"No Originals, Only Copies": Pre-Raphaelite Images of Belatedness and Innovation*

Elliot L. Gilbert

The development of a rigorous historiography in the nineteenth century inevitably led, at one of its major confluences, to a crisis of creativity. The era was the first with a full enough and accurate enough historical knowledge to arouse in its thinkers and artists what Walter Jackson Bate has called an "accumulating anxiety" surrounding the question "what is there left to do?" (3). John Stuart Mill's fears expressed in his Autobiography, that all the best combinations of musical notes must "already have been discovered" (123) was one contemporary example of this anxiety, an anxiety that inevitably follows from the idea that history, when it is to come known too accurately and in too much detail, must inevitably leave its readers with a deep sense of their own belatedness and impotence.

In this context, any consideration of the painters who called themselves the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood must begin with the name those painters chose for themselves. Such a name clearly implies a certain consciousness of—and attitude toward—history, and, in particular, a proto-modernist concern about originality. Raphael is, of course, associated with High Renaissance art, an art whose glorious achievements appeared, to some nineteenth-century painters, to have left them little to do but admire and imitate. One embodiment of this sense of belatedness during the period was Charles Blanc's Musée des Costumes in Paris, a gallery devoted to facsimiles of Renaissance masterpieces. Blanc justified his museum on the grounds that art had reached its peak during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that copies of the great pictures of that period were much to be preferred to original works by contemporary painters.²

Raphael was himself seen as a belated artist by some Victorian commentators. The American sculptor W. W. Story, for example, wrote in 1866, a Brueghelianesque dramatic monologue in which the speaker of the poem says of the painter: "...what in him I blemish/Is that he travels in his master's track/With such a slavish, imitative aim."²

Nor does having this belatedness called to his attention do Raphael any good. "Lately he's strutted to effect a change," the monologist continues, "but still an imitator he must go" (130-31). For nineteenth-century artists to declare themselves Pre-Raphaelites, then, was for them to express, at least symbolically, a desire to have lived in an era when originality was still possible, when the great accomplishments of the Renaissance

*The editors very much regret the sudden death of Professor Gilbert on February 13, 1991.

² For this and other references in any paper to the nineteenth-century's interest in copies I am indebted to the work of Clinton McVickar.
It was painted by Augustus Egg and first exhibited in 1858. Egg was not himself a member of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, though he was a close friend of Holman Hunt, one of the group’s founders. Past and Present was much influenced by the work of Hunt in perspective and by Pre-Raphaelite principles of social realism in general.

On one level, Past and Present constitutes an old-fashioned solution to the problem of representing chronology in the graphic arts since it is a composite of two scenes occurring simultaneously in the present, five years after the first event. We know that five years have passed not from any clues in the paintings themselves but rather from a letter Egg wrote to help explain the situation. And we know that the scenes are occurring simultaneously because the two pictures contain the identical moon and accompanying clouds. The second side panel shows the two daughters of the earlier scene, now young women, in mourning for their recently dead father (this is another fact we learn from Egg’s letter) as well as, perhaps, for their absent mother. The portraits of the two parents were noticed in the main picture hang no longer on the wall of this much less opulent room. One daughter is wearing a simple black dress, the other seems already to have changed for the worse. Through the window the two can see, as we can, a gibbous moon underlined with a little bar of cloud. That same moon, with its cloud, appears in the second side panel, which depicts the disgraced mother, reduced to living under one of London’s bridges. The window in the background is left foreground, clutching a child to her breast, its little legs exposed.

At first, given our interest in the representation of chronology in the graphic arts, we might be inclined to characterize Egg’s performance in this triptych as unusually naive, reducing the great issue of the past’s influence on the present to a simple matter of Victorian morality and resuming to a series of pictures, and even to an extraneous letter, to convey the passage of time. In fact, however, Egg’s treatment of both the metaphysical and the aesthetic implications of chronology in Past and Present is much less mechanical, much more sophisticated, than a quick summary of the triptych suggests. Indeed, taken by itself, the central panel, though apparently recording a single dramatic incident, is an extraordinarily complex chronological study, one that might appropriately be renamed, Past, Present and Future.

The present of that new title is, of course, the moment of horrified discovery painted in the foreground, a foreground that is, therefore, the literal conflation of the spatial and the chronological: the picture’s “here and now.” But the background of the painting also performs both a spatial and a chronological function, located as it is behind both the “here” and the “now” of the foreground. The two small frames on either side of the fireplace contain portraits of the husband and wife in earlier times, and both of these pictures are overshadowed by larger ones portraying past versions of the present thematic structures; one entitled “Abandoned” and the other showing Adam and Eve being driven out of paradise.

Perhaps most interesting as a device for converting the spatial into the chronological is the mirror painted over the fireplace on the rear wall. In it we see reflected an image of the husband and wife which we are certainly meant to understand in the space between the surface of the painting and the viewer and which therefore represents, through such spatial means, the more chronological fact of the future. For it is obvious that through this open door the unhappy wife will, at some future moment, be passing on her way to the bridge under which we will find her five years later.

But there is more to the mirror than that. It is, after all, spatially a part of the background of the picture; therefore the open door reflected in it, because it too is literally in the background, must be understood to exist in the past as well as in the future. In that past, the door is obviously the one through which the woman originally strayed from home and husband, embarked on the act of infidelity that, ironically, is to lead to her future ejection through the same door.

This irony permits Egg’s painting to address just that issue, the burdens projected into the past that helped lead the Pre-Raphaelites to choose their name. If the second side panel shows the women through the door follows so inevitably and unavoidably from the first—is so completely determined by—it, what freedom from the dead hand of the past can the present and future be said to enjoy? How far back into history must one travel to find that freedom from the past? Is there some pre-Pre-Raphaelite regress that would, at some point, make possible a genuinely original act, unshadowed by a precursor?

To the extent that Egg’s painting answers these questions, it answers them in the negative. What the picture of Adam and Eve on the rear wall of the room seems to suggest is that the only way to avoid being belated, the only way to perform an act that is not anticipated in some degree by the past, is to be the first two human beings who ever lived. But even such a circumstance does not provide a sufficient rescue from belatedness. For the expulsion from Eden is itself only a replica, a second-hand version, so to speak, of the Sisanic fall from grace. What Egg’s painting appears finally to declare, then, is that in any situation in which human action is deferred by history, there can be no such thing as originality since every response, however fresh and creative it may appear to the individual making it, has necessarily been anticipated.

The second painting to be examined here is one that might itself have been the precursor of Egg’s Past and Present, Holman Hunt’s well-known portrait of a fallen woman called The Awakening Conscience, which the artist was in fact encouraged to paint by Egg. 1

1 For a study of the uses of mirrors in the graphic arts, see Jarabak.

When it was first completed in 1854, the picture had a somewhat different title, The Awakened Conscience. But the work’s owner, Thomas Pichelhahm, was disturbed by what was for him the unpleasant intensity of the woman’s expression, and in 1856 he asked Hunt to modify that expression. That Hunt agreed to do suggests the power of art collectors at this time. Collectors were, of course, very particular about things, and artist’s anxieties about the burden of the past by often commissioning them—in the spirit of the Musée des Copistes—to paint not new and original pictures but instead facsimiles of their own previous successes. (To be sure, most artists were happy enough to pocket the income they derived from such “pot-bellied copies.”)

Having softened the look of the woman in The Awakened Conscience, Hunt altered the title to suit the figure’s new appearance, calling the work now The Awakening Conscience. This is, for our purposes, a particularly suggestive change. For by substituting the present participle “awakening” for the past participle “awakened,” Hunt was not merely commenting on the changed moral implications of his protagonist’s new expression. He was also, in effect, announcing that the subject of his picture, rather than being some static event, already completed in the recorded scene, is instead an ongoing process, a complex chronology of past, present, and future all depicted in a single canvas.
The Victorian Conscience achieves this effect of movement through time in much the same way Egg's Past and Present does. In the foreground of the picture we see a situation as it occurs at a particular point in the present: the kept woman, her condition signaled by the absence of a wedding ring, is caught at a moment of sudden insight as she rises from her lover's lap; the indolently lounging young man is shown playing the piano, never a truly respectable activity for a Victorian male; a cat symbolically with a dead bird under the table at the left; one of the young man's gloves, soiled like the woman, has been casually tossed onto the carpet, the sheet music on the floor is a setting of Tennyson's "Tears, Idle Tears," a poem that speaks of "the days that are no more" and suggests, according to one commentator, "the idea of the heroine's having irrevocably lost her innocence" (Warner 131).

As in Past and Present, the mirror on the rear wall reflects what exists in the space between the surface of the painting and the viewer, in this case a garden, the light from which falls through windows and doors to the rooms in the lower right-hand corner of the picture. This spatial forward extension is, in fact, also a chronological one, since the painting clearly means to suggest that any hope the woman may have of escaping from the ill-fated love seat of the picture's present lies in her passing through the open door in front of her into that light-providing garden, a garden which is, thus, the locale of her own possible future.

But again, as in Egg's painting, that "future" garden, appearing as it does in a mirror that is spatially a part of the background of the picture, must be understood to be a part of the past as well. Indeed, the fact that the woman herself can be seen from the back reflected in the mirror heightens the illusion that she has turned around to look behind her into the garden of her own past, a past which thus becomes an image of the early Edescian innocence she abandoned when she entered upon the scene of her present fallen state. And one inevitable effect of this mirror image is to define as already belated any future state of grace that may be implied in the protagonist's dawning consciousness of sin. The Victorian Conscience is a marginally more optimistic picture than Past and Present, but at the heart of the two works is the same dark insight, the impossibility of the present and future producing anything uncontaminated by the past. It is as if history itself were an overbearing art patron decreeing that there should be no originals, only copies.

IV

The last picture to be considered is, in a number of ways, the most complex of the three. It is an unfinished painting by Pre-Raphaelite artist Ford Madox Brown entitled "Take Your Son, Sir." Brown worked on this picture off and on for a dozen years, enlarging it at one point with strips of paper along the sides and on the bottom as if he had some quite specific plans for it, but finally leaving it in its present state. Like the paintings by Egg and Holman Hunt, this one employs a time line perpendicular to the plane of the picture to suggest chronological movement within a single frame. In the foreground, the area of the painting representing the "here and now," is a contemporary woman pleading directly out at us and thrusting an infant toward an unseen recipient, the child's father, as Brown's title makes clear.

In the wall behind the woman, the domain of the past in the works we have been considering, are several elements to be found in traditional depictions of the "Madonna and Child," of which this painting constitutes an up-to-date version. The circular mirror, for example, is so placed that its frame provides a halo for the woman's head, and the stars decorating the window suggest the cosmic dimension of this classic religious subject.

As for the future, once again a mirror becomes the means of introducing into the picture a space that, in three-dimensional reality, lies between the painting's surface and the viewer and therefore provides a locale for actions that are yet to occur. In this case, the mirror shows us an image of a man standing with arms extended ready to receive the infant, a spatial phenomenon whose chronological implications include the familiar rise de passage of the male child from the present custodianship of the woman to the control of the father.

It would be difficult to find a Pre-Raphaelite painting the interpretation of which has changed more radically since its first appearance. Early viewers of "Take Your Son, Sir," saw it in its father's dress, "some man's wife and child." It was known that Brown had used his own wife and new-born son as models for the woman and the infant in the picture, and had painted a likeness of Brown himself, and this knowledge probably helped to produce the bogus biographer of Brown's vision, a vision that critics to what has since come to be thought of as a highly problematic painting.

More recent interpreters have seen in "Take Your Son, Sir" a powerful and even an angry portrait of a woman forced to give up her child to the man who has, either in wedlock or outside of it, exploited her. In support of their thesis, these interpreters point to a number of suggestive elements in the picture: the disturbing face of the woman with its hectic flush and barred teeth; the fact that the infant is being delivered out of a womb-like clasping of her arm which, because it is the only part of the dress fully painted in, seems to be symbolically defining the woman's sole function; the brutish appearance of the man in the mirror; the bitterness of the phrase that supplies the picture's title. If we accept this more modern interpretation of the painting, we can see Brown using the spatial / chronological structure of his picture to make the same point about belatedness that Egg and Hunt make in their works. Again, the key to this effect lies in the mirror, which, here, as in both Past and Present and The Awakening Conscience, presents the future as inevitably and immediately as the past. Thus, the mirror should bring the future life, controlled by the father, to which we see the infant being consigned in the picture's foreground or present. But because the scene in the mirror is also literally a part of the painting's background and therefore of the past, it reveals that the world of the father that lies in the infant boy's future is only a belated replica of the ancient world of the father that has already produced, among other things, the desperate situation recorded in the picture's present.

If the analysts offered here of these three pictures seem reasonable, it would be hard to avoid concluding that the principal theme of each of these works is the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of achieving a new in the modern world, shadowed as it is by a burdensome history. For as the discussion thus far has made clear, all these paintings, through their structures, seem to reply to Walter Jackson Bate's question: "What is there left to do?" with the dispiriting answer: "Nothing of any consequence." Yet there is a very striking irony here. For these three paintings, whose structures appear to deny the possibility of innovation in the modern world, all have as their subjects what is perhaps the most innovative social development of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary changes in the role of women.

The pictures themselves all take more or less unconventional positions about this subject. The dracoan fate of the unfaithful wife in Egg's painting, for example, seems, even in its one "happy" version, anomalous, and the thirteenth-century premeditated connivance of the triptych has been deliberately contrived to suggest its own absurdity; the tale of suburban seduction in Hunt's picture indicts the man as well as the woman; most of all, what seems to modern critics to be the premeditatedness of Brown's vision, a vision that contains no hint of disapproval of its contemporary Madonna / Magdalene, condems a whole society and, indeed, a whole religion. And the fact that Brown left his painting unfinished, after laboring for a dozen years to enlarge and complete it, suggests that the issues the picture raises were so new that the artist could not even imagine their resolution. We need not make too much of the coincidence that all three of these "mirrored" pictures treat the same general subject. The so-called "woman-question" was, after all, a matter of great importance during the mid-nineteenth century, and the bohemian precocities of all three of these artists were, in any case, likely to have inclined them to support less traditional attitudes towards women. Thus, they could have been expected to paint pictures about this subject whether or not their works also addressed the issue of belatedness.

Still, it is reasonable to wonder whether there might not be more than a purely coincidental relationship after all between the two themes. One such possible relationship is suggested by a certain familiar polarizing of elements generally associated with the concepts of male and female, a polarizing that is, explicitly in the title of Sherry Ortner's useful essay "Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?" Studies like Ortner's of gender-identity in Western civilization routinely link the male with such things as linear time, culture, and history and the female with recurrence, nature, and myth. To the extent that the nineteenth century took for granted such clusters of associations, it is possible to see, in the pictures we have been discussing, dramatic confrontations of these polar principles, with each of the three works juxtaposing the belatedness of patriarchal history implicit in its structure with the potential resurgence of female energy suggested by its subject.

From this drama emerges an important Victorian response to the problem of how, in a world burdened by too much knowledge of the past, the new can ever be achieved. What all these paintings seem to suggest is that one career of sociocidity by means of historical inscriptions is to open itself to the creative clan of a too-long-suppressed feminine, especially the feminine as associated—by the large—nineteenth century in general and by Pre-Raphaelite artists in particular—with whatever is natural and mythical. For if events in history, taking place as they do in linear time, must always have preceded their outcome, the outcome must therefore always be belated, even in a myth, which occur in an eternal present, in what Mircea Eliade
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and Newman’s Illusive Sense: Objectivism, Relativism, and Dogma

Paul H. Schmidt

Richard J. Bernstein in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis argues that the defining poles of philosophical debate since Descartes have been those of objectivism and relativism. He defines his terms as follows:

From a manifesto perspective, many contemporary debates are still structured with traditional extremes. There is still an underlying belief that in the final analysis the only viable alternatives open to us are either some form of objectivism, like Newmanian, ultimate grounding of knowledge, edge, science, philosophy and language or that we are ineluctably led to relativism, skepticism, historicism and nihilism. (5-6)

He points out that this dichotomy takes other forms that indicate the same underlying tension: “rationality versus irrationality, objectivity versus subjectivity, realism versus antirealism” (1). However, as Bernstein’s book attests, some thinkers have begun to assert that this dichotomy has too long dominated Western thinking. Pragmatic phenomenologist such as Hans-Georg Gadamer have begun to argue that there is a way of thinking that goes beyond relativism and objectivism and “explores an entirely different notion of knowledge and truth” (“Problem” 113).

But the process of deconstructing this “different notion of truth” was already begun in the nineteenth century in the writing of John Henry Newman. In his new book on Newman, Ian T. Ker writes that in the present philosophical context, with its emphasis on existentialism, phenomenology, and the ideas of Wittgenstein, “the time is ripe for a reappraisal of Newman’s philosophical significance” (73). Newman’s philosophy has always created misunderstandings. Because he worked in an “intellectual climate in which post-Fenianism relativism (was) presumed to be normative for the exercise of human rationality,” Newman’s apparent opposition to reason leads some readers to charge him with irrationalism.1 Nicholas Lash, Martin Savidge, and Ian Ker have clearly set the record straight by showing that while Newman did reject rationalism he did not oppose reason. But if Newman opposed rationalism he was not in any sense an anti-realist. He can not be called an irrationalist, how can his position be characterized? Following the combined suggestions of Ker and Bernstein, I will look at Newman’s philosophy as a phenomenological attempt to find a middle way between a nineteenth-century British example of the objectivist-relativist split. Thus I will argue here that if one reframes the thinking of Newman in the Oxford University Sermons, the Grammar of Science, and The Idea of a Perfect Essay, all knowledge is, according to the pragmatic ideas of Gadamer, is possible to see that Newman, in his effort to define a via media between liberal rationalism and evangelical fundamentalism, attempts to arrive at knowledge that is neither purely subjective nor purely objective but opposing currents of nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought: objectivism and relativistic subjectivism. Comparing Newman with Gadamer allow us to understand both men’s theories of knowledge. Gadamer’s mind describes the conclusions of the rationalist and the empiricist and yet establishes a kind of knowledge that cannot be called subjectivism. Moreover, it shows that in Newman’s theory of non-dogmatic authority, it establishes a Gadamerian optimism about the possibility of knowledge.

Only a few readers have been willing to see Newman in this way. Only one essay has gone but more noticed since the the first edition is a comparison of the situation between Newman and Gadamer. C. F. Harrold does offer observations about Newman’s pragmatism, equating Newman’s idea of the rationalizing process with Dewey’s idea that “purposes is not logical, but personal and psychological” (gld. in Harrold 140), but he does not develop them. More recently, Nicholas Lash, also calling Newman’s theory phenomenological (5) has pointed out how “fundamental shift” in the “assumption of the range and variety of modes of human rationality” should bring about a new evaluation of Newman’s philosophical significance, and he mentions Gadamer as one source of this new emphasis (20-21).

In the important. Rhetorical Thoughts of John Henry Newman, Walter Jost has suggested some connections between Newman and the hermeneutics of Gadamer, but Jost’s strict focus on the rhetorical components of Newman’s thought prevents him from unfolding the philosophical connections explicitly. Moreover, Jost refers only glancingly to the pragmatics of Newman’s ideas. Most recently, in The Achievement of John Henry Newman (1989) Ker describes Newman as a phenomenologist in that Newman attempts to account for both the logical mind and the imagination, but Ker does not go beyond this suggestion (69-70). Thus no scholar has ever worked out the Newman-Gadamer relationship in any depth. The significance of the connection is both philosophical and literary. 1. It shows Newman to have gone beyond the purely pedantic thinking of his philosophical contemporaries, avoiding skepticism without collapsing into mere philosophical dogma. 2. It provides new language (Newman’s useful terms) for describing the problems of hermeneutics, and supplies new insights about the workings of the human mind and the possibilities of knowledge.

Thus the connection between the two is a consequential one. Ed Block has pointed out in an important article that the significance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics for religious thought has remained unexplored. Conversely, I will argue here that the ramifications of Newman’s thought for general hermeneutics has been underappreciated. The rejection of Newman, Ker says that Newman’s thoughts about faith apply equally to “other kinds of intellectual activity where ‘we must assume something to prove it’” (2). Agreement, then, between Gadamer and Newman’s ideas is based on “prejudgments” or assumptions, “assuming something to prove anything” is a central component of his theory. Thus Newman’s theory, like Gadamer’s, attempts to move beyond a kind of knowledge that is neither purely subjective nor purely objective but opposing currents of nineteenth and twentieth-century thought: objectivism and relativistic subjectivism. Comparing Newman with Gadamer allows us to understand both men’s theories of knowledge. While their conclusions differ, Gadamer’s mind describes the conclusions of the rationalist and the empiricist and yet establishes a kind of knowledge that cannot be called subjectivism. Moreover, it shows that in Newman’s theory of non-dogmatic authority, it establishes a Gadamerian optimism about the possibility of knowledge.

Before we begin observing some important ways in which Newman’s thought can be seen to be moving in the same direction as Gadamer’s, we need to observe one important difference between them: their theories of language. Gadamer views “linguisticity” as the defining element of human beings. All thought, for Gadamer, is primarily linguistic (TM 364-65). Newman, conversely, holds the instrumentalist view of language (a view Gadamer has singled out for criticism (TM 364 ff)), that language is necessary for the expression but not the conception of thoughts. This will have important ramifications for the function of what Newman calls the “illusive sense.”

The general descriptive aims of the two writers are similar. Newman’s Grammar is an attempt to describe the psychology of religious belief. But another way of viewing Newman’s project is to see it as a sort of pragmatic phenomenology of belief. He desires to describe how people come to believe. There is little normative force to Newman’s argument. As he says, “I am not propounding to set forth the arguments which issue in the belief of [Christian] doctrine, but to investigate what is it to believe in them, what the mind does, what it contemplates, when it makes an act of faith” (69). Likewise Newman’s project is descriptive either in the sense of a prescriptive epistemology. He attempts to set out the circumstances under which human beings can be said to have knowledge. The work of hermeneutics, Gadamer argues, “is not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (TM 263). This descriptive quality has tended to turn philosophers away from Newman. The new interest in Gadamer’s similarly pragmatic, descriptive aims should lead them back to him.

But similarities go far beyond this descriptive quality. A second important characteristic is the peculiar awareness of historicity on the part of both writers. Both Newman and Gadamer hold the historicist view known as perspectivism, but neither finds that position to exclude the possibility of apprehending historical or irrefrangible knowledge. In other words, both writers have begun to argue that there is a way of thinking that goes beyond relativism and objectivism and “explores an entirely different notion of knowledge and truth” (“Problem” 113).
historical thought usually leads to the charge of relativism or subjectivism. E. D. Clarke, for example, claims that relativism and subjectivism are "so interwoven that we can no longer speak of them as separate doctrines. It is as if the two were identical in all cases." (45) Thus, the concept of relativism and subjectivism is no longer a separate doctrine, but rather a combination of the two.

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prejudices to discover the prejudices of the tradition and to become aware of our own disdain or "blind" prejudices, and to rid ourselves of them. Present prejudices will then be unmasked by later writers (TM 238 ff).

