# The Victorian Newsletter

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To examine the "thought" of Anthony Trollope should not, it would seem, take very long; he has been said so often to be no "thinker," no "philosopher." He may be wonderfully good at this, that or the other, but "abstract thought" is beyond him. It may even be granted that he is the most subtle of psychologists, but he is still somehow philosophically naïve. He may be the most acute observer of man in relationship to institutions, and yet he has no philosophy of that relationship. It would seem that he suffers from some grave intellectual disability, however vivid his characters, however lively his dialogue, however captivating his presentation of moral problems.

I propose, rather, that he is intellectually sophisticated; that he has a "philosophy" or a philosophical attitude that is anything but naïve; that it is discoverable, and that it is well to discover it, for it shapes his art. The nature of the philosophy may seem at first a little difficult to determine if one looks for a system. And it would seem that literary critics do look for a system. Some of the comments on Trollope as non-thinker seem to imply that we can expect a systematic philosophy from any artist worth his salt. Professional philosophers do not, I believe, expect so much from philosophy. I think it can be shown that Trollope's own position consists in antisystematism, and that it is a deliberate, considered position, and that it is in itself basic to an extraordinarily humane artistic product.

Trollope wrote more criticism than other Victorian novelists, and we have an abundance of material from which to deduce his views. Of all this, the most useful may be his two-volume study of Cicero. He wrote it between 1877 and 1880, probably the period of his ripest thought and greatest artistic power. It belongs to the same period as his Autobiography, and it is hardly to be preferred to the Autobiography in general interest. But where the Autobiography is informal, intimate and off-the-cuff, the Cicero is carefully considered and deliberate. Where the Autobiography was written to be published after his death, the Cicero is a piece of scholarship that Trollope was ready to be answerable for. It is certainly his longest literary study, and it is also, I believe, the occasion of his most considered and direct statements on life and art and morals. The novels themselves are certainly the richest statement of his views, but here, in the Cicero, I think one may find the literal and discursive formulation of the attitudes that make the novels what they are.

Trollope's basic devotion to Cicero arises from a basic sympathy and admiration for the way he lived, the way he wrote and the way he thought. Cicero lived homme engagé to the utmost, loving politics, law, dinner parties, talk and writing. However he may seem to have veered in his allegiances in that critical time when the balance of power shifted with violent rapidity, the case can be made that he acted always with the most unwavering devotion to the public good. Trollope makes such a case for him and is supported in it by many classical specialists. Trollope loves the "divine felicity" of Cicero's writing, whether it is the rhetorical brilliance of his oratory, the sublimity of things like "Scipio's Dream," the combination of erudition with ironic play in the dialogues or the intimate honesty and wit of the letters. The way he thought is presumably the control of all this, and it is his way of thought, what Trollope called "the way his thoughts turned on the quick pivot on which his mind was balanced," that concerns us most.

It is a moot point whether we can call it philosophy; as the word philosophy shifts in usage, so have the assessments of Cicero as philosopher. We can nevertheless categorize to some extent. There are two questions that have been at times confused: one, what are his services to the discipline of philosophy? and two, what is his own original thought? His services to philosophy are inestimable. His aim was to make available in Latin the best thought of those persistent thinkers, the Greeks. What he gives us are summaries, with his own comments, of all the Greek schools; and, for the most part, we do not have his originals to check him on. Fortunately, he himself is our source for much late Greek philosophy. It is an interesting irony that Cicero's style preserved for posterity the thought of philosophers who generally on principle repudiated literary values. Then, because Cicero has given us the greater part of our philosophical terms, as he translated or imported Greek words into Latin, he has controlled our thinking to an extent impossible to assess. He himself was a man much aware of the interdependence between res and verba, and his verba have, will we nils we, shaped our res. One may

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attack any proposition of Cicero’s, but it is likely that one will have to do it in Cicero’s terms.

To determine his own philosophy proper, in the old sense, is not easy. The list of his works that involve philosophy is long, and most of them are in the form of dialogue, with much dramatic play between speakers. He generally allows each school the best possible rationale, through the voices of his charming and persuasive friends. Cicero’s legal art made him adept at putting the case for any view, and likewise adept at finding the loopholes in any case. Herein lie the interest and delight of these philosophical discourses, and herein also lies the difficulty of determining his own thought. He has been all things to all men; in his works one can find a statement to support almost anything. And yet this is a clue to his quality. The only school he can safely be assigned to is the New Academy of Socrates. The principle of the New Academy, and of Socrates, is to argue against every proposition and to pronounce positively on nothing. The only certainty is that the wise man suspends judgment; he nurtures the skeptical mind. It is true that the New Academy might, then, be better characterized as a perennial attitude rather than a “school.” Yet even today the attitude constitutes something of a school: the school of those linguistic philosophers who oppose themselves to the formalism of logical positivism. Their activity often actually seems to consist in begging questions. And hence it is that “philosophy,” now as for Socrates, can denote not so much a content but a method.

Cicero can best be thought of as the proponent of a method, and in this he is antisytematic, antitheoretical and antidogmatic. He makes fun of the Stoics, for instance, for even among themselves they agree on very little; and, as he points out with stunning logic, the contradictory factions within the Stoic fold cannot all be right, and only one can possibly be right. He adds, moreover, that probably none is right. It would seem that no theory whatsoever is unassailable, and therefore Cicero reprobates theory as such. In all this, Cicero typifies the Roman way, only that he is perhaps the most articulate Roman of them all. He speaks for the practical Roman rather than for the idealistic Greek, more realistic than theoretical, more human than philosophical. His most knowledgeable critics are agreed that his original contribution to philosophy is really a division of the field into two, the first, speculation on abstract problems, and the second, the consideration of human affairs. In the one, abstract speculation, scepticism is proper; but in the other, all matters of ethics, morals or duty, there must be dogmatism. Philosophical speculation may be a delightful exercise, but the study of ethics is man’s pressing need. And, when 

Cicero expounds duty, there is no equivocation. So Trollope finds in Cicero a strain that speaks to the Victorian; he finds a sense of duty as strong as George Eliot’s. “Duty! How peremptory and absolute!” And he finds it combined with the urbanity he especially loves and generally finds lacking in his earnest contemporaries.

There is no question that Trollope apprehends the significance of Cicero’s position. Cicero takes us, Trollope says, “Out of dead intellectuality—into moral perception” (I, 8, 31). That he was perfectly learned, Trollope has no doubt. “He had been in the schools at Athens, and had learned it all” (II, 279). He tells us the circumstances of Cicero’s philosophical writing. It was his terrible year, near the end of his life, when he was cut off from politics and even from his books, as well as heart-broken over the death of his daughter; it is supposed that it was to console himself that he wrote philosophy. Trollope comments:

As we read these works, we lose ourselves in admiration of his memory; we are astonished at the industry which he exhibits; we are delighted by his perspicacity; and feel ourselves relieved amid the crowd of names and theories by flashes of his wit; but there comes home to us, as a result, the singular fact of a man playing with these theories as the most interesting sport the world had produced, but not believing the least in any of them. (II, 288)

The theories are simply irrelevant.

Out of all the sixty-four years of his life he devoted one to this philosophy ... and so lived during all these years, even including that one, as to show how little hold philosophy had upon his conduct. ... (II, 279)

I have great doubt whether consolation in sorrow is to be found in philosophy, but I have none as to the finding of it in writing philosophy. (II, 290)

The consolation, of course, lies in the work. The philosophy itself is a dead end and can help us not at all in what concerns us most.

When Trollope makes the point that Cicero was committed to no school, he makes a particularly revealing comment: “He was too honest, too wise, too civilized, too modern for that” (II, 277). When he says Cicero was too honest to adhere to any system, is he not saying that for himself it would be dishonest to adhere to any system? When he says Cicero was too wise to adhere to any system, is he not saying that his own intellect rejects it? Then, when he says Cicero was “too civilized, too modern” to adhere to any systematic philosophy, surely it is clear that Trollope himself considers it both naïve and outworn. Trollope is always too modest or too given to understatement to proclaim an intellectual su-
periority, but I think it is nevertheless true that he felt himself above and beyond "philosophy." Cicero takes us, he says, "Out of dead intellectuality—into moral perception," and this is precisely what Trollope would do in the novels. Those critics who complain of Trollope's lack of "philosophy" are demanding what Trollope would have called "dead intellectuality." His novels do, in fact, deflate intellectuality, by the presentation of actual cases which negate commonly accepted theories, or systems or precepts. Trollope demonstrates that absolves cannot fail us in the affairs of life and can even betray us into uncharity. *Humanitas* or charity is the basis of both Cicero's and Trollope's commitment to life as against abstraction. Trollope loves Cicero as Erasmus did, "not only for the divine felicity of his style but for the sanctity of his heart and morals" (I, 123). Absolute principle must be tested by empirical morality: *is this action right in this case?* Does it harm more than it helps? Does a certain end justify certain means? And so on. We must take each case as it comes and bend principle or precept to suit it, and it is the case that constitutes the Trollopian novel. The business of ethics is not easy, for there are few black-and-white situations. And yet ethics is the business of man.

The book where Cicero makes ethics most specifically his business is the one Trollope admires beyond all others. It is the *De Officiis*, the treatise Cicero writes in *propr ia persona* to his son *propr ius persona*, and it Cicero addresses himself not to those easy cases like murder or theft where all men agree on the evil, but to the difficult ones, the moral dilemmas, where the course of virtue is obscure. The importance of the *De Officiis* in Trollope's work is inestimable. He devotes high praise and considerable commentary to it. When he explicates *honestum*, the central concept of the treatise, he gives in effect that definition of the concept of the "gentleman" that he impatiently refuses us in the *Autobiography*. The concept is a sort of extension of Christian virtues into manners and action and is central to the whole of the moral vision of his work. Even the structure of the *De Officiis* supplies the structure for many of the situations in the novels. Cicero contrasts *honestum* with *turpe*, and Trollope is often concerned to determine whether the right course demands positive action, or whether mere inaction is sufficiently better than wrong-doing. His *Cousin Henry* is the most precise example of a study of this *turpe* as opposed to *honestum*. In this short novel everything is focused on the single significant case. Henry takes no evil action; but, by failing to take the virtuous action, he commits a wrong that makes him despicable. The problem extends itself in the longer "panoramic" novel, *The Way We Live Now*, where *turpe* takes many forms in many cases, and Trollope seems concerned to show how much moral evil springs from mere silent acquiescence in slight evils. (Even this title, *The Way We Live Now*, is, I think, an echo of Cicero's phrase *sic viviunt.*)

A second large subhead in the *De Officiis* is the relating of *honestum* to *utile*; and this relationship is a recurrent and endlessly interesting theme in Trollope, as he takes up those many cases where principle and expediency seem to be at odds, in courtships, in law, in problems of Church and government. Moral perception, it seems, is to be arrived at only through the most meticulous consideration of the individual case, all sides of it, its history, the motivation of each agent involved, the results of action or inaction, repercussions in all directions. Trollope displays particularly those interesting cases that force us to turn back and reexamine our moral principles. The French psychologist Frédéric Paulhan observes that all ethical precepts are like absentee landlords, "préfets d'un gouvernement lointain"; and so are all "virtue," "points of honor," all special or systematic ethics. Trollope is on the spot, flouting the absentee landlord with the facts of the case. Sins are evils—that is a "truth" and a principle. And yet certainly the world is a better place for the presence of a certain sinner we know: Septimus Harding. Forgery offends man and the law, but Lady Mason commits her crime of forgery out of love only. Men want wives to be faithful, but Louis Trevelyan wants nothing more in the whole world than to prove his wife guilty of adultery. Of course stealing is evil; and yet Josiah Crawley, a clergyman whose great probity graces his calling and his church, has done that which is virtually stealing. "You must look to the circumstances," insists Roberts in the novel, in regard to this painfully ambivalent case of Crawley. And "You must look to the circumstances," Trollope is insisting, always, throughout his work. This is really why Trollope's work is so "circumstantial," so involved with minutiae of psychology and manners. For these minutiae can concretely, in certain cases, twist moral perspectives in surprising ways. Virtue is seldom a matter of black and white, as popular morality holds it to be, and, like Cicero in the *De Officiis*, Trollope chooses to examine those cases where it is least a matter of black and white; above all he tends to moral dilemmas, the most difficult cases of all, where principle is demonstrably inadequate and our understanding of things must be

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extended. To determine virtue is the only concern really worthy of our study, and it is, in a way, the only interesting study. Trollope’s concern is always moral, and he is always insisting on a flexible morality.

If morals are always a relative matter, where then can we find any certainty? The certainty has to be an empirical one. And Trollope found in Cicero a satisfactory statement of this sole certainty. It was not to be found in any formal “philosophy,” Trollope insists, but he speaks of Cicero’s “true philosophy,” that was “the real guide of his life.”

“Among things which are honest,” he [Cicero] says, “there is nothing which shines so brightly and so widely as that brotherhood between man, that agreement as to what may be useful to all, and that general love for the human race. It comes from our original condition, in which children are loved by their parents; and then binding together the family, it spreads itself abroad among relations, connections, friends, and neighbors. Then it includes citizens and those who are our allies. At last it takes in the whole human race, and that feeling of the soul arises which, giving every man his own, and defending by equal laws the rights of each, is called justice.” It matters little how may have been introduced this great secret which Christ afterward taught, and for which we look in vain through the writings of all the philosophers. It comes here simply from Cicero himself in the midst of his remarks on the new Academy, but it gives the lesson which had governed his life: “I will do unto others as I would they should do unto me.” In this is contained the rudiments of that religion which has served to soften the hearts of us all. It is of you I must think, and not of myself.4

This brings us to Trollope’s religious thought, which is the perfect counterpart of his philosophy. In philosophy he is antisytematic; in religion he is antitheological and antidiortinaire. We know him to be a good Anglican, and it is important to try to ascertain the precise nature of his Anglicanism. It all squares, oddly enough, with the most pervasive scepticism. First of all, he is sceptical about the intellect itself. Repeatedly in the novels he says of one character or another “he thought that he thought.” Generally this occurs when the character has a set piece of “thinking” to do, a decision to make, and it is this crisis that reveals “thinking” as something not quite what we generally—in our pride—understand it to be.

After some loose fashion we turn things over in our mind and ultimately reach some decision, guided probably by our feelings at the last moment rather than by any process of ratiocination;—and then we think that we have thought. But to follow out one argument to an end, and then to found on the base so reached the commencement of another, is not common to us.5

Logical thought processes, then, do not seem to serve us much. Indeed, Trollope insists on man’s irrationality, on his perversity, absurdity, even the element of the demonic —this last in some of his most interesting studies: Trevelyan, Kennedy, Vavasoar, Chilern and Josiah Crawley. One of his favorite tag lines is Ovid’s, “I knew and prove the better course and yet I take the worse.” The most extreme cases are suicides, which he makes his study in several novels, with the most searching care. The perversity of mankind seems to be of the essence. He says, again in his Cicero: “Men are unable to fathom their own desires, and fail to govern themselves by the wisdom which is at their finger’s ends” (I, 286).

From a writer with so vivid a sense of man’s irrationality, one can hardly expect much weight to be attached to man’s “beliefs.” We might rather expect him to say with Keats, “I have never yet been able to perceive how anything can be known for truth by consecutive reasoning.” Again it is in his Cicero that Trollope makes a very revealing statement in this connection: he is speaking of honesty and the special cases where it is difficult to determine. “To this day it is very difficult even for an honourable man to tell the whole truth in the varying circumstances of public life. The establishment even of a theory of truth, with all the advantages which have come to us from Christianity, has been so difficult—hitherto so imperfect....” (II, 33). It seems to me that for Trollope even to speak of the concept “a theory of truth” reveals then and there that he does not admit any truth as absolute. This in itself is a clear declaration of relativism. And, if there is no absolute truth that we can know, why, then, religious doctrine, and theology as absolute, are not really of much moment. We speak of “belief,” but we do not mean by it so much as we think we mean. For, says Trollope,

It is very hard to come at the actual belief of any man. Indeed how should we hope to do so when we find it so very hard to come at our own? How many are there among us who, in this matter of our religion, which of all things is the most important to us, could take pen


5. The Way We Live Now, chap. XCIII. See also: Castle Richmond, IX; The Warden, X; Doctor Thorne, XIV; Rachel Ray, XXVII: The Prime Minister, II; Sir Harry Hotspur of Humberthwaite, XX; Kept in the Dark, XII; An Old Man’s Love, IV; Ayala’s Angel, XLI.
in hand and write down even for their own information exactly what they themselves believe? Not very many clergymen even... .

This passage comes from his sketches of the Clergymen of the Church of England. But then the novels tell us a great deal. Often we find in them an ironic deflation of "belief" as such. In Marion Fay, religion itself is referred to as a "tone of mind" (chap. XVI). In the same novel, the charming young agnostic Lord Hampstead, who has fallen in love with a devout Quaker-cum-Anglican, flaunts his tolerance:

With all my self-assurance I never dare to tamper with the religious opinions of those who are younger or weaker than myself. I feel that they at any rate are safe if they are in earnest. No-one, I think, has ever been put in danger by believing Christ to be a God.

