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The Victorian Newsletter has completed its twenty-fifth year of continuous and steady publication: it is a Silver Jubilarian! Founded in 1953 by Professors Richard Altick and Gordon Ray as a joint enterprise of the Ohio State University and the University of Illinois, it was moved to New York University in 1955, "whence it has come," &c, &c, ever since. It has worn its seniority gracefully, we think, warmly welcoming to the field such "brisk juniors" as Victorian Studies and Victorian Poetry; and with what has been called its "severe objectivity," it has offered equal opportunity to apprentice-scholars and to seasoned guildsmen.

In like spirit, we now invite a new generation to bring a new order to VNL. With the approval of the Executive Committee of the Victorian Group, the editorial and business offices are being transferred to the University of Florida at Gainesville following the distribution of this issue. Professor Ward Hellstrom, author of a book on the poems of Tennyson and chairman of the English Department at the University of Florida, will be the new editor and will bring to the publication a new group of scholarly associates. He fully merits all of our primary sentiments—faith, hope, and charity.

We owe many debts—to contributors, scholarly advisers, editorial and staff assistants. New York University has given us a long-tenured home, and Queens College of the City University of New York has been, for a shorter term, our co-sponsor. We think most fondly perhaps of our 1,100 subscribers who somehow knew that we were operating on a well-worn shoestring and did not chide us for our lack of slick modern office procedures. Like Hardy, we rubbed through and concentrated primarily on the integrity of the scholarly enterprise.

William E. Buckler

Robert A. Greenberg
"Why Unblooms the Best Hope?":  
Victorian Narrative Forms and the Explanation of Calamity*

James R. Kincaid

My subject is disaster—death, alienation, loss of love, the absence of God—but I will begin with a little joy, or apparent joy: the subject of marriage. No one wrote more of marriage and less of ostensible disaster than Anthony Trollope. We think of his world as sunny, somnolent, and static; Henry James emitted a sneer to the effect that reading a Trollope love story is like sinking into a gentle slumber. No novel is more pointedly undisturbed than Framley Parsonage; Mrs. Gaskell said she saw no reason why it should ever end. The book winds toward a close where, in a rush of predictable and warm marriages, the narrator bitingly says, “When the husband walks back from the altar, he has already swallowed the choicest dainties of his banquet. The beef and pudding of married life are then in store for him;—or perhaps only the bread and cheese. Let him take care lest hardly a crust remain—or perhaps not a crust.” Does this mean that we are to view marriage as a calamity? Certainly not. But, though we know in real life that they do not live happily ever after, we are assured in romantic comedy that they do just that. And it was a romantic comedy we had thought we were reading, not some searing naturalistic account of marital disillusionment. Which is it?

How is the possibility of marital catastrophe explained by the novel? One might say that literature never explains, but it may, of course, give form to calamity, align itself with tradition and thus provide a sense of order and consolation. I believe that it is characteristic of Victorian writers to offer very convincing explanations of disaster, the most prominent of which is that there is no explanation. Often they use the forms associated with those traditions that could explain—tragedy, satire, pastoral elegy—finding ways at the same time to deny the validity of the very tradition they are employing. They tend to offer contradictory explanations and then to deny the power of the explanations themselves and of the contradictions.

The combined presence and absence of traditional structures, the ability to use and deny formal patterns, is a rich source of power and also of critical confusion. If we take a sampling of diverse critics with almost nothing in common—Henry James, Roland Barthes, Robert Alter, Wolfgang Iser, and a group of Chicago critics we’ll call Wayne Booth—we can see that they are united in their puzzlement over Victorian narrative forms. James sees most of his predecessors as formless; Barthes searches for some solidity in the hilarious category of limited indeterminacy; Alter thinks the mixture of forms is simple “wavering”; Iser takes a depressingly linear historical view; Chicago critics generally are silent about the period, jumping from Austen to Joyce. Victorian narrative forms are neither coherent nor indeterminate, and those who set out to look for either are bound to be disappointed.

