of Ruskin's position. I emphasize this background because that is why, through the vagaries of Ruskin's religious experience, the moral basis of his argument never changes. It is not based upon religion, but upon the psychologically oriented speculations of the preceding century.

Based upon his conviction of the wholeness of man, Ruskin could not be satisfied with a work of art which by-passes the intellect by the device of pure form, or which assaults the intellect by falsehood. For Ruskin believed that the intellect hungered for truth as the feelings hungered for beauty—which means in practice that men hunger for truth and beauty.

We have seen how Ruskin can say that only a moral man can perceive beauty. Taste is moral because it is not sensual and it is not intellectual. It is moral because it is a result of a right ordering of the will.

But how can the perception of truth, which is an intellectual function, depend upon a man's moral nature? It does, he argues, because it depends upon love, the capacity to lose sight of one's self. He does not assert that our moral nature perceives as such, but that the passions of love energize and sharpen the intellect and the sensibilities. An artist who does not love his subject will not be able to know it because his senses and intellect will lack the extra dimension of passionate intensity that is added by love.

The source of the pleasure conveyed by the Ideas of Truth, to use Ruskin's early phrase, lies in the contemplation by the intellect of the thing itself, as it exists outside the frame of the picture. But an artist who does not love his subject, and who is unable to lose sight of himself, will instead direct attention to himself by trickery and manipulation. This was the sin of Claude, Salvator, and Poussin, and Ruskin was able to say that a man deadened of moral sensation, i.e., a self-regarding man, is always dull in his perception of truth.

One knows an object, then he loves it, then knows it with a knowledge that can be said to differ in kind. This new knowledge Ruskin likens to a kind of total contemplation wherein the senses, will, and intellect all are engaged with the object, and he calls it theoria. Locke, Addison, Hutcheson, Alison, and Knight were working toward a definition of this new kind of knowledge, but in terms of a tertium quid. This was the "imagination" of the Romantics, but Ruskin rejects the tertium quid. He borrows instead upon his knowledge of Aristotle for a statement of the relation of the will, which is the moral faculty, to the intellect. He argues that while the intellect judges independently, the will has a double influence on the mind. First, it has an efficient and executive function, and second, a formal function when it reaches out through love to cleave to the object with enjoyment, and provide an effective knowledge.

Ruskin believed that without love there is no morality, and without love there can be no knowledge. Hence Truth, like Beauty, is impossible to the immoral, self-regarding man. Ruskin's is an early expression of that criterion which is so important to modern critics, the impersonality, or "death" of the artist. No one has stated the proposition more eloquently than
he: "The skill of the artist, and the perfection of his art, are never proved until both are forgotten. The artist has done nothing till he has concealed himself; the art is imperfect which is visible; the feelings are but feebly touched, if they permit us to reason on the methods of their excitements. In the reading of a great poem, in the hearing of a noble oration, it is the subject of the writer, and not his skill, his passion, not his power, on which our minds are fixed. We see as we see, but we see not him. We become part of him, feel with him, judge, behold with him; but we think of him as little as of ourselves. Do we think of Aeschylus, while we wait in the silence of Cassandra; or of Shakespeare, while we listen to the wailing of Lear? Not so. The power of the masters is shown by their self-annihilation. It is commensurate with the degree in which they themselves appear not in their work. The harp of the minstrel is untruly touched, if his own glory is all that it records. Every great writer may be at once known by his guiding the mind far from himself, to the beauty which is not of his creation, and the knowledge which is past his finding out." (VIII. 22-3)

Here is Ruskin's case for the necessity that an artist be a moral man. He was a child of the Enlightenment in his awareness of how the evil passions over-ride the judgment, and in general in his belief in the subservience of the intellect to the passions.

Against this dialectic Ruskin faced two difficulties. The first is how to apply the doctrine of sympathy to landscape painting—how does one love a tree? The second is the argument from history. How is it that the sense of beauty is not conspicuously associated with sanctity, but frequently seems to live with vice?