Hampstead's friend, young Roden, who may look a little familiar to us, being a Post Office Clerk with a "laugh in his eye," answers him: "They none of them know what they believe. Nor do you or I. Men talk of belief as though it were a settled thing. It is so with but few; and that only with those who lack imagination" (chap. XVI). This remark pushes things rather far. "Those who lack imagination" must be those whose views are limited, who have failed to account for certain contradictions involved in the human condition. And yet, although "belief" and "truth" cannot be absolute, religion is still "of all things the most important to us" (chap. XVI). It must be, if not absolute, a "tone of mind," our own empirical sense of humanitas, of honestum, that "true philosophy" of Cicero's, whose essence is concern for others, a concern that starts with our domestic love and extends itself to the whole of the human race. Trollope can even rationalize the idea of Christ, taking it not as absolute truth but as a fact of human psyche. His Josiah Crawley is moved at the time of the death of the dreadful Mrs. Proudie to these observations:

No doubt the finite and meagre nature of our feelings does prevent us from extending our sympathies to those whom we have not seen in the flesh. It should not be so, and would not with one who had nurtured his heart with proper care... . But do not suppose, sir, that I complain of this man or that woman because his sympathies, or hers, run out of that course which my reason tells me they should hold. The man with whom it would not be so would simply be a god among men. It is in his perfection as a man that we recognize our necessity for a Christ. (The Last Chronicle of Barset, chap. LXIII)

It does not much matter that it is not Trollope himself speaking here, for the only conclusion we need draw is that Trollope can think in these terms, where many Victorians who agonized over Truth and Doubt could not. It is because he can think of religion in non-absolute terms that he can study its institutional forms with so much detachment and breadth of understanding. For the same reason, he can write with such amusing tenderness of human attitudes, as of Miss Baker and Miss Mackenzie: "They both wished to be religious, having strong faith in the need for the comfort of religion" (Miss Mackenzie, chap. IX). When he writes of how archbishops have given up much of their ancient trappings, the apron, for instance, it is not all to the good, for these trappings induced veneration, and "To be able to venerate is a high quality." That is, the value of veneration is to the men who venerate; the process is psychologically beneficial. And the Church itself has induced in men processes that have been, for the most part, beneficial. In the course of reform abuses are certainly corrected, but we lose something of good, too. Trollope has his own nostalgia for the old faith, but it is not a crippling nostalgia as it is with some Victorians; in Trollope it is mastered by self-mockery. He feels, he says, a nostalgia "for the sweet medieval flavour of old English corruption." When Trollope summarizes what he sees as Cicero's own religion, we see most clearly, I think, his own views on religion as an empiric good. Cicero thought and lived, Trollope feels, according to Christ's teaching. A belief in "the mystical part" of Christianity is "not essential for forming the conduct of men."

Read Cicero's works through from the beginning to the end, and you shall feel that you are living with a man whom you might accompany across the village green to church, should he be kind enough to stay with you over the Sunday. The urbanity, the softness, the humanity, the sweetness are all there. (II, 325-26)

This certainly is a religion of empiricism. "Softness, humanity, sweetness"—these are things proved on our pulses. It may be surprising to find "urbanity" so close to godliness, but then the urbane man is the man who knows there is more than one way of looking at the world, and he is therefore more detached, more disinterested and possibly the more inclined to tolerance and then even to charity. He is as opposed to doctrinaire religion as to doctrinaire philosophy. No one system will satisfy. He will refuse allegiance to those "absentee land-
lords" of abstract principle or ethical precept. He will look at the specific individual instance with a tender casuistry, in the spirit of what is now sometimes called "situational ethics."

The Anglican Church suits Trollope perfectly. It is a church committed from the start, one might say, to "situational ethics," the first insistent and demanding situation being the need of Henry VIII for a divorce. Out of this casuistic beginning there grew, nevertheless, a serviceable church. When it still stood on a ticklish footing, it had the good fortune to be defined by such saintly worthies as Whitgift and Hooker. Its rationale reflects Elizabeth's respect for the privacy of conscience of her subjects; and it was under the aegis of Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* and its rather permissive doctrine that the church became established actually as it was legally. From the beginning it has been a church inclined to tolerant casuistry rather than the Letter of the Law—a Trollopian, an existentialist church. It kept within its fold such as John Wesley, with his strong vocation to go out into the fields and savannahs, and such as Sydney Smith, who found his vocation to consist in dining out. It embraces Dean Arabin and Obadiah Slope, the Red Dean of Canterbury and T. S. Eliot, and now the "heretical" Bishop Pike of California, along with many parsons just as fundamentalist as a Bible Belt Baptist. Shane Leslie, who "went over to Rome," and is something of a connoisseur of churches, writes that "The ideal of the English Church has been to provide a resident gentleman for every parish in the Kingdom, and there have been worse ideals." Trollope would condone this, I think, and would condone the fact of establishment itself, just as Cicero believed religious observance should be supported by the government, "in obedience to the opinion of the people and to the great good of the State."

So Trollope embraced the church that is not so much the Via Media, the Middle Way, as the Many Ways; and to do so was consonant with his antisystematic philosophy. Furthermore, his political position is just as consonant with his philosophy as his religious position. In politics he embraces the many ways, too; he takes up his position under the equivocal banner of "Advanced Conservative Liberal." He is, throughout, as a matter of principle, *uncommitted*, knowingly, purposefully and deliberately. Far from being "no thinker," he is a man of remarkably subtle mind who is able to think along more lines than most of us can. His political thinking is close to that of another subtle and ironic mind—Walter Bagehot. Professor Asa Briggs has indicated the likeness, which is probably even greater than he says. Both Bagehot and Trollope appreciate the "English Constitution" as an absurdity that works. Trollope's demonstration of this idea and the associated ironies of political actualities is nothing short of brilliant. Plantagenet Palliser is the type of Liberal aristocrat who is in fact presiding over the dissolution of the system he profits by, and of which he is the flower. That he and his wife and their circle are as real to us as our friends, and often much better company, makes this ironic truth viable.

Trollope's general uncommittedness, or ironic reservation of judgment, in philosophy, in religion and in politics, is just what gives his art its characteristic excellence. He is at pains to show all sides of the question, with tenderness, vast human sympathy and kindly humor. His worst men have a grain of good in them that demands our sympathy, and his best are not at all ideal, but both lovable and absurd.

In *The American Senator*, Trollope devised a brilliant ironic scheme that in some ways best achieves his artistic ends of the presentation of incongruities. American democracy is the realization of the best political and humanistic thinking of our Western world, and yet the absurd and indefinable English Church and English Constitution are often much more attractive and even, as it works out, often morally superior. The Senator visits England to study her institutions and looks about him with a naïve blandness. We laugh at his naïveté, in his social intercourse with his English friends and in the critical letters that he writes home, but the funniest thing of all is that he is always right in his criticisms. The gentleman hunters have trodden down Farmer Goarly's grain, and this is an abuse, and the Senator is right in taking up Goarly's cause; even though Goarly is not—as the Senator has a right to expect—a poor down-trodden serf, but a conniving scoundrel. The Reverend Mr. Mainwaring obtained his ecclesiastical preferment by what the Senatorrightly appreciates as a palpable abuse: his living was bought for him with his wife's dowry. It seems unfair that the Senator must find that nevertheless Mr. Mainwaring is certainly a force for good in the community. A certain pocket borough has survived the great Reform Bill, the Senator is shocked to find. But then the M.P., chosen by the great lord in whose pocket the borough is, is an excellent public servant, while the man of the people who contests the election is an unprincipled demagogue, and one would fear to see any power

9. Quoted by André Maurois as an epigraph to chap. IX of *Les silences du colonel Bramble*.

in his hands. The Senator inclines to see the evil principle, and the stupid English incline to see the good-enough actuality. We laugh at the Senator’s absurdities, and the Senator makes us laugh at our own. He is himself the naïve eiron, a variant form of Socrates himself, who forces upon us a realization of the incongruities in our institutions and ourselves. To be human is to be absurd. It is also, sometimes, to be good.

Trollope’s antisytematic philosophy has on the one hand its ethics: the ethics of the case, a “situational ethics,” relative, tolerant, charitable, always concerned to ascertain moral good. It has, on the other hand, an aesthetics also, an aesthetics, we might say, of the case, a situational aesthetics. The specific, peculiar, individuated case is the matrix of the Trollopian novel. This is one way of saying that Trollope is a realist; by giving us a strong sense of particular people in particular circumstances he achieves in his novels what we can call the “sense of life.” We can trust him not to let his characters do what they would not do. They may be examples of types, as we all are, but their specific qualities are not sacrificed to their typical qualities. They are not sacrificed to absolute plot, either. His marvels of creative psychology are the artistic counterpart of a philosophy that negates system by insisting on individuals.

In these days we cannot consider such a position without calling it existential. And, if we take existentialism in its broad sense, as the doctrine according to which existence takes precedence over essence, then Trollope is an existentialist. He stands for the reaction of the philosophy of man against the philosophy of ideas; he opposes to absolute system, absolute existence. He is a moral philosopher, a humanist, advocating and delighting in engagement and condemning speculation. He poses that man is not primarily a reasonable being but an incarnate being. He rejects the absolute for the relative.\textsuperscript{11}

Trollope’s relativism may seem somewhat surprising in one considered so conventional an Anglican, and yet, oddly, it is this very relativism that leads him to support of convention. In the face of lack of absolute truth, our strength lies in convention: in institutions like Church and Parliament, in codes of manners, in concepts like that of the gentleman, in the sense of the continuity of man’s history that is called “humanism.” It may be that Trollope’s novels are satisfactory now, not because they afford “escape” from our twentieth-century hurly-burly, but because they are based in a philosophical orientation that is valid to us now. It is not so much that ultimate reality is dead, but it is not really interesting. In the words of one professional philosopher:

When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day.\textsuperscript{12}

This is John Dewey, who would have us “acknowledge that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions.” If we acknowledge this, then Anthony Trollope is the most philosophical of novelists.

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Disraeli and the “Baronial Principle”:
Some Versions of Romantic Medievalism

\textit{Bernard McCabe}

“Don’t you dote upon the Middle Ages, Mr. Carker?”

“Very much indeed,” said Mr. Carker.

“Such charming times!” cried Cleopatra. “So full of faith! so vigorous and forcible! So picturesque! So perfectly removed from the commonplace! Oh dear! If they would only leave us a little more poetry of existence in these terrible days! . . . How dreadfully we have degenerated!”

“Yes, we have fallen off deplorably,” said Mr. Carker.

\textit{Dickens laughed broadly at contemporary attachments to romantic medievalism in Dombey and Son (1846-}

\textsuperscript{11}. The descriptions of existentialism in this paragraph are from the \textit{Grand Larousse, under existentialisme.}

1848); today we are more serious, we try to understand how these late ensembments liberated Victorian imaginations. "Escapism," the "protest of withdrawal," such phrases no longer seem adequate. We know that quite serious aesthetic, religious, social and political ideas first emerged in this fancy dress. Gothic revivalism in the Church, for instance, had a fully serious issue in the Oxford Movement. Ruskin's extravagant aesthetic neo-Gothicism turned to social criticism and ended in William Morris's left-wing political activism. In Disraeli's political novels, *Contingens* (1844) and *Sybil* (1845), both rich in the medievalizing spirit, one can find not only a much earlier, even prophetic, political flourish coming from the romantic right, but also an imaginative commitment that, despite its manifest absurdities, was also a source of serious insights into the age.

These two *romans à thèse* go beyond mere clever factionalism to present a very well-informed account and critique of the forces at play in early Victorian public life: *Contingens*'s account of politics from the inside, *Sybil*'s added weight of social commentary. Yet the novels are still (it's the familiar Disraelian dilemma) puzzlingly non-serious. The informed intelligence is there, but also there is that odd mixture of fantasy, sentiment and idiosyncratic politics and history associated with the medievalizing Young England movement.

Young England, partly literary, partly social, partly political, flourished in the early eighteen-forties. Disraeli quickly became its leader, but it began among a group of young Tory Cambridge undergraduates who felt that their aristocratic party had lost its bearings under the middle-class Sir Robert Peel. They were romantic radicals, following a line traceable through Burke (*The Constitution of Church and State*), Coleridge (the *Lay Sermons*) and Southey (the *Colloquies*), admiring the younger Pitt and Canning, and indulging a Charles-the-Martyn kind of royalism. They were also romantic medievalists, feeling, as Mr. Carker did not, that England had fallen off deplorably. So they were vaguely, and vulnerably, enthusiastic about the lost Merrie England, a land full of knights who knew about nobssete oblige and peasants who contentedly knew their place. Young England adopted the religious attitudes that went with neo-

Gothic taste; their leaders, Lord John Manners and George Smythe (later Lord Strangford) had both been friends of the then Tractarian Frederick Faber, and through Kenelm Digby and Ambrose Lisle Phillips knew Pugin and the Earl of Shrewsbury's architectural Gothic revivalism.

What was the middle-aged Disraeli up to, cavorting with this eager band of romantic idealists? No doubt he found them attractive as personalities—young, enthusiastic, aristocratic, literary, rich—they must have seemed like recreations of his own earlier fictions, the Young Duke and Contarini Fleming. He probably felt they would, as newly elected M.P.'s, be useful in his coming parliamentary struggle with Peel. Certainly their political outlook broadly coincided with, and no doubt was largely formed by, the journalism he had produced in the thirties, notably in *The Vindication of the English Constitution* (1835) and his Carlylean *The Letters of Rummy madre* (1836). Here Disraeli had defended the peerage, attacked the people as a political entity and proclaimed his new Tory faith in a nation ruled by the Three Estates under a revitalized monarchy.

Disraeli's political polemic was serious in the *Vindication*, and it reappears in *Contingens* and *Sybil*. But what about the rest of the Young England position? Take religion, for instance, and the strong Catholic element in the movement. He liked it as a "romantic" and "alien" religion, and in a very different way he liked its associations with the oldest English land-owning aristocracy; all his novels are sprinkled with names like Dacre, Arundel, Tichborne, Trafford, Vavasour—the names of the old "reusant" English families. But (although of course he was on the side of the angels) Disraeli's religious views always remained enigmatic. "The juxtaposition of Newman and Disraeli cannot be thought of without a smile," said Froude. "Fuller self-knowledge," he goes on unhappily to remark, "would have told him that the friend of D'Orsay and Lady Blessington, of Tom D unwomb and Lytton Bulwer, was an absurd associate in an ecclesiastical and social revival." Yet *Contingens* and *Sybil* are full of hints that the fuller self-knowledge is there, appearing as a sort of self-deprecating irony. The same is true of many other aspects of the Young England theme.

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2. A favorite textbook was Kenelm Digby's *The Broad Stone of Honour* (1848), a curious early herald of the Victorian version of the Middle Ages, dedicated to "the gentlemen of England," exhorting them to be "worthy their order in dignity and religion, virtue and accomplishment."
3. These writings are reprinted in *Whigs and Whiggism*, Political Writings by Benjamin Disraeli, ed. William Hutchison (New York, 1914).
4. As early as 1824 one reads this note in his diaries: "Ghent. Sunday. Cathedral High Mass. Clouds of incense and one of Mozart's sublime masses... The effect inconceivably grand. The host raised, and I flung myself to the ground."
The personalities of the movement all appear more or less recognizably in the novels, and so do its distinctive ideas and attitudes; Young England enthusiasm and ambition, Young England social and political theory, Young England historical and religious preoccupations all inform the novels. But not always unambiguously.

I

Disraeli said that Coningsby, or The New Generation, presents “the derivation and character of political parties” in England after the 1832 Reform Bill. The Vindication’s message is repeated: this Bill is the latest move in the Whig oligarchy’s plot to destroy the ancient fabric of English political life. “England is governed by Downing Street; once it was governed by Alfred and Elizabeth.” The Whigs have introduced a false value—the People, which Disraeli insists, “is a term of natural philosophy, not of political science.” The older generation of Tories (Peel and his friends), whose traditional role is to defend the constitution, have compounded with the spirit of Reform, betraying the traditions of Bolingbroke, Pitt and Burke.

Into this atmosphere of moral poverty a New Generation of political leaders strides; Coningsby and his friends, Sydney and Buckhurst, Young Englanders all, spring forward, young, energetic, heroic and of course aristocratic, as champions who will reassert true political authority, reestablish social harmony and restore to the People their ancient privileges. Aristocracy, enlarged by the admission of vigorous but enlightened captains of industry, and recalled to a sense of reverence by the Oxford Movement, will play again its traditionally authoritative role in national affairs. National unity will be re-established.

Coningsby, like most of Disraeli’s novels, is a Bildungsroman. Young Harry Coningsby is educated for his role as a leader in a series of encounters. He learns about practical politics in London, in Disraeli’s brilliantly realized world of high society and low intrigue, the world of Lord Monmouth and of those archetypal M.P.’s, Tadpole and Taper. In Lancashire he discovers the potential of emerging industrial England, and from Millbank, one of the new manufacturers, he hears a radical view of the House of Lords. He also falls in with the Jewish paragon, Sidonia. Sidonia, who in his outlandish and half-recognizable way fascinated so many of Disraeli’s nineteenth-century readers, is partly a hangover from the Byronic and sometimes self-idealizing early novels. But his function in Coningsby, as a gloriously wealthy descendant of the oldest of all possible nobilities,6 is to represent aristocracy in its purest form. Coningsby, like Sybil, is a novel obsessed by the meaning of aristocracy. Sidonia is a yardstick to measure the pretensions of English barons.

More interesting for present purposes is Coningsby’s specifically Young England education. From London and Manchester he goes to Beaumanoir, the venerable seat of his Young England companion Sydney’s family. There “an ancient feudal feeling” lingers, an “air of habitual habitation,” and he learns about “the moral influence of residence.” At St. Genevieve, the home of Eustace Lyle, another Young Englander, head of a Catholic family, “about the oldest we have in the country, and the wealthiest,” Coningsby is impressed by Puginesque décor, a “pale of modern building in the finest style of Christian architecture.” Here he learns that “It was the fall of the Papacy in England that founded the Whig aristocracy,” and here he observes “medieval” charity. Lyle tells him: “I have revived the monastic customs at St. Genevieve. There is an alms-giving twice a week.” In such scenes the ethereal world of Young England’s dreams plays its part beside the realities of Westminster and Manchester.

Coningsby has a sentimental education, too, which brings the various worlds together. In the final crisis he enters the hustings against the old generation. Elected, he marries Millbank’s daughter. Just as his election as a Young Englander sublimely transcending Whig and Tory quarrels symbolizes the end of destructive faction in the political world, his marriage to Edith Millbank represents a resolution of England’s socioeconomic problems—medieval attitudes toward responsible landownership united with nineteenth-century attitudes toward responsible manufacturing—the whole union bathed in the refugence of Young England ideals (and of course plenty of money).