Knowledge for Gadamer is factual, empirically verifiable information about things, and it is possible to explain explicitly the reason. "Understanding," on the other hand, is "more" (Hoy 46-48), a process of practical judgment, much like Newman's "practical" reason, and a man means to bring their assumptions to bear on the world and thus to mediate between these two presumptions and the "test" before them. Thus while all knowledge is bound up with prejudices, these prejudices make it possible for us to understand the world, to experience it. This process involves a transformation of the hermeneutic circle. Bernstein explains this process productively:

On the one hand, Gadamer stresses that we must always steep our understanding to the "thiness themselves"; we cannot "either see it or speak to it;" we must be receptive to the claims to truth they make on us. But on the other hand, we do not do this by bracketing or forgetting all our prejudices and prejudices. One way, only, it is only by the play of these presumptions that we are enabled to understand the "things themselves." (138)

Like Gadamer, Newman argues that at the bases of all arguments are unprovable assumptions. After establishing that the illusive sense leads to presumptions, unlike Gadamer, Newman considers the point of just how these first principles are arrived at. His point is to establish that presumptions are more than mere prejudice in the pejorative sense of the word, but the necessary building blocks of all knowledge. Though individual cases are too complex and subtle for analysis, he provides examples to show how what he calls "antecedent possibilities" might lead to intellectual assumptions. His view of "probability" requires more explanation. For Newman, the "priesthood of all men" is based upon our tacit acceptance of concrete probabilities. For example, he has never proved logically that the sun will rise tomorrow, but people live with the assumption that it will. It is only a probability, but we accept it as knowledge. The same is true of our acceptance of the proposition that Great Britain is on island (191-92). At first glance such a view may seem to be denying the meaning of "knowledge," but it is not. It is identifiable here in Newman's thinking about probability, his probability theory does not fall into the empirical trap of existing on scientific verification. It is not that logic has led us to believe these propositions; it is an act of faith to go to bed at night assuming that the sun will be up when we awake, and unless we have personally circumnavigated Great Britain, our feeling of certainty is based on probability. These are presumptions, and daily life is based on a multitude of them. In more complex matters, like religious or historical assumptions, one builds intellectual arguments on the convergence of more than one thought, the difference between believers and non-believers to Newman does not lie in the logical arguments they make, but in the degree and strength of their assumptions that lead to faith. The faithful believe in God in much the same way people believe in mortality as the world, to just as much reason. They are demonstrated categorically, but people accept them as indefatigable fact because of probability. Thus for Newman, while logic forms the exterior descriptive framework of human knowledge, the interior sense, or "practical" reason, at edge lies at the level of presupposition. Without falling into the cul de sac of requiring empirical verification, Newman, like Gadamer, suggest, can argue that assumptions are a form of knowledge.

While Newman does not emphasize the structuring function of our prejudgments, it is clear that he is attempting to move in a similar direction. When he speaks of "practical" reasons, he is not speaking of the illusive sense as an organ for determining truth outside of purely logical means. For Newman, there are two kinds of inference, formal and informal. Formal inference is the act of moving from the premise to the conclusion, and it always includes the conclusion. We have seen that for Newman, his "Way to Certitude," "formal inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition, viz., a conclusion in relation to other propositions" (139). Thus formal inference functions in the realm of logic or explicit reasoning or, in Aristotle's term, techne. Informal inference, on the other hand, operates on the implicit level of reasoning. Informal inferences are made from the convergence of probabilities and cunning, as analyzed by Freud. Newman accepts this. If it is informal inference that leads to presuppositions, the "principle" on which all scientific knowledge is based. And as for the other two kinds of reason, "notional" and "real," corresponding to two kinds of inference and the two kinds of reason. Access to a system is an inference probably leading to a notional instant. That is, when one accepts the conclusion to a syntax system one admits its logical consistency with its premises. Real instant is tied to concrete reality and involves real conviction. The abstractness of notional instant allows it to be accepted without real conviction. Though both assets are unconditional, notional is cold and ineffective. It does not engage the imagination as real instant does. As Newman observes, "Many a man will live and die upon a dogma; no man will be a martyr to a conclusion" (Grammar 66). Real asset then relies on presupposition to be deliverance into sense. Thus for Newman, the five clasticists can maintain their positions as knowledge consistent with the presuppositions or prejudices that take with them to the problem. To some, however, this still looks like pure subjectivism, the convictions of the historians are in conflict, so probably are their presuppositions. Can such conflicting views all be called "knowledge"?

Thus this subjectivity leads a fundamental question still unanswered: How can one practically distinguish between true and false perceptions? What practical method do people actually use in order to distinguish the truth of their perceptions? Or as Newman poses the question, "What is truth, and what apparent truth?" What is genuine knowledge and what is its counterfeit? What are the tests for discriminating certainty from mere persuasion or delusion? Newman judges that it is impossible to distinguish the possibility of delusion and prejudice in the perceptive sense of the term. For Newman, beliefs are finally justifiable in rational terms, but they are not based on technical reason alone. Delusions, on the other hand, are rejections of reason altogether, belief's utterly contradicted by reason (Lecture 26). Newman supposes that, in some sense, only the "real" reasons which arise from inner, implicit, inexpressable reasons, the illusory sense, it is therefore rational, not mere delusion or "prejudicial" sense. Certitude based on "first principles." Yet while Newman carelessly defines its idea of certitude to invalidate the charge of pure subjectivity, his theory of personal conviction runs aground in the same place. Since, according to the same reason, the organs by which we are able to arrive at certitude is the individual conscience, a "private" guide (Gramain 231).

The Protestant form of "private judgment" comes under Newman's scrutiny. In his case, the "danger" to both certitude is subjectivity. Yet it may be hard for the reader to see how conscience does not fall under the same charge. That is, even though Newman's notion of certitude is designed to exculpate his general theory from the charge of pure subjectivity, it is still possible to read Newman's theory of certitude and conscience without seeing clearly how it avoids the charge of subjectivism or irrationality. One might legitimately ask, can one come to believe through this process of listening without fundamentally changing the notion of conscience, which is in Newman's own terms fallible? (Gramain 152-53). I believe that the best answer to this question lies not in Newman's solution of certitude but in Newman's theory of authority as defined in various of his writings. But in order to see Newman's theory of authority in a phenomenological perspective, I would like to turn first to Gadamer's theory of tradition, which faces a similar subjectivist dilemma.

To escape the problem of subjective judgment, Gadamer holds that the very idea of "tradition" is obsolete, and that we need to shift our thinking so that we can help to decide between sound and unsound interpretations. Tradition is an authority based on "what any rational being in that particular situation would think" (Hoy 110). Thus Gadamer is able to transcend the subjective presupposition and yet claim that interpretations are not purely subjective. By comparing their findings with those of the tradition surrounding them, interpreters can test the truth of their interpretations. By comparing their findings with those of the tradition surrounding them, interpreters can test the truth of their interpretations. This same principle is illustrated in Gadamer's essay "Truth and Method" (6.11) on the importance of learning from authorities, and then develops the thought himself:

Instead of trusting logical science, we must trust personal, narrative, stories, those who we believe have the right to judge. And if we wish to share our stories in their communities and the grounds of them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned. We must take up the same object as they took it up, beginning again, even at the beginning, giving ourselves to it, depend on practice and experience rather than on reasoning, and thus gain the mental certainty, whatever its subject matter may be, which our masters have gained before us. (Gramain 230-231, emphasis added)

We see how that such a system of belief goes well beyond mere "private judgment." Anyone seeking knowledge will rely on his own sense of things as long as that sense does not directly contradict traditional belief systems. Church authority can exceed the authority of the individual conscience under certain circumstances (Apologia 222-23). (I emphasize the phrase "whatever its subject matter may be" to observe that the notion of authority must not be viewed as the mere addition of authority that can be applied to any and all questions. The important thing to notice here is that like Gadamer, Newman notices the need for an authority against which to balance the prospectively limited insights of the individual. Without an authority to back judgment, we cannot distinguish between valid and invalid interpretations of any moral, religious, or purely intellectual question.

While the move to reliance on authority may be one way to overcome the subjectivist problems in which the more readers creates a new, even more serious, problem; an appeal to authority can appear to be a collapse into dogmatic principle. Both Gadamer and Newman guard against this charge. Gadamer handles the problem this way. He first assumes that any argument for the possibility of attaining truthful (or authentic) interpretations must rely on some form of authority. But this reliance does not mean blind faith. Gadamer's distinction that while tradition is the guide to knowledge, authentic interpretations will always question that tradition. While we rely on tradition, we also are aware that tradition has, like every other cultural element, its own subject to certain prejudices, and as we have seen, it is the job of the interpreter to continually unmask these prejudices through the dialectical interplay of his own prejudices and those of the tradition he criticizes (TM 238 ff).

Gadamer's idea of the movement or revision of tradition involves a never-ending process of interpretation and reinterpretation of texts. He writes, "Tradition exists only in constant movement" (Hoy 112). Thus Gadamer is able to surpass the subjective presupposition, but still claim that interpretations are not purely subjective. By comparing their findings with those of the tradition surrounding them, interpreters can test the truth of their interpretations. By comparing their findings with those of the tradition surrounding them, interpreters can test the truth of their interpretations. This same principle is illustrated in Gadamer's essay "Truth and Method" (6.11) on the importance of learning from authorities, and then develops the thought himself:

[The recognition of authority is always connected with the idea that what the authority states is not irrational and arbitrary, but can be seen, in principle, to be true. This is

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* For Newman's discussion of "private judgment" see his Essay Critical Sayings (1914)
Harriet Martineau in America: Gender and the Discourse of Sociology

Maria H. Frawley

I, for one, do not acquiesce. I declare that whatever obligations I yield to the laws of society in which I live is a matter between myself and my will. (I: 204)

So wrote Harriet Martineau in 1837 in Society in America, one of early Victorian England’s most important attempts to apply the as yet undelined principles of sociology to American life and foreign culture. Significantly, Martineau embeds her proclamation within the ostensibly objective treatise of Society in America, not within her more personalized travel account of America, Rediscovering of Western Travel. In essence, she positions the personal as the professional and

Harriet Martineau believed that such overt statements of female independence might compromise the seriousness with which her newly emerging role as a social scientist would be taken. She was right. Consider, for example, her representation in "Blue-Stocking Rebels! or, the Feast of Violets," a satiric poem written by Leigh Hunt, who at the time was editor of The Monthly Repository.

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The Victorian Newsletter

Why love should await dear Harriet's dictates?

But great is earth's want of some love-legislators.

(183)

*Hunt published the poem in 1837, just after Martineau had returned from her two-year trip to America. A critic in *Fraser's Magazine* welcomed her home with the following remark:

"If Miss Martineau, therefore, or any other maiden malcontent, would attempt to smite the equality of man and woman, our only advice is that lady may be, in time, before sitting down to her task of the book of Geneva.*

Martineau's work in social science—as these comments suggest—was viewed as an implicit challenge—and threat—to womanhood. Her status as a single woman was both condemned and celebrated, depending on who was making the comment. But Martineau in particular endowed these institutions with the power to give the country's citizens a public voice. "The voice of a whole people goes up in the silent workings of an abstract principle", she wrote in *How to Observe Moral and Man- ners* (1873), a book sketched out en route to America and completed after her trip was over. The absence of authority that Alexis de Tocqueville described in *Democracy in America* was to Martineau evidenced by the clamoring of voices all claiming an equal opportunity to be heard in America. America, she seemed, offered everyone—including women—a chance to experience democracy and public life, to discuss and influence church, lecture halls, and newspapers the festivals assumed by public voice, and Martineau listened with interest. She also recorded. Her travel accounts are replete with lengthy extracts from newspapers, portions of conversations both engaged in and overhead, recollections of lectures and public speeches, paraphrases of sermons. In experimenting with ways to represent the variety of voices that made America, Martineau adapted—and developed—the methods of social study. She located informants, conducted interviews, inspected facilities and asked questions, and pursued answers. She compared America's men to its women, its north to its south, its cities to its country, its ideals to its reality. In offering up instances of the American voice as evidence with which to predict the course of the democratic experiment, Martineau changed the function and shape of the travel account. Much of her work reads less like conventional travel literature and more like investigative reporting. America, she reasoned, demanded a new, more studious approach. Accordingly, Harriet Martineau wrote two separate accounts of her American experience. One was a straightforward report of the equality of man and woman, our only advice is that lady may be, in time, before sitting down to her task of the book of Geneva."

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*Fraser's Magazine* (19 May 1839): 557-62. The critic responsible for this passage has not yet been identified in the *Wollstonecide*. 

*A derogatory portrait of Martineau was painted in *Fraser's Gallery of Illustrious Chenters,* a series of satirical biographies that were accompanied by caricatures. This portrait of Martineau was the only one on display at the exhibition of this "club hombres" jacket based on a prevailing distaste of the *Wollstonecide.*" -- *Fraser's Magazine* (19 May 1839): 557-62. The critic responsible for this passage has not yet been identified in the *Wollstonecide*. 

"Distinguished David argues in *Intellectual Women and Victorian Patriarchy* that Martineau's career was "defined by her auxiliary unilingualism to a male-dominatedelaide" (9)." -- *The Victorian Newsletter* (19 May 1839): 557-62. The critic responsible for this passage has not yet been identified in the *Wollstonecide*. 

(183)

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for her own status as a woman writing in a field more traditionally claimed as the province of the masculine, the university and science as a discipline. That she sensed a disjunction between the institutional America that demanded theory and the country's "lighter characteristics" is evident in her choice to pursue an advanced education. Moreover, she knew she had to invest in her education, acquiring a library, in order to finish her studies. She had the financial means to do so. In her final years, until her death in 1908, she lived off her investments and her inheritance. These investments she knew were not a guarantee of a comfortable life, but rather a means to sustain her research and her writing. She did not, however, actively pursue a career as a writer, but rather focused on her research and her writing.

In the light of this, it is clear how important it was for her to maintain her identity as a successful woman, and how this identity was central to her success as a scientist. She was able to balance the demands of her work with her personal life, and to maintain a strong sense of self and identity. This is evident in her correspondence with her family and friends, in which she often speaks of her work and her research, and in her letters to other scientists, in which she often discusses the latest developments in her field. She was able to maintain a strong sense of identity, and to continue to pursue her work, even in the face of challenges and obstacles.

In summary, the image of a successful woman, who was able to balance the demands of her work with her personal life, and to maintain a strong sense of identity, is central to our understanding of how successful women in science can be. It is clear that the success of a woman in science is not just a matter of her ability to succeed in her work, but also of her ability to maintain a strong sense of identity, and to continue to pursue her work, even in the face of challenges and obstacles.
of the west. I lived in houses which might be called palaces, in Luxury, raised in a farm house. I travelled, much in wagons, as well as stages; also on horseback, and in some of the best and worst steam boats. I saw weddings, and christenings; the gatherings of the richer at watering places and of the poor at the market places. I was present at orations, at land sales, and in the slave market. I was in frequent attendance on the Supreme Court and the Senate. Above all, I was received into the houses of many families, not as a stranger, but as a daughter or sister. (52-53)

By providing her readers with a condensed inventory of her experiences, Martineau ensures that her authority derives from the extent to which she investigated all facets of society. The best traveler, she reasons, is the most democratic traveler—the one as comfortable in the presence of the humble as the rich, the one as concerned with the goings on at the slave market as the Supreme Court. Yet, as with so many of her observations, she steers her reader toward a recognition of the value that she brought to the investigation as a woman. The last "institution" she catalogs is the domestic sphere; then, "above all," she is received "as a daughter or sister." In "How to Observe Morals and Manners," Martineau makes her authority depend equally on her ability to play the detached observer of society and the daughter or sister who warms her way into the homes and hearts of the families who greet her.

It would do Martineau's efforts as investigative author of Society in America and narrator in Retrospect of Western Travel a disservice to suggest that marking woman was limited to finding a place for the domestic within the developing discourse of sociology. Rather, she sought to represent herself as the all-encompassing context within which to place sociological or political investigation. Although her contemporary Frances Trollope chose to refrain from overt political commentary, Martineau structures her study around it. Society in America investigates what she calls "the morals of politics," an orientation which leads her to such topics as "newspapers," "utopia in citizenship," "allegiance to law," "citizenship of people of color," and the political non-sensicality of the "We the people" as a moral, she appropriates these and other sensitive topics for her own use.

In both Society in America and Retrospect of Western Travel, Martineau sought to represent herself as a public spokewoman for democracy in her assertion that women as democratic citizens was one of several issues on which she spoke and wrote eloquently. She made her voice heard in America. In one of the most vivid and theatrical essays of American Travel, she laments the "imperial" assumptions of non-existence of women to a comparison between the condition of women and slaves in the United States. Though Martineau pays homage to the middle-class domestic ideal in much of her work, her impulse to protest is always at odds with what Deirdre David labels her "spiritual confrontation of male privilege." (32) Nowhere was this impulse so tried as when she was allocated by her letters and her voice to speak. That she is acutely the limited power of women to voice their opinions, to exercise their minds. America everywhere offered evidence of its failure to live up to the principles of equality on which the country was founded. After accusing America of having "fallen below" the standards of "the Old World," Martineau

scathingly writes:

While women's intellect is confined, her morals crushed, her health ruined, her weakness encouraged, and her strength prohibited, she is told that her lot is cast in the purely domestic and that there is no country in the world where there is so much beating of the chivalrous treatment she enjoys. (291)

She notes further that America, like England, has created a situation in which marriage is the only reasonable "occupation" available to women and concludes that in America "the morals of women are crushed" (Lipps 293).

Here, as elsewhere, Martineau was careful to place her highly charged polemic in the context of the moral investigation she was engaged in. Though she makes claims to have exposed herself to a wide range of American people and institutions in conducting her study, she in fact draws upon those institutions and people selectively. In "How to Observe Morals and Manners" she asserts that "the Marriage compact is the most important feature of the domestic state on which the observer can fix his attention" (172). Although she coaches her claim in the language of science, she does little to hide her predilection "If he be a heathen, he will not be surprised at finding much imperfection in the marriage state wherever he goes" (173). Similarly, in the portion of Society in America devoted to a study of "Civilization," Martineau chooses as her focal point the "idea of Honor," "Woman," "Children," "Sufferings," and "Utterance." Women, children, and sufferers were all, to Martineau, special populations whose voices were rendered silent by implication, power—reflected poorly upon that civilization's idea of honor.

To summarize, all of America's great expectations were centered in its promise to give it citizens the power to express itself. The judgment that she, in the end, renders ("The civilization and the morals of the Americans fall far below those of the English") is partially due to what she saw as its failure to live up to its promise, the promise to grant all citizens—men and women, blacks and whites—utterance. As a deaf woman, she felt more acutely than most the necessity of this power, and, to pay homage to its personal significance, claimed in a self-propelled oratory: "Her stimulus in all she wrote from first to last, was simply the need for utterance." She began her work on America assuming that its author and deliver would be the voice of the social investigator who knew how and what to observe. But in the end America inspired in her not one but many voices, and her most remarkable and moving was the dominance of one than from the skill with which she projected many. In creating a sociological that allowed for—indeed an interplay of voices, Martineau's project provided a paradigm on which future women sociologists (e., Emily Fullilove and Beatrice Webb) sought to build. It is worthwhile in this regard to note that Harriet

scathingly writes:

It is the truth, that while there is much said about "the sphere of women," two widely different notions are entertained of what is meant by the phrase. The narrow, and, to the ruling party, the more reasonable, is that sphere appropriated by men, and bounded by their ideas of propriety—a notion from which any and every woman may fairly dissent. The broad and true conception of is the sphere appointed by God, and bounded by the powers which he has bestowed. This command the assent of man and woman; and only the question of power remains to be proved. (154)

Martineau legitimates her reinterpretation of separate spheres by positioning it as that "appointed by God." She believes in a conception of womanhood that is broader—that allows for a wider range of embedded meanings, in that which is the sphere currently lives. What is equally interesting to consider, though, is that she embeds her speculation on the highly controversial issues of separate spheres into her social investigation of America. That she does so is an extension of a Keatsian re-imagining of the flexibility of travel writing to encompass a variety to narrative strategies and narrative voices. It also suggests, though, that she sought to travel to America the liberty not just to open herself up to the new, but also to reconsider the old. She made in America a declaration of independence not just for herself but for all women—really for all men and women.

While Martineau redirected her travel account from a record of private experience into a document of public study, a declaration of her independence from the ideologies that positioned her as a woman and writer outside of social study. She found within the discourse of sociology the capacity to cultivate—and market—a professional self, and through the process enabled a good deal of what one might call "gendered" territory as sociological enterprise. The promise of the study of society enabled her to see more clearly the extent to which she was a product of society—and to see her womanhood as at least in part social, not essentially, constructed. Doing so gave her new ground for alternate readings—of America, of society, and of herself.

Willa Cather


of much how "vicious" meant to her that she kept what she had originally written and insisted that it be used.
Thomas Hardy’s _A Pair of Blue Eyes_: The Heroine as Text

Jo Deweerst

Hardy’s third published novel, _A Pair of Blue Eyes_, marked several important beginnings for him. It was the first of his novels to be published in its entirety, to appear under his own name, and—perhaps most importantly—I began to distance myself from the problems specifically associated with writing about women. Although he had previously published novels like _Desperate Remedies_ and _Under the Greenwood Tree_ (1872), which also feature female protagonists, his concern for the problems of women in literature extended beyond these two books. In _The Usurper_ (1872), he introduces the idea of a woman living a separate life, and in _The Waste Land_ (1874), he portrays a woman who is capable of living independently of men. This attitude toward women underlies the pastoral idyll of the _Greenwood Tree_, in which the singular and valuable role played by women in rural life is celebrated. It is through these novels and the process of writing about them that Hardy’s concern for the problems of women in literature extended beyond the works of other authors. In _A Pair of Blue Eyes_, Hardy explores these themes and considers the role of women in society. In this novel, women are presented as both independent and dependent figures in relation to men, and their experiences and thoughts are depicted in a realistic and nuanced manner.

While Hardy’s treatment of women is a significant aspect of his work, it is important to note that his depiction of women is not limited to the female characters in his novels. In his autobiography, he describes his own experiences with women, and the challenges he faced in writing about them. In _A Pair of Blue Eyes_, Hardy’s treatment of women is both complex and nuanced, and it is through this novel that he begins to explore the role of women in society and the challenges they face.

Further reading

Deweerst, Jo. “Thomas Hardy’s _A Pair of Blue Eyes_: The Heroine as Text” in _The Victorian Newsletter_, 2018: 19-31.

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_University of Delaware_
In this paragraph, the author contrasts the experiences of two characters, Elfrid and Lucelxan, highlighting the latter's beauty and the former's ordinary appearance. Elfrid, whose name is central to the narrative, is described as a woman who makes a profound impression on others, despite her modesty and the unassuming nature of her person. This description emphasizes her as a character who, while physically less attractive than Lucelxan, possesses an inner beauty that is reflected in her actions and personality. The contrast is drawn further when Elfrid's actions, such as her willingness to help and her loyalty, are highlighted, suggesting that her character is more admirable and fulfilling than that of Lucelxan, who is described as a figure of extraordinary beauty but one whose actions are less noble or virtuous.

In the context of the novel, this contrast serves to deepen the themes of beauty and virtue, as well as to emphasize the importance of character over appearance. The narrative continues to explore these themes through the actions and interactions of the other characters, such as Elfrid's interventions in the lives of others, which serve to illustrate the idea that true beauty and virtue are not determined by physical attributes but by the actions and intentions of individuals.