For the first, the eighteenth century doctrine of sympathy was an ethical doctrine and would take Ruskin only to a love of other people. So he had to turn to theology, and he said that we love inanimate objects because they have certain external qualities which may be said to be in some way typical of the Divine attributes. We love God as He is reflected in His works. It was this subordinate proposition in Modern Painters II that Ruskin repudiated, adjusted, and restored as his religious thinking changed. Ultimately, in Modern Painters V, he was to include landscape in an all-embracing humanity by bringing the power of landscape to root in the human emotions with which it is connected.

As to the argument from history, Ruskin pointed out that too often strong passion has been confused with immorality, and since we can't really know the moral state of any individual except in its effects, he was content to argue from the art to the morals of the artist. On the other side, ugliness has been regularly mistaken for beauty. He was prepared to argue, and this is the whole purpose of The Stones of Venice, that the taste of generations had been debauched by the Renaissance pride.

This is the essence of Ruskin's moral argument. Its principal enlargement occurs in the last book of Modern Painters, where Ruskin turns his attention from the recognition of harmony to the creation of harmony. It was there, in the great books of the 1860's, that Ruskin transferred all this abstract argument into a vision of art, not as creation, but as redemption. He had turned to social studies and he saw the world about him as a fallen world peopled with what he called the "Chaos-children." (VII. 459) And he saw every work of art, like every honest deed, as the redemption of a little ground from chaos. He brought art as he brought sociology and economics, to root in human life—hence his provocative final definition of art—the struggle of life with clay.

St. Louis University

Charles T. Dougherty

THE WAY OF ALL FLESH and A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN:
A COMPARISON

The Way of All Flesh is usually regarded as a Victorian work which stands on the threshold of modernity; A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, by general critical agreement, crosses this threshold and arrived. It is interesting to compare them; each is transmuted autobiography, and, as such, the story of the development of a writer in his time. The process involves, in each case, a submission to and rejection of formal religious training, a definition of self as opposed to family and prevailing cultural mores, a final dedication in the face of all the risks which autonomy entails. In each, self-realization and a career as a writer represent the internalization of the religious drive. Stephen Dedalus, seeing the wading girl on the beach, knows the godliness of the here and now; Ernest denies father and mother "for Christ's sake." For each, becoming a writer means assuming a mission for mankind: Stephen resolves to forge in his soul "the uncreated conscience of his race"; the intention of Ernest's work is "...to make people resume consciousness about things which, with sensible people, have already passed into the unconscious stage."
Yet these likenesses sharply define the differences, especially as they relate to the view held by Butler and Joyce of the writer in relation to his society. For the two conceptions differ in more than the obvious one that Stephen aspires to become an "artist," while Ernest, instead of writing "...a pretty graceful little story...would immediately set to work on a treatise to show the grounds on which all belief rested." We are not dealing here with the simple dichotomy between "creative writing" and "exposition." While Ernest is given to us chiefly as a writer of treatises, we are also expressly told that he aimed higher: "...from the outset he did occasionally turn his attention to work which must more properly be called literary than either scientific or metaphysical."

Butler's choice of the term "literary," rather than artistic, is in itself revealing; it reflects an ambivalence in his attitude toward "art" which is also found in his Notebooks. "Of art-rules," he says there, "the less we try to understand them, or even to think about them, the better." Attention to "style" diminishes a work: "...I cannot conceive how any man can take thought for his style without loss to himself and his readers." But this dismissal of conscious craftsmanship is counterbalanced by evidence of no uncertain desire for literary immortality: "When a man is in doubt about this or that in his writing, it will often guide him if he asks himself how it will tell a hundred years hence." And actually there are many shrewd judgments about all the arts, for Butler was as genuinely interested in music and painting as he was in literature.