But the novelist’s attitudes are thoroughly ambiguous. Sydney and Buckhurst, for example, the young champions (Wordsworth’s anti-Young England sonnet dismisses them as “Beardless Boys”), are admirably vigorous and enthusiastic; but they are also made deliberately rather absurd. The Whig Lord Everingham can say cuttingly: “Henry [Sydney] thinks that the people are to be fed by dancing round the Maypole.” And we recall Lord John Manners’ arless book, A Plea for National Holy Days (1844). Sydney expansively complains: “Everything has gone by that is beautiful,” or, seeing a portrait of an earlier Sir Eustace Lyle of Cavalier days

6. A chapter in Coningsby is devoted to the history of Sidonia’s descent from “a very ancient and noble family of Aragon,” and of its descent from an even older Mosaic family, who “probably from time immemorial had sojourned in Africa.”
“with gleaming sword and flowery plume,” he laments his ill-luck in not having been alive to fight the Parlia-
mentarians, “nay, would insist that all others must
equally deplore their evil destiny.” And he cries, “Mother-
what, a pity Beaumanoir was not besieged.”

Here is Christmas at St. Genevieve.

It was merry Christmas at St. Genevieve. There was a
yule log blazing on every hearth in that wide domain,
from the hall of the squire to the peasant’s roof. The
Buttery Hutch was open . . . from noon to sunset; all comers
might take their fill, and each carry away as much bold
beef, white bread and jolly ale as a strong man could
bear in a basket with one hand. For every woman a red
cloak and a coat of broad cloth for every man . . . For a
Christian gentleman of high degree was Eustace Lyle.
(Bk. IX, chap. I)

Somewhere behind that lies Cobbett and perhaps Carlyle,
and somewhere in the future—all that bold beef and jolly
ale and broadcloth—we can see the reactionary medi-
valizing radicalism of Belloc and Chesterton in their Ed-
wardian phase. How seriously are such passages in-
tended? There is something suspicious about the way
Disraeli’s prose modulates into this ripeness. Here is
another group of “peasants” in the England of 1840; it
is “almsgiving day” at St. Genevieve:

They come along the valley . . . . The old man who loved
the pilgrimage . . . many a dame in her red cloak, and
many a maiden with demure looks, and sometimes a stal-
wart form baffled for a time of the labour which he desired. But not a heart that did not bless the bell
that sounded from the tower of St. Genevieve! (Bk. III,
chap. IV)

Faced with that “stalwart form” baffled of his labour,
we remember the Communist Manifesto’s attention to
Young England, its reference to the “proletarian alms-
bag” which is “greeted with loud and irreverent laugh-
ter.” Disraeli was always apparently liable to let rhetoric
take over from commonsense, and perhaps it is claiming
too much to suggest a conscious appeal for laughter here.
But certainly the ironic attack is broad enough upon
Young England’s Buckhurst, who “had been in Paris and
had returned with his mind very much opened and
trousers made quite in a new style” and who is made to
say of the movement: “As for me, I never would enter
a conspiracy unless the conspirators were fellows who
had been at Eton with me.”

Two clubmen discuss Young England at Crockford’s
(the passage is in Disraeli’s liveliest “social” manner):

“Buckhurst . . . swears by Henry Sydney . . . ”
“A sort of animal magnetism, or unknown tongues, I
take it from your description.”
“Well, I don’t know what it is . . . but it has got hold
of all the young fellows . . . I had some idea of giving
my mind to it, they made such a fuss about it at Ever-
ingham; but it requires a devilish deal of history, I be-
lieve, and all that sort of thing.”

“Oh! that’s a bore . . . It’s difficult to turn to wish a
new thing when you are not in the habit of it. I never
could manage charades.” (Bk. VIII, chap. I)

Charades! At the novel’s climax Harry Coningsby con-
frets his grandfather, Lord Monmouth, in a brilliant
scene which rehearses the whole political theme of the
book. Lord Monmouth finally dismisses the movement
in these terms: “I will tell you what it is, Harry . . . you
will behave like a man of sense . . . who is not prepared
to sacrifice all the objects of life for the pursuit of some
fantastical puerilities.” Coningsby triumphs in the end,
by “daring to be great,” but Lord Monmouth’s reference
to “fantastical puerilities” echoes on, too, and makes its
point.

II

Disraeli wanted Sybil, or The Two Nations, to be seen
in the context of Coningsby’s political analysis. The
Condition of England is the result of Whig policies; the
Tories have not dealt with it. The People have resorted
to revolutionary solutions, and anarchy is the result.
Only the triumph of Young England can save the coun-
try. Sybil’s range is broader: Disraeli, borrowing freely,
is able to reflect the range of comparatively enlightened
social opinion beginning to make itself heard in con-
temporary middle-class circles. Carlyle’s Chartism and
Past and Present lie behind it, also the Parliamentary
Blue Books, Lord Shaftesbury’s writings in the quarter-
lies and even (or so he claimed) the journals of the Char-
tist Feargus O’Connor.

So Egremont’s education goes deeper. Like Coningsby,
he meets and rejects the political-social establishment,
but he also meets destitute farm laborers, unemployed
handloom-weavers, exploited factory workers and the
like. He does not meet Sidonia, but he does become in-
volved with the Chartists. Also like Coningsby he meets
Young England in numerous guises. Aubrey St. Lys is a
Tractarian clergyman who works with the urban poor in
the parvenu Lord Mowbray’s squalid industrial town. St.
Lys wants the deplorably Erastian Church of England to
return to more ancient religious forms. Egremont meets

7. The Communist Manifesto, ed. Samuel H. Beer (New York,
1955), pp. 33-34.
another Young Engander in Mr. Trafford at whose model manufactory the workers live in a model village, with public baths and gardens, a school and a church (he is a Catholic). Trafford combines ancient and modern. Believing that between employer and employed "there must exist other ties than the payment and acceptance of wages," he rejects the cash-nexus. Life, therefore, is carried on "under the baronial principle, revived in a new form, and adapted to the softer manners and more ingenous circumstancies of the times." And although it is the socialist Stephen Morley who goes to the heart of the Condition of England question for Egremont, with the famous reference to Two Nations, he does so under Young England auspices; Morley speaks on the grounds of Marney Abbey, the ruined home of monks dispossessed at the Reformation, and Egremont must first listen to the "yeoman," Walter Gerard, who reminds him of the contrast between the present landlords of Mowbray and Marney and the past:

All agree that the Monasticks were easy landlords; their rents were low...they were men of spirit and property. There were yeomen then, sir, the country was not divided into classes: masters and slaves. (Bk. II. chap. V)

Walter Gerard, another Catholic, is a collateral descendant of the last abbot, a kind of latter-day Abbot Samson. Although at this point in the novel he is associated with the misguided People, he will eventually, after imprisonment and suffering, come to accept Young England's gospel. He is also the father of Sybil.

Egremont's involvement with Sybil provides the novel's sentimental intrigue and a courtship punctuated with political debate. Sybil hankers after radical doctrines: "If there be a change," she says, "it is because in some degree the People have learnt their strength." Egremont sweeps this dangerous notion away: "Ah! dismiss from your mind those fallacious fancies...The People are not strong, the People never can be strong." And his long discourse concludes with a Young England clarion call: "The new generation of aristocrats of England...are the natural leaders of the people, Sybil; believe me, they are the only ones." Their marriage—uniting the Two Nations—is also symbolic. In the end Sybil is loaded with wealth and titles in the usual lavish Disraelian manner ("there are not three peers in the realm who have so much a year clear") and may seem a rather unrepresentative champion of the downtrodden populace, but this is no longer only another symptom of Disraeli's fascination with silver forks and sentiment. By reclaiming her lands from the usurping pseudoaristocrat, Lord Mowbray, Sybil recovers their medieval patrimony for the true People, the "natural aristocracy," rather than for their unlawful Chartist representatives. The union of Sybil and Egremont is a truly aristocratic match, in the Disraelian sense, joining as it does the best elements in the established English nobility with the best elements in the dispossessed but anciently noble English people.

Disraeli manipulates romantic and medievalizing Young England to make a serious critique of the spirit of the age and to make serious proposals about it. Yet how seriously are we to take this heroine? She first appears in the ruins of the plundered Abbey immediately after Stephen Morley's famous remark about the Two Nations:

At this moment a sudden flush of rosy light, suffusing the grey ruins, indicated that the sun had just fallen... The hour, the scene, the solemn stillness and the softening beauty repressed controversy, induced even silence...from the Lady chapel there rose the evening hymn to the Virgin. A single voice, but in tones of almost supernatural sweetness: tender and solemn, yet flexible and thrilling.

The romantic scene-setting here is of a kind familiar to Disraeli readers. But Sybil, with her theatrical entrances, makes a curious heroine for a study of the Condition of England. She has the usual lush beauty of Disraelian ladies ("as rare as it is choice") but also seems to be a part-time nun, in and out of the cloister. Her religious habit does not completely hide her charms; Egremont's eye is "caught at once by the symmetry of her shape;" or he sees her "springing along with quick and airy steps. Her black dress displayed her undulating and elastic figure." A light absurdity seems to attach itself to her every action, as it does to her father who, for example, when challenged by an impasive London policeman, responds in Saxon warrior terms, "Advance and touch this maiden, and I will fell you and your minions like oxen in the pasture." The policeman's comment is: "Well, you are a queer chap."

The Gerards, father and daughter, come from the same Young England dream world as the red-cloaked peasants in Coningsby. Yet the intention behind them is serious enough. In Sybil, where kind hearts are more than coronets, and simple faith than Norman blood, Disraeli uses superior Saxon virtue as an aristocratic touchstone. Much of the novel is devoted to exposing a false aristocracy—that pseudonobility made up equally of the descendan

8. Pugin's Contrasts (1841) may well have suggested Sybil's recurring technique of juxtapositions.

of Church-plundering Whigs and eighteenth-century profiteers. English aristocracy needs new blood. The Millbanks will have their place there, and so will brilliant politicians (whatever their origins), but the basic stock must be the medieval Saxon.

Disraeli and the Young Englishmen had already edged back the date of England’s moral and political decline through eighteenth-century Whiggery and seventeenth-century regicide to sixteenth-century Reformation. In Sybil he hints that it should be even earlier—1066. At the Conquest, the Normans grabbed the land, and the Saxons, the pure and natural medieval aristocracy, were robbed of their patrimony and freedom; Sybil and her father are representatives of that persecuted race.

Disraeli—in his characteristically deft way—was picking up another long-standing medievalizing myth, the “Norman Yoke,” the evocation of Anglo-Saxon England as a kind of lost Atlantis. Christopher Hill has shown how the idea was variously invoked by Stuart Royalists, Republican Levellers and Diggers and eighteenth-century Whigs.10 Early in the nineteenth century the theory was in fact most popular among radical working-class writers. But by midcentury the newly disenchanted middle classes had taken it over. The nineteenth century liked to make its discriminations in more or less discreet racial terms (one thinks of Arnold, Carlyle, Tennyson, George Eliot). Scott had already romanticized the medieval rivalry of Anglo-Saxon and Norman, and the idea turns up again and again in Victorian literature (in Bulwer-Lytton’s Harold, Last of the Saxon Kings, for example, and in Tennyson’s Harold). Disraeli’s own intense and understandable racial preoccupations emerge in odd ways throughout his fiction, but perhaps nowhere more bizarrely than in the Young England world of Sybil. In fact his ultimate and rather delightful master symbol of Saxon virtue is Sybil’s chivalrous and refined dog, Harold, a bloodhound of “ancient breed” and aristocratic discrimination, who does a good deal of bounding and gambling beside his ebullient mistress.

Does Disraeli license us to laugh at his Saxon dog, or at his Saxon heroine? Are we to echo the policeman who finds Gerard “a queer chap”? The temptation to rescue Victorian absurdities by discovering saving ironies must no doubt be resisted, yet there are hints in Sybil as in Coningsby that the medieval mysteries of Young England need not always be taken at their face value. Sir Vavasour Firebrace, for example, who wishes to see the baronets reinstalled in their rightful place as “natural and hereditary champions,” is partly a joke about Young England’s affection for pomp and circumstance and the follies of the Eglington Tournament.11

Other examples could be cited, but it is hard to find a pervasive ironical intention. Should we look for it? Disraeli’s attitudes are so persistently devious. With his Vindication as guide we can accept that the analyses of recent history in Sybil and Coningsby, precarious though they may seem, are intended as truth. Racial matters, as Sir Cecil Roth has shown, were always complex and disturbing for Disraeli, and all his books betray the fact, in varyingly oblique fashions. Religion seems to bring out his frivolity. (Aubrey St. Lys is a strange Tractarian; he believes, for instance, that the New Testament is “admittedly only a supplement” to the Old.) Then there are Disraeli’s solemn recognitions of new economic glories; the virtues of Manchester are extolled: it is “the new Athens,” but he dryly adds that the inhabitants “are not so impressed with their idiosyncrasy as the countrymen of Pericles and Phidias.” His running attack on parliamentary government, “that fatal drollery,” does not obscure Disraeli’s evident fascination with and attachment to its processes. Even his picture of the superb Sidonia, with its touches of idealized self-portraiture, gains a different dimension when we remember that Disraeli was addressing a very knowing audience.

Certainly the roman-à-clef aspect of the novels, with the opportunities it provided for semiprivate jokes, reinforces an impression that the parade of Young England is partly a performance, with Disraeli indulging a taste for extravaganzas, satisfying an audience that had come to expect it from him. Yet we can also recognize deliberate attempts to introduce a common-sense assessment of Young England’s more fantastic aspects. A sense of imaginative balance is there.

But the ambiguities seem also to reflect a profound uncertainty in Disraeli, an uncertainty that finds its echo in his style, the voices that shift so disconcertingly in these novels from colloquial astringency to florid lushness. We are of course used to such changing voices in Victorian fiction. They seem often to be the product of a general uncertainty of touch when it comes to expressing deep feeling. Most of the serious and important things that are said in Disraeli’s novels are said in the first of these voices, the quick, sharp, rational language of Disraeli the clever Cockney (this is the voice one hears in his journals, letters and reported conversation). When the yearning to “feel deeply” comes he strays into sen-


11. Professor W. L. Burn has pointed out that even that muddy extravaganza had a serious and solidly practical side to it (The Age of Equipoise [New York, 1965]), pp. 62-63).
mentality or melodrama, and the Young England theme does seem to release these effusions.

These ambiguities and uncertainties having been pondered, however, it is still possible to accept Young England and especially its medievalizing aspects as a sort of large metaphor running through the novels. It articulates the author's energy and enthusiasm, and moreover it allows a free play for his grace and wit (and it is the grace and wit that redeems the whole Young England movement, with its nationalism, authoritarianism, racism and Sidonian passionate intensity, from an unpleasantly prophetic resemblance to various unhappy twen-
tieth-century political youth movements). The metaphor is sometimes uncertainly elaborated and sometimes deliberately undermined. Disraeli will make gestures about which he is openly self-conscious and self-critical, but which he also believes in. Yet, through some sort of Disraelian buoyancy or sleight of hand they succeed in the end in expressing genuinely enough the author's anti-Benthamite attachment to "reverence," his deeply nostalgic and again prophetic sense that, as Sybil says, "the glory has gone out of our life."

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Tennyson's Death in Life in Lyric and Myth: "Tears, Idle Tears" and "Demeter and Persephone"

Gerhard Joseph

The moving poetic effects that Alfred Tennyson can achieve arise from his sustained ability to translate an overriding, frequently unlocalized sense of personal loss into a cosmic principle, and to do so with an unsurpassed aural sophistication and in an abundant variety of forms. In lyric portrait, in ballad, in dramatic monologue, in romantic medley and in epyllion, the "idle tears" rise in the heart and gather to the eyes of speakers who experience love's failure to stave off the terrors of decay and abandonment, exiles from metaphysical ease who come to feel life's ultimate coldness. But, though T. S. Eliot's ascription of greatness to Tennyson's work on the grounds of its "abundance, variety, and complete competence" represents the starting point of a just modern assessment, it is true that in some forms Tennyson was merely competent while in others his mastery touched a perfection that will assure a large body of his work continuing resonance in ages to come.

Tennyson knew that it was the "passion of the past," the longing for the "far, far away" that inspired his best poetry. And it is a truism of Tennyson criticism that this addiction to the distant in time, the remote in landscape and the exotic in subject matter finds its most felici-
tous outlet in two forms—as pure lyric lament and as dramatic monologue on a classical subject. The melancholy languor that eludes a completely convincing treatment when it is encased within a contemporary or near contemporary domestic idyll settles into its appropriate mold as the short lyrical evocation of a lost past. Or, alternately, a monologue spoken by a character out of classical mythology allows Tennyson to disguise the extent to which the lament is his own and to work against and make less painful the bare, autobiographical cry. In this essay I should like to follow Tennyson's poetic melancholia, his habitual theme of "Death in Life," as it moves from one poetic mode into another: I should like to read "Tears, Idle Tears," the song first embedded in the 1847 edition of The Princess, as a lyric foreshadowing of "Demeter and Persephone," the dramatic monologue that was the title poem of Tennyson's 1889 volume. A complementary examination of these works may both illuminate two of Tennyson's finest poems and point to a transformation of genre in Tennyson's most important theme.

The lyric has been fully examined in recent years, and I have little to add to the body of criticism that has

addressed itself to the poem’s intricate structure, except insofar as that structure prepares for the “god” Death in Life who comes into focus in the concluding line.