The contrast in appearance and character also reflects broader social and cultural values, where beauty is often equated with physical attractiveness, while virtue is associated with moral behavior and service to others. By highlighting Elfrid's virtues, the author challenges these societal norms and invites readers to consider the subjective nature of beauty and the importance of character over superficial attributes.
Clough, in America, scribbled both horizontally and vertically—"a scabrous, bawdy little man," as he was described at the time. Clough wrote in a hurry, often in private, about his experiences and encounters with his contemporaries. His style is characterized by a blend of wit, sarcasm, and political commentary. The letters are filled with his thoughts and observations on society, politics, and personal relationships.

Clough's correspondence with Bertram is among the most well-known and has been the subject of extensive study. Bertram was Clough's close friend and literary associate, and their correspondence provides valuable insights into the lives of the Victorian intelligentsia. The letters cover a wide range of topics, from literature and art to politics and social issues.

Clough's relationship with Bertram was complex and multifaceted. They shared a deep respect for each other's intellectual abilities and were often in disagreement on political and literary matters. Despite their differences, their correspondence is marked by a sense of mutual admiration and a desire to understand each other's perspectives.

Clough's letters to Bertram are a testament to his wit, intelligence, and political acumen. They offer a window into the world of Victorian literary and political figures, providing a rich understanding of the times in which they lived.
It is difficult not to feel insulted when you do not respond ... If we do go on together I shall ... be willing to learn strength of you. This is the greatest comfort to me to feel you strong and determined to do the right thing.

To further cajole him, Blanchc resort to standard elements of the myth of female inferiority: that women live for love and that meaningful work is solely the province of men. She argues that being properly looked after by Blanchc is not only understood but necessary for her to work and wishes that she could do great work. “It work the object of life ... Sometimes I am terribly inclined to think that love is the only true thing. I am afraid it is the weakness of my sects.” She causally concludes by saying that they not enjoy each other but that each help the other to work.

Clough is at a loss to answer this manly assault, admits his nature is perverse, and rejoices that she calls him “Dear boy,” which is the appellation dear to me in the whole world. In his next letter to Blanche he has pulled himself together and is trying to manage an accent to manage a month. Blanchc responds by praising the work of: “I should think I was cruel and wrong besides if ... for my sake [you] languish in inactivity instead of doing some good work.” Then, using a revealing adverb, she states: “I do love you so much now, dear boy.”

In reply Clough admits he is selfish and in the wrong, but he is much too busy at the time. “It seems to me at the present the natural course is to take it quietly and patiently. I will wait—perhaps go over to America first—you shall see.” He adds:

You might within two or three years see someone who should like more than me. I have felt this all along. I have checked you through my own coldness perhaps ... Under such circumstances ... I do not think we are arrived at the moment of laying plans...

The summer of 1852 finds their correspondence increasingly dejective. Travelling in Devoes with her family, Blanche writes to Clough: “I do wish you were here my darling—you can’t think how I want you—.” Clough writes: “Believe me, if you feel doing your harm ... I will leave you at your slightest indication of the wish—for whatever length of time you please.”

But in July Clough’s recession to commit himself begins to the intermixed with expressions of physical passion: “I must stop a bit, take you into my arms, as it were, and give you a few, few kisses.” A letter from Blanche also shows their relationship is growing warmer.

I love you so much, my darling. I wish you were here. Do you think you would like me as much afterwards. Indeed I am afraid not ... it is only yesterday morning I was wishing on your knees being nodded for being cross but I had to box your ears for it. My own darling.

From the time he embarked in November, 1852, for Boston, Clough wrote voluminously to Blanche, although he was licensed by Boston’s literary and social leaders, Clough was miserably lonely, recapitulating his boyhood experience of separation by the Atlantic from those he loved. In addition his indecencies not only kept him from forum at the Boston literary establishment he had followed proposed conferences in and a southern Boston suburb, but even prevented him from declining whether to stay in America or return to England. Euphorically he no better off than he had been in London. He toured a few papas in Greek, wrote some magazine articles and poems, and started a pamphlet revising of the motion of Plutarch’s Lives. But from the sheer quantity of his letters to Blanchc, Clough must have spent much of his time writing to her.4 Pages in each letter are devoted to assertions of love, even lover’s babble—Clough wants to talk to her a little “looks-in-tend—” He shows his characterist self-deprecation in November—when he writes: “I only fear I shall be too happy with you.” Few days after Christmas, 1852, he complains to Blanche that his friends have not written to him and encloses the poem “That out of sight is out of mind.” In January, 1853, he fears he shall be “almost unwisely” fond of her. Constantly he implores her to join him in America, about which he is anathema. “I am anxious for you all, a little sick of America, sometimes of people who are good enough, but strange to me and not at bottom quite like English people—.” On the other hand, writing to Blanche he quotes as to why he was eloquent by mail but tongue-tied when he was with her, he writes:

[Hiving come across the water, which I didn’t like the thought of, makes me think myself to have done something—so as to lose my tongue. Another thing is that this country is so much more handsome for me, and the people so much more than London people—]

The emotional forecast which led Clough to abandon poetry for eight years began to build up shortly after he departed from England, leaving boxers of his manuscripts and letters with Blanche. Mulhauser quotes the pertinent elements of Clough’s and Blanchc’s interactions. In early December Blanchc writes for permission to read Dipsychus.

Will you please to give me leave to read Dipsychus, for I want it. I have put some of my books in that box ... so please write and tell me to read it all. (Mulhauser 2: 350)

With justifiable anxiety, Clough replies: “Please don’t read Dipsychus yet—I wish particularly not. You shall see it sometime—but not now, not, please—dear, I beg not ...” Of all things Clough seems the most likely to offend Blanche was Dipsychus, in which a Mephistophelian Spirit tries to

reduce a choice young man with Venetian prostitutes. Then, on January 8, 1853, Blanchc assures him:

I won’t read Dipsychus, dear Arthur, don’t be afraid, you know I will do whatever you tell me; it was more chance that I stammbled on that one poem, and I only just glanced it over, pray forgive me ... (Mulhauser 2: 350)

But like another young woman, Blanchc could not resist opening the forbidden book. In early March she wrote that she had dipped into the manuscripts and was appalled by what she found:

It is strange those poems and reminders of your old times and thoughts and your other sides always upset me ... it is horrid—they seem too full of honest coarse strength and perception ... but I don’t like it. I don’t like men in general; I like women—why was not the world made all women ... I did hardly know that good men were so rough and coarse. (Mulhauser 2: 400-405)

Blanche’s thunderbolt devastated Clough, lonely, in a foreign land, and with little means of support. He hysterecally both complains and capitulates to Blanchc in a 250-word let ter which he wrote over a six-day period that included Good Friday and Easter Sunday. While much of the letter is excerpted by Mulhauser on pages 402-05, some of Clough’s self-qualification that Mulhauser does not include is worth quoting:

You are above me—better than I am. I sallited—why should I therefore try and come near you ... If I had worked more quietly and diligently at my regular work, the feelings you abort so would not have come upon me perhaps ... The implication is that if Clough had confined himself to translating and not written poetry he would not have felt, much less written about, the horrid, coarse masculine emotions that repelled Blanchc.

By Easter Sunday Clough is incoherent and defensive. It is truly possible that without a loss of your own self to play from afar off those aberrations which indeed is it very hard for anyone who does not himself from the life of men and their words to keep wholely clear of ... O my dear Blanche, I hope without taking one step downward you will be able to reach my hand to me ... Cannot you do so, cannot you take me up ... Easter Monday he continues:

Your letter gave me the feeling that if you known (as you say) all my ideas you would have nothing to say to me that you should be reviscd ... you do not know how hor ribele such thoughts are to me ... it a few words sufficed ...
Clough's panic in response to Blanche's cenure is understandable, but now seems both ludicrous and pathetic. Blanche, a product of an era in which Mrs. Grundy and Podsnap were unattainable, was indeed formidable, and Clough himself knew that his poetry was too avant garde in its discussion of sexuality and mortality for him to finish, much less publish, *Dipsychus*. It also was Clough's misfortune that in his emotional neediness he was overmatched by someone as implacable as Blanche. Angrily after Clough's outburst of self-aboration, Blanche continues excoriating him about what she had seen in his boxes of letters and manuscripts, but simultaneously retains her stance of childlike dependence on him.

I felt very hard and angry at first—with the idea that it put into my head... I could not suppose you did not know about wrong, but to be thinking, speaking... of things in any way but the highest is immense me as if you really thought so. It is necessary for men to corne their relations. It is curious how very poetic and bombastic of any kind that does not in any degree offend... I hope you are not angry with me... Whipsawed between the loving, clinging Blanche and the stern, admonishing Blanche—she split angelic/demonic personality types which Victorians contradictorily expected in their women, according to Austerlitz—Clough capitulated. Since he could not, like Browning's character, compartmentalize his life between his lover at night and "a world of men" by day, he gave up the poetry that offended his fiancée, returned to England in July, 1853, for a government job found through Clough and Carlyle, and married Blanche the following June. Except for "O ship, ship, ship," which Clough wrote for Blanche on May 6, 1853, and which he described as "a dogged ballad all about nothing," and possibly three other poems which were published in an American magazine in the summer of 1853, Clough abandoned writing poetry from Easter 1853 until a few months before his death in 1861.

Blanche gives her own explanation of the silent years in the memoir she wrote for The Poems and Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough. (Indeed, Blanche was indefatigable in organizing editions of Clough's works posthumously, beginning only two weeks after his death.) Blanche's explanation is both deAAFious and confused. She begins:

It has often been a subject of surprise, that with such evident powers and even facility of production, Clough should have left so little behind him, even considering the shortness of his life, and that such long periods he should have been entirely silent. (1:40)

Since there had been no previous mention of "such long periods" of silence, Blanche seems to be trying to distract attention from the only actual period of silence. Then she alleges that Clough wrote only during "short intervals" when he was free from "the pressure of constant and hard practical work" (1:40). But Clough's job as an examiner in the Privy Council Office was demanding. Until he accepted his unpaid labors for Miss Nightingale to his workday, Clough's hours were from 10 to 4 with eight weeks annual vacation.

When Blanche, as the unacknowledged memoirist, describes Clough's life after marriage, her explanations of his poetic silence becomes defensive.

[In June 1854 he married. For the next seven years he lived quietly at home... No events of any moment marked this period; but it was one of real rest and contentment... he was able... to devote his great faculties freely to the service of others. Up to this day we may almost say that he had been too free from active and absorbing employment for his own happiness. (1:44)]

Now Blanche implies that when Clough wrote before his marriage he was too unoccupied to be happy. To her it was only when he was occupied—and not writing—that he was happy. While a bachelor Clough had time to speculate, but marriage ended vain, solitary philosophizing.

[The want of definite and continuous occupation left his mind free to deal restlessly with the great insoluble problems of the world... After his marriage there was none of this enforced and painful solitude and self-alienation. He had plenty to do; and the close relations... with his wish's family kept him actively employed... (1:44)]

According to Blanche marriage for Clough had blown the irritating aspects of his character and molded him into perfection. His humor, which had tended to "irony and sarcasm," now was "natural and healthy." His home life "made many perplexing questions, both social and religious, clear and simple to his mind" (1:45). She delicately hints that to her goes the credit for Clough's transformation and that an epiphany was about to occur:

The close and constant contact with another mind gave him a fresh insight into his own, and developed a new understanding of the wants of other people... it is quite certain, from little things which he was in the habit of saying, that, had he been permitted, he would have expressed his mature convictions in words of a more positive and substantial kind. (1:45)

While it is simplistic to portray Blanche as a succubus, draining Clough of his poetic power, the record of his correspondence and Blanche's memoir indicate a dialectic between them that resulted in his poetic spirit. Only in the last few months of his life did Clough return to poetry, three short poems, "Mary Magdalen" and "Cantebury Tales," in which travelers on a ship bound to Boston from England exchange stories about love and marriage. Probably awareness that his life was ending enabled Clough to drop his self-imposed ban and create tales that enthralled love and sexuality, defying the restrictive morality of both his wife and his time. The one Mary Magdalen tale which critic finds embodiments conventional prudery may be read as a fantasy of revenge against Blanche for her and her doctors' having exiled him to the south of Europe for his health, and to blame Blanche for her credit that he did not try to suppress this tale or the others in *Mary Magdalen* which she found objectionable, although she did argue against including some of them.

Indeed in Clough's last days his revived poetic impulse seems to have been sustained by Blanche's love and care. In Florence, on his deathbed, Blanche aided him as he struggled to write the three Mary Magdalen poems and "Lawyer's Second Tale," although later she expressed disgust for the story. The tale endorses the love (iy) of Christian, a symbolically named Scots woman, with an English fellow. When the Oxford fellow returns briefly to his college, Christian, pregnant, is taken unwillingly to Australia by his uncle and aunt. Years later, happily married to a wealthy man, Christian returns to England and gives their child to the former Oxford fellow, whose marriage to a barrister is also symbolically Christian. This seems to be a further, and most daring, development of a theme that often engaged Clough: love between an unspoiled, sensitive, yet hard-working country girl, usually Scottish, and an Oxford fellow or student. But only in *Mary Magdalen* does Clough advance far beyond the conventional views of contemporary writers who a by the rules of Victorian society must be considered "immoral" is, unlike Lady Dedlock, not only not punished, but is rewarded. She is truly worthy of her name: loving, non-judgmental both of her lover's leaving her and her relatives' forcing her to leave him, and self-sacrificially willing to give her son up to his father.

The sexual, social, and religious concerns of Clough's productive period seemingly had simply lain fallow during his eight-year drought. Clough's proving mind, which questioned the validity of all a priors given, except truth itself, had refused to be quelled. *Mary Magdalen* is a poignant reminder that Clough, before his inner tensions caused him to surrender to Blanche's prudence and counsel writing poetry was among the few Victorian poets whose sole interest was grappling with the pressing concerns of his era.

A Reading of Swinburne's "A Leave-Taking" in Light of Arnold's "The Forsaken Merman"

J. L. Kerbaugh and Margaret Kerbaugh

Until the posthumous publication of Arnold's letters, which contain references to Swinburne that wounded his vanity and caused him to revise his opinion of Arnold sharply downward, Swinburne had been, for the most part, Arnold's unadmitted admirer. 1 In his essay entitled "Matthew Arnold's

1 See Sidney Colvin's essay on the relationship between Swinburne and Arnold.

New Poems," first published in the Forsythe Review in October 1867, Swinburne was particularly lavish in his praise, generously acknowledging a grateful debt to the older poet. "The Forsaken Merman" especially elicited his profound admiration. It was, he recorded, among the poems by Arnold

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SUNY College at Farmingdale
which he “had mainly by heart in a time of childhood just ignorant of error” (15:66), and he confessed preferring it even “to Thyraxis,” which he considered the better work (94). For the space of some three hundred words he paid an elaborate and impassioned tribute to it: “No man can imagine,” he has pressed from the bells and buds of the moons and downs by cape or channel of the north a sweeter honey than this; it is “a piece of the sea-wind”; it has an “inexplicable inevitable sweetness” and “an incomparable beauty”.

Swinburne’s homage to “The Forsaken Merman” did not, however, begin with the poem in the Forsaken Merman. We believe that it had already found poetic expression in the slight lyric entitled “A Leave-Taking,” which has been published in Poems and Ballads the year before. But, although the correspondence between the two works seems deliberate, systematic, and at greater length below, there are also a number of more superficial but nevertheless suggestive parallels between the poems. Both, for instance, arise from the rejection of the speaker by a beloved woman. The speaker’s rejection is a matter of melancholy resignation, and she, in both cases she expresses her hope by imagining that the beloved woman will turn steadfast toward him and sigh. Arnold’s merman imagines Margaret gazing “over the sand at the sea” from her window; then, “soon there breaks a sigh, / And soon there drops a tear.” Swinburne’s narrator (probably with less reason) imagines of the beloved that she

1 Coin Velvernon. Long in his 1599 MLA essay “Swinburne’s Lost Love” was first to identify Swinburne’s inamorata as Mary Cuninghame. Earlier, in his life Swinburne, Edmund Gurney had identified her (although not by name) as Jane Fawkes (78).

2 David Thomas Swinburne. The Poet in His World notes “the dissolute for marriage in which Swinburne was able to indulge in uncounselling of his

3 Nevertheless, “A Leave-Taking” has not received very little comment of any sort, evidently for two reasons. First, it is generally understood to refer to the conclusion of the unhappy love affair, probably with his cousin Mary Gordon, that Swinburne memorized more impressively and at greater length in “The Triumph of Time.” That poem has eclipsed “A Leave-Taking.” Second, there is a wealth of Swinburne’s sexual peculiarities, which have tended to render doubtful the sincerity of the complaint behind either poem. Swinburne’s rejection by Mary Gordon may have been more convenient than otherwise and his dispute more theological than real.

4 In the third stanza of “The Forsaken Merman” Arnold gives the reason for flight: “She will not come.” Swinburne gives a similar and identically phrased reason after each and every call: in the first stanza, “She will not come;” in the second stanza, “She will not love;” in the third stanza, “She will not love.” The argument of course offers a clearly stated motive for her behavior: “I lose my poor Mermaid! Merman! here with thou, / whereas in Swinburne no motive is given, although weariness of the narrator’s part seems suspect. But even with her motive—perhaps it is—Margaret, like Swinburne’s lady, is preternaturally cold: “Dear heart,” I said, “we are long alone; / The sea grows stony, the little ones come on. / But, ah, she gave me never a look, / For her eyes were a sad to the holy book!”

5 Margaret is intent on her own survival, her own good, her own holy passion. In her self-absorption she is remote and inaccessible, she is deaf to the most moving prayers for pity. The “cold strange eyes of a little Mermaid” are the type of her own eyes, because in their frozen focus on self they are inhuman and unnatural. The dialogue between “natural” and “unnatural” is a rich and integral part of “The Forsaken Merman,” a fact that was not lost on Swinburne and that he indirectly acknowledged in the opening sentence of the paroegy in the Forsaken Merman: the poem “but in it the pathos of natural things” but also “the word of something lost—filling with glad and sin

6 Note, by the way, that the language is the language of the merman when he tells his children “that Doris the winds afterwards blow” (emphasis added).
Given all the gold that all the seasons wear
To do that at a thing of bareless hours
More impressive is the fact that the same images appear in "The Triumph of Time." In the second stanza the narrator asks,

Is it worth a tear, is it worth an hour?
To think of what we outlive,
Of idle, husk and fugitive flower,
The dream forgone and the deed forborne?

On one level, of course, fruitlessness here results only from the fact that "the dead" has been "forborne." That another level of meaning exists is suggested, however, by the fruitlessness in the tenth stanza—of the "weeds of the wave, without fruit upon earth." Here the wave is part of the ocean of love, and what grows from love, a "weed," is something unwanted and rank. Also, given that fruit has in the third stanza been closely identified with love (as the "fruit of my heart," which "will not grow again"), it is distinctly odd, astonishing, in fact, that the narrator should suddenly announce, in the fourth stanza,

I have given no man of my fruit to eat.

Clearly, analogy of "The Triumph of Time" cannot summarily dismiss the likelihood of a homosexual element in "A Leave-Taking." In both "The Forsaken Merman" and "A Leave-Taking," the dichotomy between the natural and the unnatural is integrally related to the theme of alienation. Arnold's merman is alienated from the socially cohesive force of Christianity, and therefore from Margaret and from human society, by his very nature; he is created a pagan, and a condition of his "unnatural" bodily existence is exclusion from Christianity. "Loud prays the priest," but "shut stands the door of the church; the merman and his children must jostle without," and even the windows through which they peer are "small leaded panes." The merman exists under a dispensation different from that of humankind. The narrator of "A Leave-Taking" is similarly alienated by his bodily nature from the different but even more fundamentally cohesive forces of procreation and domesticity. His sexual abnormality (whatever it is) is as much a part of his nature as mere-ness is of the merman, and is as much a condition of his existence. And it alienates him from his lover and from society not only if the lover is a woman and the narrator's abnormality is, say, impotence, but also if the lover is a man.

For the ideal union of lovers in not only private and sexual, it is also public and ceremonial, and part of the perceived public role.

One difference between Arnold's poem and Swinburne's may be as telling as the similarities. In Swinburne we have no hint that the lover shares the narrator's sense of alienation; the lover has no discernible individuality and exists principally as an object of fancied desire. But in "The Forsaken Merman" Margaret is as alienated from the sea of love as the merman is from the land. In that poem the mutuality of alienation on the part of the lovers amounts to a split in a single personality, a split into parts that can be variously characterized as the pagan and the Christian, the Hellenic and the Hebraic, or the id and the super-ego—so that ultimately "The Forsaken Merman" can be read as a poem in pursuit of the integration of personality, which is to say, in pursuit of wholeness. But because alienation in "A Leave-Taking" is ostensibly caused by the narrator, as a theme it lacks the dynamic and dialectical qualities that in "The Forsaken Merman" are sources of many layers of rich meaning. Therefore, to read it primarily instead as a poem of fascination-appeal to universals, Swinburne's, especially to the extent to which it is about abnormality, seems exclusive and essentially reductive.

Nevertheless, considering "A Leave-Taking" in terms of "The Forsaken Merman" demonstrates that it is a more complex and revealing poem than is evident from treating it as a postscript to "The Triumph of Time." "The Forsaken Merman" is not representative of Arnold's poetry, and despite his assertions to the contrary, that Swinburne should have been much influenced by the main body of Arnold's work is unlikely. But it seems that this uncharacteristic departure of Arnold's into a predominantly lyrical mode spoke intimately and urgently to the young Swinburne, engaging his imagina-

tion for many years. For "The Forsaken Merman" clearly remained in Swinburne's literary consciousness and on his pulse until the influence it exercised found expression in a poem that resembles it in a number of meaningful ways.

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NARRATIVE DISFIGUREMENT AND THE UNNAMED FRIEND IN Tennyson's THE LOVE'S TALE

Ernest Fontana

Tennyson's "The Lover's Tale" (1879), which was composed at different times in his life (Parts I, II, and III in 1827-28, Part IV in 1868), has either been ignored or written about in a largely by-passed manner, or translated as "Leaves of Grass." C. E. Shortt, argues that the poem's theme is "the disastrous effects of complete submission to passion" and refers to Julian's "one noble deed," his return of the resurrected Camilla to her husband as the "ideal of a Leaves of Grass". More recently, Herbert Tucker describes Julian as "an emotional cripple" and identifies the theme of the poem as "the alienation of a feminine society" (1988, 57). Even the technical experimentation of the poem has been moralisti-

"The narrative of Boccaccio's Decameron 10, a tragicomedy in which the voice of Julian, in Parts III, figuratively represents not so much Camilla but his own absent self. Instead of action, character-agents, and the explicit theme of "those who acted generously or magnificently in affairs of the heart" (1982, 600), the constituents of Boccaccio's narrative, Tennyson's lover's centric lyric narrative necks, in Parts I-III, to make present the distant, absent self of the speaker. It is this submerged subjectivity, variously designated in the poem as 275

--The Lincoln title edition of 1869 introduced the poem as "founded upon a story of Boccaccio." (p. in "Tennyson's 3002".) Also see Wight 33-38.
The metaphoric source for the power of memory acting upon the heart thus converges with the actual images of what is remembered. The narrated images of sailing, recalled by a remembering self / heart, become images of the remembering heart / self. Imagines from a distant past conflate with images of a distant self as a lyricized narrative becomes an enactment of self.