Compared with Stephen's rapturous summary of esthetics, however, the absence of reference to the technical problems of the writer in The Way of All Flesh is particularly striking. But what is lacking on this score is counterbalanced by another emphasis, the idea that the writer's ultimate business is the communication of wisdom, and that wisdom is the fruit of experience and reflection. Whereas Dedalus in A Portrait commits himself to art during late adolescence, as a spiritual response to the choices confronting him, Ernest does not begin to write seriously until he has made a symbolic pilgrimage through all social institutions. The preliminary to Stephen's dedication is rapture; to Ernest's, a ripening into intellectual maturity. Stephen's interpretation of reality is based upon apprehension (of which the epiphanies themselves, as a device of A Portrait, are illustrative); Ernest's, through comprehension, the summing up of meaning, the recurrence of which in The Way of All Flesh gives it weight beyond its satire of Victorianism.

Of course, it does not follow that because Butler disparaged technique his novel is without it, any more than that Joyce, because he refuses to philosophize in A Portrait, is without ideas. Butler tempts us by both his attitude and the transparency of his style into taking such art as he has for granted. There is much to admire in the literary craftsmanship of The Way of All Flesh. The tripartite structure of the novel (it was conceived as three volumes, a fact not indicated in modern editions, which number the chapters consecutively): the broad genealogical foundation of the first book, which universalizes and deepens much of the insight set forth; the choice of indirect narration to strengthen its judiciousness; the adroit balancing of narration and moral in individual chapters; the selective use of detail; the consistent anti-romantic approach in the characterization of Ernest; the irony of the religious allusions — all these are surely worthy of critical note. More important, perhaps, is the carrying through of the theme of the title (Butler's manuscript had it as the subtitle, but no matter) in the conception of Ernest as a kind of intellectual everyman. One recalls Butler's feeling of affinity for both Bunyan and the Homer of the Odyssey, as possibly contributing source and representativeness to Ernest's ordeal. Certainly much of the power of the novel for us today rests in its appeal to widely shared experience, especially the kind which forces the individual to question the validity of cultural demands upon him. Not all the problems posed are uniquely the consequence of Victorian bigotry.

Whereas the art of The Way of All Flesh has elicited very little attention, A Portrait has provoked a large body of criticism. Joyce's novel has not only deserved more study as a work of art, it has also required it; transparency is not one of its attributes. There is no need to repeat here what is generally understood about its method except insofar as it illuminates the sharp divergences in approach between the two. In A Portrait, meaning exists not apart from style, but in it; words do not transmit our attention directly to an idea beyond, but arrest it; the play of our imagination upon the words as symbols may indeed be endless. In Butler's opinion, words were only imperfect approximations of thought: "Thought pure and simple is about as near to God as you can get." To Joyce, it would almost appear that art is nearer. This inference would seem a valid one from the action of A Portrait; Stephen's progress from potential priest to potential poet must surely be accepted as an affirmation of the holy office of art, if the epiphanies are to be read with adequate responsiveness.

But as Hugh Kenner, in his study of A Portrait, justly warns us, Stephen becomes to Joyce's mind not an artist, but an esthete: "Stephen's introspective visions are constantly
judged, and ironically, by the terms in which they are raised." Herein lies the modern complexity and the "difficulty" of *A Portrait*: it demands that we surrender emotionally and hold off intellectually; it refuses to be committed to an attitude or an idea. Joyce's qualification of what otherwise might be abstracted as a direct meaning of Stephen's experience was, of course, intentional. It is the imposition of Flaubertian detachment upon a narration which, stylistically, proceeds by the methods of poetic symbolism. Its aim is the disassociation of argument from art, the disassociation of the emotions of the artist from the emotions evoked by the work. The inhibition of both emotion and idea is conscious. It derives ultimately from the great advances in psychology and in artistic method which were made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from Joyce's awareness of the complexity of human consciousness and his belief in the new possibilities of doing it justice in fiction.

Butler's attitude concerning the attempted detachment of the writer from his created work could hardly be farther removed from Joyce's. He says (in the *Notebooks*): "What we should read is not the words but the man whom we feel to be behind the words": "...only those works live that have drained much of their author's life into them." Butler's own lack of embarrassment about draining his ideas directly into his fiction is apparent from the similarity of the opinions expressed in *The Way of All Flesh* to those of his other writings.