Briefly, the poem traces the speaker’s repeated attempt to explain to himself what the tears of the first line “mean.” Each stanza surrounds the tears with fresh adjectives which, in substituting for the epithet “idle,” gradually elucidate the meaning that the speaker seeks. The complexity of that meaning becomes evident as the adjectives are opposed: in the four stanzas the tears are “fresh” but “sad,” “so sad, so fresh,” “sad and strange,” “so, so strange,” “dear” and “sweet,” “deep” and “wild.” The similes attached to these adjectives carry forward and enrich this dualism. Each comparison mingles the joy of remembered life and the sorrow at its passing to capture the Janus-like posture of the speaker, torn as he is between present and past. Such concrete images of the happy “days that are no more,” the generalized refrain with which each stanza ends, magnify the sorrow and indicate a growing abandon in the speaker. As in the last stanza he broaches the subject of lost and unrealized love, the adjectives convey a climactic desperation. The last two phrases, “Deep as first love, and wild with all regret”—especially the final long-voweled “wild”—precipitate in the speaker the shock of recognition:

O Death in Life, the days that are no more!

This culminating epiphany summarizes all of the earlier concrete oppositions. Tonally, the “idle tears” of the poem’s opening contemplation have been transformed into the closing line’s invocation.

Several readers, suggesting that the abstraction Death in Life is deified, have speculated about the theological status of the emergent “god.” Both Graham Hough and Leo Spitzer recognize the pagan context of the despair that the speaker knows: they feel that the language of the poem prepares for the final address to a specifically classical, pagan deity. Thus the friends of the second stanza come to visit the speaker from the “underworld,” from the geographical antipodes in a primary sense. But surely the secondary meaning of the underworld as the classical land of shades is so strong, given the poem’s additional references to the gods, that it all but buries the primary denotation. Furthermore, the tears rise up from “the depth of some divine despair.” For Hough, the fact of this despair, reinforced as it is by the allusion to the Greek underworld, confirms the pagan iden-

The particular god (or Sondergott, to use the classical scholar Usener’s term) of Tennyson’s making is neither Life nor Death, but Death-in-Life; surely not the Christian deity as Hough has felt; no more is he Thanatos or Pluto, the God of the underworld before whom man is doomed to appear after death, or even one of the aloof, serene Gods of Epicurus who dwell in the intermundia, unconcerned with man. The God Death-in-Life, who, like Christ, has his dwelling-place among the mortals as his name indicates, while sharing the aloofness of the Epicurean Gods, is an impressive and sterile dark God wrapped in his own “despair” (his intermundium is life itself), “idle” as are the tears of the poet.4

Death in Life, the cry that captures Tennysonian deliquescence, may indeed evoke the dark god that Hough and Spitzer describe. My own feeling is that they defied the abstraction too confidently by calling excessive attention to isolated phrases within the poem. Cleath Brooks, for instance, considers the possibility that Death in Life is little more than “a loose appositive: ‘the days that are no more are a kind of death in life.’” 5 Perhaps the truth lies in a nuance between the two positions: the intensity of the speaker’s apostrophe personifies—even deifies—the abstraction more emphatically than Brooks suggests, although the phrase “the depth of some divine despair” supplies too vague a context to prepare for the elaborately identified god that Spitzer seems emerging in the poem’s last line. The abstraction Death in Life, that is, verges upon apotheosis: as the idle tears of the speaker and the psychic probing they stimulate lead to the discovery of the “name” Death in Life, the speaker’s very act of remembering his losses approaches the delification of memory. “Tears, Idle Tears” thus describes the evolution of one genre out of another: a sorrow that begins in lyric musing, having been broadened by the speaker into an abstract cosmic principle, touches—however faintly—the borders of myth.

Tennyson’s work, both early and late, is full of voices that

5. Brooks, p. 173. Brooks also considers the possibility that the exclamation is a “tortured cry like ‘O God! the days that are no more!’” though he does not stop to describe the “God” invoked.
that dramatize and bear witness to the condition that achieves its name in “Tears, Idle Tears.” Mariana in her moated grange, the Lady of Shalott cursed to her life of shadows, the mariners of Ulysses unable to resist the seductive luxuriance of Lotus-land, Tithonus doomed to mortality, Merlin sealed up as dead within a hollow tree—the list of Tennysonian figures trapped between past and present, hyperbolized within a twilight state between life and death, is long enough for us to recognize that a paradoxical Death in Life is the human dilemma that Tennyson explored most obsessively and with the greatest artistic success.

Near the end of his life Tennyson once more indulged his complex yearning for the days that are no more in a poem that emphatically carries over the abstraction Death in Life into its mythic correlative, that modulates the possible classical overtones of “Tears, Idle Tears” into the explicit details of one of Tennyson’s favorite Greek myths. Demeter of “Demeter and Persephone” is Tennyson’s valedictory portrayal of Death in Life. Because the deserted mother can but imperfectly redeem the loss of her daughter, she mourns for a remembered harmony with a sorrow as intense as that which the speaker of the lyric felt.

The tears of Tennyson’s 1847 lyric flow in part from the speaker’s knowledge of the finality of seasonal change within the individual life. The “divine despair” arises initially in eyes that look on autumn fields, happy but also filled with the pathos of a dying summer and of the winter to come; the sounds of summer dawn that reach the dying ears anticipate the winter of life that cannot be far behind. Tennyson throughout his life—in “The Hesperides,” “The Lotus-Eaters,” “Oenone,” “Ulysses,” “Tithonus” and “Tiresias”—continually discovered the apt classical myth to render a private emotion. When toward the end of his life—on the evidence of such late poems as “Rizaphah” and “In the Children’s Hospital”—Tennyson’s conception of love was becoming even more


7. G. Robert Stange in the course of his essay, “Tennyson’s Mythology: A Study of Demeter and Persephone,” Journal of English Literary History, XXI (1954), 67-80, especially pp. 70-71, shows that Tennyson’s conception of the Demeter-Persephone myth contains insights similar to the anthropological ones developed in Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough. (The first volume of Frazer’s work appeared in 1890, the year after the publication of Demeter, and Other Poems.) Frazer, like Tennyson, treats Demeter as the Corn Goddess at Eleusis, the buried seed of Persephone preparing for Demeter, the ripe ear of corn. Frazer, however, sees no justification for the nineteenth-century tradition in which Tennyson is working that transformed the Corn Goddess into Earth Mother (“Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild”), The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, 12 vols. (London, 1911-1915), VII, 90-91.

James Kissane feels that since the correspondences between Frazer’s interpretation of the Demeter myth and Tennyson’s poem “had long been the veriest commonplace in Victorian mythology,” a more profitable juxtaposition for the history of English poetry than Stange’s would consider Tennyson’s poem in the light of Walter Pater’s essay, “The Myth of Demeter and Persephone” in Greek Studies, published thirteen years before Tennyson’s poem. Kissane shows that the three phases that Pater, a representative Victorian interpreter of classical mythology, sees in the myth’s development can also be distinguished in Tennyson’s poem (“Victorian Mythology,” Victorian Studies, VI [1965-1966], 5-28). My reading of “Demeter and Persephone” is indebted to both the Stange and Kissane essays.

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Demeter's journey through the cosmos and her discovery that all of Nature is given to her own tears suggest that the "idle tears" of the 1847 lyric are not limited to a single human speaker. They represent a universal principle of divine despair; they are the Virgilian lacrimae rerum of which any human loss is an instance but never a meaningful explanation. If one loses a friend such as Arthur Hallam or a son such as Lionel, "we know not why we moan." The mystery of human suffering is deepened, not merely exemplified, by individual losses.

The goddesses of Tennyson's so-called "classical idylls" until "Demeter and Persephone" are without exception ruinous to man. The Aphrodite of "Oneone," the Eos of "Tithonus," the Venus of "Lucretius," the Pallas Athene of "Tiresias"—each is with a greater or lesser degree of intention responsible for the destruction of the mortal who comes in her path. Either these deities are such hard avengers as Pallas Athene who chastizes the intellectual audacity of the Tiresias that seeks her out, or they are the Epicurean "quiet gods" of "The Lotus Eaters," deities oblivious to the suffering of mere mortals. (Lucretius associates both alternatives with the Venus who drives him to his death.) Conceivably Demeter had been one of the indifferent, serene Olympian goddesses before her loss of Persephone, but she is now changed:

"Where?" and I stared from every eagle-peak
I thrilled the black heart of all the woods,
I peer'd thro' tomb and cave, and in the storms
Of autumn swept across the city, and heard
The murmur of their temples chanting me,
Me, me, the desolate mother! "Where?"—and turn'd,
And fled by many a waste, forlorn of man,
And grieved for man thro' all my grief for thee. (ll. 67-74)

Suffering has softened Demeter into one who grieves for humanity; she has come to understand what human suffering is through its analogy to her divine despair.

The climax of her empathy with mankind occurs in a dream when she learns from the ghost of Persephone that

"The Bright one in the highest
Is brother of the Dark one in the lowest,

36. If Hough is right, Tennyson was able to achieve a creative distance between a sorrow whose origin, however muted, in Hallam's death he may have understood and the "idle tears" whose meaning the speaker of the lyric questions with increasing urgency.

9. Arthur Carse, "Tennyson as a Modern Poet," University of Toronto Quarterly, XIX (1950), 362-82, cites Freud's distinction between melancholia which "is in some way related to an unconscious loss of love object" and mourning "in which there is nothing unconscious about the loss" as particularly applicable to Tennyson's poetry before and after Hallam's death.
And Bright and Dark have sworn that I, the child
Of thee, the great Earth-Mother, thee, the Power
That lifs her buried life from gloom to bloom,
Should be for ever and for evermore
The Bride of Darkness.” (ll. 93-99)

Here Tennyson provides the mythic echo of his habitual poetic aversion to extreme height and extreme depth, the rarified isolation of Princess Ida’s mountain pride or of the soul’s arrogance in “The Palace of Art” and the marine depth of “The Kraken’s” “sickly light.” Both extremes are antithetical to human emotion which Ida in her song from The Princess (“Come down, O maid, from yonder mountain height”) learns “is of the valley.” Accordingly, Demeter’s “pleasant vale” of Enna with its prefiguring of a Christian Eden10 looks forward to a new spiritual, meta-spatial dispensation, what Tennyson in “The Voice and the Peak” of 1874 characterized as

A deep below the deep
And a height beyond the height!
Our hearing is not hearing,
And our seeing is not sight.

The voice and the Peak
Far into heaven withdrawn,
The lone glow and the long roar
Green-rushing from the rosy thrones of dawn!

It is the height of Zeus’ realm and the depth of Aidoneus’, the symbolic distance from the love that flourishes in the pleasant vale of Enna, that indicts the gods. The discovery that both the “Bright one in the highest” and the “Dark one in the lowest” are brothers in their cool, fastidious contemplation of misery makes Demeter curse her fellow gods and refuse to partake in their feasts. Her tears and raving soon render the earth barren. Only then does Zeus, in his vanity at no longer receiving the sacrifices and praises of men, make Aidoneus surrender Persephone to her mother for nine months of every year.

In “Tears, Idle Tears,” we have seen, the sorrow of the speaker reaches such a pitch that it is all but apothecarized, that it actually becomes the “god” Death in Life, if we fully accept the thesis of Hough and Spitzer. Human and divine despair touch: in his final tortured cry the sorrowing speaker is united with his proper god. While the dramatic direction is reversed in “Demeter and Persephone,” Demeter’s perspective, which embraces both divine and human sorrow, resembles that of the lyric’s speaker. For, as she disavows the gods, Demeter intensifies her identification with and commitment to a suffering humanity:

The man, that only lives and loves an hour,
Seem’d nobler than their hard eternities. (ll. 104-5)

Demeter is thus a far different goddess from the Aphrodite, Venus or Pallas Athene of Tennyson’s previous poems on classical subjects. Neither a “quiet god” nor man’s torturer, she is rather his fellow sufferer and defender, the Great Mother.

Nevertheless, as the Earth Goddess she is still the Death in Life that “Tears, Idle Tears” has laid bare. (Strictly speaking, Demeter and Persephone together, the springing blade of corn and the buried grain, are the mythical embodiment of Death in Life. But the feeling of Death in Life is dramatized only through the mother’s voice: we may safely assume that Persephone, the poem’s interlocuter, shares her mother’s divine despair.) Because Persephone must spend her gloomy winters in the underworld before the first beam glitters on the sail that brings her unto the threshold of her native spring, Demeter remains “but ill content/With them who still are highest.” She yearns for the overthrow of the Olympian system. When will they appear, she asks, that the fates had predicted, those younger kindlier Gods to bear us down,
As we bore down the Gods before us? Gods,
To quench, not hurl the thunderbolt, to stay,
Not spread the plague, the famine; Gods indeed,
To send the noon into the night and break
The sunless halls of Hades into Heaven?
Till thy dark lord accept and love the Sun,
And all the Shadow die into the Light,
When thou shalt dwell the whole bright year with me,
And souls of men, who grew beyond their race,
And made themselves as Gods against the fear
Of Death and Hell. (ll. 129-40)

In this proclamation of the coming triumph of a gentle Christianity over the harsh Olympian gods, an instance of the modern “frame” that Tennyson insisted upon for his classical poems,11 Demeter envisions the replacement of Death in Life by a God of Life in whose Love all contradictions will be reconciled. When the younger, kindlier Gods appear, the Queen of Death shall be no more. “Thou,” Demeter assures her daughter,

that hast from men,
As Queen of Death, that worship which is Fear.

10. Stange (p. 75) shows that Tennyson’s description of Enna clearly imitates Milton’s description of Eden in Paradise Lost (bk. IV, ll.268ff.).
Henceforth, as having risen from out the dead,  
Shalt ever send thy life along with mine  
From buried grain thro' springing blade, and bless  
Their garner'd autumn also, reap with me,  
Earth-Mother, in the harvest hymns of Earth  
The worship which is Love... (ll. 140-47)

This frame can be criticized on formal grounds, but we can meet such criticisms if we are willing to grant that the faint, uncertain trust in the larger hope of Tennyson's middle years had gained considerable assurance by the late eighties. The imagery, for instance, of the poem's conclusion may strike the reader as slightly inappropriate to the triumphant conception of eternal love, fruition and life after the coming of Christianity's "kindlier Gods." For even under the new dispensation the "springing blade," Demeter, must still arise out of the "buried grain," Persephone. The process cannot avoid the symbolic burial of Persephone in the underworld before her rebirth in the spring. But Tennyson had never denied the paradoxical union of a constantly evolving cycle of life and a future perfection marked by unearthly stasis. The very first poems of the 1830 Poems, chiefly Lyrical had set up the opposing theses that "Nothing Will Die" and that "All Things Will Die." "Demeter and Persephone" suggests that Tennyson kept to a like juxtaposition of contraries until the end of his life.12

Or, it may be argued, the Christian frame of the poem is full of the gorgeous but static decoration that we associate with the later rococo style of Tennyson, while the frame's most powerful, concluding lines return to the tortures of the damned in the Elysium of the poem's present. With the coming of the kindlier Gods, Demeter predicts, the world will

See no more  
The Stone, the Wheel, the dimly-glimmering lawns  
Of that Elysium, all the hateful fires

Of torment, and the shadowy warrior glide  
Along the silent field of Asphodel. (ll. 147-51)

The way these lines apparently undercut the frame's hopeful mood may indicate once more the surface confidence which Tennyson had shown in "Ulysses" and in the conclusion to "In Memoriam" and which the inner man did not perhaps wholly feel. But the fixed calm of "Demeter and Persephone"'s Christian frame may, on the other hand, be a formal mirror of the eternal love that Demeter envisages before she is reminded of the flux in the present Elysium. It is true that the fertile cycle of the buried grain becoming the springing blade does not possess the evocative terror of the barren cycles of the damned, wherein Sisyphus must push his stone up the mountain only to have it roll down again and Ixion turn perpetually on his wheel of fire. The Inferno of Dante, too, is more dramatically interesting a region than the Paradiso, just as Milton's conception of Hell inspired a more highly charged poetry than did the serenity of his Heaven. The return in the last lines of "Demeter and Persephone" to the tortures of Hades affirms Tennyson's scrupulous opposition of contraries. It restores the balance between the joy released by the prevision of "kindlier Gods" and the tears attendant upon the mother's yearly loss of her daughter.

The foregoing discussion has, I believe, yoked works that complement each other. Tennyson's lyrical "naming" of his habitual deity, Death in Life, leads inevitably to a dramatization in myth of that deity's suffering and metamorphosis. In describing the emerging classical environment of "Tears, Idle Tears" as a preparation for "Demeter and Persephone," we become aware of how naturally the subjective lyric impulse within Tennyson assumes the noble and austere condition of myth.

N. N. Feltes

The subject matter of John Ruskin's early works is dauntingly specialist, and readers who turned to the early period, to Modern Painters, begun in 1843 and concluded in five volumes in 1860, to The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849) or to the three volumes (1851-1853) of The Stones of Venice, have often, like Matthew Arnold focused their attention on the "exquisite" descriptions of natural scenery, passing over the details of paintings, of Venetian

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balconies and tombs and of Ruskin's theory of art. But Ruskin warned against selective reading, rebuking, in the third volume of *Modern Painters*, those "careless readers, who dashed at the descriptions and missed the arguments." And I should like to suggest reasons for heeding Ruskin's warning, to show how little we can ignore the "arguments" even to appreciate the descriptive passages fully; whatever their value in the history of art, Ruskin's arguments provide keys to understanding the structure of his own prose.

Professor Rosenberg has pointed out that Ruskin's early prose is "charged with the sudden clarity of first sight." Ruskin himself wrote in *Modern Painters*: "the greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to see something and tell what it saw in a plain way" (V, 333), and in his work the *seeing* and the *telling* are intimately related. The arts, for Ruskin, were analogous: "It is well," he wrote, "that the young architect should be taught to think of imitative ornament as of the extreme of grace in language... not to be obtained at the cost of purpose, meaning, force or conciseness, yet, indeed, a perfection... the sign of the most highly-trained mind and power when it is associated with others" (VIII, 174-75). And his early critics implied the same analogy in the very terms by which they characteristically described his writings. Frederick Harrison, for example, spoke of Ruskin's early prose as "word-painting," a "gorgeous mosaic," but did not (as I shall do) go on to examine this early manner in the light of the advice Ruskin gives to painters throughout his works.