Victorian writers who sought to explain disaster were themselves more flexible, confusingly so, rejecting possibilities for explanation that were still affirmed. Thomas Hardy’s “Hap” offers to tell us directly why things are so miserable and claims an absolute assurance about the gloomy state of affairs—or seems to do so. The poem takes for granted a pervasive anguish and then explains clearly and certainly where it comes from. The structure is that of a cocksure argument: “If there were vengeful Gods, then I could be a tragic hero. But there are not. I’ll tell you what there is: time and crass casualty.” There can be no Prometheus, he says, since there is no tormentor. The tragic position unavailable, the speaker is presumably cast adrift in a world of purposelessness and causeless pain. But not so. For one thing, his explanation is itself coherent, or appears to be, thus denying the condition of the absurd world he says exists. Surely that absurd world cannot support explanations, but a perfectly clear explanation is what we get. The speaker is explaining why he cannot explain. He takes a Prometheus-like stance to deny the possibility of Prometheus stances, railing bitterly at the Gods, those damned purblind doomsters, that he cannot be bitter and that there are no gods at which to rail. The powerful operative words in the poem are “joy” and “hope,” both apparently dead as a doornail but obviously alive as well; otherwise there is no motive force in the poem. The speaker feels cheated, feels that hope and joy ought to flourish. Thus he must erect a whole structure of emotion centered on joy and hope in order to claim that the structure does not exist. But of course he has just built it, and it is therefore still standing, even after he has demolished it. The excuses for anguish are both present and absent; the explanations are both valid and absurd. The poem borrows incoherently from tragedy, irony, and mor-

* This paper and the three that follow by Professors Martin, Sprinker, and Taylor were presented at the Victorian Group Meeting of the Modern Language Association in Chicago, December 1977.
al apologue; it is both didactic and a parody of didacticism.

These explanations that both present and deny themselves are most easily observed—or most easily demonstrated—in the poetry of the period, but they dominate all genres. Hardy again provides a good example of formal incoherence. Jude the Obscure seems to be constructed as a parody of tragedy—as in the scene where Jude, in despair, decides to end it all, walks onto the ice prepared for a tragic finale. But the ice will not break, and the potential tragic hero is reduced to ludicrousness, hopping up and down on the ice, trying to get himself dead and failing. But such parodies of tragedy are impossible without somehow evoking tragic explanations. Hardy can only manage an inversion of tragedy by operating a tragic rhythm as a counterpart to its ironic burlesque. For instance, when Jude, ill and defeated, walks through the rain for one last interview with Sue, no reader, I suspect, is without the sense that all is fruitless, that all is a bitter mockery of the grandeur of romantic tragedy. At the same time, the energy and passion of the scene, plus the fact that Jude does die as a result of this trip, make us feel very strongly the pressure of tragic explanations. We see Jude and Sue at once as star-crossed lovers, exalted and dignified, and as poor dupe born out of their time.

Such contradictions are often more subtle and are introduced by the most spectacular of Victorian narrative techniques: the commenting narrator. That figure, contrary to popular belief, almost never acts to support the action, explain things to us, and help us along. More commonly, he acts to contradict the action, offer uncoordinated explanations, and make things tough for us. There are many examples of this is Thackeray, Eliot, and, most of all, Trollope. Even Overton, the narrator of The Way of All Flesh, acts to disrupt the comic form of the novel, which in its main action is presenting a series of non-disasters, assuring us that all will work out well for the hero. The ironic narrator, however, continually distances us from the comic aura of good luck, insisting that there are in fact real disasters and that there is very little we can do about them, if we are not moneymed and parentless, born like the lucky sphinx wasp, wrapped in bank notes, to find that our parents have been eaten by the sparrows weeks before. Are the disasters real or not? We receive some protection from the comic form of the action, but the narrator does his best to rip that protection from us, thus exposing the artificiality of the comic form of the novel is at the same time exploiting.