It is this self that is discovered, metaphorically figured, and enacted by realizing the liberating heteronarrative, the story of Julian’s love for Camilla. Camilla is a threat to this submerged self. Through no action of her own, she causes the sexually ambiguous lover to lose himself.

By narrating the past, Julian discovers the music of his heart and feels its nail-like edges, and he propels it pastward to a distant past and distant emotions. The music of memory is the music of the inspired heart evokes for Julian “in the horizon of the mind” (1: 47) the image of Camilla and himself sailing on the bay. "Beneath a low-browed cavern."

By the slow rolling ridges on the cliffs -Climbed, calling to each other, and through the arch
Down three low walls, like a setting star,
Mist with the gorgeous west the lighthouse shine.
(1: 54-58)

Even now the Goddess of the Past, that takes
The heart, and sometimes touches but one string.
That quavers, and is silent, and sometimes
Stops suddenly all its half-moulder chords
To some old melody, begins to play
That which pleases but for a time. I feel thy breath: I eat, each great Masters of the sea and eye
Thy breath is of the pinewood, and through years
Have hollowed out a deep and stormy breast
Birds have the nature liquid of love and food,
Breathe but a little on me, and the sail
Will draw west to the rising of the sun,
The livid members of the morning star,
And out of Life. (1: 16-20)

By narrating the past, Julian discovers the music of his heart and feels its nail-like edges, and he propels it pastward to a distant past and distant emotions. The music of memory is the music of the inspired heart evokes for Julian “in the horizon of the mind” (1: 47) the image of Camilla and himself sailing on the bay. "Beneath a low-browed cavern."

\footnote{For the target-source analysis of metaphor, see Liebkoff and Turner.}

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donna chiamata madonna Caterina, moglie d’un Niccolò Cacchianomico (1794, 857). In Tennyson, Julian’s experience of love is indeed the focus; in fact it is the experience rather than Camilla, his inamorata, that becomes the subject of the text, led to the discovery of Tucker, who feels uneasy because of the absence of her literal presence (1988, 99). Julian’s presence as narrator erases Camilla, as her soul, as beloved, erases him as lover. If Camilla is a sweet fountain in which you “lose yourself in utter ignorance,” a drop of this fountain can be left percolated and carried in the cup-like spirit of the self-figuring male narrator, instead of losing himself in Camilla, she can become part of his body, a drop of sustenance that can be assimilated and thereby cease in the body of the self-figuring, self-regarding male imagination.

And like the all-enduring cumb, driven
Far from the dissembled fountain by the palm,
Who tells across the middle monstrous night
Or when the white heats of the blinding noon
Beat from the consecrated sand; yet in him keeps
A thought of that sweet fountain that he loves
To stay his feet from falling, and his spirit
From bitterness of death. (1: 132-38)

When Julian discovers that Camilla loves Lorenzo rather than himself, he figures Camilla’s “innocent heart” and “maiden empire of her mind” as a map ruled by another. Glaring into her heart, he discovers (and [the text italicizes this]) Already, we assume, on a literal level is Lorenzo, though in a text in which most metaphorical figuration refers back to the narrator, the other may be seen as Julian’s distant, ambiguous, and unrequited love. Just as Lorenzo, at the point of fulfilling his role as heterosexual lover, discovers instead another self, and, as the catalpica Prince in The Princess, passes out in a passion.

There, where I hoped myself to reign as king,
There, where that day I crowned myself as king,
There is my realm and even on my throne,
Arentch there it seemed as though a link
Of some tiest chain within my utmost frame
Was riven in twain: that life I heed not
Flowed from me, and far from me in the grave,
The darkness of the grave and utter night,
Did swallow up my vision; at her feet,
Even the feet of her I loved, I felt
Smell with exceeding sorrow unto Death. (1: 580-89)

The “entanglement” (1: 615) that follows, is a result of Julian’s discovery of Camilla’s love for Lorenzo, when in fact it can be seen as a form of psychic paralysist that follows upon Julian’s discovery that he is unable to fulfill the romantic heteronarrative. His discovery of his unfitness for the role of lover, an unfeint evidence in his repeated “failure to speak to Camilla about his love” (Tucker 1983, 24), suggests to him that he is unfit for life, that he has no proper role, no story to enact, and little story to tell.

Dead; for henceforth there was no life for me!
Mute, for henceforth what use were words to me?
Blind, for the day was as the night to me!
The night to me was kinder than the day.
(1: 597-602)

In Parts II and III of The Lover’s Tale, the “dream-drama” (Short 83) foregrounds the submerged, distant self of Julian as subjectivity rather than his explicit narrative topic. The male subject, “brain” (2: 9-49) becomes the focus in three dream-narratives in which Julian both anticipates and desires the death and burial of Camilla.

In the second of these dreams, Julian is with Camilla in a summer house, adorning with her their collaborative painting of “a vessel in mid ocean / Clambersing and / The ravin wind / In her sail soaring” (2: 166-68). As the two gaze upon the painting, the vessel begins to "heave upon the painful sea” (2: 189). At this point, Julian, in the dream, falls into a senselessness as he did when he discovered Camilla’s love for Lorenzo. In the dream Julian and Camilla enter into the represented storm of the shipwrecked ship, the shipwrecked earth within Julian merging with images of the pictorialized tempest.

An earthquake, and my lord-hearts, made the ground
Reel under us, and all on us, soul, life
And breath and motion, past and flowed away
To those serial billows: round and round
A whole heaven tumbled, and sea and wind
Raged, blazed, and burst, and hiss, and hiss,
Rapid and vast, of hasting spray wind-driven
Far through the dizzy dark. Aloud she shrieked;
My heart was torn with pain, I wound my arm
About her head, and white giddily the wind
Sung; but I clapsed her without fear.
(2: 190-99)

Nowhere more clearly do we see how what Tucker refers to as “the power of doom” has “taken up residence” within Julian’s self (98). But this power of doom is, in The Lover’s Tale, associated with those moments when Julian imagines a profound psychic disability that, for the reader, prevents him from fulfilling the romantic heterosexual plot of December 10, 4. It is this source of doom that surfaces at these moments, and articulates itself in the dream-drama which disrupts and disrupter narrative continuity in Parts II and III of The Lover’s Tale. In Maud these disruptive lyrical moments will free themselves from narrative to become discrete, autonomous lyrics, but the movement to lyric autonomy begins in The Lover’s Tale. The effect of this narrative disruption is for Julian’s absent, suppressed self, his “innerrnet madonna” (2: 94), to become the dominant presence in the text that contains what we might identify as Tennyson’s sense of

\footnote{The text references a selection of the Poets’ catalog and various biographical records including The Cambridge Apocalypse. Tennyson begins and ends much of The Lover’s Tale in the intense homonatural culture of Cambridge in 1828-29.}
Julian’s “homosexual” doom. Thus it is significant that Julian abandons Camilla, in the dream-seizure, to the jaws of Death. For Julian’s absent, repressed self has become an “empty phantom.”

He came in, and now sniffling fast, and now sniffing whilshe so once, but evermore
Holman his golden barthom in his arms,
So bore her through the solitary land
Back to her mother’s house where she was born.
(4-76-90)

In a passage that echoes both Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” (Tennyson 341) and Poe’s “Tell-Tale Heart,” Boccaccio’s monstrous fatal-mist of a disease at which the sexual appetite is transmuted into a complex, rarefied experience of self. Furthermore, Tennyson invents the splendid Gothic tableau of Julian’s carrying of Camilla from out the tomb, which in Boccaccio is tersely narrated as messer Genzile “as gently as he could, assisted by a servant carried her from the tomb” (1982: 618).

When the resurrected Camilla discovers that Lionel, her husband, has gone away and cannot be summoned, she wails and assigns Julian the right and responsibility of returning her to her husband, whereas in Boccaccio it is messer Genzile who proposes the scheme that he return madonna Catalina to her husband. She agrees, in return for his promise not to annul her sexually. In Tennyson, where appetites are rarefied to emotions, Julian, “our lovely lover,” rides away after the death of Lionel’s son. It is at this point that the unnamed narrator friend of Part IV meets Julian at “a dismal hostel” and nourishes him through a malarial fever. Figuratively, Julian is cured of the fever of his unsexualized, self-transcendental homosexuality by the ministrations of homoerotic friendship.

A dismal hostel in a dismal land
A flat melancholical world of cloud and muck
But there from fever and my cares of him
Sprang up a friendship that might help us yet.
(4-104-43)

The unnamed friend accompanies a recovered Julian back to Camilla and experiences himself her seductive, maddening power.

Yet when I saw her (and I thought him crazed,
Though not with such a craziness as needs
A cell and keeper), these dark eyes of hers—
Oh such dark eyes and not her eyes alone,
But all from these to where she touched the earth,
For such a sensuality as Julian’s hookers
No less than one divine apology.
(4-162-68)

The unnamed friend-rescuer confronts his antagonist, a femine-fatale of domestic heterosexuality and bourgeois marriage, to which Julian is culturally impelled, but for which he is unfit, stuck both in terms of his catechetic seizure and his malarial fever.

Julian is thus rescued by his male friend not only from the sickness of his grief that he unable to enact his culture’s prescribed text, but from the burden of narrating his story with it uncontrollable deviations from Boccaccio. It is this unnamed friend who assumes the responsibility of narrating when the narrative appears to approximate for the first time the precursor narrative and it is he who replaces Camilla to become Julian’s intimate friend.

Significantly, the “weird and wild” banquet (4: 223) Julian prepares at which Camilla will be restored to Lionel is a detailed amplification by Tennyson of the episode in Decameron 10, 4. The banquet over which Camilla’s draped portrait presides (she will later descend from it) and which provided the title of Tennyson’s 1869 poem becomes a symbol of the conventional bourgeois marriage that Julian, now recovered from his illness, will not partake of. The “strange feast” not only restores Camilla to Lionel but is the prelude to Julian’s “self-exile” (4: 208) from the territory of Lionel and Camilla’s heterosexual marriage to residence in the land of his unnamed friend.

The guests,
Wandered at some strange light in Julian’s eyes
(I told you that he had his golden hour).
And such a feast, ill-suited as it seemed
To such a time, to Lionel’s sense and his
And that resolved self-exile from a land
He never would revisit, such a feast
So rich, so strange, and stranger even than rich,
But rich as for the repulse of a king,
And strengeth yet, at one end of the hall
Two great flowered curtains, looping down
Parted a little see they met the floor,
About a picture of his lady, taken
Some years before, and falling bid the frame,
And just above the paring was a lamp;
So the sweet figures folded round with night
Seemed stepping one of darkness with a smile.
(4-203-19)

The Lover’s Tale ends not as Decameron 10, 4, with the generous friend and lover living in clove unity with the married couple whose marriage he has restored in a public act of unparalled and selfless generosity, but with Tennyson’s Julian cured of his sickness, his inability to narrate and enact the heterosexual intertext, and ready now to begin a new life

With his unnamed friend in his friend’s native land. Tennyson takes Julian to the frontier of a new narrative, one that grows from his decomposition of Decameron 10, 4, one in which homoerotic intimacy is seen as creative and restorative, a native land that can only be named at the close of Tennyson’s disturbing and disfiguring narrative by a voice in which Julian, the diseased exile of The Lover’s Tale, finds health and home.

There were our horses ready at the doors—
We had them so farvelled, but mounting them
We past for ever from us native land;
And with him, my Julian, back to mine.
(4-382-85)

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Xavier University

\footnote{\textsuperscript{9}Wright notes in Boccaccio’s narrative’s allusion the “there is more of passion that of reverence” (457).}\footnote{\textsuperscript{10}Adams’s study of Tennyson’s use of feminine erotization in In Memoriam and his association of science and nature with “female binatry.”}
Cultural Cartography: A. S. Byatt's Possession and the Politics of Victorian Studies

Louise Yelin

A. S. Byatt's Possession is a novel about the discovery of an 18th-century espionage network; it is a memoir of Robert Browning (with a bit of Thomas Mann and Meredith) and an unconventionally feminine Victorian poet composed of Emily Dickinson and Christina Rossetti. The discovery is by a jobless young scholar of a draft of a letter from the male poet, Randolph Henry Ash, to the female one, Christabel LaMotte, sets in motion both a romantic plot that connects the Ash scholar, Roland Michell, and Maud Bailey, a feminist critic of LaMotte's studies in a not so red brick university, and a detective plot that involves English and American scholars and critics of both genders and many critical persuasions in a search to uncover hitherto unknown secrets. Having spent their careers variously trying to possess the lives and work of Ash and LaMotte, the critics and scholars must now alter their views to assimilate the new discovering.

Possession is a clever and compelling narrative. Designed, as Byatt put it, to resemble "the books people used to enjoy reading" (qtd. in Rothstein 17), it is stuffed with descriptive hues of its characters and what they wear, the houses they live in, and the books they read and write that, with the kind of metonymic details that constitute what, in an earlier, less self-conscious critical era, one would have called the Victorian novel. If Possession gives its middlebrow readers a hefty dose of literature and especially Poetry tempered by an abundance of plot and the seductions of romance, it has a slightly different appeal for the culturally literate—those of us, you, who were reading it on the airplane to and from the last MLA. It entices us with its depiction of a Victorian culture (as a detective game) and, at the same time, it flatters us by offering us the pleasures of recognizing the intertextual allusions and revisionary rewritings out of which it is made.

Although, I confess, I find Possession extremely seductive, I want in this paper to read Byatt's novel against the grain of the substantial pleasures it offers those of us who work, like Roland and Maud, in the literary world. Indeed, Possession is an instance of cultural cartography, a simultaneous mapping of Victorian culture and contemporary Victorian studies. Like any map, Byatt's distorts, displaces, and excludes as much as it reveals: as an attempt to show us at just two维ctorian maps and mappings that allow us to see what her maps omit or ignore.

Possession represents Victorian England as Victorian as the Viceroy of India and it is as unsympathetic to the pomposity that was and is in the published and unpublished writings of LaMotte and

"A version of this paper was read at the English X section of MLA (Victorian) at the MLA Convention, San Francisco, 30 December 1991."

The Rothstein interview. Byatt does not regard Browning as a misogynist; this view, held by one of the characters in the novel, is discredited (23-24). In

making Ash echo Tennyson, Browning, and Meredith but not Arnold, moreover, Byatt invents a masculine poet whose writing is not exactly undogmatic but who could be considered, in Woolf's terms, a precursor to Rachel Browning's character for suggesting the past played by Meredith in the depiction of Ash.

JANE WELCH CARLYLE and John Ruskın, Charlotte Brontë and Carlota Bronte, and Charlotte Bronte and John Ruskın, two novels and novels of figures that, like Ash and LaMotte, Byatt invents. Although Matthew Arnold is not mentioned in Possession, one of Byatt's projects is to recuperate an Arnoldian notion of culture: Roland and Maud choose to work on the only poets who "stayed alive when [they'd] been taught and examined everything else . . . . What could survive [their] education" (62). But Byatt's novel maps, unlike Arnold's, accommodate, even privilege, the feminine, and not just the conventionally feminine. The discovery of Ash's affair with LaMotte forces critics to reevaluate and re-evaluate both poets and to acknowledge the influence of LaMotte, and hence the feminine, on Ash, who has traditionally been regarded as quintessentially masculine. (As a figure whose iconographic interests—Norse epic to geology—makes him a Victorian version of the Renaissance Man, Ash represents a cultural life unavailable to the specializing late twentieth century). Moreover, in the healthy and robust sexuality of Christabel LaMotte, namesake of Coleridge's Christabel, Byatt revives Coleridge, disassociating his name of same-sex female eroticism with demonic possession of a passive victim. (The aggressive sexuality of Coleridge's Geralinade goes, however, unacknowledged in one of the twelfth-century characters, the aggressively lesbian American Leonora Stern.) In fact, Possession reworks one of the commonplaces of Victorian literature, the critique of Romantic excesses, rewriting it as a critique of Romantic androcentrism: Byatt's Ash departs from suchromantic precursors as Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Byron in not regarding female eroticities simply or even mainly as the matter of poetry, as in "The Solitary Reaper," to take just one: (301).

Byatt's recuperation of Victorian humanism is self-conscious, if not self-consciously postmodern. Byatt draws attention to both the textuality and the historical contingency of the best that has been thought and said and therefore calls into question the universalizing values of Arnold. What we know of Roland and Maud, "it is a song" that Byatt invents as an instance of cultural cartography, a simultaneous mapping of Victorian culture and contemporary Victorian studies. Like any map, Byatt's distorts, displaces, and excludes as much as it reveals: as an attempt to show us at just two维ctorian maps and mappings that allow us to see what her maps omit or ignore.

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Byatt's representation of the Victorian cultural project is a number of postmodern voices alike, in inventing a range of voices that differentially voice the voices of Ash, Byatt's hero, and indeed of her postmodernist. Roland gives Maud a crash course in Ash by having her read the standard biography, the work of a misogynist voyuer (265-72).

"With this phrase, Byatt means..."
“Experiments Made by Nature”
MAPPING THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY HYSTERICAL BODY

Dianne F. Sadoff

On October 15, 1886 after returning to Vienna from the Salpêtrière in Paris, Freud read a paper titled “On Male Hysteria” to the Society of Physicians. Freud’s lecture provoked sharp criticism because he had presented no original research, seemed to assume his men ignored of the beginning to fall into diapause, and sided with Jean-Martin Charcot in a hotly contested argument among German, French, and American physicians about “railway spine.” Members of the Society thus changed their case of male hysteria, he said in his autobiographical study, and on November 26, 1886, he did so (SE 20:15-17). He began by reporting the patients’ “family history” and “life story,” and then, on to the hysterical body:

The examination of his internal organs reveals nothing pathological apart from dull continuous ones. If I press on the normal areas on the side, the patient turns his head with an expression of severe pain. . . . The cranial vault too is very susceptible to percussion in its left half. The skin of the left half of the head behave, however, quite differently to our expectation: it is completely insensitive to stimuli of any kind. I can prick it, pinch it, twist the lobe of the ear between my fingers, without the patient even noticing the touch. Here, then, there is a very high degree of anesthesia as far as the skin but also the mucous membranes, as I will show you in the case of his patient’s tongue. If I insert a small roll of paper into his left external auditory meatus and then through his left nostril, no reaction is produced . . . in accordance with the anesthesia, the sensory reflexes, too, are abolished or reduced. Thus I can introduce my finger and touch all the pharyngeal tissues on the left side without the result being striking . . . If we now proceed to an examination of the trunk and extremities, here again we find an absolute anesthesia, in the first place in the left arm. As you see, I can push a pointed needle through a fold of the skin without the patient reacting against it. The deep parts—muscles, ligaments, joints—must also be insensitive to an equally high degree, since I can twist the joint and stretch the ligaments without provoking any feeling in the patient . . . I bandage his eyes and then ask him what I have done with his left hand. He cannot tell . . . We have observed anaesthetic patients at the Salpêtrière who, if their eyes were closed, retained a much more far-reaching control over a limb that was lost to consciousness. (SE 1: 27-30)

Note: The version of the paper was read at the English section of MLA (Victorians) at the MLA Convention, San Francisco, December 1991.


“Experiments Made by Nature.” Mapping the Nineteenth-Century Hysterical Body

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tactile" and "visual perceptions" of the familiar body— for patients did not, after all, know neuroanatomy as did the physician (Warrington 113-14). The seat or original site of attack, hysterogenic zones might also cause its cessation— for example, by signifying areas of heightened sensation—demarcated from the remainder of the spatial body, they might through the aura (a sensation that rose hemi-anesthesia for both patients) in the form of colorful, transparently dissolvent with other apparently segregated places on the body. Mediated by these zones, this geography could account for step by step for the necessary successes and concomitances of an hysterical attack. The physician could not tell which wrist he had pricked or which side of her chest, pinched (62-63). Although pin pricks sufficiently measured deep-seated anesthesis, Janet instructed physicians to measure induced measurement which defined itself by being careful to correlate results obtained by assessing both sides of the body. To examine an eighteen-year-old anesthetic patient, Mitchell used electricity; he "applied[] to the nipple the bare metal poles of the secondary current of an induction coil—a severe test—no signal of pain appeared; but, when two needles were carried through the skin, and a strong current passed between them, some pain was felt." On the spine, however, "pin-pricks could be readily felt. Elsewhere the needles used caused no more expression of pain than if the woman's flesh had been a piece of silk (Mitchell 23-24).

This poking and pricking of the hysterical body mapped its surface so as to make anesthesis indirectly observable. Clinical physicians, according to Michel Foucault, exercised a quantification of the visual via the nervous system. For example, procedures of examination—sight, hearing, and touch—subsumed under the "dominant sign, sign (16). But to locate the body's diseased organs or systems, medical men hammered, touched, and listened to the body to bring its secrets to the skin's surface for viewing. This mapping trooped the malfunctioning body. At his clinic, Charcot sketched and mapped the loci of anesthesis, identified by his assistant, "anesthesia in geometric arguments"; "anesthesia in shirt,"8 for example, or "leg-of-mutton-sleeve." The Salpêtrière's staff observed "sharply defined spot, islands of anesthesia, smokers of pain" irregularly over the body without any apparent order. Janet's discourse figured the body as a yet-unseen geography and "clothed" its terrain, a topography of the hysterical body, a picturing of internal bodily diagnosis. The body was a surface of classically correlated symptoms or discolored the symptom as sign, but subsumed both as it figured the body. The body's organic volume had become a representational space mapped by dis- placed areas functioning "manually," or "captive" from one another, separated by virtue of differences from a norm and one another, and definable by particularized laws of expression.

Charcot theorized these spots and left or leg-of-mutton sleeves as hysterogenic zones which, from the first, however, were characterized by a certain terminological ambiguity. They refused to obey the body's ways of thinking. While a paralyzed hand should have produced anesthesia on the forearm, where the muscles didn't work, it nevertheless dematerialized the hand and its shape (63).9 Such hysterogenic zones, Freud would later say, represented the "hysterogenic" position between a woman's raised and spread leg, and her retraction in the left side of her "Sissi" position, where she could see her only from behind. And exposure of the female genitalia to the medical man's gaze, necessitated by the speculum's entrance to the vagina through the vulva, had been accompanied by the patient's illumination. While for patients primarily because instrumentally assisted observation had sustained such gains in other specialized medical practices. Precisely because it marked what was "vaginal" (a topography of the paradox), the speculum focused questions about the intrusion of "the touch" with the physician's representation of otherwise unobservable and so enigmatic female body parts.

The speculum debate turned up, too, in the literature on female insanity. Hoping to capture a lucrative new market for his gynecological services, Horatio Sterner recommended that all women confined in American asylums be examined by speculum using armed gynaecologists. Robert Bradley Crater vowed that "indiscriminate employment" of the speculum dis- grated female "chastity and modesty" and physician profes- sionalism (67). Tenth, he said, to espe- cially "lasichirous" hysterics who, willing to present an image of sexual inac- ake and a little lescuremiere, to offer blushing affirmatives to leading questions, could trick the unsuspecting doctor into an "examination of the sexual organs"; to those patients, insanity, it was scarcely, Carter, said, the physician's proper office to minister. Worse yet, repeated examination reduced unmarried, middle-class women to the "mental and moral condition, to the degradation of the woman for the grace of the husband's house," Marshall Hall warned in The Lunatic, broke the "family circle" and betrayed the "domestic heart" (600). Fears about the fragility of middle-class economic arrangements, displaced and described as anxiety about female sexual morality, had made women's hysteroid hidden bodily spaces the focus of this medical debate that mapped not only the individual but the social body.