Yet Butler, no less than Joyce, adhered to a discipline of detachment. Because he identifies the artist so closely with his work, however, he conceives this discipline as being applied more to the writer as a person. The writer himself is controlled; he exercises constant check upon his own spontaneous reactions and upon possibly untrustworthy opinions and responses. To compare the detachment of Joyce with that of Butler, one might say that the action of *A Portrait* is placed by Joyce at an aesthetic distance; that of *The Way of All Flesh* is put at an intellectual distance.

The most obvious manifestation of this attempted distancing is Butler's selection of the voice of the novel. Not Ernezt, in the distress or confusion of his immediate encounters with life, but Overton, the seventy-three-year-old uncle, recounts Ernezt's biography. The maturity of his voice interposes a space of many decades between experience as felt and experience as rationally understood. Overton's age, financial security, his bachelorhood, his intelligence, his self-knowledge (his recognition that his passion for his nephew inevitably involves jealousy of wife and friends), all make him sublime aloof, engagingly trustworthy and detached.

Even more is implied in the characterization of Ernezt. His dullwittedness, his slowness to grasp things, have often been regarded as a defect of the novel. But are they not Butler's way of lending emphasis to one of his fondest convictions about the way truth is earned? He believed in "practised knowledge" (that is, tenable knowledge), as opposed to inherited, intuitive, or theoretical knowledge. Ernezt's dimness, naiveté and passivity permit reality to register and to penetrate slowly. Out of the resultant internal conflicts between his old inherited "impractical" knowledge and the new evidence of his experience, he will forge those more honest, more qualified truths which are worth recording. His priggishness is not entirely what it appears to be. His upbringing was stern; to this he adds a rigidity imposed upon himself from within; he stiffens his resistance to his own temptations in an attempt to think facely. He maintains a vigilance against all the influences which may distort his judgment: the pull of affection, the desire to be agreeable, the lure of abstract speculation, the pressure of conformity. To become a writer of integrity means, for him, being cast in the role of opposition. He nerses himself to the social aspects of this role fairly easily, for his becoming a writer means that he has already accepted the harder duty of living in permanent opposition to himself.

He becomes ultimately a man who is always on guard, outwardly and inwardly. His distrust of "systems" of knowledge is, by the end of the book, total and absolute: "...he told me that no system that could go on all fours was possible.... Having found this he was just as well pleased as if he had found the most perfect system imaginable." His children he gives to the hase couple, to be reared in fresh air and with simple affection — these he is sure are good — but not to be educated, because systems of education are suspect. He gives higher value to the manual and bookkeeping labors of the tailor shop than to speculative thought. He becomes progressively more detached from people. He cannot brace himself perpetually to this task of inner intellectual winnowing while remaining committed emotionally to parents, wife, children, or even to fellow searchers. His course leads — as we come to see — to isolation and emotional thinness. This pattern was the way of Butler's own life; in all fairness it must be said that he never hoped to disguise or transcend himself in his fiction. Yet when we bear in mind the prodigious insights into human consciousness and into the social structure which he achieved on the analytical level, we cannot help lamenting his inability to apply his findings more generously to himself as a human being and as a writer. But of course he could not; the puritan ardor which drove him on his quest for spare and honest truth made relaxation of inner guardedness impossible.
It is to this distrust of the idle play of consciousness that Morton D. Zabel (in his preface to the Modern Library College edition) in part refers when he says that Butler wrote “from deep inside the Victorian ethos.” The Victorian ethos, in this sense, comprises attitudes more shared by Carlyle and Arnold than, for example, by Tennison, Browning or Pater. Carlyle’s decisive turning from romantic introspection as a way of knowledge in Sartor Resartus and Arnold’s firm rejection of “the dialogue of the mind with itself” in his Preface of 1853 express a view of the writer’s role which is most nearly akin to Butler’s. As comparison of the Way of All Flesh and A Portrait shows, the cultural distance between these Victorians and the young Joyce is infinitely greater than one would infer from reference to simple chronology. The passage from “Victorian” to “modern” requires the crossing of many thresholds.