The classic example of this type of contradictory explanation is in Wuthering Heights, which examines the catastrophe in all varieties of ways: through Heathcliff and Cathy as a tragedy, through the second generation as prelude to a comedy, through Nelly as an irony. The structure of the novel is very strange. Heathcliff does not die with Cathy, as he should have done had he been attending to his tragic role. The novel is a bit like a tragedy in which the traditional glimpse of restored order is prolonged for another three acts. It is as if Montague and Capulet not only shook hands but went about the tedious business of making things right, producing a second Romeo and Juliet for whom all was well. Explanations abound, but none is sufficient.

Nor can we project an assurance into the future, as we are able to do in tragedy. At the end of Romeo and Juliet the Duke promises—or threatens—"to have more talk of these sad things." This "more talk," extending beyond the boundaries of the play, seems to be very important to tragic fulfillment. It guarantees the permanent effects of the tragic sacrifice, assures us that others will get the point and that the lesson will not be lost. This promise to keep the story alive is a necessary hedge against futility, so important that there is often in tragedy a figure who functions explicitly as a reporter, Horatio being the most prominent example.

This reporter figure is also prominent in Victorian literature, but he is generally incompetent. Tragic stories are presented but are entrusted to someone whose interests lie elsewhere, to someone who doesn't quite get the point, sometimes to a plain dummy. In Wuthering Heights, the story of Cathy and Heathcliff is told by Nelly, who never understood very well what was going on, to Lockwood, who never understood anything at all. This presents us with a curious sense of the combined greatness and futility of the catastrophe, the sense that it both does and does not have significance. Tennyson's Idylls of the King manages the most brilliant twisting of this figure. After tracing the rise and collapse of an entire civilization, Tennyson gives us a picture of the dying Arthur which is beautifully elegiac, or would be but for the fact that the expiring King is accompanied by his last knight, Bedivere, who is faithful but stupid. Bedivere is next to useless even in helping with the funeral arrangements, and Arthur is forced to threaten violence to get his knight to throw away Excalibur. As the King vanishes into light and so forth, there is poor, confused Bedivere, entrustted with the story and aware only that he is now alone among "new men, strange faces, other minds," unable to articulate the power of a tale that has never entered his conscious mind to begin with. Another reporter, Percivale, earlier gives Arthur's central definition of the nature of a spiritual kingdom, adding, "So spake the King: I knew not all he meant." No one ever seems to know very well what he means, and the sad catastrophe of Camelot's fall is thus explained in two violently contradictory ways: the tragic
explanation is that human beings are not able to be human; the ironic explanation is that human beings are pretty dim-witted.

This incompetent reporter figure becomes very quickly a stock device, common in dramatic monologues, where a speaker resists the facts that are so painfully clear to us. An example is Browning's "Cleon," a portrait of a brilliant man treating Christianity as altogether beneath contempt. By the time of Matthew Arnold, the formula is so established that variations can easily be achieved, most commonly in Arnold by making the speaker's failure to be touched by great forces of the past the subject of sympathetic inquiry. Arnold at the Grande Chartreuse is a repetition of Bedivere at the scene of Arthur's death. Both are alienated: Bedivere by the days which will darken round him as he goes forth companionless, Arnold by the estrangement of wandering between two worlds. Arnold is not stupid, of course, but he is Bedivere all the same—just in different dress.

The effect of this manipulation of tragic form is not simple parody but rhetorical duality, a quality which informs even genres of apparent release and relaxation: nonsense poems in particular. There are many protections in the form: the notion that it is written for children, the fact that it is nonsense, the distracting puns and linguistic jokes, and, in Lear's limericks, the mechanical, flat, redundant stanzaic pattern. But what of the subject matter—annihilation, mutilation, pointless murder? The protections may simply be covers for the poet, who proceeds to offer us the most terrible catastrophes without any explanation at all. Old men who play gongs or dance with their pets are going to be "smashed" by some anonymous "they." The protections necessary to the form are both employed and frustrated, and we are left with a strong desire to escape the nightmare.