For this discreet medical man examined his middle-class patient at her home, or she visited his office-based private practice. In the teaching hospital, private tutoring situation, or asylum, however, the female body was exposed differently. As Charcot's iconographies showed, when the researcher mapped the working-class female body in the public, state-supported hospital reserved primarily for charity and incurable cases, he, in contrast to the gynaecologists, gravitated toward medical practice. Charcot preferred, he said, to examine all patients nude— if modesty permitted; he could thus observe their bodies unencumbered by the clothing secrecy when treating them immanently. Yet many opportunities for a variety of mistreatment occurred routinely at the Salpêtrière. Here's a small—or not so small—example. At the Tuesday lectures, Charcot tolerated unruly patients who had not previously consulted him and imposed his symptoms— tomometer, diagnoses, and treatments. He tested reflexes, mapped anatomic sections, determined the extent of paralysis; he also "incurably" and patients and family members (L'hystérie 96-98).

8[Lettres 1: 1-10] Also in Gallia 50-54, 49, with slightly different translation: "grand affair for human misery."

9[To the patient]: Clean your eyes and try to seize your purchases. The patient: I don't know where it is; it gets on my nerves. Charcot: She feels nothing; I might twist it, I might break it rather than be given any sensation. But as you see, these subjects don't object. The patient: Oh no! Charcot: She is very difficult to manage, but they're adaptable. [To the reader]: Thus, lack of muscular sense, complete loss of sensibility. Here is the circular line that separates the insensible from the sensitive part. (To the patient): So, move your fingers quickly. (The patient show signs of bad humor.) Charcot: So, don't throw me your bad character. The patient: Hey, someone pricks you and you're supposed to be pleased. (L'hystérie 105)

Although Charcot's operations were usually more gentle than for this young woman, this dialogue staged not only the touch of a medical body and the power to back up the body's internalization into institutionalizing observatory practices.

Like other contemporary researchers, Charcot invoked the "claims of science" to justify his clinic to the "medical public." In his 1882 inaugural address as occupant of the Chair of Clinical Diseases of the Nervous System, Charcot recalled his "revolutionary effort to rid hospitals of the notion of suffering" a "regularly organized teaching and research center for diseases of the nervous system" that could routinely produce "scientific evidence." By pressing hysterogenic sites on the body, the physician could provoke and "artificially reproduce" hysterogenic seizures. According to Paul Richer, ovarian compression regularly produced the grand attack for observation; researchers applied shocks or blows, pressure, kneading, and massage to the body so as to change its reflex actions; they touched, pricked, and pinched to test cutaneous and subcutaneous conditions; they electrically excited localized muscles to sketch arm and facial physiology (89-112, 535-75). To verify mysterious stigmata, Janet reported, staff members used particularly inventive procedures. Taking patients by surprise during the night and using percussion not to wake them, researchers would pinch or prick to map sensibility, and would base conclusions on somnamb- ulous groans or speech. Injecting morphine, applying electrothermia, and the ingestion of alcohol tested whether insensible patients could be rendered sensible (104-05, 168-69). Yet even Janet admitted, in his 1906 lectures to Harvard medical students, that the clinic's experimental results had been thoroughly managed in Charcot's research enterprises.

Scientists articulated as a research goal the demographic and ideological function of mapping the social body, of protecting the middle and upper classes from those identified as abnormal. By clearly serving to justify the use of impoverished and incarcerated patients as
The Birth of Culture from the Spirit of Cartography

David Faulkner

The following sentence might appear anywhere in Culture and Anarchy: "It may be taken as man’s rule of duty in the world to find out, as well as he can, and to do as well as he knows how." Surely here is the unison of Hellenic intelligence and Hebraic virtue that "culture" seeks! Actually, I’ve quoted E. B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture (1871) in the text of anthropologists who would want an answer of "culture" have coalesced so powerfully around 1870. My hypothesis is this: the explosive growth and transformation of the world economy was opening up a new set of ready-made and available (for the British) subject, which I will call "global space"; the concept of "culture" arose as a way of mapping this terra incognita. An emergent global dimension subverts and marks both Arnold and Tylor’s�ysical versions of "culture."

In order to evoke a dimly-perceived global conceptual space, I will glance briefly at the infrastructures of industrial capitalism being decisively established as a worldwide system, and then at three major consequences for "culture": 1) the erosion of free-trade liberalism; 2) incipient problems of imperial cultural policy; and 3) wilder unseen economic development. The triumph of the commodity economy had become "a genuine world economy and the globe was therefore transformed from a geographical expression into a commercial and economic reality" (47). The world market con- solidated rapidly after 1850— as Hobbesbarn puts it, "partly due to the railway, the steamer, and the telegraph ... geographical size of the capitalist economy could suddenly multiply at the expense of transcontinental increased" (72). In 1859 alone, the North American railway was completed, and the Suez Canal opened; the second half of the 1860s witnessed "a burst of international cable-laying which ... virtually girdled the entire globe with other telegraph lines. National and density of many states' intercommunications had grown dramatically, drawing practically the whole planet into Britain’s ambit."

We need only consider the small, local character of the early Victorian life-world in order to grasp the magnitude of changes impinging on the individual consciousness. Arnold wrote, "Is not the close and bounded intellectual horizon within which we have long lived and moved now lifting up?" (1) Now, then, is the moment for culture to be of service" (92, 93). Charles Wentworth Dilke’s popular book Greater Britain (1883) hints at an emerging global perspective generally— particularly the Anglocentric, physical examination, or physiological expressionism ever "see" it? While observing the middle-class female hysteric in his private consulting room, Freud did so, and thus Heald’s "dis- tance" as objects of medical observation. "... Heald’s perspective of the female body, the natural, analyzable entity emerging from the prac-

In 1819, Brikett proposed a new form of medicine, called "hystera," which was not only a disease of the female sex, but also a condition of the whole body. This new form of medicine was based on the idea that the womb was the center of the body, and that any disturbance in the womb could affect the whole body. Brikett’s proposed a new form of medical treatment that was based on the natural and healing properties of the womb. This new form of medicine was known as "hystera." It was a revolutionary approach to medicine, and it was quickly adopted by doctors and patients around the world.

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research subject in European hospitals (Canov 137-42). Freud understood that the clinic’s "false value." Since a researcher waited years to prove organic change in nervous diseases that were not immediately fatal (and there- fore did not quickly grow popular), it was not surprising for a surgeon in a hospital for incurables like the Salpêtrière was it possible to keep the patients under observation for such long periods of time (J 3: 14). John Hughlings Jackson’s phrase, "experi- ments made by animal "surgistes" in the scientific literature to endorse patients as living experimental subjects. "Mais c’est une maladie," Charcot stated at the 1881 International Medical Congress about David Perrier’s experi- mentally-induced hallucinations (Spaltung 392-93). Manipulating the resemblance between convulsive human and motor-impaired animal subjects, Charcot announced that dis- ease or disease could be reduced to clear-cut, card geographic anatomy precisely localized such lesions. Charcot claimed superiority for his "experiments made by nature," which took place "spontaneously" and "in the human subject"—an "inestimable advantage," in the scientist’s view. "Scientific research socially useful" (Lectures 2: 9). And although in his published lec- tures and lectures, Charcot demonstrated and mapped male and female convulsant bodies afflicted with a variety of nervous disorders, his clinic documented experimentation only on inmates women. As Donna Haraway argues, although the nature / culture / sex / gender research and discursive fields are not always identical, especially in nineteenth-century science in which the "female animal emerged as con- densed focus of medical and other practice," and "as the rub of social theory." Where the "organism is the historically specific form of the body as scientific object of knowledge," the female became the "focus of "productive" research dis- courses and practices (287-90). In the nineteenth-century national or state-sponsored asylum, the female experimental subject had become more "valuable" to the project of knowl- edge production and social mapping than were Perrier’s monkeys.

Yet when Freud presented a male hysteric’s body to the Society of Physicians, he attempted to demonstrate—as had Birkett Brikett in 1839, as had Charcot after him—that hystera was not only a female disease (see Brikett v-vii). While mapping the hysteric’s body, Freud had introduced not only the question of limits lost to consciousness, but, in an encyclopedia essay on hysteria, had proposed "psychical dis- tances" as objects of medical observation. And though he had argued, "a problem of greater than others have been interested in the ongoing creative dialogue. As the Empire became increasingly "active," and the global economy, it could be said, that the birth of a global economy was a natural phenomenon. This is what Derrida would call a "non-governable" economy. The concept of "culture" emerged as a way of mapping this "terra incognita." An emergent global dimension subverts and marks both Arnold and Tylor’s "physical" versions of "culture.

In order to evoke a dimly-perceived global conceptual space, I will glance briefly at the infrastructures of industrial capitalism being decisively established as a worldwide system, and then at three major consequences for "culture": 1) the erosion of free-trade liberalism; 2) incipient problems of imperial cultural policy; and 3) wilder unseen economic development. The triumph of the commodity economy had become "a genuine world economy and the globe was therefore transformed from a geographical expression into a commercial and economic reality" (47). The world market con- solidated rapidly after 1850— as Hobbesbarn puts it, "partly due to the railway, the steamer, and the telegraph ... geographical size of the capitalist economy could suddenly multiply at the expense of transcontinental increased" (72). In 1859 alone, the North American railway was completed, and the Suez Canal opened; the second half of the 1860s witnessed "a burst of international cable-laying which ... virtually girdled the entire globe with other telegraph lines. National and density of many states’ intercommunications had grown dramatically, drawing practically the whole planet into Britain’s ambit.

We need only consider the small, local character of the early Victorian life-world in order to grasp the magnitude of changes impinging on the individual consciousness. Arnold wrote, "Is not the close and bounded intellectual horizon within which we have long lived and moved now lifting up?" (1) Now, then, is the moment for culture to be of service" (92, 93). Charles Wentworth Dilke’s popular book Greater Britain (1883) hints at an emerging global perspective generally— particularly the Anglocentric, physical examination, or physiological expressionism ever "see" it? While observing the middle-class female hysteric in his private consulting room, Freud did so, and thus Heald’s "dis- tance" as objects of medical observation. "... Heald’s perspective of the female body, the natural, analyzable entity emerging from the prac-
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which the gentlemen ethnographic observer deploys cultural data at a glance, a separation that follows the fact that the following facts are arranged neatly in order of culture:—Australian, Tahitian, Aztec, Chinese, Italian” (1: 27). Similarly, Arnold can tell us that a Philistine possesses more light simply by looking at him (97-98). But the colonial history of man could also render obsolete the assumption that the next fact is illustrated neatly in order of culture. In the year 1600, he wrote, “I have acquired...intimate communion with the native mind...” (1:2). And to this day, he has been brought face to face with the very question which he [ones] put” (p. 26, in Haight 389), Colenso’s scandalous religious controversy derived from a Darwinian cultural relativism. Arnold loved to satirize Colenso, yet even then, his corrective defamiliarizing of received values is the supreme function of “cultural” itself. The “believer in culture,” he says, must dissolve Liberal complacency, and “get the present believers in action...” to make a return upon their ideas and scrutinize their stock notions and habits much more” (226). And Tylor salutes the moral meeting. “A true grasp of the correspondence of c...cultural and savage cultures, which imply that there is “scarcely a head’s breadth’s difference between an Englishman and a negro of Central Africa” (1: 7). The putatively self-evident hierarchy of “culture,” as well as its pluralistic relativity, must once more be attained to the disarming cultural confrontation along a global front. The true social process of a global system is uneven development. The gaps in wealth and power were increasing vitally—between industrialized and peripheral colonials, but also, crucially, between “advanced” and “backward” areas of Europe itself. Those groups left behind were moved to autonomy in the face of Britain’s and others’ dominance. Such struggles were often justified by a new idea of national culture (Wolf 387), or, at least, an older idea which breathed new life in global space: the claim that a nation-state should be the politico-geographical expression of an inward spirit—and further, that distinct, language-based “national cultures” inherited in certain peoples, and were internally constituted, bound, homogeneous and totality—in short, the claim that cultural aggregates were so many billiard balls colliding in the political arena.

Tylor, for example, gestures toward that remarkable tacit consensus or agreement which so far enables whole populations to unite in the use of the same language, to follow religious and customary law, to settle down to the same general level of art and knowledge. . . . There is found to be such regularity in the composition of necessities of men, that we can drop individual differences out of sight. (1: 10-11)

Tylor shows the relative novelty of this idea by recognizing that such a thing as internal homogeneity is “remarkable fact, which we notice so little because we have lived all our lives in the midst of it” (1: 12). Arnold laments the fact that Englishmen “have not the notion of the State, the nation in its collective and corporate charactere” (117). He boasts his arguments for “culture”—which he calls “an inward operation” (234) radiating to be at the foundation of man’s ideas. In an appeal to the “best self” that transcends individuals differences of class or education (134-35). This “best self” postulates some essential unitary Englishness as the invisible yet unassailable foundation of Social authority (220). How Arnold diverges toward Tylor’s famously ambiguous definition of “Culture or Civilization” as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (11). These proto-anthropological culture-concepts arguably participate in the recalibration of a new global order. The appearance of uneven development underwrites the epistemology of Tylor’s “comparative method.” Only when palpable material differences stratify societies is it possible to draw any comparative conclusion; only when those societies are religiously in direct contact and not merely imaginatively apposition, it is possible to posit them as liminal stages in a single evolutionary pattern. Tylor declared that “in such comparisons, a little respect must be had... for date in history or place on the map; the ancient Swiss lake-dweller may be set beside the medieval Aztec, and the Ojibwa of North America beside the Zulu of South Africa. (1: 6)

His method implies a totalized global context for “Culture,” a spatialized sense of juxtaposed practices, and virtually unlimited access to the data. This method actually produces new knowledge based on new assumptions and standards of proof which require him to posit a “hypothetical primitive condition” (1: 21) roughly corresponding to contemporary primitive cultures. This assumption reflects what George Stocking has described as the changing status of “contemporary savagery” (77, 111, 172, 183): if previous ethology had been a science of “rudiments,” studying the marginal or leftover aspects of human diversity (102, 312), then Tylor’s “relation of ‘civilized’” brings contemporary savagery back into a totalizing global system which, by definition, leaves nothing out. Tylor also inscribes an alternative epistemology when he makes the tendency of his global comparative framework to self-correct against unreliable ethno-ographic observation: two otherwise questionable cultural facts glimpsed at the antipodes “accidentally supply proof of their own authenticity” (1: 9)! For the comparative method, then, evidence is, in a sense, self-evident. An analogy may help to sharpen a sense of the cartographic imperative posed by global space. In 1833 John Robert Seeley argued that the linear, ontogenetic, Parliament-based narrative of domestic history had adequately described an emerging global history. He advocated a kind of structuralist historiography that traced events not chronologically but “by internal affinity of causation” (95), a history that saw causality as radiating through the peripheries of Europe as it moved outward from the center. Seeley urged his students, faced with England’s dizzying expansion, to “break the fetters of narrative”—essentially, to think globally and act locally.

If the States seem to you so large, the Ocean so boundless, and the settlements so scattered that you cannot bring them into view, make an effort, bring them into the same map and draw the map on a small scale. (99)

When in doubt, make a map. Similarly, Tylor wrote of “the bewildering complexity of the problems which come before the general historian”:

If the field of inquiry be narrowed from History as a whole to that branch of it which is here called Culture...the task of investigation proves to lie within far more modest compass...the evidence is no longer so wildly heterogeneous, but may be more simply classified and compared...stage by stage, in a probable order of evolution. (1: 5-6)

Tylor glimpsed the mutual necessity of global and local outlook. In anthropological exercise, for instance, “interpretations made to suit a narrow view reveal their weakness when exposed to a wide one” (1: 281-82); in etymological analysis, the global comparative perspective actually corrects unreliable speculation and produces local knowledge: “By simply enlarging the survey of language, the imagination is brought within narrower limits” (1: 162). Amid the overwhelming flood of information about other societies, the anthropologist-writes “culture” to subdivide the sublimity of globality. Indeed, in 1869 the Ethnological Society of London commissioned a series of actual maps detailing the conjunctural distribution of cultural stages across the world (Stocking 106).

Let us hastily conclude with a glance at our own tumultuous civilization and its distant mid-Victorian mirror. Daily, we hear of the stressful new global environment for our economy, politics and culture. Whole countries dissolve and recombine before our eyes, and one pitieth, in fancy, the crisis-management task force at Rand-McNally. “Culture” is a fighting word as never before, even as it shifts under our postmodern, multinational feet. We sometimes seem faced with the equally unstable alternatives of militant cultural-nationalist separatism on the one hand, and the shining unipolitan of a capitalist New World Order without difference on the other: either Yugoslavia writ large, or the United Colors of Levisanim. In a potboiler comes, William Empson forswear a world in which “The gigas - / tic anthropological circus / Houlds open all its booths.” This world “can then all be taught / And recounved to be kind and clean.” Here, in the center ring of the anthropological circus, perhaps we should, with Empson, feel fortunate that “A more heartening fact about the cultures of man / Is their appalling stubbornness” (83).

Works Cited


Princeton University

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“What Cannot Be”, John Addington Symonds’s Memoirs and Official Mapping of Victorian Homosexuality*

Joseph Cady

The volume of Memoirs that John Addington Symonds drafted between 1889 and his death in 1893 and that remained unpublished until 1894 is unique for the period, but has received so significant attention in the discussions of nineteenth-century homosexuality that has been most influential with literary academics to date. In my discussion here I want to recommend the book as a central and indispensable text for the study of Victorian homosexuality. As reflected in the titles of Symonds’s poems "What Cannot Be" (1861) and "L’Amour de l’impossible" (1882)...

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in Lord Alfred Douglas’s famous 1894 description of his boyhood love for his “boyfriend” (that is, his lover), “The real Victorian culture officially held that homosexuality “could not be” in the phenominal sense—that is, that homosexuality literally “did not exist” in human experience and “was not to be considered.” This is the result of the cultural and political pressures to repress my own sex” (281), but only as self-clarification and self-

confirmed. The book also explores the “invention of homosexuality” in the late nineteenth century to clarify to what extent and in what ways it was possible to imagine a subject term of the same-sex attraction that could be considered homosexual. The purpose of the book is to examine the “invention of homosexuality” and its impact on society, culture, and individuals.

The book is divided into three parts: “The Invention of Homosexuality,” “The Politics of Sexual Identity,” and “The Cultural Production of Homosexuality.” Each part is further divided into chapters that delve into specific aspects of the history of homosexuality, such as the medicalization of homosexuality, the role of the state in regulating homosexuality, and the ways in which popular culture has been influenced by and has in turn influenced the construction of homosexuality.

In the first part, “The Invention of Homosexuality,” the author examines the ways in which homosexuality was constructed as a category in the late nineteenth century. The author argues that the invention of homosexuality was a response to the needs of a bourgeoning medical and scientific community, which sought to define and classify a range of sexual behaviors and orientations. The author also explores the ways in which the invention of homosexuality was shaped by the political and social contexts of the time, including the rise of nationalism and imperialism.

In the second part, “The Politics of Sexual Identity,” the author examines the ways in which the category of homosexuality was used by political and social actors to advance their own agendas. The author argues that the invention of homosexuality was a tool used by political and social actors to control and manipulate the behavior of individuals and to justify their own power and privilege.

In the final part, “The Cultural Production of Homosexuality,” the author examines the ways in which the category of homosexuality was produced and consumed in popular culture. The author argues that the invention of homosexuality was a response to the needs of a bourgeoning media and entertainment industry, which sought to produce and distribute representations of sexuality that would appeal to a wide range of audiences.

The book is a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of the history of homosexuality, and it is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of sexuality, gender, and culture.
accurately used to describe his same-sex feelings does Symonds use the new scientific vocabulary, a fact that amounts to a private rejection of it, for, as we know, he did become familiar with that language while writing the Memoirs and had revised every chapter in it. In this sense, it had the determining force of new-inventionism implied it for the period's homosexual. Instead, Symonds characteristically has two other ways of describing what we might call a homosexual orientation. One is the older, affective, categorial language that, contrary to new-inventionism, did exist for the subject. His favorite term of this kind is "masculine love," which I have argued elsewhere, is a derivative of, and prominent Renaissance language for male-male attraction and survived in fluctuating use until the early twentieth century (Cadby). For example, elaborating on the effect his first reading of Plato had on him, Symonds says, "For the first time I saw the possibility of resolving in a practical harmony the discord of my instance. I perceived that masculine love had its virtue as well as its vice, and stood in this respect upon the same ground as normal sexual appetites." (99). Symonds's other characteristic language for homosexuality in the Memoirs is simply plain descriptive terminology, as several of his comments I have already quoted indicate. Here he employs a variety of extended phrases that amount to direct facto denotations of the subject, referring, for example, to his "natural inclination for the male sex" (166), to "the sexual relation between man and man" (227), "to passion between males" (100), and to "the love for man for man" (189).

Though the late nineteenth-century's "medicalization of homosexuality" may be significant in the history of sexuality in several other respects, Symonds Memoirs suggests that it had no essential relation to homosexuality's sense of their own difference in the period and to their language for their experience. One can only guess what the alternation of that same Symonds, implies simply from the texture of individual homosexual experience, especially under heterosexual cultural domination—that is, Symonds's self-torture, suggests that homosexuals attracted to their own sex will automatically feel "different" and will need a special language for only permissible and public model for sexuality is heterosexual, and Symonds's direct, de facto, denotation of homosexuality indicated that, what they wanted to or were free to homosexuality could build a meaningful language for homosexuality out of their available everyday vocabulary alone, independent of their dominant culture's official language for it. Because of its inherent point about how homosexuality should ideally be studied, it is this general implication of the Memoirs, rather than any of its more specific items of content, that in my view ultimately makes the book an indispensable source for the subject. (For example, in recommending the Memoirs here, I do not necessarily mean to endorse Symonds's particular innatantion conception of homosexuality. To my mind, all considerations of homosexuality's origins ought to be retired, and one of new-inventionism's most troubling ironies is the way its preoccupation with homosexuality's "invention" has helped to revivify and legitimise questions that the late Victorian period had implicitly been homophbic and that in the early days of gay liberation we thought had been put to rest.)

All formulations about homosexuality, Symonds's Memoirs imply, should ideally be based on concrete testimony from within homosexual experience. Another ironic coincidence between the official Victorian and new-inventionist logics is that the discourse of, and practice of approaching homosexuality abstractly, externalistically, and deductively—that is, both from surprisingly "higher" and more authentic bases outside homosexuality, from which we work down to assert that "it is what it is" or what its possibilities are. Official Victorian culture's base is its complex of assumptions about nature, erotic relationships, and gender roles, among other factors. In new-inventionism this externality is seen rather in the kinds of sources it typically relies on. For instance, commentators like Foucault and Jeffrey Weeks invoke law codes or medical texts, while others like Eve K. Sondag argue from psychoanalytic theory or, in bet Between Men, chiefly from heterosexual rather than homosexual literature. Richard Delamare's recent Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian Aestheticism is validating in actually focusing on material from Victorian writers whom we would now call homosexual, though even here Symonds receives only minor attention. Hence, it is not clear from Symonds's Memoirs how we should study homosexuality in situations where there seems to be no available homosexual speech itself. However, as a private homosexual document from a period when homosexuality was supposedly non-existent, the text is a differentiating language for homosexuality when there supposedly was none, the Memoirs does, at a minimum, caution us against presuming that there was no homosexual experience or homosexual practices in the era of official heterosexual monotheism. Such a view of the subject say so. Furthermore, only by attending to the kind of individual homosexual testimony the Memoirs gives us may we begin to identify those unverbalized qualities in homosexuality that seem to provoke dominant cultures to try to erase it from their official experiential maps.