New York University

THE CHARLES A. STONEHILL COLLECTION
HUNTER COLLEGE LIBRARY

Included in the special holdings of the library of Hunter College in New York City is a collection of rare English novels, purchased about twenty years ago from the famous bookseller Charles A. Stonehill. The brief note about this collection in Cross’s Bibliographical Guide to English Studies gives hardly any indication of the value of it to students of minor nineteenth-century fiction.

Having had an opportunity to examine this collection recently, I can give some account, though necessarily a sketchy one, of its specific contents. The collection is small, something over 550 items, but rich in that all these novels are particularly hard to come by in this country and many represent significant examples of special genres—gothic, epistolary, sentimental, satirical. The group as a whole covers about a hundred years, from the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. About two-thirds, I should say, fall into the period of interest to readers of VNL.

Among generally forgotten, but interesting, authors to be found here are: Selina Bunbury (Coombe Abbey), Isaac Crockett (The Italian Banditti, Romantic Tales), the Misses Cuthbertson (The Forest of Montalbano, Santo Sebastiano, The Romance of the Pyrenees, Rosabella; or, A Mother’s Marriage), Rebecca Etridge (The Scrinia), Mary Leman Grimstone (The Beauty of the British Alps, Louisa Egerton; or, Castle Herbert); Innes Hoole (Hearts Versus Heads), Hannah Maria Jones (The Gipsy Girl, The Outlaw’s Bride, Village Scandal), R. N. Kelly (Frederick Dormont), Alicia Lefanu, the mother of Joseph Sheridan Lefanu (Henry the Fourth of France), Mrs. Mary Meekie (Which is the Man?), Annabella Plumptre (Tales of Wonder, of Humour and of Sentiment; The Western Mail), and Jane West (Alicia De Lacy, A Gossip’s Story, The Infidel Father, The Loyalists).

Also among those present are such once popular and influential continental novelistists as Frederika Bremer, Madame Sophie Cottin, Francois Guillaume Ducray-Dumini, August Heinrich Julius La Fontaine, and Pigault Lebrun. (I should add that their works are in translation.)

There are a good many items not recorded in the British Museum Catalogue—for example: Dorothea, or a Ray of the New Light (a kind of British Candide, with William Godwin occupying the place of Leibnitz); a set of luridly illustrated paper-back penny dreadfuls issued by the publisher Duncombe in 1800; the tantalizingly titled It Was Me. A Tale, By Me, One Who Cares for Nothing or Nobody. The Minerva Press is well represented. Some of the odder items are a fraudulent sequel to Tom Jones, a version of the Rob Roy story written shortly after Scott’s more celebrated one, a volume written in imitation of Scott’s Tales of My Landlord.

As for better-known works, there are to be found here first editions in good state of Medora Gordon Byron’s Celia in Search of a Husband, James Justin Morier’s The Adventures of Hajji Baba, of Istaphan, in England, Maria Edgeworth’s Helen, Susan Perrier’s Destiny; or, The Chief’s Daughter, Elizabeth Harvery’s Anabel; or Memoirs of a Woman of Fashion, several novels by John Galt and Charles R. Maturin, as well as the first American edition of Charles Brockden Brown’s Jane Talbot and the first English translation of Madame de Stael’s Corinna; or Italy.

I have been assured that the novels in the Stonehill Collection can be made available on Interlibrary Loan upon request. Those who are interested should communicate directly with Miss Margaret G. Plumb, Associate Librarian, Hunter College, 696 Park Avenue, New York City.
DOCTORAL THESSES IN THE VICTORIAN PERIOD

GENERAL TOPICS:
Primitivism and the Exotic Women in English Fiction, 1837-1914. (Kenneth W. Scott, N.Y.U.)
Victorian Verse Humor as a Literary Mode. (Donald J. Gray, Ohio State, 1866)