Lear's limericks commonly use logical forms, explaining with calm assurance that such and such happened because of some prior event. But where is there any real causality? Flat and simple words present the fact of death—someone is "concluded"—and those who meet horrendous ends are pronounced "unfortunate." Such terms are jokes on a death that is unreal anyhow; they are also ironic understatements, showing us how fruitless explanations of any sort are. The words, like the formulaic repetitions, like the poems themselves, are bland and shocking at once.

Serious explanatory poems reproduce the same contradictory rhetoric. Tennyson's "Break, Break, Break" is an obvious instance, but gloomy poems may seem to afford examples all too obvious. Since there are optimistic, cheery explanations of catastrophe, we might look to them for a more rigorous test.

Hopkins' "God's Grandeur" is certainly a rousing and beautifully energetic poem. Nothing, not even man, can destroy nature's freshness and its power to renew itself. The final image of the holy ghost as a brooding dove promises a constancy and a formal closure that are both vital and solid. But what of those trodding insensitive generations, marching toward the last lights in the black west? They have not managed to destroy nature, but where is there hope for them, for their renewal? What is the holy ghost doing about that? One can say that the holy ghost is making available the power of resurrection, but who is listening? The poet, presumably, and some who read his poem. But what are we listening to, what is present so emphatically or what is absent?

Notice the "And" that begins the sestet—"And for all this, nature is never spent." A "but" would be more usual here, but the poet insists so strongly on his confidence in the dearest freshness deep down things that he uses an "and" and repeats it two lines later. The fact of man's insensitivity and the fact of God's power in nature are made coordinate, not opposed. But surely they are in opposition, and the use of "and" here paradoxically calls up the contrasting word very strongly. It calls up the word that is not there—the disconnecting word "but"—and places it right before us. Also, we wonder about the strain, the lovely "ah," the way in which the language of the poem calls attention to itself as language, forcing us to see the experience or perception recorded as an artifact, a contained and formulated expression. All this is masked, of course, by the formal precision, the energy—as if we had better get through this weak explanation as quickly as possible—and masked also by the pseudo-logical term "Because," which suggests a clincher, a clear and final explanation. There is, however, simply an assertion; the poem answers something, but not the question it poses. One way to put this is to notice, as we must, the absence of the second member of the Trinity, Christ. His presence is implied by the resurrection image of the daybreak, but, even so, the explicit references to God and the Holy Ghost make Christ's omission conspicuous. This is crucial because it signals the poem's masterful faking, its inability to link the presumed solution to the problem it announces. It is man who threatens to smear and blear nature totally. That won't happen, since Nature's freshness is God's freshness. But we could guess that: man will not kill God. The real question is why man is out of contact with his God, why men do now not reek his rod.

What hope is there for man? The explicit connection between man, God, and man's hope is, of course, God-man, or Christ. That is the tie and the hope, and it is not much there in the poem. The poet thus solves with great beauty a minor or even an unreal problem but pre-
sents to us as insoluble a catastrophe that is very real and terrible. The poem is immensely complex, and I do not mean to suggest that it is dismal. I just mean that this celebration poem is at once a celebration and a lament, an affirmation and a denial. It both closes its form triumphantly and sadly, inescapably opens that form.

I wish there were some way to imitate this duplicity in my own conclusion. Hardy was certain he knew why the best hope unbloomed, and he also hadn’t the slightest idea. I know why Hardy didn’t know about that unblooming hope; I also have no notion of the reason. This mixture of ignorant honesty and total assurance is mirrored in the formal contradictions in these works and perhaps should be recaptured somehow in this paper—at least by an abrupt and inconclusive conclusion.

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Browning: The Activation of Influence

Loy D. Martin

A great deal has been said lately about the phenomenon of literary influence, the relationship between a writer and past writers whom he takes as models or recognizes as predecessors. What I miss in most recent discussions, though, is an awareness that, when a writer thinks about a past model, he does so within the limits of his own period in literary history. To use a term proposed by Ziva Ben-Porat, an alluding or imitating text can “activate” earlier texts according to many radically different strategies, and these strategies seem to be conditioned by the changing vocabularies used by the literary community to discuss the idea of precession per se.¹

I want to focus on Browning’s “activation” of Shelley, both as text and as poetic ideal, but I also want at least to suggest how the Victorian norms that govern Browning’s mode of activation differ from those which precede it among Romantic and Augustan poets.