Ruskin speaks, apropos of the "lamp," or spirit, of "Power" in architecture, of the "crust about the impossibly part of men's minds, which must be pierced through before they can be touched to the quick" (VII, 105). And he suggested, in the first volume of *Modern Painters*, how a landscape painter might pierce the crust of familiarity which insulates men's minds. A painter has two purposes: "to induce in the spectator's mind the faithful conception of any natural objects whatsoever," and "to guide the spectator's mind to those objects most worthy of its contemplation." He continues:

In attaining the first, the painter only places the spectator where he stands himself; he sets him before the landscape and leaves him. But in attaining the second end, the artist not only places the spectator, but talks to him; makes him a sharer in his own strong feelings and quick thoughts; hurries him away in his own enthusiasm; guides him to all that is beautiful; snatches him from all that is base; and leaves him more than delighted,—ennobled and instructed, under the sense of having not only beheld a new scene, but of having held communion with a new mind. (III, 133-34)

I am impressed with how literally Ruskin, the word-painter, follows the advice of Ruskin, the landscape-painter, placing his reader at the vantage point where he stands himself, talking to him and making him a sharer of his own strong feelings and quick thoughts. Moreover, Ruskin asks of his readers the "highest imaginative faculty" (IV, 250), the penetrative imagination, "the very life of the man, considered as a *seeing* creature" (V, 177), which reaches "by intuition and intensity of gaze... a more essential truth than is seen at the surface of things" (IV, 284). These elements, vantage point, the personal voice and the penetrative imagination that works through close attention to specific detail, not only continually reappear in the early works as the subjects of discussion, but *function* as well, informing his most characteristic passages.

Ruskin's preoccupation with vantage point is evident in his discussion of "focus," as in the first volume of *Modern Painters*. There Ruskin attributes part of Turner's greatness as a painter to his awareness of the importance of focus: "it is in Turner only that we see a bold and decisive choice of the distance and middle distance, as his great objects of attention; and by him only that the foreground is united and adapted to it... by the most precise and beautiful indication or suggestion of just so much of even the minutest forms as the eye can see when its focus is not adapted to them" (III, 325). When we look at a body of water we normally focus on its surface, rather than looking down into it; hence Turner paints water from the surface focus. Our first impression is of the wide surface of Turner's lakes: "we glide over it," says Ruskin, "a quarter of a mile into the picture before we know where we are" (III, 535-39). Turner's unique consciousness of vantage point leads him to paint, truthfully, "the dark sides of leaves hanging over a stream, in their reflection, though we see the light sides above" (III, 541), and Turner paints the sea, not from the shore where the breakers seem "something uniform and monotonous," but from a point twenty yards from the shore where we receive a totally different impression of "the grand, extended, and varied lines of long curvature which are peculiarly expressive both of velocity and power" (III, 562, 563). Ruskin's discussion of the infinite mystery in Nature, and its expression in art,

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is another example of his preoccupation with the “vantage point” of the artist. Since Nature is “never distinct and never vacant, ... always mysterious, but always abundant” (III, 329), it follows, he says in The Stones of Venice, that “for every distance from the eye there is a peculiar kind of beauty, or a different system of lines of form; the sight of that beauty is reserved for that distance, and for that alone. If you approach nearer, that kind of beauty is lost, and another succeeds, to be disorganized and reduced to strange and incomprehensible means and appliances in its turn” (IX, 294). The great artist must recreate this mysterious abundance, as in a cathedral, “each order of ornament being adapted for a different distance: first, for example, the great masses,—the buttresses and stories and black windows and broad cornices of the tower, which give it make and organism, as it rises over the horizon, half a score of miles away; then the traceries and shafts and pinnacles, which give it richness as we approach; then the niches and statues and knobs and flowers, which we can only see when we stand beneath it.” All good ornament, Ruskin goes on, is thus “arborecent, as it were, one class of it branching out of another and sustained by it” (IX, 301).

Much of Ruskin’s argument, therefore, in his analyses of painting and architecture is concerned with the idea of vantage point, and in those discursive passages which illustrate the discussion, he stands beside us (just as “we” approached the cathedral together), and he talks to us; we have a vivid sense of Ruskin’s voice. A paragraph may begin: “The other day, as I was lying down to rest on the side of the hill round which the Rhone sweeps in its main angle, opposite Martigny,” and we have not only a strong sense of place but we almost forget that “the other day” was in September 1854 (VI, 77, n. 1). Rhetorical questions engage us; there is in Volume 4 of Modern Painters a cluster of speculations about the Alps which recalls Darwin’s urgent questioning of the story of Creation in The Voyage of the Beagle: “Is this indeed the actual first work of the Divine Master on which I gaze? Was the great precipice shaped by His finger, as Adam was shaped out of the dust? ... Or is it the descendant of a long race of mountains, existing under appointed laws of birth and endurance, death and decrepitude?” (VI, 209). The reader himself interrupts Ruskin with questions (VI, 233), or denies, in direct discourse, “that more beautiful things are to be seen in nature than in art” (V, 40), or he comments thoughtfully on one of Ruskin’s remarks about a Dutch painter (VII, 368). A conversation between the reader and Ruskin can go on for four pages (VI, 79–82), and we are constantly urged to “observe,” to “take glances,” to “look at” something, and ultimately through it to its “life.”

But what Ruskin, standing beside us, first asks us to look at are the specific details of the surface of the thing. He wrote the first volume of Modern Painters partly in order to refute the doctrines of the followers of Sir Joshua Reynolds, and throughout that volume he emphasized that “the true ideal of landscape ... is the expression of the specific... characters of every object” (III, 27). The task of the painter, he said in the second volume, “is to attain accurate knowledge, so far as may be in his power, of the peculiar virtues, duties, and characters of every species of being” (IV, 173). Modern Painters, as a whole, attempts to impart just such accurate knowledge, of clouds, water, vegetation and mountains. Be able to paint Nature as she is, he advises, before you even begin to rearrange or compose (VI, 391). As we have seen, mystery implies detail; noble mystery is simply “a veil thrown between us and something definite, known, and substantial” (VI, 94). The “finish” of a painting, or a sculpture, or a cathedral, consists “not in the smoothing of surface, but the filling of space” (V, 167), with an infinity of detail. Hence, the nobility of a Gothic cathedral frontal, “lost in the tapestry of its traceries, like a rock among the thickets and herbage of spring” (X, 245).

Ruskin here compares Gothic tracery to a thicket; as we have seen, he thought all good ornament was “arborecent,” and I should like to emphasize the appropriateness of this image. For all the clouds and mountains of his early writings, I think the hedge best images what Ruskin most values in art, in the particularity and detail of which we have just been speaking. He told the followers of Reynolds in 1843: “There is a perfection of the hedge-row and cottage, as well as of the forest and palace,” and he used the hedge as an image for “that noblest industry... which transforms accumulation into structure” (III, 47). Furthermore a hedge, though shaped, is yet quickset, formed of living plants, and the hedge can represent not only the accumulation and interweaving of detail, the foliation, but it can represent life. For, as Proust pointed out in his essay, Ruskin’s careful attention to surface detail was only, after all, the prelude to understanding the life, the “sap” that informed the details. Just as Turner, by attention to its surface, captured the very life of water,
so any artist, or spectator, must, by intensity of gaze come to see the life that informs surface details. Ruskin said of the "penetrative imagination": "it gets within all fence, cuts down to the root, and drinks the very vital sap of that it deals with" (IV, 250-51). The formalism of the Roman Renaissance was a "sapless thicker" (XI, 138), and there was no energy in Greek and Egyptian art, but Gothic ornament has, in contrast, the vitality of a quickset hedge: "Gothic ornament stands out in prickingly independence, and frosty fortitude, jutting into crockets, and freezing into pinnacles; here starting up into a monster, there germinating into a blossom, anon knitting itself into a branch, alternately thorny, bossy, and bristly, or writhed into every form of nervous entanglement; but, even when most graceful, never for an instant languid, always quickset" (X, 240).

The image of the hedge can, finally, also represent the "arborescence" of Ruskin's early prose, writhed into every form of nervous entanglement, digressive, interspersing abstract theory and particular description, or, to be more precise, moving from the vantage point of abstract speculation down through the description of particular surfaces to the life within. For the celebrated "purple passages" seem to me generally to be organized in this manner, accumulation becoming structure by a process that moves from vantage point through specific details to their "life." Some examples are the passage in the fifth volume of Modern Painters where Ruskin tries to enter into "the spirit of the pine" (VII, 105-10), or the approach to Venice from the sea, in the final chapter of the first volume of The Stones of Venice and the first chapter of the next, leading through details of tides and stairways to the "great natural Laws" (X, 23), which rule in Venice. The well-known description of grass in Modern Painters places us, at its climax, "in the springtime, among the meadows that slope from the shores of the Swiss lakes to the roots of their lower mountains." As Ruskin talks to us, we "look up towards the higher hills, where the waves of everlasting green roll silently into their long inlets among the shadows of the pines; and we may, perhaps, at last know," says Ruskin, "the meaning of those quiet words of the 147th Psalm, 'He maketh grass to grow upon the mountains.'" In another familiar passage, from "The Nature of Gothic," he asks us to imagine ourselves raised above even the level of flight of the stork and swallow, "when they lean upon the sirocco wind." From this vantage point we can see the whole surface of Europe, from the "orient colours" of the Mediterranean to the "mighty masses of leaden rock and heathy moor." As we move closer, examining the details of this broad surface, we come to understand "the great laws," "the Statutes" which inform it (X, 186-87).

A fine example is Ruskin's description of St. Mark's in Venice. He prepares us by portraying a contrasting English cathedral town (once again in the manner I am describing), and then asks us to remember "that we are in Venice, and land at the Calle Lunga San Moise..." The "place" is established in the vivid details of the street down which we move, and "as we advance slowly, the vast tower of St. Mark seems to lift itself visibly forth from the level field of chequered stones." He describes the details of St. Mark's front, the pillars and white domes, the five great vaulted porches, the sculptures and mosaics, all of it "quickset," the sculptured birds "clingling and fluttering," the sculptured acanthus and vine "drifting," and all "beginning and ending in the Cross." But Ruskin's vision of the "life" that informs St. Mark's is more than merely Christian; all of the description is a confusion of delight, amidst which the breasts of the Greek horses are seen blazing in their breadth of golden strength, and the St. Mark's lion, lifted on a blue field covered with stars, until at last, as if in ecstasy, the crests of the arches break into a marble foam, and toss themselves far into the blue sky in flashes and wreathes of sculptured spray, as if the breakers on the Lido shore had been frost-bound before they fell, and the sea-nymphs had inlaid them with coral and amethyst. (X, 78-83)

Now the comparison of the marble of St. Mark's to sea waves is not mere "fine writing," for it comes as the climax to a carefully structured approach from a particular vantage point and a careful accumulation of detail. Ruskin sees the forms of St. Mark's as expressing the very "life" of Venice, the "great natural laws" of that place. As he wrote later, in defense of the passage, he believed that "the Venetians...were always influenced in their choice of guiding lines of sculpture by their sense of the action of wind or sea" (X, 83, n. 3).

It is this belief in the great natural laws and expression in Nature and in art which is, itself, the "life" informing Ruskin's early prose. "The divisions of religious tenet and school to which I attached mistaken importance in my youth, do not in the least affect the vital teaching and purpose of this book," he wrote of Modern Painters in 1860 (VII, 462); its vitality lies, rather, in what Carlyle called to do was to gaze intensely from his vantage point through the carefully delineated details of the sea of grass to its informing spirit, or "life," the final clause is essential.
his "noble audacity and confidence in Truth's gaining the victory" his confidence, ultimately, that these laws and the forms that display them are truly there, awaiting the spectator. The forms of nature express eternal truth as two adjoining mountain ranges at Chamonix suggest true unity (VI, 243). A child might be taught, wrote Ruskin, "to understand the nineteenth Psalm, on a starry night, better than by diagrams of the constellations" (VII, 253), like the boy in Wordsworth's "Excursion," who with the hues and forms of Nature, and with the spirit of her forms, "clothed the nakedness of austere truth."11

Ruskin's own belief was sustained by the coincidences he saw in the forms of Nature and art, by the way in which the rocks at Chamonix, for instance, "lie down in the same lines that lead forth the fibres of the down on a cygnet's breast" (VI, 346). He devotes Plate VII in The Stones of Venice to what he calls "Abstract Lines," certain beautiful curved forms which he has seen in Nature: line ab is "a curve about three quarters of a mile long, formed by the surface of a small glacier of the second order," on a mountain above Chamonix; line h is a line about four feet long, a branch of spruce fir; line eg, about five hundred yards of the southern edge of the Matterhorn; line lm, the side of a willow leaf, "traced by laying the leaf on the paper"; line st, the side of a bayleaf, and so on (IX, 267-68). All of these curves, be they willow-leaf or mountainside, compose themselves gracefully on the page, and one realizes that their very harmony sustains his faith in the forms of Nature. But this plate alone is not the final evidence of the intensity of belief which is, itself, the living force in Ruskin's prose. One hundred twenty pages later, in a description of the cornices and capitals of St. Mark's, Ruskin singles out a particular capital, the lily capital, as the most beautiful. He discusses its decoration, a carved lily, and the refinement of its chiseling. Then he turns to the lines of its curvature and, recalling the plate I have just described, he asks the reader to perceive and to note thoughtfully "that the outer curve of the noble capital is the one which was our first example of associated curves; . . . that this lily, of the delicate Venetian marble, has but been wrought, by the highest human art, into the same line which the clouds disclose, when they break from the rough rocks of the flank of the Matterhorn" (IX, 387).

Ruskin's early works on art and architecture are, I have suggested, "arborescent," his belief in the forms of Nature and art transforming his accumulation of details into structure. In his descriptive passages he guides the reader's penetrative imagination from a particular vantage point through the surface details to the forms, the "lines" that express general laws. And, increasingly, Ruskin assumed, therefore, his readers' familiarity with these general laws. Furthermore, he became increasingly disturbed by the ways in which modern life was at variance with the general laws of the universe. After 1860, Ruskin's subject matter changed, and (my final point) the shift in subject matter is marked by a changed style. Beginning with the assumption that there are certain general laws, Ruskin no longer found it necessary to establish a particular vantage point from which his reader might exercise his penetrative imagination. Rather, in his later works in which Ruskin judges modern life by these great laws, the style is direct, sardonic and explicit; no longer arborescent, no longer a quickset hedge.

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Metaphor and Method in Mill's On Liberty

David R. Sanderson

John Stuart Mill's assertions, in his Autobiography, that he and his wife worked for two years writing On Liberty and that "none of my writings have been either so carefully composed, or so sedulously corrected as this," not only give evidence of Mill's diligence and industry but also suggest that On Liberty represents the epitome of Mill's literary expression. On this basis, the critic may be confident that the verbal characteristics of the treatise correspond as closely as possible to Mill's habitual mental processes and his philosophical methods. I should like to demonstrate how one feature of Mill's prose style—the absence of metaphor—is consistent with, and in fact depends


upon, his mode of thinking—the incisive method of analysis.

The statement that metaphor is absent from *On Liberty* requires important definition and qualification. In the first place, the term “metaphor” refers here broadly to the kind of language which represents an intuitive, not a logical, mental function. A metaphorical statement is elliptical, in the sense that the relationship it establishes between dissimilar things evades the correspondences and consequences of logic. And, although a metaphorical relationship really exists in only one or two resemblances, the metaphor itself does not necessarily elucidate the precise way in which the relationship should be viewed; in fact, the quality of metaphor that relates the whole of a thing to the whole of another tends to obscure the distinctions inherent in a comparison of dissimilarities. Thus, metaphorical language, representing the intuitive leaps of mind, is often unruly and expansive. On the other hand, of course, metaphor can have great value. Its peculiar capacities include broad implication and ramification, enlargement of the scope of a mental construction, the freeing of nonintellectual faculties and the demonstration of a unified view of experience—a view unamenable to the intellect and the intellect’s logic. Except for two instances that will be discussed at the conclusion of this study, Mill never engages in this kind of metaphorical thinking.

Secondly, the conscious or vital metaphorical process described above should be distinguished from the metaphor implicit in all language. That new metaphors lose their impact as they pass into general usage is, of course, a truism. When they become common and unconscious, metaphors no longer represent an intuitive mode of thought, even though they may still retain a degree of their former interest and usefulness. The metaphors appearing in *On Liberty* are chiefly of this kind (and there are very few even of these) since they are “given” in the language available to Mill and act as vestigial or decorative elements in the treatise. The metaphor Mill most frequently employs, the metaphor of battle, belongs to this classification. With repetition, the figure makes a sort of pattern throughout *On Liberty*:

It is accordingly on this battlefield, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle....

To fight the battle on such ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist.... (p. 23)

The creed remains as it were outside the mind... doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant..... The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with.... (pp. 40-41)

With what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst.... (p. 46)

Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. (p. 47)

Once Mill allows himself an extended image, based on a similar metaphor:

Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak and claws. (pp. 2-3)

But even here, though fancifully amplified, the metaphor is essentially decorative, as in the earlier examples. It simply defines in hyperbole the relationship between persons who differ, and is a figure that comes to everyone who is preoccupied with the ideas of liberty, tyranny and public opinion. Thus it serves no vital metaphorical function.