TOPICS ON PARTICULAR AUTHORS:
The Diaries of Matthew Arnold: A Transcription and Commentary. (William B. Guthrie, Virginia, 1987)
A Study of Genre and Techniques in George Borrow. (Robert Meyers, Washington University, 1957)
The Italian Appreciation of Robert Browning as Man and Poet, 1887-1953. (Blaise J. Opulente, St. John's University, 1956)
The Imagery of Carlyle. (John W. Lindberg, Wisconsin, 1958)
Arthur Hugh Clough, Man and Poet: A Revaluation. (Michael Tisko, Wisconsin, 1958)
The Reception of Joseph Conrad's Works in England and America during His Lifetime. (Henry Van Slooten, Southern California, 1958)
Imagery as a Narrative Technique in Four Novels of Dickens. (Sister Marian Sharples, Southern California, 1957)
Repetition of Symbols in Dickens' Early Novels. (James Gottshall, Cincinnati, 1956)
Italian Influences on George Eliot. (Gennaro Santangelo, North Carolina)
Structure and Symbolism in the Works of John Galsworthy. (Earl Stevens, North Carolina)
George Gissing's Literary Reputation. (Justus C. Drake, Duke, 1957)
The Influence of Benjamin Jowett on Victorian Men of Letters. (Henry W. Prahl, Wisconsin, 1956)
The "Contemporary" Novels of Charles Kingsley. (Hubert E. K. Hall, Southern California, 1957)
George Meredith's Conception of Philosophy in Piction. (Jean A. Howard, Ohio State, 1956)
William Morris and the Epic Tradition. (Frederick S. Bromberger, Southern California, 1956)
A Concordance and Vocabulary Study of Swinburne's Poetry to 1866. (John C. Mullen, Duke, 1957)
The Relationship of the Works of Algernon Charles Swinburne to Those of Theodore Watts-Dunton. (Tom J. Truss, Jr., Wisconsin, 1956)
Thackeray as a Social Critic. (Edward R. Easton, Columbia, 1957)
The Novels of Frances Trollope. (Paul Bowerman, Southern California, 1957)

EDITORIAL NOTES

THE FIRST two papers printed in this issue of VNL were read at the Chicago meeting of MLA at Christmas. ... WE HAVE had some FIFTY subscribers to VNL since the last issue. ... SOME REACTIONS to the new format of VNL: "Congratulations on the Victorian Newsletter in its new format. It looks interesting." "Warmest congratulations on VNL! ... Your choice of format seems to me highly acceptable." "First let me congratulate you upon Number 8 of The Victorian Newsletter, which reached me recently. It is a most interesting and valuable publication—and what a handsome appearance it makes!" "I was very glad to receive a copy of The Victorian Newsletter, which looks attractive in its new format." "May I quickly yield to an impulse to write, praising The Victorian Newsletter of 'Autumn 1955'?" ... It should be stated, in all honesty, that the proper recipient of this praise is Miss Julia Augustoni, of the New York University Print Shop, who is directly responsible for the "new look" of VNL. ... RESPONSES to the proposal (VNL, Autumn, 1955) that English X sponsor a book of essays, prepared under the supervision of a senior Victorian scholar, which would do justice to the importance of 1856: "Your proposal that we celebrate 1859 in 1858 with a book of essays appeals to me very much. I hope that you will continue to push the project." "I was interested in your suggestion about an 1859 project for the English X group of MLA. I have been collecting references to events in 1859 for a dozen years, originally with the plan of making a book, but I would be glad to pool some of the material in a cooperative project." "If I particularly approve of your suggestion of a cooperative project on the year 1859. Indeed I trust this will be but the beginning of other group projects. The difficulty of organizing a true group project is evidenced by our failure up to now to bring one off. Perhaps what we need is a Victorian Institute. The physicists do it and the social scientists seem to be able to work together. I suppose we share somewhat the isolation of the creative artists we study, but we certainly are rugged individualists. But 1859 might show us new ways to pool our research efforts. Let me urge you to push this idea and to offer any cooperation I can give. ..." - BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF STUDIES IN VICTORIAN LITERATURE FOR THE TEN YEARS 1945-1954, to be published in June by the University of Illinois Press. Editor: Austin Wright. List Price: $5.00. In this volume are collected and reproduced by photolithography the annual Victorian Bibliographies, for the decade covered, published in the May issues of Modern Philology. The original pagination has been inserted at the bottom of the page. There is
a thorough index containing in a single alphabetical arrangement the names of modern scholars whose books and articles have been listed in the annual issues, the names of Victorian figures who have been the subjects of these studies or who are mentioned in any way, and certain topical entries comprising periodicals, selected place names, and a selected number of headings relating to literature and economic, political, and social background. PLEASE see that your college library buys a copy; and if anything remains after the grocery bill is paid, why not buy a copy yourself? There is little likelihood that anyone will make money from this publication, and undoubtedly all of us in English X would like to see the University of Illinois go as little as possible into the hole on a publication which the Press is undertaking as a sort of contribution to our general welfare. REVIEWS of recent books and articles on matters Victorian will form a conspicuous part of the Autumn VNL. Reviews of all sorts are invited from readers.