In the eighteenth century, poetic imitation usually entails a rivalry, a competitive displacement of the ancient poet by the modern, or vice versa. By contrast, the great Romantic writers, beginning with Wordsworth’s prefaces to the Lyrical Ballads, abandon this Augustan metonymic model in favor of a metaphorical one in which the contemporary poet relates to his predecessor mainly by resembling him. The poet may discover this similitude by finding a language for feelings shared by all men, as in Wordsworth, or he may encounter resemblance as a duty or responsibility, as in Shelley’s Preface to The Cenci or Defence of Poetry, where the modern poet is urged to do for his age what the ancient poets did for their own.

I associate the Romantic solution with metaphor, and I mean to evoke a particularly Romantic kind of metaphor. This Romantic metaphor reveals, in Shelley’s terms, “the before unapprehended relations of things,” where by “relations” he means similarities.² Metaphor discovers and multiplies similitudes until the world of discrete particulars and categories seems, by implication, to contain a principle of unity. Shelley’s own version may be well illustrated by the famous series of similes from “To a Skylark”:

Like a Poet hidden
In the light of thought,
Singing hymns unbidden,
Till the world is wrought
To sympathy with hopes and fears it heeded not:

Like a high-born maiden
In a palace-tower,
Soothing her love-laden
Soul in secret hour

With music sweet as love, which overflows her bower:

Like a glow-worm golden
In a dell of dew,
Scattering unbeheld
Its aerial hue

Among the flowers and grass, which screen it from the view!

Like a rose embowered
In its own green leaves,
By warm winds deflowered,
Till the scent it gives

Makes faint with too much sweet those heavy-winged thieves:

Sound of vernal showers
On the twinkling grass,
Rain-awakened flowers,
All that ever was

Joyous, and clear, and fresh, thy music doth surpass: . . .

Shelley establishes the repetition of similitude stylistically, through the parallelism of the stanza form and syntax, and thematically by placing a poet, a maiden, a glowworm and a rose each within a sheltering or secret enclosure from which a mysterious emanation pours forth. Through this sequence, the Poet is metaphorically linked to the skylark—the idealized singer in the heavens—just as all true poets are said to be “like” one another in Shelley’s prose statements.

This Romantic paradigm more or less assumes that the world always has and always will contain poets. To the England of the 1830’s, however, a plenitude of great writers can no longer be taken for granted. The deaths of Keats, Shelley, and Byron and the withdrawal of Wordsworth correspond to a time in which serious doubts have already arisen as to whether a modern materialist England can sustain the development of poetic genius. A few, like Carlyle, rejoice in the demise of poetry, but writers like Francis Jeffrey offer a more typical response. Recalling the sense of “discovery and enterprise” which accompanied the first Romantic experiments, Jeffrey laments in bewilderment their subsequent disappearance:

Then came, in rapid succession, the poetical miracles of our age: we lent our charmed senses to the witcheries of Scott, the passion of Byron, the high metaphysics of Wordsworth, the wonderful and unearthly melodies of Shelley; and, when the unexampled richness of that period had wasted itself in excess of luxuriance, we still listened for a space to the prolonged echoes of inferior yet sweet minstrelsy. The popularity of the art was maintained, and poetry contained a matter of common literary interest, through the exertions of many who attained not to the first rank, after these had become silent. Those were times in which critics flourished, and bore a part . . . in the general prosperity of the commonwealth of the Muses. But they are past, and no visible tokens seem to announce their return. Even while many of our best poets are yet alive, poetry herself is dead or entranced.3

The recurring theme of this nostalgic period is the loss of continuity in English poetry, and while the Romantic strove to resemble the great poets of the past after the Augustans had struggled to surpass them, Victorians began to feel a need to re-establish human contact, to recreate a semblance of that continuous “current of ideas” which Arnold said the modern poet could “nowhere find” in his immediate literary environment.4