Worse Cited


9Interestingly, Symonds uses the new vocabulary of "homosexuality" in A Problem in Modern Ethics and Sexual Inversion, though mixed with a skepticism about its validity as a category of thought, as well as a growing awareness of the limitations of the new medical language was a cultural concession they had to make when writing about homosexuality publicly.

For Foucault and Weeks, same n. 3. In her more recent Epistemology of the

Client, Sondag writes a discreet and highly selective sample of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century male homosexual writers. But she presents them as a group, as a category, and is concerned with the introduction of a form of "gender" and "cultural identity" (it sets up one queer of the century, apparently on the assumption that homosexuality can only be conceptualised via a prior heterosexualism. Homosexual writing, Sondag seems to say, cannot substantially speak for itself, nor can it be understood primarily through the interests, concerns, and historical knowledge of gay narratives.

In the context of the present essay the section on "Echoes of a Dead Das"osis" is Light in August (1939). But see especially新人的(1971).

The Ring and the Book and Light in August: Faulkner’s Response to Browning

Martin Bidney

Ever since Cleetham Brooks drew up his remarkable table of Faulkner’s allusions to English poets (mostly nineteenth-century (Brooks 345-54), critics have been aware of the novel’s deep indebtedness to poetic tradition. Recent scholarship, by showing the wide range of influences on Faulkner’s own early books of verse, and by demonstrating, in turn, the long-range pervasiveness that has since Faulkner’s poetic apprenticeship on his novelistic art (Sensibler pascal) encourages us to explore Faulkner’s appropriation of the poetic heritage more fully than has been done before. In his brilliant new biography of Faulkner, Frederick R. Karl suggests in passing that in As I Lay Dying, a novel written as a series of dramatic monologues, "The multiplicity of voices—and here the literary influence seems Browning, especially the techniques of The Ring and the Book—established Faulkner’s sense of the world as relativistic, fluid, and lacking in center" (395). This sense of the elusive complexities of human motivation, I would suggest, becomes even stronger in Light in August, and it is there that we should look for a still more pervasive Faulknerian appropriation of what Robert Browning had taught, both as literary artist and as moral thinker. In Light in August Faulkner uses a variety of specific images and image-clusters which may also be found in The Ring and the Book, and he uses them for the same ambiguous purpose that animated Browning’s masterpiece. Like Browning, Faulkner seeks to show how the exercise of voluntary power makes possible a penetrating moral psychology of crime and punishment. Light in August is Faulkner’s most comprehensive attempt to reassert and refashion, in his own terms, the poetic legacy of the nineteenth century. Faulkner’s rewritings of Keats in this novel have often been remarked (Pearson, Pascale). His reimaginings of lyrical moments from Blake, Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley are equally impressive (Drey- ney, "Faulkner’s Variations"); and his bold adaptations of Tennysonian visions, both lyric and epic, clarify our understanding of the novel’s major characters (D’Aussunay, Bidney, "Victorian Vision"). Though the question of a Browning-Faulkner linkage in this novel has not yet been broached in the critical literature, we know that Faulkner’s brother "greatly admired" Browning, that his friend Stephen Vincent Benét enthusiastically imitated Browning’s art, and that in December 1969 during an illness Faulkner asked his friend Linton Mauzy for some Browning to read (Bisonton, one vol ed. 16, 58; two vol ed. 1: 205; 2: 186). Indeed, Faulkner’s strong attraction to the Romantics and to Tennyson makes it likely that Browning, the most novelistic of nineteenth-century psychological explorers in verse, would have had special appeal for him. In particular The Ring and the Book, like Light in August, deals with the complex interrelation of the motives for violence, the problematic nature of moral judgment, and the need for a compassionate attempt to probe

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accurately used to describe his same-sex feelings. Symonds uses the new scientific vocabulary, a further amount to a private rejection of it, for, as we become familiar with his prose style, we realize that his use of the the determining force new-invasiveness period's homoeroticism.4 Instead, Symonds' use of words like "homosexual orientation" or "sexual orientation" may have been an attempt to challenge the binary categories of sexuality commonly accepted at the time.###

It is appropriate that Faulkner should borrow so many details from The Ring and the Book, for—as we shall see repeatedly in tracing the working of Browning's motives—he shares Browning's vision of our complex moral nature, and he shares his willingness to employ grotesquely vivid metaphors to dramatize that complexity. Grotesque imagery, in Faulkner as in Browning, heightens the pathos of moral drama even while it clarifies them: this painful vividness allows us even to suffer along with the accused. And a metaphors of combined and conflicting opposites—as with Browning's enigmatic brilliant rocket soaring into the unknown, or his galactic sphere with its dazzling, dating alterations—is the most useful literary tool Faulkner could have chosen to convey his Browningesque intimations of our mental wars within, both as victims and as would-be understanders of our own elusive, riddling natures.

The rocketlike death-moments of Browning's and Faulkner's executed offenders produce different impressions on the respective crowds of accusers: Guido's glare of defiant desperation, ghastly now white ("ghastly, yellow white"). Contras with Joe's look of strangely triumphant peace, experienced as if after a rush of released breath. Browning's rocket symbol relates to the limits of our moral and metaphysical understanding, though Browning's Guide—hardly a lifelong victor like Faulkner's Joe—is altogether of a lesser moral stature than Joe. After Guido concludes his second monologue with the despairing words, "Pomplina, will you let me die?" (XII: 242f?) Browning begins his poem's final section, "The Book and the Ring," with the metaphor that apparently left a strong impress on Faulkner's imagination:

Here were the end, had anything an end:
Thus, lit and lowered, up and upward soared
A rocket, tell the key of the world.
And when the heavens held, a breathless silence space,
In brilliant unanswerable: thus caught speed,
Rushed to the height, and hung at full of fame
Over man's small pitted earth, and set the seas on fire.
Our guiding Guido: now decline must be.
In its explosion, you have seen his act,
By your proven—he may, be judged it you own,
Or composite as good as a proved, or drowned.
With worse ingredients then the Worwood Stud.
(12.2-12)

Far from wanting to make it easy for us to determine whether Guido is or will be finally "saved," Browning underlines instead the open-endedness of Guido's final moments: "brilliant unanswerable," accompanied by a prose exultancy with the idea of unanswerable, has the effect of an oxymoron. Browning strategically leaves it open whether his poetic power, combined with the reader's perspectival acuity, will create the portrait of a composite (spiritually mixed) character or as irreducibly wicked as the star "Wormwood" of Revelation 8:10—suggesting "chaosy" and "glaring" cosmic belligerence.4 Yet the image of unimpeded access to the campstone of heaven's vault—even though followed by "inward tending in a way that cannot be dismissed. The effect is that of an uninvited rock.

Producing a similarly Browningesque atmosphere of inexplicability, the rock image that emblemizes the death of Joe—"the Christmas embodiement, in its act toward the illimitable and inaccessible, the enigmatic nature of the transcendent Joe achieves. It also sums up the tragic progress of Joe's life. After Percy Grimm castrates Joe and tells him, "Now you'll let white women alone, even in hell," the dying victim

just lay there, with his eyes open and empty of everything save consciousness, and with something, a shadow, about his mouth. For a long moment he looked up at them with peaceful and unfathomable and unobtrusive eyes. Then his face, body, all, fell in upon his cheeks and from out the slashed garments about his hips and legs and the pent black blood seemed to rush like a released breath.

He seemed to rush out of his pale body like the rush of sparks from a rising rocket, upon that black blast the man seemed to rise roaring into their memories forever and over.

As Browning's rocket "roared and soared," so Faulkner's rocket seemed to "rise soaring:" (513)

The serenity of the look, relating to the peaceful valley and placid streams, recalls the "green pastures" and "still waters" of Psalm 23: 3. But the faces of the children, "mirroring those of their sadly remembering elders, must be clouded by the elders' awareness, too, of the "valley of the shadow of death" (Psalm 23: 4), for there was a "shadow" about Joe's mouth as he died (513). The rocket-like upward soaring of Joe's spirit into the memories of the townpeople produces a composite effect. Joe's eyes seem "peaceful and unfathomable and unobtrusive." (513). The image suggests a knowledge beyond human perception, something that "passeth understanding" yet is attained through a suffering which is also beyond what we can conceive, or bear to conceive. In different degrees and in different ways, the deaths of Joe and Guido seem to combine tragedy and transcendent.

Browning further sets the precedent for viewing the symbolic image of the rocket as a theme of change.

For Browning, the theme has no evident reference to racial stereotyping such as Joe has been forced to internalize; instead, it is primarily to our moral and metaphorical incarcerations. Whatever mitigation of Guido's own personal dooms may be promised by his last moments, the eventual destiny, like the ultimate inner nature, of his troubled spirit is to obscure that the final apparition threatens to disappear into darkness as soon as seen. The moment's meaning will become worse diffused.

to the Over and ended, falls and fades. What was once great changes what is now described, and then talked of, about, a sign is dark. In every fresh transmission; till it eludes, tricks in silent orange or wax gray. A shadowy, white and lined by dark, and presently we find the states again.

Follow the main streams, meditate the mode. Of brightness, how it hastens to blend with black! (12.13-21, emphasis added)

As we watch the fading fall of a bright spark of lights into increasing darkness and invisibility as it "hastens to blend with black," we see, too, that our knowledge of Guido's (or our own?) nature quickly proves elusive if not illusory, stunning.
It is appropriate that Faulkner should borrow so many details from *The Ring and the Book*, for—as we shall see repeatedly in tracing the workings of Browning’s motifs—he shares Browning’s vision of our complex moral nature. Faulkner’s protagonists are caught in the web of grotesquely vivid metaphors to dramatize that complexity. Grotesque imagery, in Faulkner as in Browning, heightens the painfulness of moral drama even while it clarifies it: this painful truth makes us suffer along with the accused. And a metaphors of combined and conflicting opposites—as with Browning’s enigmatic brilliant rocket soaring into the unknown, or his galvanic sphere with its dazzling, dazzling alternations—is the most useful literary tool Faulkner could have chosen to convey his Browningesque intimations of our moral worlds within, both as victims and as wounds in the hands of human nature and God.

The rocketlike death-moments of Browning’s and Faulkner’s executed offenders produce different impressions on the respective crowds of spectators: Glaud’s glare of defiant vindictive allusion, even in impious laughter, to the split-second alternations of the conflicting “black” and “white” self-concepts within Joe’s mind—bewildering alternations that have plagued his life and that accelerate as he nears his death—are depicted in words that poetically recall Browning’s metaphor of a galvanic sphere that shifts at a finger’s touch from black to white and vice versa, an emblem of the monstrous human soul. Motivates us into a novel impossibility of definitive moral judgments. Indeed, Browning’s metaphor of “white” and “black” to symbolize respectively the known and the unknown shows a profound similarity to the “white folk” metaphors, in turn elaborates and clarifies as he shows us how fear of what is unknown becomes tragically transformed into hate.

With the suffering of Browning’s Glaud and transfers them, still more moving (so for we feel for Joe more than we do for Glaud), to Joe Christmas. Glaud’s scrupulous vision of worms, tears, and sweat offers three different moments of his moral personality: his moral compulsion, his passionate lighting and weaponry that accompany the anger of Browning’s outraged Pomplia. Moreover, Rev. Hightower, whose compassionate understanding shows genuine penetration of Joe’s moral and tragic complexity, stands as a touchstone of ethical, struggling forces that reminds us dramatically of a comparable vision of celestial conflict that appears to Browning’s Pope. Indeed, the metaphor “light” that Faulkner has to offer coexists constantly in visionary rings.

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2The Browning edition in Wicks’s Childe has been chosen because it was standard for the period when Faulkner was writing *The Rock and the Book*. It reproduces the modernized Browning made in 1879 and 1882. The original 1880-69 text, reissued in Richard D. Allen, ed., Robert Browning in the New World: London and N.Y., Yale U. Press, 1982, is now more commonly used.

3Langhorne offers a subtly argued, well-balanced presentation of the poem and notes his edition of a 1972 essay vividly reviews the literature on the controversial question.

4It was not, however, quite as well received as another of his novels, *The Invented Life*. The New York Times of October 18, 1965, in its review, called it "the most ambitious and most considered of his novels, a magnificent achievement of the imagination and the mind, a book that stands among the greatest masterpieces of the 20th century."
Browning mentions how “What once was seen ... melts across our memory” (11: 2013-2014) in the act of the memory of blackness and white, the last of which results in a black and white image. (11: 2013-2014)

This is a vivid description of the way in which blackness and white are perceived and experienced. The act of the memory of blackness and white is a process of recalling and retaining visual images, and it is through this process that the artist is able to create a sense of depth and perspective in the painting. (11: 2013-2014)

The painting itself is a work of art that is intended to evoke a sense of mystery and intrigue. The use of black and white colors is a common technique in the art world, and it is often used to create a dramatic and thought-provoking effect. (11: 2013-2014)

The painting is also a reflection of the artist's own experiences and emotions, and it is through this that the artist is able to connect with the viewer and engage them in a deep and meaningful conversation. (11: 2013-2014)

In conclusion, the painting is a beautiful and evocative work of art that is sure to leave a lasting impression on those who view it. (11: 2013-2014)
quickly flaring Guido-rocket fade and their traces “haste to blend” and “black and black” meld confidence to the realm of the unknown or unseen. Certainly Joe Christmas, the “abhorred one,” was made a “martyr all the time” because of incoherence and unrequited condemnation. Joe’s blackness is an unknown, something not understood and therefore feared.

In a fashion similar to his twofold treatment of the words “black” and “white,” Browning uses “shame” and “shame” to mean different good versus bad (or again more profoundly, with an insight that evidently impressed Faulkner) the known versus the unknown. Here we see “shame” and “shame” meaning respectively bad and good.

Well, the result was something of a shade on the parties thus accused—how otherwise! Shade, but with a sense. Each had a profound defense. . . . (3: 1340-43)

But in the following passage, “shame” and “shame” mean known and unknown.

So do the faces abroad and superabound: And nothing more hides them as we lift the case
Out of the shade into the light, allow
Qualified persons to pronounce at last. . . . (4: 5-8)

Shine and shade, white and black, indicate differences, but not necessarily moral opposites. What appears good may be simply unfamiliar. What seems bad may be familiar.

That is precisely the point that Faulkner (more clearly and consistently, I think, than Browning) makes throughout the novel: blackness, for most of the book’s people, stands for something unknown; people fear what they do not know; and fear turns easily to hate in pre-emptive gestures of defense. Joe Christmas, internalizing the habits of his repressive and masculine society, uses blackness to refer to all those aspects of his being which he knows not, has no place in, are for- cibly suppressed by, his conscious mind: “the lightless hot wet primogeotive Female” element (126)—passion, intuition, sexuality, feeling itself. “The abhorred one was a martyr all the time,” as Browning says; Joe punishes that part of himself which he cannot and will not allow himself to know. By associating the unknown quite explicitly, in Freudian fashion, with the unspoken, Faulkner creates in black and white a stark contrast. Faulkner clarifies the psychological mechanisms whereby the hidden and the feared can become the repressed and the abhorred; that the unknown becomes regarded as the simply bad. It seems highly likely that Faulkner’s psychological deepening of the implications of “white” and “black” in the historical context of Light in August owes much to the similarities and contrasts exploited by these and related terms in The Ring and the Book—primarily in the rocket and galactic sphere passages, but also quite significantly in the other Browning passages we have cited.

Physical and psychological literarizations (of the sort Faulkner practices when he takes Guido’s fantasy of a “pest” “instinct” allowed to “surge” into a “visible flow” and literalizes the image into a visible surging flow of post-put blood when Joe is castrated)—these are two metamorphic processes. Faulkner takes these literary tricks back to the realm of the unknown or unseen. Certainly Joe Christmas, the “abhorred one,” was made a “martyr all the time” because of incoherence and unrequited condemnation. Joe’s blackness is an unknown, something not understood and therefore feared.

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Shine and shade, white and black, indicate differences, but not necessarily moral opposites. What appears good may be simply unfamiliar. What seems bad may be familiar.
Power in the air for evil as for good, Promptenings from heaven and hell, as if the stars Fought in their courses for a face to be. (10. 662-64)

The scars in conflict within the Pope's vision reappear as the struggling celestial intelligences or conflicting ethereal forms in Hightower's analogous experience as he sees, in amazement, the spirits of the murderer Percy Grimm and the martyr Joe Christmas "Power in the air for evil as for good" in Browning's phrase) trying in vain to discharge themselves from each other. Within his vision of "asphothe", within a bright, imperial "halo" of his own, he sees the redemptive power of humanity, Hightower discerns the conflict of "two faces which seem to strive...in turn to free themselves one from the others, then fade and blend again" (542-43), the faces of Christmas and Grimm, who have the selfsame veritable and peculiar qualities for good and evil. In this vision, Christmas and Grimmm are in the greatest possible moral tension—the two charged with—yet the two figures are at the same time so mutually inseparable in their fight that Hightower's ethereal vision issues forth in the permanent human dilemma of being torn between contrary moral actions, impulses, or powers. Furthermore, the image of the Pope's vision of "Power in the air for evil as for good" in the passage where Mrs. Hines tells how her husband picked up Lena's new baby that Hightower had delivered: "he picked it up and held it up, higher than the lamp, like he was waiting to see if the devil or the Lord would win" (418). The Pope's vision of "Power in the air for evil as for good" hovers over Faulkner's book in an uneasy way. It must also be noted that the halo of light where Christmas and Grimmm engage in their ethereal strife is nothing less than the book's emblematic "lambent suspension of August" (542) or light in August. Like Browning, Faulkner's Hightower has become his author's supreme visionary spokesman. A halo of light is a golden ring. And this brings us, finally, to the topic of rings of light, of rings and books. Hightower's epiphany, in which he sees a halo of transfigured faces in light, is a vision of the total community, of all the steersman, which he does not understand. It is the "brownp'ping" (542) with which Hightower has known and, in former years, preached. Hightower's halo-visions or ring-visions is a comprehensive portrayal of society. Browning's unique book, The Ring and the Book, is also a ring of gold or of ringed or framed words. The authorial disquisitions on rings in the opening and closing sections, the book as a whole constitutes a unified, rounded portrait, most merily many-faceted community or social circle. But the symbolic ring of Books I and XII in Browning's poem stands somewhat outside the main narrative. A symbol of the unifying feature of reality and imagination, it is discussed by the characters; its golden personna and I amentionizes the activity of that personna as the poet's. The poet as Hesperus stands back from the poem's action and invites us to view that action as a word-foreglod ring, a divine antelice wedding reality and imagining, fact and fiction, life and death.

By contrast, Light in August presents no emblematic ring outside the book's action: rather, the novel as a whole is filled with symbolic rings, many of which are also rings of light, as Browning's metaphoric ring is golden. Light in August might equally well be titled The Book of Rings. As in Browning's poem, there is a surrounding frame: the chapters on Lena Grove which begin and end the novel encircled or sur- round the main action as do the ring-moons of Browning's personna; and Lena's journey is ringlike, resembling a movement "across an urn" (L.A. 7). Rings also reappear throughout Faulkner's novel. When Joe grumously realizes that, as he puts it, "I have never broken out of the ring of which I have already done and cannot ever undo" (735-74), the ring image is not presented as golden or as metaphorically illuminated. But more often and more typically, Faulkner does indeed offer us rings of light. At one point Joe pauses to observe how "the slow constellation wheels" (116). On another occasion Joe sees a "garland of Augustan lightness" around the black pit of Freedman Town (126). Later, Joe observes his paramour embared or surrounded by "peaceful firelight" as a "portrait in a frame" (255). Also, Rev. Hightower, tormented by his conscience and the day's heat, surprisingly sees the bright heat-waves rising as a halo or "vinnamon" (541). In the course of their search for the helpless Joe, we see the sheriff's men "ringed about with quiet, inter- ested faces in the early sunlight" (360). Joe's manchaded hands full of glare and light like lightning bolts (511) present still more rings of light. The glowing August halo filled with maladroit, exalted "faces" in the"guignard affluence," and that is an end to that. We are not saints, but we have kept our appointment" (51). To wit, given the options of embracing a willful death or waiting and talking in hopes of receiving meaning from outside of ourselves, humans may choose to wait, and to keep themselves busy. Eurargon notes: "We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the impression we exist?"

"Yes, yes," Vladimir agrees, "we're magicians" (44). Becktell's. portrait of human perseverance at the crossroads of aspiration and material limitations was not a model easy for audiences to swallow. Early patrons walked out. They refused to accept Becktell's vision as severed or as a picture of their lives. Thus, the reputation of Godot for breaking intellectual ground in the arts. For a critical or historical perspective, see Gassman and Garrow. Yet, a century before Becktell's work debuted, Arthur Hugh Clough labored over a series of poems collected as the "Seven Sonnets" of 1851, which directly anticipate in tone Becktell's modernist point of view. In fact, while the poems were left in manuscript form, the group desire careful attention from readers of Victorian verse. They offer solid documentation of Clough's insightful movement toward positions we now regard as norms for art of the genre, to grow or down. Indeed, they document Clough's importance as a thinker.

What, ask the sonnets, is the basis for human understanding of existence, given the limitations of logic, imagination, spiritual insight? Moreover, the group question, are we not—even as Becktell will demonstrate in Godot—caught somewhere between "dauphin" and "hope"? Are we not driven to the deliberate, though absurd, ritual of questioning the very imponderables of our situation, simply as a means of living.

Waiting for Thol: Rescuing Clough's "Seven Sonnets"

Robert Johnson

"To have lived is not enough for them," explains Vladimir as he and Estragon ponder the need of the deceased to "talk about their lives," in Samuel Becktell's celebrated evocation of modern angst. Waiting for Godot, a primary need, even of the dead, to be something. "Say anything at all?" Vladimir urges (40.1). According to Godot, talking, forming our experiences into meaningful patterns, supplies one of the basic strategies humans use for surviving in their endless, patient vigil. Meanwhile, they long for the arrival of divine, or logical, meaning. The mind relents at work, schematizing linguistic structures so to locate human significance becomes an image for life's central struggle.

Such diligence is, after all, a source of human dignity. "We are forced to keep our appointment," as the eye's vision of the human community is of course the most important ring in the book, but it is assuredly not unique. Rather, Hightower's ring of light should be seen as the culminating emulative ring in a book-length vision demanding in rings of light, as Light in August abounds in homages to The Ring and the Book.