The general absence of vital, explicit metaphor in *On Liberty* manifests Mill's rigorously limited epistemeology, his surgically incisive approach to the wester of experience. None of his readers can escape a sense of massive precision as Mill builds up his argument; the length of *On Liberty*, and its intellectual weight, force some such kind of architectural metaphor when one tries to describe the structure of the treatise. But to say that Mill's argument is "built" is to mislead. Actually, the length of the treatise is determined by the number of errors to be demolished; and its intellectual weight is the weight of a demolition ball. Mill does not raise a house of truth, but carefully destroys a house of error—and all for the sake

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3. I have found no other pattern of metaphor in *On Liberty*. The careful reader will discover several miscellaneous figures in the treatise, but these will prove, I think, to function only as decoration.
of the principle of liberty, a fragile icon hidden inside, as it were. The argument proceeds, after Mill states the principle, by the continuous pointing out of objections to the principle and the painstaking devastation of each objection until finally the stated principle stands alone, unencumbered of error.

Besides the internal evidence shown by this brief figuative description, we have Mill's own statements of his method. His essay on Bentham is relevant in this connection. Although in that essay Mill defines Bentham's method, it can be shown that Mill himself has used the same approach in On Liberty:

Bentham's method of laying out his subject is admirable as a preservative against one kind of narrow and partial views. He begins by placing before himself the whole of the field of inquiry to which the particular question belongs, and divides down till he arrives at the thing he is in search of; and thus by successively rejecting all which is not the thing, he gradually works out a definition of what it is. This, which he calls the exhaustive method, is as old as philosophy itself.4

This method of "dividing down" functions in the first chapter of On Liberty. Distinguishing between what might be called metaphysical liberty on the one hand and social or political liberty on the other, Mill goes on to strip away obsolete questions about the nature of political freedom until he can define the problem as it appears at the present time. This stripping process, as Mill says, forces him to see "every subject in connexion with all the other subjects with which...it is related, and from which it requires to be distinguished."5 The "exhaustive method" is wholly intellectual: the connections Mill finds are not those of metaphor, but of cause and effect, etc.; and the distinctions he makes represent a thinking process wholly antithetical to metaphor.

Mill's other statement of method corresponds to the way in which he structures On Liberty after the introductory chapter. This procedure, which I have already described as a demolition, Mill calls "negative logic"—the method "which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths" (On Liberty, p. 44). This Socratic dialectic is the basic structural principle of the treatise. It works by cutting and dividing, stripping and dissecting. Metaphor, on the contrary, assimilates and synthesizes—relating things which to the intellect are discordant and can never be related. The mode of thinking represented by metaphor is wholly foreign to intellectual analysis; Mill's verbal usage, in short, corresponds to and springs from his epistemological method.

This study would not be complete if it did not discuss the fact that Mill uses vital metaphor at least twice in On Liberty. Yet there is no conflict here with my earlier statements, for in the case of both these usages, the metaphors represent the intuitive leap Mill makes before his intellect begins to function; they show, in other words, a way of thinking which is opposed to, yet which paradoxically supports, the method of negative logic. The first passage occurs in Chapter III:

Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. (p. 59)

Mill's belief in the doctrine of human progress is the starting point and the heart of On Liberty. Everything—the principle of individual liberty and its massive defense—depends upon his assumption that individuals have the potential for their own government. And that is at best a moot assumption.6 The main point here is that Mill must use a metaphor; he must intuit a relationship between human nature and something noble in its development; and that he must find a resemblance demonstrates the irrelevancy of bringing logical processes to bear on this basic question.

In the same way, Mill uses similar metaphors a few pages later:

But these few [persons of genius] are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant pool.... Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people—less capable, consequent ly, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of molds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these molds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better

5. Ibid., p. 57.
6. Carlyle's reaction to On Liberty (quoted in Michael St. John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill [London, 1954], p. 408) strikes at the heart of Mill's treatise: "As if it were a sin to control, or coerce into better methods, human swine in any way;... Ach Gott in Himmel! The difference in metaphors for human nature [tree and swing] is fundamental and irreconcilable, and marks the two poles of social theory that Mill and Carlyle represent."
for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break their fetters, they become a mark for the society. . . . (pp. 64-65)

The metaphors in this passage are badly mixed, thrown together haphazardly. Persons of genius are "the salt of the earth"; life without them becomes "a stagnant pool"; genius needs "soil" in which to "grow"; it also needs an "atmosphere of freedom" in which to "breathe"; it cannot be fitted into "molds"; and if true individuals are restrained, they will SWF. Six metaphors—more than Mill usually employs in six pages—yet their relationships are unclear and highly tenuous. This suggests that Mill is struggling to express a language unfamiliar to him and that he is not at ease in the mode of metaphorical thinking which he engages in here. Yet, since he has kept the passage intact, it seems safe to assume that he knew he had no initial recourse to the intellect on the problem of genius. The metaphor of human nature as a tree is implied in the second passage by the words "soil" and "grow"; much as in the first passage, Mill has stated metaphorically his unprovable assumption of mankind's inherent nobility. Thus, before the rigors of his analytical method begin, at the place where he first reacts to his experience and where feeling holds sway, Mill intuitively a relationship on which stands the whole logical process of the treatise. Human beings are not machines, he says; they are living plants. That metaphorical assertion of feeling and imagination makes a slim and ironical support for the weight of Mill's analytical argument in On Liberty.

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The Parson-Snob Controversy and Vanity Fair

Myron Taube

EARLY IN Vanity Fair Mr. Sedley twits his son, Jos, and is later rebuked by his wife: "... in a curtain lecture, I say, Mrs. Sedley took her husband to task for his cruel conduct to poor Jos" (Chap. 4). Thackeray's italics are an authorial wink at his readers, a statement of shared literary experience. The reference is to Douglas Jerrold's Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures (which Thackeray had reviewed enthusiastically in the Morning Chronicle in December 1845). Behind the reference is Thackeray's fight with Jerrold over policy at Punch at a time when Thackeray's views of life and art were in transition.

The changes in Thackeray came, Gordon Ray feels, "late in 1846 [when] he experienced a change of heart, the culmination of a progressive reconciliation to life, which can be compared with John Stuart Mill's awakening from Benthamite Utilitarianism twenty years earlier." But Thackeray was not merely undergoing a "reconciliation to life"; he was also bothered by a problem which every artist must solve: he was not quite sure how to handle his material. He had started a novel early in 1846 which he referred to as "The Novel without a hero" and "Pen and Pencil Sketches of English Society." After several rejections, he finally placed it with Bradbury and Evans, probably as early as January 1846. But he did little work on the novel until late in the year, when he had an insight into its structure. When he discovered the title Vanity Fair, Thackeray found more than just "an organizing idea, about which to arrange the wealth of impressions that he had accumulated," he found his tone, his attitude and his persona, and he unblocked the stream of his creativity. The discovery of the title—and the subsequent reshaping of the novel—resulted from Thackeray's modified religious and social views. The climactic action that served to clarify these views occurred during 1846, when he clashed with Douglas Jerrold over the policies of Punch in what is known as the Parson-Snob controversy.

Jerrold came to Punch after years of fighting his way through the world. The son of itinerant actors who played the provinces, Jerrold had to combat the twin demons of poverty and class distinction. The result was a burning hatred of oppression and a "known sympathy with all reform movements." For Jerrold, the only solution for the ills of England was the elimination of institutionalized evils; he was "clear and outspoken in [his] attacks on the triple giants, snobbery, toadyism and humbug" (Douglas Jerrold, p. 289). He lacked a cohesive program, but he op-


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posed the five “P’s” every political party strives for: “Place, Patronage, Power, Perquisites, Pensions.”

It has been suggested that *Punch* and Jerrold were made for each other. The meeting of the two was like the meeting of Wordsworth and Coleridge: each took fire from the other’s spark. Jerrold gave *Punch* his spirit and wit; *Punch* gave him a platform from which to speak. Jerrold’s spirit is seen in the fact that “The Song of the Shirt” appeared in the Christmas 1843 issue of *Punch* after three papers had rejected it and Hood was “sick of the sight of it.”

But Jerrold’s social and political radicalism made *Punch* unpopular with the vested interests, and a clash with Thackeray was inevitable.

Although Walter Jerrold has quite properly suggested that “overmuch has been made of the ‘imperfect sympathy’ subsisting between Douglas Jerrold and Thackeray,” both men were similar and different in areas in which even similarities led to friction. For example, both were social satirists. The source of their wit was an innate sympathy and kindness for the human condition. But Jerrold had an “impatient fervor... [a] ready zeal for running atilt at anything that he regarded as unjust or unworthy” (Douglas Jerrold, p. 387); Thackeray was a viewer, not a participant; a thinker and feeler, not a doer. Moreover, they came from different worlds. Jerrold had rootless parents, who operated on a lower level of society. Thackeray came from several generations of English and Anglo-Indian gentlemen. To Jerrold, life was a conflict between rich and poor, haves and have nots; to Thackeray, it was more a question of good and bad—regardless of whether money was involved or not. Their personalities differed. “The one was a man of bright, impulsive, not to say tempestuous, nature, with strong convictions, the other a man of more level-headed, more self-conscious, and ‘dignified’ demeanour.” Thackeray “was more of a statesman than his colleague Douglas Jerrold, who for years was practically *Punch*’s Prime Minister.” But neither man had a thoroughly organized view of society.

The reputation Jerrold created for *Punch* bothered Thackeray, who joined the staff in 1844 with some trepidation. He knew it was a “very low paper” that gave a “great opportunity for unrestrained laughing sneering kicking and gambadoing” (Letters, II, 54). Although the pay was “more than double” what he got elsewhere (Letters, II, 135), Thackeray wanted the connection kept “a secret” (Letters, II, 54). He once wrote to John Allen that he feared bringing Brookfield into disrepute: “I often fancy this good fellow may get into disgrace with his superior officers by the fact of his intimacy with such a repromote as me—smoking pipes at midnight with a caricaturist a writer in *Punch*” (Letters, II, 274).

Unlike Jerrold the radical, Thackeray desired gradual rather than violent social change, although he was fairly skeptical about political or social action. Thus, he favored the Anti-Corn Law League, but rejected the Chartists, in whom he saw a complete denial of law and order. As he grew older his respect for the great traditions of England deepened, and he was repelled even more by Jerrold’s leveling attacks. Thackeray had a Burkean fear of the destruction of tradition, and in Jerrold he saw the revolutionary who would destroy both good and bad to perform his experiment. The question around the *Punch* table became: What kind of magazine should *Punch* be? Should it continue as it was in the past, a sounding board for radical ideas, or should it be a commentator on society? Should it rally men to action, or laugh them out of their folly? Should it instruct, or amuse?

In 1845, Thackeray began his campaign against Jerrold’s anticlericalism, “a passive opposition against the Anti-Church and Bishop sneers” (Letters, II, 274-75); it was not until the following year, when the conditions were right, that the conflict crystallized. Outwardly, it was a “clash between gentlemanly and Bohemian standards,” and soon the rest of the staff took sides: Jerrold and Mark Lemon opposed Gilbert à Beckett, Leech, Percival Leigh, Tom Taylor and Dicky Doyle—for which group Thackeray had become the spokesman.

In 1846, when the major battles were fought, Jerrold was at the peak of his career. During 1845, his most famous serial, *Mrs. Caudle’s Curtain Lectures*, had “created something of a furor,” and the circulation of *Punch* soared. So great was the influence of the series that “news-vendors would inquire whether the number contained a further installment of the lectures before giving their orders for a new issue.” The unpolitical humor of Mrs. Caudle sent *Punch* into places where Jerrold’s more caustic wit was anathema, and Jerrold became “the first wit of the present age”! the series extended Jerrold’s reputation “as widely as that of Dickens himself” (Douglas Jerrold, pp. 495-384).

Ironically, the success of *Mrs. Caudle* depressed Jerrold. Although he considered himself a “wit with a mission,” in

8. Ibid., p. 27.
the Lectures his “main object was entertainment—satire being subordinated to fun.” His success had been at the expense of his political and social mission. Hannay pointed out:

Accordingly, he was a little ashamed of the immense success of the Caudle Lectures,—the fame of which I remember being bruited about the Mediterranean in 1845, and which as social drolleries set nations laughing. Douglas took their celebrity rather sulkily. He did not like to be talked of as a funny man.

In great irritation, Jerrold remarked that “the public will always pay to be amused, but they will never pay to be instructed.”

Meanwhile, early in 1846, Thackeray began his Snobs of England—and Punch entered into a new phase in its history:

The effect of these papers was remarkable; the sensation they caused was profound. It may be compared to that of Jerrold’s “Caudle Lectures,” save that they appealed to a more cultivated and less demonstrative class, and were appreciated in proportion to their superior merits. The circulation of Punch rose surprisingly under their benign influence, and Thackeray did not leave the subject until he had handled it from every point of view and even carried it abroad. He was, naturally, not a little proud of his first great success, and in his unaffected manner was tempted to speak about it in Society—where more than in any other quarter the papers were appreciated.

This double occurrence—the increased popularity of both Jerrold and Thackeray because of nonpolitical work—weakened Jerrold’s position as the political heart of Punch and made a test of his power inevitable.

The conflict reached a climax in 1846 with the papers on clerical snobs. In the first clerical snob paper, Thackeray stated that, although there were clerics who were snobs, he would not discuss them in Punch: “for the same reason that Punch would not set up his show in a Cathedral, out of respect for the solemn service celebrated within. There are some places where he acknowledges himself not privileged to make noise, and puts away his show, and silences his drum, and takes off his hat and holds his peace.” This is certainly very un-Jerroldian in tone. He then makes a plea for those clerics one never hears of—since one hears only of those who do wrong:

And I know this, that if there are some Clerics who do wrong, there are straightforward a thousand newspapers to haul up those unfortunates, and cry, “Fie upon them, fie upon them!” while, though the press is always ready to yell and bellow excommunication against these stray delinquent parsons, it somehow takes very little count of the many good ones—of the tens of thousands of honest men who lead Christian lives, who give to the poor generously, who deny themselves rigidly, and live and die in their duty, without ever a newspaper paragraph in their favour. My beloved friend and reader, I wish you and I could do the same: and let me whisper my belief, entre nous, that of those eminent philosophers who cry out against the parsons the loudest, there are not many who have got their knowledge of the church by going thither often.

We see Thackeray’s softened, more conservative view of life when he nominates for the patrons of clerical snobs the “seven or eight Irish bishops, the prelates of whose wills were mentioned in last year’s journals, and who died leaving behind them some two hundred thousand pounds apiece.” But he is not wishing to cast the first stone:

And I confess that when those Right Reverend Prelates come up to the gates of Paradise with their probates of wills in their hands, I think that their chance is. . . . But the gates of Paradise is a far way to follow their Lordships; so let us trip down again, lest awkward questions be asked there about our own favourite vices too.

News of this kind of prelate creates “the vulgar prejudice that clergymen are an overpaid and luxurious body of men.” But, Thackeray protests, this is not so. He must have been thinking back to his 1842 trip to Ireland, and his visit to his cousin Elias Thackeray. At that time, he wrote to his mother, he went “to Thackeray’s living of Louth, the best in Ireland it was, worth £3000 a year, and has no expenses or extravagances of his own. He must live on 500 and the rest goes to Schools, hospitals and the poor and curates. I am sure God Almighty himself must be pleased to look down on honest Elias Thackeray, and [when I] hear of human depravity as applied to him and some others, can’t believe [it for] the soul of me” (Letters, II, 84; editorial conjecture is by Professor Ray). However, much of the distortion is caused by contemporary writers:

From reading the works of some modern writers of repute, you would fancy that a parson’s life was passed in gorging himself with plum-pudding and port-wine; and that his Reverence’s fat chops were always greasy with the crackling of tithe pigs. Caricaturists delight to represent him so: round, short-necked, pimple-faced, apoplectic, bursting out of waistcoat, like a black-pudding, a shovell-hatted fuzz-wigged Silenus.


In reality, "the poor fellow's flesh-pots are very scantily furnished with meats"; he works "for a wage that a tailor's foreman would despise"; and he has additional expenses forced upon him by social pressure: he must keep up with the Joneses—particularly if the Joneses are gentlemen—and "bring up his six great hungry sons as such" (Works, VI, 341).

Then Thackeray makes a beautifully ironic answer to those who felt that parsons were led too easily into temptation:

if he does his duty, he has such temptations to spend money as no mortal man could withstand. Yes; you who can't resist purchasing a chest of cigars, because they are so good; or an ornolult clock at Howell and James's, because it is such a bargain; or a box at the Opera because Lablache and Grisi are divine in the Puritans: fancy how difficult it is for a parson to resist spending a half-crown when John Breakstone's family are without a loaf; or "standing" a bottle of port for poor old Polly Rabbits, who has her thirteenth child; or treating himself to a suit of corduroys for little Bob Scarecrow, whose breeches are sadly out at elbows. Think of these temptations, brother moralists and philosophers, and don't be too hard on the parson. (Works, VI, 341-42)

Jerrold took offense at the reference to "modern writers of repute," but the majority of the Punch staff sided with Thackeray. Mark Lemon saw which way the future lay, and adjustments were made. From this time on, the radicalism of Jerrold was rejected as the raison d'etre of Punch. The last paragraph of The Snobs of England established the future policy: "To laugh at such [Snobs] is Mr. Punch's business. May he laugh honestly, hit no foul blow, and tell the truth when at his very broadest grin—never forgetting that if Fun is good, Truth is still better, and Love best of all" (Works, VI, 464). Punch was to be a more conservative, more tolerant, more broadly humane publication. It was to aim not at the masses, but at the middle class; it was to emphasize humor, not reform.

By the middle of 1846, Jerrold knew that the tide had turned. He wrote to Dickens:

Punch, I believe, holds its course.... Nevertheless, I do not very cordially agree with its new spirit. I am convinced that the world will get tired (at least I hope so) of this eternal guffaw at all things. After all, life has something serious in it. It cannot all be a comic history of humanity. Some men would, I believe, write the Comic Sermon on the Mount. Think of a Comic History of England; the drollery of Alfred; the fun of Sir Thomas More in the Tower; the farce of his daughter begging the dead head and clapping it in her coffin on her bosom. Surely the world will be sick of this blasphemy.... When, moreover, the change comes, unless Punch goes a little back to his occasional gravities, he'll be sure to suffer. (Douglas Jerrold, p. 445)

The shift can be seen in the decrease in Jerrold's contributions to the magazine. In 1844, he wrote 221 columns; in 1845 this dropped to 282/4; in 1846 it became 159; in 1847 it fell to 129, and during the first half of 1848 he contributed only 58/4 columns. Thackeray, too, realized that he had won. Early in 1847, he wrote to John Allen, "Last year I made an active one [fight] (Jerrold & I had a sort of war & I came off conqueror).... It's something to stop half a million people from jeering at the Church every week—No cry is more popular. At this minute we might be turning the Bishop of London into such scorn & ridicule upon perfectly just grounds too, and to the delight of the public" (Letters, II, 274-75).