This nostalgia, I think, is the relevant context for the opening lines of Browning’s well-known invocation to Shelley in Pauline:

Sun-treader, life and light be thine for ever!
Thou art gone from us; years go by and spring
Gladdens and the young earth is beautiful,
Yet thy songs come not, other bards arise,
But none like thee: they stand, thy majestic,
Like mighty works which tell some spirit there
Hath sat regardless of neglect and scorn,
Till, its long task completed, it hath risen
And left us, never to return, and all
Rush in to peer and praise when all in vain. (11. 151-60)5

The great poet is gone, and none replace him. The world values Shelley now, but Browning has not always been so certain that others shared his love of the “sun-treader.” A few lines later, he offers a crucial metaphor stating his discovery of comradeship in worship. This metaphor “activates” the actual influence of Shelley in many particulars of its imagery and diction, and yet it anticipates a very different kind of metaphor which is characteristic of Browning’s later work. It represents, in other words, a moment of transition in which Browning is straining both to use and to escape Shelleyan metaphoric language. Moreover, it reveals patterns of thinking about past poets which are different from those of Shelley, transforming the Romantic analogical mode into one which embodies the Victorian desire to re-establish a lost continuity. Browning tells us he has worshipped Shelley,

As one should worship long a sacred spring
Scarse worth a moth’s fitting, which long grasses cross,
And one small tree embowers droopingly—
Joying to see some wandering insect won
To live in its few rushes, or some locust
To pasture on its boughs, or some wild bird
Stoop for its freshness from the trackless air:
And then should find it but the fountain-head,
Long lost, of some great river washing towns
And towers, and seeing old woods which will live
But by its banks untried of human foot,
Which, when the great sun sinks, lie quivering
In light as some thing lieth half of life
Before God’s foot, waiting a wondrous change;
Then girt with rocks which seek to turn or stay
Its course in vain, for it does ever spread
Like a sea’s arm as it goes rolling on,
Being the pulse of some great country—so
Wast thou to me, and art thou to the world! (11. 172-90)

Some affinities with Shelley are obvious, especially the use

4. See, for example, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” in Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold, ed. A. Dwight

of the river which is so central to poems like “Alastor” and “Mont Blanc” and to the philosophical speculations of Shelley’s essays and correspondence. The symbolic potential of the river’s source fascinated Shelley, and he often called these originating fountains “sacred” as Browning does. They may also be symbols of past poetry or the poet’s thought, as when Shelley reminds Maria Gisborne of

of the river
how we sought
Those deepest wells of passion or of thought
Wrought by wise poets in the waste of years,
Staining their sacred waters with our tears; . . .

Here the Shelleyan metaphor again creates an analogy between the speaking poet and other “wise poets”: as the passions of the latter provide the hidden well-spring of a stream, so the quest for passion yields a similar outflowing of waters in the tears of Shelley and his friend. Thus, both the modern poet and the poets he reads are parts of that repeating metaphorical projection of which the “Poet hidden/In the light of thought” and the skylark are also parts.

Browning’s image of the wild bird is also a common one in Shelley, as is the tower in the town and the general landscape surrounding the river “girt” with stones and “embowered” by trees. The Browning passage is not an imitation of any particular poem in Shelley, but if it has a principal antecedent, it is probably “Mont Blanc.” Browning’s river is “Like a sea’s arm as it goes rolling,/Being the pulse of some great country,” while, in “Mont Blanc,” “one majestic River,/The breath and blood of distant lands, for ever/Rolls its loud waters to the ocean waves.” Browning’s “sacred spring” may be read as a transformation of the “secret springs” in Shelley’s poem, from which “The source of human thought its tribute brings/Of waters.” This connection is rendered all the more appropriate by the fact that Shelley’s metaphorical equivalent of these secret springs of thought is a “feeble brook” that empties into a great river.