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The Victorian Newsletter

Even the tone of Clough’s poems foreshadows Godot’s wondrous attack on the anodyne prose of Life’s quandaries. The sonnets begin and end at formal disputation: a logical attempt to quantify the nature of human confusion. They replicate, one Clough scholar writes, the “reasonant gravity” of the intellect at work upon life’s essential questions as the mind “circles on its own sense of mystery” (Blasius 371). This is language as ritual, as an act of meaning-making. Even as do Estragon and Vladimir’s exchanges under their scrapyard tree, Clough’s poems document the everyday, domesticated rhetorical behaviors humans embrace in the place of certainty. Sonnet I opens upon the ultimate human fact: Everything passes away. Children die. Life cannot be trusted to respect “dawning” human beauty (I, 2). Nor, the poem asserts, does it seem unnatural that the efforts of the old should be replaced by those of the young (I, 4-9). We simply grow accustomed to loss. “But,” Clough points out, the fact that a person

Whose perfection didst not all at once
In things towards forming which time could have

Anything—whose sole office was to exist—

Should suddenly dissolve and cease to be . . .

(I, 10-13)

is a certainty that tries our deepest understandings. What crime can it be merely to exist, that it merits death? The question daunts human comprehension.

We can accept, however, intellectually, Sonnet II continues, that the universe, Nature, functions in manners beyond our ken. Nature’s only “ordinance” being to continue its own grand movements without regard to individual, flickering human consciousness—here, we recognize—by theory.

Yet, the sonnet also acknowledges, we like to believe ourselves more than “flowers, beasts.” And, if man is to conceive of himself as “Poe’s Soulmaker”—in possession of some continuing or non-material element beyond that which decays—then accepting the limitations of uncertainty and sure loss is powerfully disturbing (II. 9-14)!. It is one thing to embrace Nature as a repository of divinity or primary purpose; quite another to level ourselves with all the perishable matter in Nature’s closet, to be the equal of an ear or leaf or tree.

Romantic pantheism, it would seem, does not stoop to Clough’s concerns. The remaining smoke lines along Mr. Wordsworth’s celebrated woody ridge, with its parade of anonymous loss and return, does not provide Clough assurances of a cosmic home.

Nor, Sonnet III continues, is there necessarily to be found relief in some Ktaatian song of harvest and autumnal splendor. We may well indulge ourselves in the sensuous wonder of Nature’s fullness at the calm of season’s change. Moreover, to “see the rich autumnal tints depart,” to witness the glow of winter’s sun retreat from fields of snow, may a strange thankfulness impart” (II, 1-3, 8). But only because it is easier to lose beauty totally than to watch it in the balance, to long for its continuance before our senses. The “assurance of loss, the poet counsels, offers pleasure because it conquers blank dismay” (II, 11-12). Better to lose beauty, than to agonize over its incalculable potential to fade.

“But,” Sonnet IV counters, if, as human wisdom and man’s heart and narrative story would hold, there is an essential bit of identity or existence that is not lost through change, then we must believe, as well, that some Thou “still” exists who understands or watches over this process of birth and decay (I). In addition to the embodiment of the much-beloved believed, the “patient heart” is temporarily satisfied and does not push the issue: “The where and how of [Thou’s] existence, that heart does not desire to know” (I, 14).

How like the awkward patience of Godot is this satisfaction. If we are willing, Clough’s sonnets argue, to accept as fact the projections of our own thinking, desires, and fictions, we can be a far more contented out of which we rarely climb to seek ultimate answers.

Clearly, though, this patience is not an absolute confidence, not a faith to move mountains. Sonnet V asks of Thou: is it that you are “casual” (I, 2-3) in creating and removing the individual elements of your handwork, how many infinite-seeming ages must pass before “hopes dead—slumbering” in human kind may “dare to reawake” (I, 7)? “Worse than deathless chance” into which humans and divine light to “recompense / The skiey picture [they] had gazed upon” (II, 13-14)!
The romanticized adjective skiey itself labels the lost confidence as belonging to flighty realms of trust no longer accessible by the narrative voice of the poems. What are the odds that a “casual” Maker will come to our collective aid, anyway?

“But,” continues Sonnet VI, if not the same patience be a “stilled ardor” of a deliberate chanced-mindlessness in “service of untruth,” or merely ignorance—embraced as does a dying man hold to important lies or a huntsman bird turn away from the approaching enemy—who about this shall tell us what to think (I, 3, 7-14)? Can we sort out what we are truly to believe?

Thou remains distanced; “skiey” beliefs lie scattered over time. And humankind lacks the ability, the sonnets worry, ever fully to engage our heart-shrinking to our earthly predication. Without whom would we ask for answers?

Just so, Estragon pleads to discover, in all our human thrashing at unanswerable, “what truth will be whole?” We will inevitably fall back into our writing, making and forgetting:

“We have to time to grow. The air is full of our crimes . . . But habit is a great deadness” (58). We have no one to speak with, ultimately; but, as we keep asking questions, this is—that is our magic. The noisy self-questioning keeps us alive. Always changing our perspective upon our collective plight, but never reaching bottom in our disquisitions. We play through all our intellectual habits; then we wait, to ask more questions. The cycle buffers us against encountering the knowledge that our existence is difficult to attach to any surrounding, defining system of values.

They wonder Clough’s final sonnet, as well: shall I decide it [what to believe] by a random shot? (I, 1). Importantly, by asking such a question, we are not indulging in emotional despair or dejection. We do not have a “rebellious” heart, but our ability to feel, with the deepest, highest, most emotional, most innocent, most intimate, to feel, to hope, and to fear are “not mere motions of the blood” (I, 3), but sincerely felt. Humans, at their best, do recognize the absurdity of their existences.

That is to say: On the one hand, we must suppose that there is a “seized” notion or impulse behind the universe in which we live (I, 5-8). Yet, in spite of this urge, we cannot escape asking: “What if despair and hope alike be true” (I, 9)? In that case, the heart, ‘sin manifest, is free to do Whichever Nature and itself suggest. . . (II, 10-11)

A choice in which we may initially feel some freedom. However, even this sense of freedom does not remove us from acknowledging our status:

always in a fact that we are here;
And with our being here, doth palsy—giving fear,
Wher’er can cast, or hope accord the best? (II, 12-14)

With which conclusion to the sonnet cycle, readers will recall once more the concerns of Godot. There is freedom to be had in being out free of predetermined identities and allegiances. But, once severed from cosmic moorings, who can say if fear or hope is the appropriate response to our situation? To be constantly questioning the nature of our being is a conscious choice. Yet, accompanying that interrogation comes the knowledge that such questioning can never end with a sense of resolution. Questioning becomes a manner of living mirrored in the sonnet series’ structure, opening in giver’s, closing with an interrogative. Arguments over whether Clough’s series is complete, therefore, seem moot:
The series clearly demonstrates that its logical process cannot be concluded. It ends in a question, and that is where humans have always been.

The only position that we can affirm in all of our knowledge is our still being “here.” This status has not changed because of or during the rhetorical maneuvering. All we have to build upon is physical existence. Even a format as clever and demanding as the sonnet offers but counterpoint to the knowledge that such arrangements provide artful elaboration of irreducible complexities.

We are, then, magicians enamored of, devoted to, asking enough trying questions to keep our consciousness engaged for a bit, but always circling back to our being “here”—under our tree, on a road to who can say. Waiting. Questioning. Knowing that our choice is binary: remove ourselves physically, or patiently abide. We cobbles Thou together from our worries, hoping it will respond to queries.

Here, in Clough’s sonnet sequence—“early modern” or “pre-existential” or simply “high-water Doubt”—the group should not be overlooked in studies of essential Victorian verse. Arthur Hugh Clough, writing with admirable facility in a demanding poetic form born of Renaissance faith in intellect, has captured the spirit of art for a generation to come, a time when faith in intellect, ironically, will fail. He has peeled deeply into concerns that will found twentieth-century Western philosophical discussion. Clough has realized that the modern world will shrug endless perspectives, but very few final explanations.

Additional, Clough is dismaying honestly, his resolution to the series of poems being not to resolve the ambiguity uncovered in the course of their rhetorical progress. This willingness to identify the mere of existence with an acceptance of the ineluctable nature of the questions he pursues would alone make the sonnet sequence as sufficiently courageous to merit critical attention . . . and more frequent inclusion in standard anthologies.

Here, the expected mid-century philosophical solutions are never embraced—not romantic absorption into Nature, not leap (or return) to faith, not the continuity of sensuality, not even the hard resolutions of agnosticism. As Will Beckett in Godot, Clough leaves his art asking questions for the sake of asking, waiting for answers that the narrative voice apparently knows will not come. Whom do we ask? Hugely hopeful “hope” and “fear” as equals, we comprehend that all the conceivable ultimate solutions are quite probably projections of our own desires.

This is Arthur Hugh Clough’s lonely, remarkable stance in his seven sonnets. They capture the thinking of an artist who has stepped into an intellectual arena that will attract, and stagger, minds from the age of Picasso on.

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*Kenneth Chorley notes of the sonnets: “the death in [Clough’s] 1871 novel, although very carefully written, was ever so vague especially in significant works, do not always show whether he had made his dead final decision as to what words or phrases to choose of the various alternatives he is trying over. But it is hard to believe that he would have made any radical alterations, since they are already such accomplished work” (255).
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Bicknell, Peter. The Picturesque Scenery of the Lake District 1752-1855: A Bibliographical Study. Winchester: St. Paul’s Bibliographies; Detroit: Omnigraphics, 1990. Pp. x + 198. $44.00. (This bibliography is an annotated chronological list of books about the scenery of the English Lake District, first published not later than 1855. It is limited to works which are devoted to scenery and not to other subjects such as agriculture, archaeology, history, dialect, folklore, geology, local industries and sport. Novels set in the Lake District, like directories which include descriptions of scenery, unpublished manuscripts and articles published only in periodicals, are not included; nor are works of the Lake Poets, apart from a few items, such as Wordsworth’s Guide and Southey’s Letters from England and the Lake District, 1804, and Longman’s Dictionary of which describe scenery and can be regarded as topographical books.)

Booth, Richard. Theatre in the Victorian Age. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Pp. xii + 218. $49.50 (cloth), $16.05 (paper). (The purpose of this book is to provide an interested reader with a survey of the English drama and theatre within, approximately, the dates of Queen Victoria’s reign, 1837-1901.)


Dahs, Thomas. Reforming Marlowe: The Nineteenth Century Canonization of a Renaissance Dramatist. Lewes, East Sussex: Falstaff Books Limited, 1991. Pp. 170. $29.50. (Little was mid or even known about Marlowe until the nineteenth century. Moreover, no literary historical figure rose to prominence more quickly or more forcefully than Marlowe during this period. This sudden appreciation afforded to Marlowe’s life and works therefore reflects a distinctly nineteenth-century change in the way literary history was perceived by most critics.)

Engen, Rodney. Sir John Tennial: Alice’s White Knight. Aldershot: Scarecrow P, 1991. Pp. ix + 232. (This finalist scale illustrated biography contains a complete catalogue listing of all Tennial illustrations for the serious collector, a list of all exhibited work and lists of cartoons and paintings hilariooiero ignored by students of Victorian art. . . .)

Federico,0. Marked by History in Gazing, Rutherford, Madison: Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, London: and Toronto: Associated UP, 1991. Pp. 148. $20.95. (This book provides an illustrated guide for understanding and interpreting the illustrated works contained within 150 black and white illustrations, many of which have never been published before, to give a complete picture of the work of Victorian artists.)

Finnegan, Gillian. The Contributor’s Index to the Dictionary of National Biography 1885-1991. Winchester: St. Paul’s Bibliographies; Detroit: Omnigraphics, 1989. Pp. xiv + 413. $100. Lists alphabetically the contributors—more than 600 of them—and identifies their subjects (almost 30,000) by name, dates, vol. no. and pp. These indexes are invaluable to the researcher. . . .

Glancy, Ruth. A Taste of Two Cities: Dickens’s Revolutionary Novel. Twain’s Studies No. 13. Boston: Twain, 1991. Pp. xii + 325. $20.35. (The text is divided into two parts: "Literary and Historical Context' and "Dickens and Reading." In addition there is a chronology and an appendix—"How A Taste of Two Cities Was Serialized," a selected bibliography and an index.

Hair, Donald S. Tennyson’s Language. Toronto, Buffalo: London: U of Toronto P, 1991. Pp. 198. $50.00. (I attempt to define Tennyson’s own views of language, and in particular to understand the tenor of his enthusiasm for the old philology, based mainly upon Locke) and new (philology, with it historical and comparative studies of world languages. . . .)


Lawley, Oliver. The Clerical Character in George Eliot’s Fiction. Cambridge: English Literary Studies Monograph Series no. 53. Victoria U of Victoria, 1991. Pp. 135. $8.50 paper. (The primary focus of this study is on the exploration of methods for delineating the character of the cleric (characterization), but a comparison concern is the examination of the strictly clerical qualities of this fictional personage (character).)

McCormick, Jerusha F. John Gray: Poet, Dandy and Priest. Brandon UP, Hanover, NH: UP of New England, 1991. Pp. (xii) + 319. $35.00. (Although with origin marking and notation and sometimes with Saint Paul’s Bible or himself as a pietist priest . . . it was a part in question that Gray will always remain, never more fully available to us than he was to himself, and available to us only as he understood himself: as a matter of inquiry, as a psychological consuming . . .)

Maynard, Katherine Kearney, Thomas Hardy’s Romantic Poetry: The Lyrics and the Dynasts. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1991. Pp. xii + 231. $29.05. (This study examines the question of tragic romantic’s vitality in a secular age and explores the philosophical underpinning’s of Hardy’s tragic vision in his lyric poems and in The Dynasts. It also examines its efforts within the context of the poems of Hardy’s.)


Monman, Gerald. Oliver Schreiner’s Fiction: Landscape and Power. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1991. Pp. xv + 201. $45.00. (I propose to chart the topography of Schreiner’s fiction and its construction of both the earth and human life, with special emphasis upon the African landscape in relation to the sociocritical transformation of imperialism. . . .)


Tacky the Tapster, William Makepeace. The History of Pendennis. New York: Garland, 1991. Ed. Peter L. Shillingsburg. Pp. xxiv + 499. $100.00. “The purpose of this new edition is, first, to present the text, as much as possible as Thackeray produced it and second to show the composition and revision of the work. The text is based on a comparative study of all extant versions from the now fragmented manuscript to the last edition touched by the author. The present reading text is, basically, that of the first edition” (xvi). Includes more than a hundred pages of illustrations, introductions, notes on textual apparatus, a record of text variation and related documents.


Walton, Priscilla L. The Disruption of the Feminine in Henry James. Toronto, Buffalo & London: U of Toronto P. 1992. Pp. viii + 179. $40.00. “The interconnection between femininity and absence is the focus of this study...” (4) “I would suggest that the link between the two derives from the ways in which both femininity and absence work to subvert Realism’s overt effort to depict ‘life’ realistically. Indeed, the ‘presence’ of femininity and absence foreground the absence of referential knowability and emphasize the inherent instability of language” (113).

Wechs, Alexander. Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992. Pp. xi + 262. $29.95. “This book argues that strong representations which make the facts speak for themselves... became the single most prominent form of narrative in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In any era a narrative amounts to a way of thinking, a process of sorting things out temporally, for many purposes... In this period, narrative consisting of carefully managed circumstantial evidence, highly conclusive in itself and often scornful of direct testimony, flourished nearly everywhere—only not in literature but in criminal jurisprudence, natural science, natural religion, and history writing itself” (ix).

The Victorian Newsletter

Victorian Group News

Announcements


“The Home and Homeliness: Charles Dickens and the Victorian Imaginary” is the subject of a conference 8-11 June 1992 at Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem. For a program write: Munsey Baumgartner, The Dickens Project, 354 Keseg College, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 or H. M. Dalecki, English Department, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel.

Victorians Institute Conference, 2-3 October 1992, College of Charleston, has as its theme Tennyson 2000: Reckoning and Reappraisal. Ten-page papers on any aspect of Tennyson should be submitted by 1 July 1992 to Dennis Goldberry, English Department, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC 29424.


Victorian Studies invites submissions for a special issue entitled “Victorian Sexualities.” Essays which emerge from interdisciplinary study are particularly encouraged. Submissions should be sent to Donald Gray, Editor, Victorian Studies, Ballantine Hall 338, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. Deadline for submission is 1 June 1992.

RSVP Third Annual VanArsdel Prize will be awarded to the outstanding essay on British periodicals, written by a graduate student. The winner will receive $100 and publication in VPR. The paper may have been submitted for a graduate class, or as a chapter of a thesis or dissertation, and must be the product of the student’s own original research with historical, critical, or bibliographical emphasis on the importance of periodicals to the history and culture of Victorian Britain, Ireland, and the Empire. The unpublished paper (10 to 20 pp. including notes) may be in the areas of art, music, history, literature, science, etc. RSVP reserves the right to withhold the award if no paper meets the criteria of quality writing, accuracy, and contribution to the field. Two copies of the paper are to be submitted by 1 June 1992 to William Schesler, 18412 Timberlake Dr., Lutz, FL 33549.

RSVP 1992 Conference will be held 10-12 July 1992 at Manchester Polytechnic. Papers will be presented on reading Victorian periodicals, research methodologies, and representations and localities. For information write Margaret Beetham or Alan Kidd, English and History Department, Manchester Polytechnic, Ormond Blvd., Lower Ormond Street, Manchester, M15 6DX, England.

Notice

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### Pater and His Younger Contemporaries

**Gerald Monman**

When Walter Pater exhibited the young men of Oxford to burn, like the stars of the French Pâtéline, with a “hard, gemlike flame,” he was challenging them in the concluding paragraphs of Studies in the History of the Renaissance to devote their lives to a new ideal, to the search for beauty, and “the love of art for art’s sake.” Unfortunately, his description of the aesthetic life seems to have seduced many of his younger contemporaries into the pursuit of naked beauty up the stairs of the ivory tower. That was not the life Pater had meant to describe, but confusion persisted, and until recently his reputation suffered. T. S. Eliot’s essay on Pater is representative of the disregard in which his writings were held during the decades after World War I. Eliot found Pater’s novel, *Marius the Epicurean*, a “hodge-podge” because his mind was “incapable of sustained reasoning”—which meant for Eliot and his readers that Pater was primarily neither a philosopher, a literary critic, a classicist, nor a master of any other systematic discipline. Further, because Pater’s mind was “mushy” and because he had confused art and life in his studies in *The Renaissance*, Eliot charged him with the blame for a number of “united lives” among his self-proclaimed disciples in the nineties. So, tarry with decadence and covered with the feathers of too many disciplines, that the Paterian corpus was borne from his academic inderision.

But despite Eliot’s dismissals, the influence of Pater’s aesthetic ideal on modern literature has been extensive, though not yet fully documented. In particular, his ideal of the gem-like flame, the moment of aesthetic ecstasy isolated within the flux of sensations, seems to have had a pervasive influence on many who read him. In addition to Eliot—reestablishing the religious significance of the Paterian “moment”—poets as diverse as Hopkins, Yeats, Dowson, Johnson, Symons, Wilde, Pound, Stevens, Auden, MacNeice and novelists such as James, Conrad, Woolf, Joyce, Lawrence, and Proust have exhibited Pater’s influence. And among artists and aestheticians, critics and historians of art, George Santayana’s and Bernard Berenson’s experience of being dazzled as undergraduates at Harvard by Pater’s *Renaissance* seems not unusual. Although Pater missed the chance in 1888 to admit the future historians of Italian art to his lectures, in a few years Berenson testified that Pater’s mythic and imaginary portraits “revealed to me what from childhood I had been instinctively tending toward. . . . It is for that I have loved him since youth and shall be grateful to him even to the House of Hades where, in the words of Nausicaa to Odysseus, I shall hail him as god. It was he who encouraged me to extract from the chaotic succession of events in the common day what was wholesome and sweet, what fed and sustained the spirit.”

The principal route of Pater’s influence on twentieth-century literature led from the decadents to Yeats. Richard Le Gallienne pays tribute to the centrality of Pater among the litterati of the fin de siècle: “Among the many . . . who were rapidly putting on immortality under our very eyes, perhaps the most important of all, as in certain directions the most influential, was . . . Walter Pater. Mr. George Moore has put himself on record more than once to the effect that Pater’s ‘Marius the Epicurean’ is the most beautiful book in the English tongue. This was the opinion also of many young men in the ’90s.” In his Confessions of a Young Man, Moore had praised Pater’s novel as “the book to which I owe the last temple of my soul,” declaring that he shared with the novel “the same tenderness” as Hopkins’ “inclined because the beauty of material things is sufficient for all the needs of life.” Whatever preconceptions these young men of the nineties may have brought to Marius, owing to the construction they put on the aestheticism of The Renaissance, the beauty of its style, if not its vision of ideal love, remained for them undiminished despite the changing taste of the times: “Three or four years ago I reread Marius the Epicurean, . . .

expecting to find I cared for it no longer," wrote Yeats in his Autobiography in 1922, "but it still seemed to me, as I think it is for most great prose in modern English, and yet I begin to wonder if it, or the attitude of mind of which it was the noblest expression, had not caused the disaster of my friends. It taught us to walk a rope, tightly stretched through serene air, and we were left to keep our feet upon a swaying rope in a storm."

The "friends" to whom Yeats refers were members of the Rhymer’s Club, fellow walkers on the tightrope of existence, whose poetry and music audience and isolated from each other. Obsessed with innocence and evil in a society that cared merely for responsibility, they led lives which were at best "untidy," and, as one critic observed, most often as their constitutions would decently permit. Among the Rhymer’s Yeats, Johnson, Dowson, Smyson, Herbert Horne, and Wilde (an occasional visitor when the Club met in private houses) could be numbered as disciples of Pater. Although as a group these young men barely shared a common, aesthetic philosophy of the late 1800’s, the "Conclusion" of Pater’s Renaissance focused much of what they believed, and in its three or four years of existence the Club carried the banner of "art for art’s sake" and celebrated Pater’s writings as the ultimate expression of this idealism. In his "Introduction" to The Oxford Book of Modern Verse, Yeats wrote:

"The revolt against Victorianism meant to the young poet a revolt against irrelevant descriptions of nature, the scientific and moral consciousness of In Memoriam, ... the political eloquence of Swinburne, the psychological curiosity of Browning, the passion of Dante... Poetry was a tradition like religion and liable to corruption, and it seemed that [poets] could best restore it by writing lyrics technically perfect, their emotion pitched high, and as Pater offered instead of moral earnestness life lived as "a pure gem-like base" all accepted him for master."

Then, as an example of pure poetry detaching itself from the flux in a moment of ecstasy, Yeats began his anthology by printing in vers libre Pater’s purple passage on the Marriage of Reason and Imagination:

In later years Yeats acknowledged that whereas Rossetti’s work had held an emotional, subconscious attraction for him, the Paterian celebration of pure, intense experience provided him with his conscious aesthetic program, which is evident in Early Yeats and Paterian. Particularly notable is Yeats’ fantasy, "Rosa Alchemica"

10. The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (London, 1910), p. viii. In effect, Pater is using Ruskin’s critical appreciation to undercut Arnold’s famous dictum that the "aim of criticism is to see the object as its subject sees it.
11. "The Paterian" in The Preface to the Renaissance, and in the "Conclusion" he exalted the young men of Oxford "to be for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions."
13. The Remains: Studies in Art and Poetry (London, 1910), p. viii. In effect, Pater is using Ruskin’s critical appreciation to undercut Arnold’s famous dictum that the "aim of criticism is to see the object as its subject sees it.

inner vision, and drifted ever deeper into their private world of rarefied emotion. Even in the face of mounting of remorse, ideal love and the vanity of life, produced in his "Non Sum Qualis Eram Bonae Sub Regno Cynarum" (1896) the definitive expression of alienation. The distance from the "Conclusion" to this expression of the brevity of life and its loss is shorter than Pater had realized. Marvis, too, with its (almost) mystical loving of religious ritual and its beatific vision of the saintly Cecilia and the Christian community was easily assimilated into Dowson’s despairing Catholicism. These are specific echoes, even, such as in Dowson’s "Extreme Unction" in which the phrase "all the passages of sense" is taken from Pater’s description of the last sacrament."