The Parson-Snob controversy clarified Thackeray's attitude toward the church and provided him with a persona for Vanity Fair. He realized that except for his one skeptical friend, FitzGerald, and one or two others, like his stepfather, those men who most impressed him by their morality, goodness, habits, sobriety were clerics. Besides his friends, Thackeray had a family with a strong clerical tradition, and his awareness of this double influence upon him is seen in the last paragraph of the first clerical snob paper:

But what is this? Instead of "showing up" the parsons are we indulging in maudlin praises of that monstrous black-coated race? O saintly Francis [Thackeray], lying at rest under the turf; O Jimmy [James White], and Johnny [John Allen] and Willy [William Brookfield], friends of my youth! O noble and dear old Elias [Thackeray]! how should he who knows you not respect you and your calling? May this pen never write a pennyworth again, if it ever casts ridicule upon either! (Works, VI, 342)

In 1849, Thackeray wrote to Mrs. Brookfield:

the paper this m4 announces the death of dear old Horace Smith that good serene old man who went out of the world in charity with all in it, and having shown through his life as far as I know it, quite a delightful love of Gods works and creatures—a true loyal Xian man. So was Morier of a different order but possessing that precious natural quality of Love whatev is awarded to some lucky minds—such as these, Charles Lamb's & one or 2 more

16. "The clerical traditions of a family, with nineteen parsons among them made Thackeray, quite apart from his intellectual convictions, the true churchman and filled his imagination with the poetry of the rites of the Church." Sir William Hunter, The Thackerays of India and Some Calcutta Graves (London, 1897), p. 181.
in our trade—to many among the parsons I think—to a friend of yours by the name of Makepeace perhaps, but not unalloyed to this one—O God purify it, and make my heart clean. (Letters, II, 563; italics mine)

Thus, by the time Thackeray came to revise that part of the novel he had already written, his position was quite clear: society was sick, but could be made somewhat better through Love and Humility. But since his wife’s madness, Thackeray had been experiencing a deepening sense of withdrawal from life.¹⁷ As an observer, an ambulatory lay preacher, he could comment on, without involving himself in, the action before him. With the Parson-Snob conflict, he came full cycle from the early skepticism at Cambridge: by the end of 1846, he was of the Bishop’s party, though not one of them. Still not an orthodox Christian, Thackeray had the attitudes and sensitivities of the cleric. No wonder he could say, in 1847, “And our profession seems to me to be as serious as the Parson’s own” (Letters, II, 282), for in his own case the responsibilities and attitudes of the two had coalesced.

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Putting Quilp to Rest

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In his informative and lucid discussion of Charles Dickens’ use of Gothic materials in “The Gothic Flame of Charles Dickens,” (VN, No. 32, Spring 1967), Larry Kirkpatrick has interpreted Daniel Quilp of The Old Curiosity Shop as “a caricature of villainy, a satire upon the concept of undiluted evil in the world.” This interpretation, I think, obscures the meaning of Quilp, and, therefore, of the early art of Dickens, since it fails to consider the nature of the villain in Dickens’ early novels, his conception of the incorrigible criminal and the folk and literary traditions from which Quilp is derived. Neither in Dickens’ understanding of evil—especially in his early work, nor in folk or in literary tradition, do we find much basis for calling Quilp a “caricature” or a “satire.” Examination of the nature of the villain in Dickens’ early novels and of the sources upon which Quilp is based may help illuminate both Dickens’ creative methods and our understanding of the character.

Evil was a relatively simple idea to the young Dickens. When he wrote his first five novels, he had little knowledge of social problems and little social experience outside the lower middle class; consequently, he turned to obvious and readily available sources for suggestions for evil figures. Thus a catalog of Dickens’ early villains reveals a variety of uncomplicated and mostly melodramatic types. In it we find rascals and rogues from farce, thieves and murderers from the sensation and Newgate novel, scoundrels from melodrama, dissolve aristocrats, incompetent and cruel magistrates and minor civil servants and stereotypes, such as evil Jews and devils from English literature and European folklore.

Expressing, as they do, only surface defects in society, these early villains represent comparatively superficial sources of evil. They are types that one might expect from an apprentice writer with more imagination and talent than experience and perception. Moreover, since most of these villains are melodramatic, they naturally embody “the concept of undiluted evil in the world,” and thus, in the early stages of his art, Dickens made frequent use of characters who were totally evil. Accordingly, Quilp is no more a “caricature of villainy, a satire upon the concept of undiluted evil” than is Fagin, Sikes, Monks, Gride, Ralph Nickleby, Gashford, Chesterton, Sir Mulberry Hawk or any of his other completely wicked villains. One must conclude that Dickens’ predilection for simple villains in his early novels is based upon the fact that he was unaware there was any other.

Moreover, in the creation of character, Dickens’ belief in an unreframed criminal type tends to support his artistic practice. Although the later villains in his developing art are psychologically and artistically more complex, Dickens always believed in the existence of an entirely unredeemable culprit. In the preface to the 1867 edition of Oliver Twist, he defended the character of Bill Sikes by saying that “there are in the world some insensible and callous natures that do become, at last, utterly and incurably bad.”¹ Indeed, this belief in the total depravity of some criminals was the rationale for his

¹. Oliver Twist, The Works of Charles Dickens, with introduction, general essay and notes by Andrew Lang (New York, 1962), III, xiv. (All later references to Dickens’ novels will be to this edition.)
defense of corporal and capital punishment. It is difficult to believe that an author who believed in incurably evil character would turn upon his own view and satirize it. But, if he is not a "caricature" or a "satire," what is the nature of Daniel Quilp?

Mr. Kirkpatrick is certainly correct in his observation that Quilp is "beyond the pale of humanity." But Quilp is not intended to be part of the human race because his character is derived from three principal demonic sources: the evil dwarf, the devil and the comic devil of the English stage, characters who have an ancient ancestry in folklore and literature. Although he was not, like Sir Walter Scott, a serious student of folklore, Dickens' prodigious sensibility absorbed much of the content of European folklore. The colorful supernatural folk characters—the goblins and devils, the dwarfs and evil spirits—undoubtedly kindled the imagination of Dickens as they had that of Spenser, Shakespeare and Scott. Most importantly, the characters and attributes of these immemorial figures were blended by Dickens' creative consciousness, so that we do not see in Quilp only one folk character, but a few, harmoniously fused, to make a vivid and greatly original grotesque.

Daniel Quilp is foremostly an evil dwarf. The dwarfs of European folklore, especially after centuries of Christian teaching, were usually regarded as dangerously evil figures outside the church. And it is an old tradition that evil dwarfs were usually very ugly—irrespective of their ugliness symbolizing their moral wickedness. Thus Dickens found in the tradition of the evil dwarf a ready-made villain that his creative power could heighten with darkly mysterious associations. Dickens' use of a dwarf imbued with devilish and preternatural traits to deepen the aura of mystery about him is not unique among nineteenth-century novelists. Indeed, rather than being an innovator, Dickens is a latecomer to this art. Sir Walter Scott employed the same subject and technique in The Black Dwarf (1816) and in other novels. Moreover, the identity of literary practice and the resemblance between the Black Dwarf of Mucklestone-Moor and Daniel Quilp may point to an influence. The similarities between the two dwarfs include deformity, misanthropy, physical strength, unsociability and remote habitat, as well as suggestions of demonic origins and associations. This catalog, of course, may show merely that both novelists portrayed a commonly held view of the appearance and habits of mythological dwarfs. Admittedly, the two figures are far from identical: Scott's dour dwarf lacks comicality, and, despite his hatred of humanity, he shows enough benevolence and generosity to become the hero of the story. Nevertheless, since Dickens was well acquainted with English prose fiction, it is quite possible that he might have obtained from Scott the subject of the grotesque dwarf as well as the technique of using demonology to develop character. The mysterious Black Dwarf is exactly the type of character the young Dickens might borrow and modify to exemplify his simply view of evil. Scott may also be a major source of Dickens' knowledge of folklore since his poems and novels swarm with goblins and demons. Scott was a lifelong student of demonology, publishing his Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft in 1830.

Whatever the source of Dickens' knowledge of devillore, Quilp is also a devil figure. The devil is a folk character deeply engrained in the popular imagination, representing a simplified idea of evil. The simplicity and perhaps Quilp's comicality may have prompted Mr. Kirkpatrick to view Dickens' treatment of Quilp as satiric. However, simplicity and humorous villainy are not necessarily satiric. To those who believe in the devil, or, as in Dickens' case, to an author who desires to add resonant symbolic overtones to intensify his portrait of villainy, diabolism can be a serious artistic device. Thus Dickens was quite serious when he created Quilp, as was Shakespeare when he gave us Richard III, another character who is a comic devil. Nor does the fact that the popular imagination could at times view the devil as a vehicle of humor in any way reduce his terror or wickedness. As Maximilian Rudwin has commented: "Although the Devil was hailed by our medieval ancestors with such laughter as still rings across the ages, it need not be inferred... that his audience did not stand in awe and trembling of him. It is a well-known psychological fact that we strive to laugh ourselves out of our fear and to grin away our apprehensions." Many critics have pointed out the similarity of The Old Curiosity Shop to the fairy tale, a narrative form that is a traditional vehicle for folklore and an especially suitable context for a grotesque dwarf. See Edgar Johnson, Charles Dickens, His Tragedy and Triumph (New York, 1931), I, 325, and K. J. Fielding, Charles Dickens, A Critical Introduction (Boston, 1958), pp. 67-68.


Although authors since the medieval period have taken widely differing attitudes toward the devil, some satirizing him during the eighteenth century and others worshipping him during the Romantic period, the simple view of evil held by the young Dickens made neither of these views supportable. He might occasionally present his devil figures and other simple villains as humorous characters, such as Fagin,9 Squeers and Quilp, but, in the early novels of Dickens, the devil character was the old black-hearted and uncomplicated villain of folklore who could not be admired or satirized. The devil figure, then, as we find him in Dickens, is a totally evil man whose personality is symbolically colored by allusions to the devil or his agents and whose desire to do evil is largely unmotivated, except for a delight in wickedness.

Such is the character of Quilp as described by Dickens, by other characters in the novel and by himself. When introducing Quilp, Dickens says he grinned "like a devil." This description is more than simile, because Dickens explicitly likens the ugly dwarf to an imp, the diminutive agent of the devil whom Quilp closely resembles:

The creature appeared quite horrible, with his monstrous head and little body, as he rubbed his hands slowly round, and round, and round again—with something fantastic even in his manner of performing this slight action—and, dropping his shaggy brows and cocking his chin in the air, glanced upward with a stealthy look of exultation that an imp might have copied and appropriated to himself.10

Elsewhere, Dickens reinforces this portrait by describing him as "impish" and "goblin-like" and also frequently refers to him as an "evil spirit," and "evil genius" and a "little fiend." As one might expect of an imp, he delights in performing a "demon-dance" and indulges in "demon whims." Mrs. Nubbles thought he embodied "that Evil Power, who was so vigorously attacked at Little Bethel" (XI, 107). Sampson Brass, when confessing his complicity in crime with Quilp, reveals that Quilp delighted in torturing him as a devil might torment a victim in Hell: "Quilp—Quilp, who deludes me into his infernal den, and takes delight in looking on chuckling while I scorch, and burn, and bruise, and maim myself..." (XI, 285).

Moreover, Quilp's infernal character is further darkened by frequent allusions to other mythological creatures and phenomena. Noting Quilp's immunity to injury when quaffing boiling liquids and his almost inhuman predilection for enveloping himself in suffocating cigar smoke, Dick Swiveller calls him a "Salamander" (X, 229). In medieval belief, a Salamander was a demon who inhabited fire. But Dickens, of course, could have been merely alluding to the fabled idea of the Salamander's tolerance of fire. In any case, Quilp's immunity to burning liquids and his love of thick smoke are important requisites for an imp of Satan. Defending his irregular hours, Quilp warns his wife that he will be a "Will o' the Wisp, now here, now there, dancing about you always, starting up when you least expect me, and keeping you in a constant state of restlessness and irritation" (XI, 127). This phrase may be only a figure of speech, but in the context of folklore in the novel, it is suggestive. Widely known by many names, the Will o' the Wisp, or ignis fatuus, is an ominous phenomenon. One of the superstitions associated with it is that it is the "soul of an unbaptized child or forest spirit," which deliberately misleads lost travelers. The Will o' the Wisp can also warn against the presence of a villain, and it can be a "death omen," since it precedes an "invisible funeral procession."11 When Quilp suddenly pops his head through a little door, Dickens describes him as "an evil genius of the cellars come from underground upon some work of mischief" (XI, 100). This incident might have been suggested by the subterranean gnomes who dwelt in tunnels and mines and who were widely known for their mischief, perhaps the bucca, the Cornish fairy or the kobold, the German gnome. And, as a spirit of some importance, Quilp has an "attendant sprite," named Tom Scott, who naturally cavorts "like a Banshee" (XI, 133). In keeping with his goblin character, Quilp keeps a grotesque ship's head on the wall of his den, which, Dickens says, looked "like a goblin or hideous idol whom the dwarf worshipped" (XI, 236).

After Quilp's death by drowning, Dickens shrouds his burial in mysteriously suggestive ambiguity. It would appear that the dwarf, like an-exorcised demon, had completely disappeared, not even leaving a body behind. Dickens suggests that Quilp "was left to be buried with a stake through his heart in the centre of four lonely

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9. Dickens employs numerous devil figures as minor characters, particularly in his early novels; however, the only other major character based upon the devil is Fagin, the evil fence of Oliver Twist. In Fagin, Dickens combines the characters of the evil Jew and the devil, unconsciously exploiting the old tradition that Jews were devils. See my article "Fagin of Oliver Twist, an Early View of Evil," Lock Haven Review, No. 9 (1967).

10. The Old Curiosity Shop, X, 31. If popular tradition did not suggest him, Dickens could have gained the idea for the imp-like character from Daniel Defoe's The Political History of the Devil, which he read while writing Oliver Twist. See The Letters of Charles Dickens, ed. Walter Dyster (Bloomsbury, 1938), 1, 136.

roads," a grisly burial reserved for suicides and, in Slavic folklore, for those demons who were vampires. But then Dickens intimates that this burial did not take place at all: "It was rumoured afterwards that this horrible and barbarous ceremony had been dispensed with, and that the remains had been secretly given up to Tom Scott. But even here, opinion was divided; for some said Tom dug them up at midnight, and carried them to a place indicated to him by the widow" (XI, 355). Like a creature from mythology and folk superstition, Quilp seems to have simply vanished from the earth. The mysterious disappearance of his body, his strange nocturnal habits, his preference for solitude and for outlandish retreats like "Quilp's Wharf" and "The Wilderness," his unmotivated hatreds and his fantastically odd behavior—all reveal him to have more affinity with the nonhuman dwarfs and demons of folklore than with the human race.

As Quilp's demonic nature is derived from folklore and literature, his comicality is probably derived from English stage tradition. As has been noted, an old dramatic tradition, much older than Shakespeare's portrayal of Richard III, is that of an agent of the devil possessing a comic delight in doing evil. Sidney Thomas has convincingly shown that Richard III is the culmination of the long history of a similar comic villain, the Vice or Iniquity of medieval morality plays. Although Dickens was no medievalist, he was well acquainted with Shakespeare's play. Furthermore, many readers from Dickens' day to ours have naturally associated Shakespeare's diabolic and humorous king with Dickens' malicious dwarf. Thomas Hood, one of the first critics to notice the similarity, uses "Richard Glosser" as a gloss upon the character of Quilp. (Dickens, incidentally, praised Hood's review in the preface of a succeeding edition of the novel.16) Among scholars in our century, Ernest E. Pollack has pointed out some of the obvious similarities, e.g., physical deformity, delight in evil, incurably bad character and comicality. However, Pollack omits the parallel of the devil figure, an important omission if one believes that Richard III inspired the creator of Quilp. But Shakespeare leaves no doubt that Richard is to be identified with the devil. Throughout the play there are frequent references to his demonic character, and Richard himself confesses that he is a devil: "And thus I clothe my naked villany/With odd old ends stol'n forth of holy writ/And seem a saint when most I play the devil" (I, iii, 336-38). Elsewhere he alludes to his similarity to the Vice: "Thus, like the formal Vice, Iniquity,/ I moralize two meanings in one word" (III, i, 82-83).

Quilp's humor is clearly the diabolical type exhibited by Richard III. Referring to his mother-in-law, Quilp says: "If I could poison that dear old lady's rum and water... I'd die happy" (XI, 113). And when his wife visits him at his "ogre's castle" to bring him some news, Quilp hopefully inquires about her mother: "Is it good news, pleasant news, news to make a man skip and snap his fingers?... Is the dear old lady dead?" (XI, 294). In addition, Quilp shares with Shakespeare's evil king the same unholy resolve to do evil. Richard III asserts: "I am determined to prove a villain" (I, i, 30), and Quilp makes a parallel remark: "I hate your virtuous people!... ah! I hate 'em every one!" (XI, 106). The dash and color of the two villains make them captivating, especially to women. Dickens has no scene comparable to the famous one in which Richard woos the widowed Anne, but pretty Mrs. Quilp explains that the grotesque dwarf has a way with woman that resembles, we suspect, that of Richard III: "Quilp has such a way with him when he likes, that the best-looking woman here couldn't refuse him if I was dead, and she was free, and he chose to make love to her" (X, 40). Once married, of course, Quilp resumes his true character and sadistically torments her; thus he shares Richard III's facility for dissembling. In conclusion, these many parallels suggest that Dickens' merry Quilp owes something to Shakespeare's great example of a humorous villain.