ENGLISH X NEWS

OFFICERS:
Chairman, Francis E. Mineka (Cornell); Secretary, Jerome H. Buckley (Columbia).
Advisory and Nominating Committee: Richard D. Altick (Ohio State, Ch.); Karl Litzenberg (Michigan); Edgar Johnson (CCNY); Carl R. Woodring (Wisconsin); Francis E. Mineka (Cornell, ex officiis).
1956 Program Committee: Bernard N. Schilling (Rochester, Ch.); G. Robert Stange (Minnesota); John E. Tilford (Emory).
Bibliography Committee: Austin Wright (Carnegie Tech, Ch.); William D. Templeman (So. California); Francis G. Townsend (Ohio State); Roma A. King (Michigan); Catherine W. McCue (Boston College); Robert C. Slack (Carnegie Tech).

"At the time of going to press, the editor had learned that Professor Austin Wright had resigned as Chairman of the Bibliography Committee and editor of the annual Victorian Bibliography. He had heard, too, that the officers had unanimously decided to ask Professor Francis G. Townsend (Ohio State) to be his successor. He had not, however, had time to learn whether or not Professor Townsend had accepted the editorship.

We are grateful to Professor Wright for many years of excellent work on the Victorian Bibliography. His has been, without much doubt, the most demanding post in English X. We thank him heartily for the profit which we have derived from his most conscientious labors.

PROGRAM FOR 1956:
Contrary to the practice of previous years, no special theme or topic has been assigned for the papers to be read at the Christmas, 1956 meeting of MLA-English X (in Washington). Members are therefore invited by the Program Committee to send whatever papers they consider appropriate. The Chairman writes: "The suggestions so far include Hardy, G. M. Hopkins, and T. L. Peacock—sufficiently various, to be sure!" Papers should be addressed to Professor Bernard N. Schilling, Department of English, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York. The absolute deadline is 10 September; but to have all papers in hand by mid-summer would facilitate the work of the committee, whose members are separated by many hundreds of miles.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS: A SELECTED LIST
(Compiled by Oscar Mauzer, University of Texas)

GENERAL


CRITICISM AND LITERARY HISTORY. Jackson I. Cope, "An Early Analysis of The Victorian Age' in Literature," NLB (January), pp. 14-17. George Lillie Craik was among the first to survey the "Victorian Age" as a socio-literary phenomenon (1861).


Humphry House, All in Due Time. Hart-Davis. Collected essays and broadcast talks, on Dickens, Ibsen, and others, Rev. TLS (Nov. 25), p. 706.


Gladstone vs. Disraeli.


W. S. Scott, Green Retreats: A History of Tavistock Gardens, Odhams.


AUTHORS

Lionel Kochan, "Acton on History." Deutsch. Rev. by David Mathew, Blackfriars, XXXVI, 300-301.


W. Stacy Johnson, "Parallel Imagery in Arnold and Clough." English Studies: Amsterdam (February), pp. 1-11. The two writers were more important to each other poetically than has often been thought.


F. E. L. Priestley, "A Reading of ‘In a Glass Room.’" Unv. of Toronto Quarterly (October), pp. 47-59. Like Blouym, Browning is reticent (even in this personal utterance) about the deeper grounds for his faith.

Jerome Thale, "Browning’s Popularity and the Spasmodic Poets." JBQ (July), pp. 349-54. Hobbs, Nobbs, Stokes and Dobell are identified with Bailey, Dobell, and Smith.