Certainly Pater’s fatal Lady Lila shad- owed not only Dowson’s profane loves but also his sacred ideal, Cynara, who as Adelaide Joahnswicz was his twelve-year-old epige of innocence. Failing to capture this beatific vision of purity, Dowson stumbled toward death with, in Symons’ memorable phrase, the face of a "monstrous best." Or perhaps he was more like a Pater who had visited the France of Verlaine, Baudelaire, and Gautier and on whose return the sea change was apparent, the tint of mortality was upon him. And so Dowson cries: "Unto us they belong / Us the bitter and gay, / Wine and women and song." He was dead of to- be-it not too drunk as the moderns.

Lionel Johnson in his self-imposed isolation was another casualty. He rose at six in the evening, spent his waking hours in his library in the company of whisky, and went to bed at dawn. Like Pater’s Sebastian van Streeck, he hated his image, and after the age of twenty-one would not allow himself to be photographed or drawn. But Pater was worth the effort of a visit, and Johnson reported after one such excursion that the master had "talked theology and praised Anglicism for its endless promise of further doubt and sober mysticism." Sharing religious mysticism and a tendency to distill the intellectual aspects of religion into graced sentiment, the two also shared a style sensitive to the precise value of words, a stylistic discipline praised as characteristic of "seriousness of expression". Twice Johnson wrote of Pater in his poetry. "A Friend" (1899) begins: "His are the whiteness of soul, / That Virgil had . . . . And in the 1902 elegy Johnson praised Pater as the "Hierarch of the spirit" and "Scholarship’s constant saint," extolling him at the conclusion as "that unforgettingly most gracious friend." But the Paterian contrast between the ideal whiteness of soul and the life of the senses becomes in Johnson’s religious poetry a tragic conflict exacerbated by the introspective
melancholia of his spiritual isolation. Although he under- stood the "silent call" for an aesthetic in harmony with cultural norms, Johnson almost despite himself felt the sinister undertow of a shadow self, the Dark Angel: "Through thee, the gracious Muses turn / To Furies, O mine Enemy! / And all thing things of beauty burn / With flames of evil ecstasy." 16 Pater, too, had spoken of the "ecstasy" of burning, but his enthusias- tic desire in the seventies to explore the possibilities of aesthetic life had, with the Rhymer, entered into a new and terrifying phase which, tragically, Johnson could not escape. But Sidney's fall was not a personal man. Like an aristocratic Irish version of Pater's Duke Carl, Gregory went out to meet life with courtesy, to conquer it with ceremony, and to die with his youth (though in fact he was nearly forty) still upon him.

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It seems clear that for the major modernists, the signifi- cance of the nineties lay in the misrepresentation of the Paterian moment of "ecstasy" as a revolt against "theor- ic" (the climate of nineteenth-century philosophy and morals) and as a celebration of pure sensation and form, as a "de-idealizing" of a type of experience which went all the way back to Wordsworth's "spots of time." Just why they came to the opposite conclusion, and how, is a problem in 19th- and-Gastier Aestheticism, as it was called, may in part be explained by the fact that these younger writers no longer wished to admit their debt to any Victorian. To protect his image as a radical modernist, Younger's close friend, Ezra Pound, covered up his embarrassment at Pater's early influence with the patronizing confession that he "is not dull in the least. He is adolescent reading, and very excellent bait." 17 Yet in three of his early es- says, "Vortices," "Vorticism," and "Vortographs." Pound, who would have been an ardent-one in an "adolescent" when he wrote the last of these essays, credits "the immediate ancestry of his school to Pater's dictum that "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music." 18 Younger's sister as editor also, but Pater's in- sight is accorded priority, doubtless owing to Pound's ex- perimentation with the "rhythm-phrase." Pater's asser- tion that "In its primary aspect, a great picture has no more definite message for us than an accidental play of..." 

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patterns of form and color seen and felt directly are su- perior to symbols used merely "to suggest some system of economics." Not only does Pound's phrasing here echo Pater's "Conclusion" in par- ticular ("theory or idea or system"), but when Pound defines the poetic image as "a radiant node or cluster, a VORTEX, from which, and through which, all things into which, ideas are constantly rushing," he both adapts Pater's metaphor of the gem-like flame and reaffirms the Paterian perception of consciousness as a "whirlpool" (for this image Yeats also had used). If the poets of the Moderns isolated unified moments to export to Pater, poets in the first decades of the following century who proclaimed the kinetic gospel of vital forces were also his heirs—the Paterian flame, "point of purest energy," became the Poundian vortex, "point of maximum energy." 19 Small wonder Yeats was led to inquire a study apprehensively: "Did Pater foreshadow a poetry, a philo- sophy, where the individual is nothing, the flux of The Canter of Ezra Pound?" 20

Pound's fellow countryman Wallace Stevens was equally indebted to what, afterwards, he called the "dreadful going-on of Walter Pater," adding that "it would be impossible nowadays, I suppose, to conceive anything at all in that direction." 21 Certainly the Pater- ian sensibility informs Stevens' richly sensuous first vol- ume, Harmonium (1916), especially "Tea at the Palau of Hoon" which may be cited as echoing the aesthetic self- sufficiency of Pater's "supreme, artistic view of life." Pater is again present in "Two or Three Ideas" and in The, where Younger's "morality of the right sensation," as well as in "the impossible possible philosophers' eat!" of "Asides on the Ooze," and above all in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" which tentatively sanctions Pound's "magic moments" and Pater's "ideal instants": "Perhaps there are times of intense excellence, their moments of awakening, / Extreme, fortuitous, personal, in which / We more than awaken." Pater's influence on Stevens may be traced at least in part to his Harvard mentor, Santan- yana, friend of Berenson and of Pater's ardent disciple, Lincoln Steffens, whose aesthetics ("in which the "sense of beauty" shaped itself in the intellectual milieu of Rusk and Pater, Santanyana began as a poet of fragile sonnets not unworthy of Edmund Gosse. During Stevens' Harvard years, Santanyana's Sense of Beauty (1896) and Intuition of Poetry (1896) Religious (1909) unveiled a Pateresque "materialistic Platonism" which blended neo-pagan naturalism with the metaphysics of the flux and elevated poetry to the seat of religion—all of which left a lasting impression on Stevens' aesthetics. In one of his early poems, "To an Old Philosopher in Rome," Stevens pays tribute to Santanyana and depicts the path- sensations of death in terms similar to Pater's descrip- tion of Marius' last illness. Such lines as "The threshold, Rome, and that most merciful Rome / Be- yond, the two alike in the make of the mind" forcefully recall Pater's description of the earthly city and the Rome on high. When Pound set out "to bring poetry up to the level of prose," he was, of course, thinking not only of the French problem of "poetry in the street," but of Pater's influence. He knew how the "pre-crossing" of the threshold was achieved and that Pater's influence was greater on the novelists of the twen- tieth century than on its poets. Possibly Henry James best expressed the paradoxical response of the emerging twen- tieth-century novelist when in an 1891 letter to Pater after his death he parodied the image of the gem-like flame and yet concluded with a line of absolutely genuine praise: "Faint, pale, embarrassed, exquisite Pater! He reminds me, in the disturbed midnight of our actual lit- erature, of one of those lucid moments which you put, on going to bed, near the candle, to show you, in the darkness, where you can strike a light: he shines in the uneasy gloom—vaguely, and has a phosphorescence, not a flame. I agree with you that he is not of the fit- tlest—dull and the longer time," 22 Certainly one reason for Pater's durability lay in the distinguishing technical characteristic of his prose romances, their emphasis not on action, but on attitudes. He does not render immedi- ate gesture and utterance, but their temperamental equiv- alents; that is, finely discriminated "sensations and ideas" (the subtitle of Marius). Although his "imaginary portraits" lie outside the generic categories of Victorian literature, in their diminished plot emphases they may be considered forerunners of one of the major develop- ments of twentieth-century fiction, the "modern novel" with its stress on the rendering of impressions, on character and point of view. Writers such as James, Conrad, Ford, and Woolf, translating into fictional technique the concepts of self and time explored by William James and M. R. James, took over Pater's preoccupa- tions by nearly a quarter-century. Soon after James first "took possession" of London, he met Pater and found him "far from being as beautiful as his own writing..." 23 He found the opportunity of conversing at "literary tea-drinkings" and dinner parties; at one such gathering for J. S. Sargent, Violet Paget observed "Pater limping with goog and Henry James wrinkling his forehead as usual for tight


boots, and a lot of artistes buzzing about.”25 As early as 1873 James had wanted to review Pater’s Renaissance, but, he wrote, “I do not know much about it.”26 Yet by 1879 he is citing Pater in his fiction (“A Bundle of Letters”) as the exponent of the life-is-in-art doctrine; and by 1881 the Paterian exhortation for a “quickened sense of life” and a “quickened, multiplied consciousness” is echoing in his description of Isabel Archer’s “quickened consciousness” and “multiplied life.”27 James, sharing with Pater a celibate dedication to art, was likewise an aesthetic observer, a spectator of life, recollecting and steeling rich in the density of phrase—all mixed with un-Paterian touches of the colloquial—the multiplicity and intensity of his impressions. A few years later Pater’s influence becomes equally evident in Joseph Conrad’s 1897 “Preface” to The Nigger of the Narcissus: “A work that attracts, however humbly, to the coming of art should carry its justification in every line.” With this brash conflation of dicta from the “Gorgiones” and “Style” essays, Conrad introduces his famous symbolist manifesto saturated with verbal echoes from Pater’s work in its final paragraph (to leap to the end) Conrad assimilates two of Pater’s most striking sentences describing Gorgiones’ “ideal instant.” The verbs “arrest” and “pass” and the phrases “a sigh, a smile” and “a smile that was his” (p. 41) reverberate in the epilogue (“a smile, a visage, and the whole of life”). As he was finishing The Nigger, Conrad stylishly described to Edward Garnett in a letter (November 6, 1896) a Cambridge don who admired his work: “He—I fancy—is not made in the image of God like other men but is fashioned after the pattern of Walter Pater which you cannot but admire, a much greater distinction.”

Virginia Woolf’s absorption in the “moment of being” likewise betrays an indebtedness to Pater. In “Modern Fiction” she portrays the mind in true Paterian fashion as receiving “a myriad impressions—crisply, fantastic, vanishing, or engraved with the sharpness of steel”—and in “The Moment: Summer Night” she describes “the terror, the exaltation” as the walls of the moment open and “the flood of beauty” (p. 196). Woolf substitutes the even more Paterian “ecstasy” (for the second noun in this pair). Clarissa Dalloway herself might serve as an excellent fictional equivalent to Pater’s awareness of nature and his recognition of the unique individual experience as basic to fiction. Pater nevertheless failed to explore the possibilities inherent in the first-person narrator. But for that, his imaginative portraits might have provided the “new strain” to say it with the young Pater early evening.” Even more typical of Pater’s metaphysics of multipersonal selfhood and its gem-like confluence in Woolf’s delineation of a series of Clarissa-selves which attempt to consolidate, as she describes it in a Paterian passage, into “one centre, one diamond.”28 Elsewhere, as in The Voyage Out and The Waves, Woolf develops another aspect of the multiplicity of self, utilizing the theme of the mythic double much as Pater had done in Martin’s of Warwick. Woolf, who incidentally had been taught Greek by Pater’s sister Clara, “very white and shrivelled” she described her,29 explicitly acknowledged her debt to Pater in the “Preface” to Orlando in which she thanked the friends who had helped in the writing of the book, concluding with those dead “and so illustrous that I scarcely dare name them, yet no one can read or write without being perpetually in the[re] debt.” Pater’s name rounds out her brief list; and for good reason, since Orlando not only displays a very Paterian interest in the relation of the present moment to the changing flux of time and experience, but the hero- heroine is a symbolic figure of multiple selfhood who, like Pater’s Mona Lisa, spans the centuries and epitomizes history in a captivating vision of the present form of a new Tobacco Tree. Woolf had praised Pater’s “vision” of Leonardo da Vinci—a vision, such as we get in a good novel where everythi...

27. The Portrait of Dorian Gray, Chapters VII and XII. In The Tragic Muse (1892) the so-called “Monstreous-Whistler-Wilde: atheistic” of Gustave Naudé (pseudonym for James himself) has its closest Victorian analogue in Pater’s writings:

Pater alone among the major Victorian prose-poets seemed to reject the Victorian conception of art as quasi rhetorical and to urge in its stead the morality of pure sight and sensation. Pater alone conceived of the revelation of personality (Marivaux and Lisette) in terms of mythic archetypes. But because these insights have become so widely assimilated and hidden within the modern sensibility, the literal minded might question the propriety or maybe the sobriety of claiming that this impotent Oxford don (pater of no little flesh) fathored the future. Yet circumstances suggest that when Proust grew up among his memories of Albertine and found the ego to be “composed of the superimposition of our successive states,” each “fresh memory” bringing a “different Albertine,”30 he was aware of how Mona Lisa had embodied the quintessence of beauty and how Marivaux had gathered successive visions of Cecilia and her equivalents or antitheses. Or again, the ultimate source of Woolf’s multipersonal self, of her sense of the divinility of time in contrast to the “moment of being,” of her emphasis upon the androgynous and upon the identity / death equation (all but embodied in Clarissa Dalloway and exemplified in herself), and of her Ezra Poundian interest in the primary significance of rhythm and syntax, Pater stands as the Ur-modern. But he is a modern whose genetic contributions often lie beyond the range or compass of sources either peripheral or direct; rather, he exists as a “prae-teacher” in unacknowledged, subliminal associations which have combined with other influences and emphasized the most strikingly light, almost countless-twentieth-century threads lead back to him, as for example D. H. Lawrence’s “Poetry of the Present” which describes a supercharged Paterian intuition of the “immediate, instant self”. The quivering nimble hand of the present, this is the quick of Time. This is the innuendo. The quick of the universe is a pulsating, carnal self, mysterious and palpable.” To imagine Pater murmuring this to a friend would be (one

31. Quoted by R. de Clermont-Tonnerre in Robert de Montesquieu

In The Wings of a Dove (1894) Susan Strangham’s insinuation...
hopes) more parody than truth; yet Pater did suggest something not unlike it.

James Joyce ... identified Pater's character in the next few years, was more heartless, picturing it as he did the distorted face and swollen brass nose of the Branscombe College gatekeeper (in Finnegans Wake Pater's college is parodied as "Brus-
snaux" and "Brazenaze"). Yet Joyce's 1902 "portrait" of James Clarence Mangan is Paternoster both in its rhythms and in its lyric love of beauty; and not only does Joyce, in comparing Mangan's brooding lady to the Mona Lisa, utilise Pater's intimations (a figure of many lives), words ("precious", "delicate", "lost", "wreathes"), and phrases ("distant terrors and r tic dreams, and that strange stillness"); Pater: "strange thoughts and fant asy reveries and exquisite passions"); Joyce: "embodi- 
ment of that idea, Pater: "embodiment of the . . . idea"); he but also explicitly describes the Irish poet himself as a guesting Paterian hero: "he seems to seek in the world . . . what is there in no satisfying measure or at all." 84

In the concluding paragraphs of this essay, Joyce borrows the theme of the exiled pagan gods reborn in Pico della Mirandola's thoughts, and uses it to describe Mangan (unread yet imaginatively vital), verbally echoing the eloquent confirming affirmation of Pater's study. Joyce's unconscious caricature of the heroic Pico in the febrile-bodied Mangan with his con- fused learning, pilfered loves, hasty paint, and early death, may possibly anticipate such later parodies as Finnegans comic death and rebirth, in which case the Paterian motif of the gods reborn takes its place along side theatrical schemes and Viscous cycles as an influence on this most experimental novel.

Eliot was closer to the truth than he probably had a right to be when in a discussion of Ulysses with Virginia Woolf he called Joyce "a purely literary writer . . . founded upon Walter Pater with a dash of Newman." 85 Significant Paterian motifs in the Mangan may migrate to Stephen Hero and afterwards are found in Joyce's Paternoster entitled Portrait as well as in Ulysses and Finnegansnot only a sentence from "Pico" parodied in Ulysses or the story on Mona Lisa burlesked in Ulysses and Finnegans, signs, John: he may be, but the entire idea of the "epiphany" itself. That moment of revelation by the spirits in Aquinas, Vico, and whatever, might also be described as the beneficent, preeminently so, of Pater-as-precursor-source. Likewise Joyce's parody of Pater's style in the "Oxen of the Sun" episode in Ulysses is truly comic, the postcard Joyce sent his brother, a "phantom" of Pater he became, was more heartless, picturing it as he did the distorted face and swollen brass nose of the Branscombe College gatekeeper (in Finnegans Wake Pater's college is parodied as "Brus-
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which Joyce described in "Mangan" and the Portrait as "less than the pulsation of an artery, [but] equal in its period and to a thousand years," derives from Blake's Milton via Pater's "shades" / "epiphanies" in the "Conclusion." These epiphanies throughout Joyce's work are very much like the expanded image of the gem-like flame or such other indelible Paterian moments of perception ("The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man"; "Finnegans Wake"; "Marian's" vision in the courtly romance); and of course Joyce's terms, Pater's "Child in the House" is a study in the epiphanies of an artist's childhood) or Marian's vision in the courtly romance). As (illustrative of the manner in which Pater-as-precursor-source functions, it could be shown (though it has not yet been) how completely Joyce dramatises Pater's "Con- clusion" in Stephen Dedalus' climactic epiphany on the beach at the end of the fourth chapter of the Portrait. The spirit liberated or reborn through its passion for art is the subject of the poem and, as the general Paterian celebration of new impressions as well as the basic vocabulary of "easiness" and "flame" is everywhere applied to Stephen.

In scenic terms, Pater's initial image of somber bath- ing, which modulates into "movements of the shore-side where the water flows down" at ebb tide, anticipates Stephen's seashore encounters, as does Pater's presenta-
tion of the perpetual flux in the "drift" of the tide, which finds its final realization in Stephen's wailing among the "endless drifts of seaweed". Equally pertinent to Joyce's description of Stephen's epiphany is Pater's defi-
nition of aesthetic passion as the only escape from the prison of one's experience of time and history; the mind, isolated like "a solitary prisoner," is seeking an "epiphany, a round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without." For Stephen, this "incertitude that had ringed him round" tinged with unravelling the calls of his bathing friends until the mythic overtones in his banner struck him like a "voice from beyond the world," a note "piercing" his isolation, and he conceived an acheing "de- sire to cry aloud, the cry of a hawk or eagle on high, to cry piercingly his deliverance." As is frequently noted, the bird imagery in this passage defines Joyce's central Dalaius / Icarus archetype of the artist, and this, on the preceptor-source hypothesis, now appears to hack back to Pater's prison image and his stress on the power of art to "set the spirit free." Additional support for the J22; lan origin can be found in Joyce's own vision of confinement, flame, and cry for freedom to describe Mangan's earlier failure to escape: "History encloses him so straitly that even his fiery moments do not set him free from it. He, too, cries out, in his life and in his mournful verses. . . ." What the Joyce of the Portrait brought to the Pater / Mangan Dante is the dramatisation of these themes in myth, although the epigraph to The Renaissance—"Ye shall ye be as the wings of a dove" (Ps. 60: 19)—suggests elements of this legend, as does the Cupid / Psyche story in Marius which patterns the quest of its hero in the same archetypal fashion. In the final paragraph of the "Conclusion" Pater elaborates his image of the prisoner, describing man as "un- under sentence of death" and citing Rousseau, to whom "an undeftinable taint of death had clung always," as one who discovered the desired liberation in aesthetic passion. Joyce could hardly have missed Pater's description of this as "the awakening in him of the literary sense." And not only is Stephen's apprenticeship as an artist initiated by his sense of "ceremonies shaken from the body of death," but it also coincides with a repudiation of the priest- hood in harmony with Pater's assertion that any facile orthodoxy "which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of [aesthetic] experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, . . . has no real claim upon us." Finally, Stephen's culminating vision of the hardship, though only faintly anticipated in the "Con- clusion" by several references to the perfected or friendly "face", is nonetheless yet another Paterian import from the Marius essayLeonardo's ambiguous Mona Lisa. The epiphany of the proflane goddess, the "presence that rose thus stragoly beside the water", may well have served as the prototype for Stephen's awesomely sensual "angell of mortal youth and beauty" (the ending of this chapter, after all, is designed as an explicit parallel to the "swoon of sin" which concludes the second chapter). As we see him later, writing a villancico to his "temptress", Stephen is little more than a bewhiskered Donjon. He was lucky to have escaped.

Unlike Joyce and the other major modernists, Pater is not now and probably never will again become popular with any number of readers outside the walls of academe. But Eliot himself has given the lie to his own assertion that Pater failed to influence any first-rate mind: "No! Shakespeare's kings are not. nor are meant to be, great" writes Pater:" No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be" comes the Prufrockian echo of the young Eliot. And on the more elusive level of unacknow-
ledged associations, the mature Eliot in the second of his moving "Four Quartets" proves he has not forgotten Pater's "Conclusion" or the pilgrimage of Marius: University

The "Central Fiery Heart": Ruskin's Remaking of Dante

John Ruskin's lifelong interest in the Divine Comedy is well-known. But it has yet to be shown how Ruskin takes images from, or relating to, Dante and merges these with his own vision of Dante as poet of the "central fiery heart." Again: Ruskin's chief contribution to aesthetic thought during the decade 1846-1850—his concepts of the "penetrative imagination," the "Gothic," the "grotesque," and the poetic-psychological "bal-
ance" by which the "pathetic fallacy" is overcome—have received attention.2 But the imagery of fire and center in which this notion of the fire of Dante is conflated with the notion of central verisimilitude, and which is an essential component of the Romantic vision of Dante as expression of the Romantic ideal of intense and organized consciousness—a poetic myth that stands as a major Romantic achievement (comparable, for example, to Blake's) in its combination of aesthetic, moral and political concerns. And an attempt to produce a vision of Dante as expression of the Romantic ideal of intense and organized consciousness—a poetic myth that stands as a major Romantic achievement (comparable, for example, to Blake's) in its combination of aesthetic, moral and political concerns.

2. George P. Landow, The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin (Princeton, 1971) is good on the symbolic grotesque and on the balance that assuages the pathetic fallacy; his reference to Dante in connection particularly with this balance are worth reading (pp. 49, 148, 179, 181, 184). But this concern, however, is part of the aesthetic and satirical grotesque, which I characterize below as the first two stages in Dante's Romantic commodity or journey toward the balanced, allegorically, stage of grotesque consciousness. For imaginative and Gothic, see John D. Rohmer, The Romance of the English Novel (New York, 1950), pp. 13-18, 47-68. Harold Bloom, "Introduction," to The Literary Mind (ed. by J. S. Mill, New York, 1952), pp. 49-50. See also John R. Pope, "The Romantic Novel," American Literature (1948), pp. 104-111.


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