Whatever the source of Quilp's comicality, Dickens' addition of a comic dimension to his evil character was a masterstroke. We can enjoy Quilp, as we enjoy Richard III, as a major artistic creation, without being perturbed about his lack of reality or his inadequate representation of evil. We can accept Quilp as we accept Richard, as an artistically valid but self-limiting character; hence, there is no need to explain him away as being a caricature or a satire, implying that his creator did not really mean what he seems to have created.

In his later novels, especially in the great period of

9. The Antic Hamlet and Richard III (New York, 1943), chap. 2. Although the serious devil and the comic Vice are dramatically distinct characters in the morality plays, the two figures merge into one in later drama, as, for example, in Shakespeare's Richard the Third. For this reason the term comic devil may be used to describe this later villain. This term would be inaccurate, however, if applied to the morality play's comic Vice. See L. W. Cushman, The Devil and the Vice in the English Dramatic Literature Before Shakespeare (Halle, 1900).

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Bleak House, Little Dorrit, Great Expectations and Our Mutual Friend, Dickens came to realize that the view of evil as seen through centuries-old mythological characters could not possibly express the evils of an urban, industrial civilization with its completely different intellectual milieu, economic system and governing class. And thus in his mature works, after a lifetime of artistic and social experience, Dickens gave us a complex and profound understanding of society and the evil forces that corrupt it. In this later phase, he greatly minimized the use of the simple villain, embodying an "undiluted concept of evil." Most importantly, although Dickens might occasionally flavor a minor character with some devilish traits, he never again, after the creation of Quilp, made a major villain a devil character. Limitation of this artistic device is an important indication that Dickens' growing maturity led him to see far greater wickedness in human villainy. In the realistic atmosphere of Dickens' last great novels, a fantastic gargoylike Quilp, expressing a simplistic concept of evil, would be entirely out of place. And Dickens knew it, since he had long ago put Quilp to rest.

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Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley and John Leyden’s "The Cout of Keeldar"

Katherine Ware Ankenbrandt

Some years ago it was suggested that the surname Keeldar in Shirley is taken from a stanza quoted in Scott’s Black Dwarf and that this borrowing constitutes additional evidence of Charlotte Brontë's knowing Scott's novel. But, without discounting her very probable acquaintance with it, we can find the name Keeldar available in two other places, both connected with Scott and both widely known. The better source is the Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, in Part III of which, "Impitations of the Ancient Ballad," appears John Leyden's poem "The Cout of Keeldar." Its sixty-two unnumbered stanzas, occupying seven pages, are explained not only by a brief introduction and a page and a half of notes, but by a companion poem, "Lord Soulis," on a cognate story, also by Leyden and also explained—at much greater length—by Scott. Another possible source is Scott's notes to The Lady of the Lake, in which he quotes seven of Leyden's stanzas, referring to the poem by title and author and adding a prose parallel from Northumbria. Both the Minstrelsy and The Lady of the Lake were not only immensely popular but almost certainly known to the Brontës, who were thus very probably familiar with Leyden's poem in both contexts.

The story of "The Cout of Keeldar" makes evident what Charlotte Brontë must have intended the name to convey about Shirley Keeldar. Scott's headnote explains the Cout as "Chief of Keeldar, a Northumbrian district adjacent to Cumberland," and "the most redoubled adversary of Lord Soulis," the cruel sorcerer whose death by boiling—when other methods proved ineffectual—Leyden described in the first of the pair of poems. The general locality of the Cout's story is thus fairly close to the Yorkshire of Shirley, especially given the tendency that the Brontës seem to have shared with Scott, to class all northern English folklore together with Scottish. Scott's headnote sums up the Cout's character. His end came in a sudden encounter [with Soulis and his men] on the banks of the Hermitage. Being arrayed in armour of proof

3. Sir Walter Scott, The Lady of the Lake, note II to Canto IV, stanza xiii (part of the poem "Alice Brand"), in Poetical Works, ed. J. Logie Robertson (London, 1904), pp. 300-1. In the note just preceding, Scott says that his "learned and indefatigable friend, Dr. John Leyden," supplied "the most valuable part" of the information about Scottish fairy beliefs in the "Essay on Fairy Superstitions" (i.e., the introduction to the "Tale of Tamlaine") in the Minstrelsy.
4. Even aside from Charlotte Brontë's recommendation to Ellen Nussey of "Scott's sweet, wild, romantic Poetry" (Letters July

4. 1834], in the Shakespeare Head Brontë, ed. T. J. Wise and J. A. Symington, 1932, I. 123 and Emily's demonstrable familiarity with it (see my forthcoming article on "Songs in Wuthering Heights"), it is beyond belief that literate people in the Brontës' circumstances could have neglected volumes so attractive and so close to their other interests as those of Scott. We would expect them to be, as Francis A. Leyland says they indeed were, "great admirers of Scott" (The Brontë Family [London, 1886], I. 105).
5. For instance, after noting examples of the "natural intellect" between Scots and northern English, Scott comments, "we may infer that there was little difference between the Northumbrian and the border Scottish" (Introduction to Minstrelsy, p. 44).
Gareth's Four Antagonists: A Biblical Source

W. David Shaw

Scholarly comment on Tennyson's use of Revelation is largely limited to incidental footnotes on Biblical images from "The Coming of Arthur" (ll. 290-464), "The Holy Grail" (ll. 526-27), and minor poems like "Sea Dreams" (ll. 25-8). Despite Tennyson's testimony of his own high regard for this book, parts of which he thought finer in English than in Greek, no one seems to have noticed that in "Gareth and Lynette" (ll. 886-1032) the model for Tennyson's treatment of his hero's four antagonists—the Morning-Star, the Noonday Sun, the Star of Evening, and Death—is the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.

St. John uses four horses of different colors and their riders to represent four apocalyptic woes, all concerned with warfare and its devastating results. Sir Morning-Star, who emerges from "a silk pavilion, gay with gold" and "all lent-lily in hue" ("Gareth and Lynette," ll. 889), resembles the first horseman of Revelation, whose white horse and crown seem to mimic the power of the apocalyptic Christ and the armies that follow him "upon white horses," clothed in "white linen." Attired himself in "rosy raiment," which recalls the pure vestment "dipped in blood" of the apocalyptic Christ (Rev. 19:13), Sir Morning-Star rivals even the majesty of Arthur's own person. Gareth's second antagonist, the Noonday Sun, has a brutally "red/And cipher face." Like the second horseman of the Apocalypse, to whom "power was given... to take peace from the earth" (Rev. 6:4), he is mounted "on a huge red horse" (l. 1000). He also wields a "great sword" with which he exchanges blows with Gareth four times. The knight's last two antagonists, the Star of Evening and Death, correspond to Revelation's third and fourth horsemen, representing famine and death, respectively. But Tennyson reverses the attributes of these two figures. Like the third horseman, whose pair of balances indicate that grain is scarce and that famine is at hand, the Star of Evening represents devastation and nakedness. But instead of using the apocalyptic symbol of the black horse, Tennyson reserves this imagery for Gareth's fourth antagonist, Death, who appears "High on a night-black horse, in night-black arms" (l. 1345). As for the Star of Evening himself, Tennyson describes him as a pale knight, "Naked it seemed" and wrapped only "in harden'd skins" (l. 1067), the way St. John portrays the fourth horseman: "And I looked, and behold a pale horse; and his name that sat on him was Death" (Rev. 6:8).

Once we are aware of the Biblical source we are better able to appreciate the peculiar horror with which Tennyson invests his hero's antagonists. The monstrous nature of their disguises is Tennyson's most effective way of dramatizing the paradoxical nature of evil, which is both a moral fact and an eternal negation. In this way the mock-heroic allusions anticipate the more serious meaning of Arthur's incident in Emily Brontë's life, see E. C. Gaskell, Life of Charlotte Brontë (London, 1908), chap. XII, p. 284.

7. The incident of the dog bite occurs in Shirley, chap. XXVIII, 390, its explanation later in the chapter, pp. 400-2; for the

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[Keeldar] sustained no hurt in the combat, but stumbling in retreating across the river, the hostile party held him down below water with their lances till he died, and the eddy in which he perished is still called the Couth of Keeldar’s Pool. His grave, of gigantic size, is pointed out on the banks of the Hermitage at the western corner of a wall, surrounding the burial-ground of a ruined chapel. As an enemy of Lord Souls, his memory is revered; and the popular epitaph of Couth, i.e. Colt, is expressive of his strength, stature, and activity. (Minstrelsy, p. 632)

The character clearly suggests the active, strong Shirley, taller by “an inch or two” than Caroline Helstone, conscious of her dignity as “Shirley Keeldar, Esquire” (chap. XI, p. 160), and courageous enough to cauterize her own arm after a dog bite, in an incident seemingly based on Emily Brontë’s life.

If we accept Mrs. Gaskell’s observation that Shirley’s character is Emily’s “had she been placed in health and prosperity” (chap. XVIII, p. 277), the manner of the Couth’s death is perhaps also important. After an impressively brave fight—like Emily’s dogged, silent battle against tuberculosis?—Keeldar is eventually killed by the forces of nature rather than by any human enemy. Not the happy marriage that ends Shirley but the tragic destiny of Charlotte Brontë’s sister Emily is the most basic element that Shirley shares with the Couth of Keeldar.
Recent Publications: A Selected List

Arthur E. Minerof

MARCH 1968-AUGUST 1968

I

GENERAL


Thompson, Paul. “Building of the Year: Manchester Town Hall.” Victorian Studies, March, pp. 401-6. A classic of its age, the main building was completed in 1875.

Wills, Geoffre Love. The English Life Series. Vols. V and VI.

A. Wheaton. Life of the period through pictures of furniture, costumes, pottery and silverware. Rev. TLS, 27 June, p. 690.


The Victorian Newsletter


Thompson, F. M. L. "The Second Agricultural Revolution, 1815-1880." Economic History Review, April, pp. 62-77. There were three agricultural revolutions, not one.


RELIGION. Allen, Peter R. F. D. Maurice and J. M. Ludlow: A Reassessment of the Leaders of Christian Socialism." Victorian Studies, June, pp. 461-82. Their political attitudes were founded on closely related, yet conflicting, religious beliefs.


Boxell, Paul J. P. T. Barnum's Lecture for Londoners." Quarterly Journal of Speech, April, pp. 340-46. The English were not taken with Barnum's bootstraps concept of success.


II

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS


Forshay, R. A. "The Buried Life"—The Contrasting Views of Arnold and Clough in the Context of Dr. Arnold's Historiography." ELH, June, pp. 218-53. The isolation that prevented Arnold's participation in his times was the source that helped Clough's commitment to those times.


Wright, Charles D. "Matthew Arnold on Heine as 'Con-tinuator of Goethe.'" Studies in Philology, July, pp. 693-701. Arnold's assertion that Heine is 'the continuator of Goethe' is mostly wrong.


Millgate, Jane. "Narrative Distance in Jane Eyre": The Relevance of the Pictures." Modern Language Review,
April, pp. 315-19. Jane’s paintings help chart her growth to maturity.


Gridley, Roy E. "Browning’s Pompelia." JEGP, January 1968, pp. 64-83. Pompelia’s monologue is a search for understanding that culminates in discovery.


Korg, Jacob. "A Reading of Pippa Passes." Victorian Poetry, Spring, pp. 5-19. The theme of the play is the issue of free will.

Maurer, Oscar. "Bishop Blougram’s ‘French Book.’" Victorian Poetry, Summer, pp. 177-79. The book was probably Diderot’s Supplément.


Phipps, Charles T. "Adaptation from the Past, Creation for the Present: A Study of Browning’s ‘The Pope.’" Studies in Philology, July, pp. 702-22. Browning’s character re-creation was both eclectic and effective.


Sonstroem, David. "Animal and Vegetable in the Spanish Cloister." Victorian Poetry, Spring, pp. 70-73. The vegetable (Lawrence)-animal (the speaker) motif is the key to the poem.

Tanney, C. E. "Madness and Hope in Browning’s ‘Evelyn Hope.’" Literature and Psychology, Vol. XVII, Nos. 2 and 3, pp. 155-57. The speaker will not give up hope even when it is hopeless.


McMaster, R. D. "Criticism of Civilization in the Structure of Sartor Resartus." University of Toronto Quarterly, April, pp. 266-80. The apparently confused structure and jumble of ideas are a symbolic reflection of the world.

CLARE, Green, David Bonnell. "Three Early American Admires of John Clare." Bulletin of the John Rylands Society, Spring, pp. 365-86. These admirers helped preserve poems and letters of Clare.


Blount, Trevor. Dickens: The Early Novels. Longmans. Rev. TLS, 1 August, p. 834.


Jarmuth, Sylvia. Dickens’ Use of Women in His Novels. Excelsior.


—, "Laughter and Oliver Twist." PMLA, March, pp. 63-70. Language is used to subvert the reader’s conventional social views.


Welsh, Alexander. "Satire and History: The City of Dickens." Victorian Studies, March, pp. 379-400. The crowding, contrasts and changes of the city provide the satirist with the image of moral confusion that he requires.

DISRAELI, Merritt, James D. "The Novelist St. Barbe in Disraeli’s Endymion: Revenge on Whom?" Nineteenth-Century Fiction, June, pp. 85-88. Carlyle may have been the model for St. Barbe’s ingratitude.


Faber, M. D. "Tess and The Rape of Lucrece." *English Language Notes*, June, pp. 293-93. The similarity between the two victims of rape.


Ziegler, Carl. "Thomas Hardy's Correspondence with German Translators." *English Literature in Transition*, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 87-94. Hardy was concerned with his German image.


Mariani, Paul L. "The Artistic and Tonal Integrity of Hopkins' 'The Shepherd's Brow.'" *Victorian Poetry*, Spring, pp. 63-68. The poem is a small masterpiece.


White, Norman E. "G. M. Hopkins' Triollet 'Cockle's Antibilious Pills.'" *Notes and Queries*, May, pp. 183-84. The triollet was written for popular public consumption.


PATER. Hill, Donald L. "Pater's Debt to Romola." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, March, pp. 361-77. No evidence that Pater was deeply impressed by the novel.


RUSKIN. Landow, George P. "Ruskin and Baudelaire on Art and Artists." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, April, pp. 295-308. Similarities.


--. "Tennyson and Layamon." *Notes and Queries*, May, pp. 176-78. Tennyson's use of Brut.
Moews, Daniel D. "The 'Prologue' to In Memoriam: A Commentary on Lines 5, 17, and 32." Victorian Poetry, Summer, pp. 185-87. The relationship of the lines to each other and to the poem.


Tennyson, Sir Charles. "Tennyson's 'Doubt and Prayer' Sonnet." Victorian Poetry, Spring, pp. 1-3. The sonnet was an early work revised shortly before the poet's death.

Wilkenfeld, R. B. "Tennyson's Camelot: The Kingdom of Folly." University of Toronto Quarterly, April, pp. 281-94. The motif of the fool is part of its dramatic design.

THACKERAY. Loomis, C. C., Jr. "Thackeray and the Plight of the Victorian Satirist." English Studies, February, pp. 1-19. Thackeray's satire was universal enough to include the conceptions of his reviewers.

Stevens, Joan. "A Note on Thackeray's 'Manager of the Performance.'" Nineteenth-Century Fiction, March, pp. 391-97. The puppet metaphor should not be too heavily weighted.


Projects—Requests for Aid

MATTHEW ARNOLD. Kenneth Allott wants to find manuscripts of Arnold's poems not listed in the Tinker and Lowry O. S. A. Notes and Queries, July, p. 265.

W. S. GILBERT. Jane W. Stedman needs information for a biography. TLS, 4 April, p. 356.


GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS. Anthony Bischoff is looking for letters and papers for a life. TLS, 30 May, p. 360.

THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Thomas Pinney wishes letters, manuscripts and private papers for an edition of the letters. TLS, 22 August, p. 905.

Staten Island Community College
City University of New York
A. THE NEW YORK MEETING

Chairman, Martin J. Svaglic, Loyola University of Chicago
Secretary, John D. Rosenberg, Columbia University

I. Business

II. Papers and Discussion
   1. “The Poet as Heroic Thief: Tennyson’s ‘Hesperides’ Re-examined,” James
      D. Merriman, Wichita State University (18 minutes)
      Miyoshi, University of California (Berkeley). (18 minutes)
   3. “Anthony Trollope, or The Man with No Style at All,” Ruth apRoberts,
      University of California (Los Angeles). (18 minutes)

1968 Program Chairman: U. C. Knoepflmacher, University of California (Berkeley).

Advisory and Nominating Committee: Chairman, Wendell Stacy Johnson, Hunter
College, City University of New York (1968); Park Honan; R. H. Super (1967-
1968); Roma A. King; David DeLaura (1968-1969); George Levine; John

Bibliography Committee: Chairman, Ronald E. Freeman, University of California
(Los Angeles); Robert A. Colby; Curtis Dahl; Ward Hellstrom; Dale Kramer;
Edward S. Lauterbach; Robert C. Schweik; Robert C. Slack; Richard C. Tobias.


1969 Officers: Chairman, John D. Rosenberg, Columbia University; Secretary, Ron-
ald E. Freeman, University of California (Los Angeles).

(Nominations to be voted on)

B. THE VICTORIAN LUNCHEON

The Group Luncheon will be held 27 December in the Americana Hotel (Royal Ball-
room B), with cocktails from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and luncheon promptly at
1:00 p.m. For reservation, please send a check for $6.75 to Professor Michael Timko,
Department of English, Queens College, Flushing, New York 11367, by 20 December.