Carlisie Moore, "Interpretation and the Problem of Carlyle’s Conversion." PMLA (September), pp. 682-81. A noteworthy study of Carlyle’s “crisis” and “centre of indifference.”

Susan Ades, "Unpublished Letters of Thomas Carlyle." PMLA (September), pp. 878-84. Three of the letters, written to Geraldine Jewsbury in 1840, are of especial interest.


DICKENS, Arthur A. Adrian, "Dickens and the Brick-and-Mortar Sects." NCP (December), pp. 188-201. On Dickens’s animus against masons and Dissenters.


George H. Ford, Dickens and His Readers: Aspects of Novel-Criticism since 1836. Princeton, Rev. ELIOT, IV, 2, 1953, pp. 267-70. A valuable account, based on m.s. material.


Edward Wagenknecht, "Dickens in fellow’s Letters and Journals," Dickensian (December), pp. 7-18. A valuable account, based on m.s. material.

ELIOT, Gordon S. Haight, ed., The George Eliot Letters, Vols. IV-VII. Yale, Rev. by Lionel Trilling, NCP (Dec. 18), p. 1. This invaluable collection is now complete. The final volume contains judgments on George Eliot’s and George Lewes’s literary earnings, and a full index.

Barbara Hardy, "Imagery in George Eliot’s Last Novels." MLN (July), pp. 6-14.


SPENCER. Andre Maurois, "La Vieillesse d'Herbert Spencer," Revue de Paris (February), pp. 8-16.

Includes hitherto unpublished diary kept by Fanny Stevenson, 1890-94.


TENNISON. Edward Engelberg, "The Beast Image in Tennyson's "Idylls of the King." III, XXII, 287-92. Unity of structure and dramatic intensity in the Idyls are strengthened by beast imagery.
Betty Miller, "Tennyson and the Sinful Queen," Twentieth Century, CLVIII, 355-63. No other poetry (said Mr. Auden, speaking of Tennyson) is easier, and less illuminating, to psychoanalyse. But Betty Miller's article is none the less illuminating to the reader of Guineweere.
Margaret Munsterberg, "Letters from Lady Tennyson," Boston Public Library Quarterly (October), pp. 175-91. Eighty autograph letters from Emily Tennyson to Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Gatty with sidelights on the poet's home life and temperament.

THACKERAY. Morchard Bishop, "Emily Fotheringay and Ellen Ternan," TLS (Jan. 27), p. 60.


Constantia Maxwell, "Anthony Trollope and Ireland," Dublin Mag. (Oct.-Dec.), pp. 6-16


PROJECTS — REQUESTS FOR AID

ROBERT BROWNING. John Fleming is preparing an essay on Browning and the fine arts, and would like to trace the whereabouts of the paintings collected by the poet at Casa Guidi. TLS (Jan. 20), p. 37.

THOMAS CARLYLE. Charles R. Sanders is making a systematic study of Carlyle's letters, and asks information which will help in completing a chronological file of copies of the original autographs. TLS (Aug. 26), p. 493.


AMY LEVY. Mrs. Beth-Zion Abrahams is collecting material for a biography of Amy Levy (1861-89), poet and novelist. TLS (Nov. 11), p. 673.

H. W. MASSINGHAM. J. W. Robertson Scott is writing a third volume of recollections of a long life in journalism; it will deal especially with Massingham, a notable late Victorian editor. TLS (Oct. 7), p. 589.

QUIDA. Monica Stirling is planning a biography. TLS (Aug. 26), p. 493.

JOHN RUSKIN. The Morgan Library has recently acquired a collection of Ruskin letters which it plans to edit and publish. TLS (Jan. 13), p. 21.

LESLIE STEPHEN. Brother Francis Emery is engaged in research on the literary criticism of Stephen. TLS (Dec. 16), p. 761.

WESTMINSTER REVIEW. Rosemary Van Arsdel is making a study of the Review, especially for the years 1837-1895. TLS (Jan. 6), p. 7.