I mention these details because it has often been assumed that the influence of Shelley had, in Mrs. Orr’s terms, “passed away with [Browning’s] earliest youth.”6 Pauline is not a poem of Browning’s earliest youth, yet some actual reliance on Shelley clearly remained important. Indeed, I think the 1830’s were a period of tension for Browning, a period in which his desire to write his way nearer to Shelley conflicted with the reverse movement of Victorian linguistic and conceptual norms away from those of the Romantic era. I think we can see this latter movement in Browning’s use of metaphor in Pauline. Even the poem’s most Shelleyan moments reveal an organizational logic which renders the text of Shelley a dying, if not already dead, letter.

The Romantic model elaborates by repetition, and the single most conspicuous repetition in the Browning passage is the word some, which appears six times in the nineteen lines. This is a Shelleyan favorite. The best example from “Mont Blanc” occurs when the poet, addressing the Arve ravine, states that “One legion of [his] wild thoughts” seeks “In the still cave of the witch Poesy . . . Ghosts of all things that are, some shade of thee, / Some phantom, some faint image; . . .” Phrase repetition, though simpler than in our earlier examples, signifies an unbounded extension of the catalogue to include “all things that are.”

The lines which contain the first three instances of some in Browning’s invocation to Shelley seem to me, if taken out of context, indistinguishable linguistically from some of the most typical passages in Shelley’s own writing. Browning compares his discovery of Shelley to the discovery of a sacred spring and indicates his delight in converting occasional other readers to his devotion by extending the metaphor:

Joying to see some wandering insect won
To live in its few rushes, or some locust
To pasture on its boughs, or some wild bird
Stoop for its freshness from the trackless air: . . .

The indefinite determiners introduce three nouns in parallel phrases, and the nouns have a readily discernible level of semantic equivalence; each is a figure for a person discovering the joys and sustenance of the sacred spring of Shelley’s poetry. We might, from this observation, want to generalize as we have done for Shelley by saying that Browning is creating a paradigm which becomes ontologically inclusive in the final line of the metaphor: “so / Wast thou to me, and art thou to the world!” But if we were to stop here, we would seriously distort the metaphor as a whole.

Internally, Browning’s three parallel phrases each link an animal (insect, locust, and bird) to its new-found natural environment (rushes, boughs, and freshness [water]). Syntactically, this relation is provided by the same participle-plus-infinite construction in each case: “[won to live],” “[won to pasture],” and “[won to stoop].” Moreover, the “environment-series” (rushes-boughs-freshness) has already appeared in the preceding three lines: water in the sacred spring itself, rushes as the long grasses which cross the spring, and boughs in the small tree which “embower” it. In this wider context, however, it is possi-

ble to see that these noun sequences are not of the same type as the Shelleyan sequence, Poet—maiden—glowworm—rose. In linguistic terms, despite the parallelism of the second four lines, the first three lines establish a chain of association among the nouns which is syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic as it was in the Skylark similes:

As one should worship long a sacred spring
Scarce worth a moth's flitting, which long grasses cross,
And one small tree embowers droopingly—

The sentence unfolds a physical landscape in which the water, grasses and tree are spatially contingent features. This is still metaphor, but it is, to risk our own oxymoron, "metonymic metaphor" in its inner structure, since parts interact extensively in a visual panorama rather than re-embodying a single "picture of integral thoughts." The items, grasses and tree, are the subjects of relative clauses which modify, rather than parallel, the initial term, spring. The result is that, when we come to the next four lines, with their obvious syntactic parallelism, these details retain their character of being spatially organized and temporally accumulated in a continuous landscape and thus incorporate the insect, locust and bird into the same matrix. Shelley's paradigmatic stanzas display no such descriptive continuity from one nominal group to another. He is more interested in the similarity/difference relations among representatives of human, animal, and vegetable nature than in locating these details relative to one another in space and time. Browning, though he retains vestiges of Shelley's technique, replaces these discrete categories, and the poet's implied struggle to reach a higher perception of equivalence among them, with a single expanse in which each detail gives way naturally in time and space to the rest. Hence, the other three occurrences of the determiner some do not display the same apparent symmetry as the first three. The first one designates the river itself which is diachronically "downstream" from the original spring. The second occurs in an awkward half-smile, really a modifying clause for the river's banks, which functions to locate them in temporal flux by saying that they appear to be "waiting a wondrous change." And the third and last introduces "some great country" which displaces the banks, "untrod of human foot," in the poet's metaphoric journey down the river.

Critics like Harold Bloom and Walter Jackson Bate have suggested that poetic influence arises out of anxiety and desire. But Browning's desire is not like Shelley's desire. Shelley lives in a world well supplied with great poets, but his age, unlike preceding ones, seems increasingly to reject its poets; they live as outcasts and recluses.

Thus, Shelley develops metaphoric projections in poems like "To a Skylark" and the "Letter to Maria Gisborne" and in essays like the preface to Prometheus Unbound and the Defence of Poetry whereby the modern poet becomes analogous to his ancient predecessor as preserver of vital language, giver of wisdom and even legislator. In Pauline, however, the poet is not presented as desiring to be analogous to another poet; he wishes to make contact, to recreate a continuity which has been lost in time. Thus, he fantasizes, trying to distend some ephemeral vestige of the lost past to inhabit the present in the person of Shelley: "The air seems bright with thy past presence yet." The poet recognizes the oxymoron in "past presence" and yet he persists in his fantasy:

But thou art still for me as thou hast been
When I have stood with thee as on a throne
With all thy dim creations gathered round
Like mountains, and I felt of mould like them,
And with them creatures of my own were mixed,
Like things half-lived, catching and giving life. (ll. 162–167)

In Browning's projection, he stands with Shelley in contiguous space, and his poetic creations are "mixed," almost as though socially, with Shelley's own.

This discursive mixing, this permeability of the poet's creations allowing past and present to flow together in an exchange of life, is the quality sought in predecessors by many other Victorians besides Browning. The Edinburgh Review, for example, complains in 1836 that Byron's poetry lacks just this capacity for mixing and is therefore not a congenial model for the Victorian poet:

[Byron's poetry] stands . . . by itself, a pyramid of black and dazzling marble—proud, monumental, barren; while all our poets of any really creative character, conscious of possessing, and determined to retain their personal identity, seem to be turning elsewhere for those assimilating and pervading qualities which are destined to feed them in their growth. 7

Victorian poets need to "assimilate" and be "pervaded" by their models, and Browning is no exception in his longing for Shelley. Still, there is a dimness to his vision; Shelley can only be brought to a kind of half-life through the intensity of abstract desire. The story must be told again; it must be made more alive through metaphor. Hence, Browning gives his fantasy a local habitation in the nineteen lines I have been analyzing. The metaphoric juxtaposition there is not between one poet and another, or between the emanations of two poets as in the "Letter to Maria Gisborne"; it is between the predecessor poet

and a more accessible allegorical sign of him. Browning, the present poet, is not likening himself to Shelley; he is trying to make Shelley less distant from him. He cannot literally draw nearer; his creatures and Shelley’s can never truly “mix” in the medium of historical time, and he can never walk with Shelley in the same “landscape.” So he invents a metaphoric landscape, a “country” in which the figure for himself and the natural symbol of Shelley—Shelley’s own image of the great river—interact contiguously in time and space. This is still fantasy, but the restatement brings Browning nearer the ideal of human contact with the lost poet. His fictional “country” begins as a private world of nature, the sacred spring, and through an unbroken following of the water’s course, the poet is brought back to that social world of men which had been so empty of poets. But now Shelley, abstracted in time and space by the image of the river, has survived in the world of men: “so / Wast thou to me, and art Thou to the world!” This too is metaphoric projection, but the projection is a horizontal displacement bridging an unsettling discontinuity.

“Activating” past writers and texts in order to project the repair of discontinuity survived in Browning’s writing far beyond the fascination with Shelley. He continues to use metaphor to explain his use of earlier texts, and those metaphors display the features and bear the implications that were progressive in the example from Pauline. What does change is the nature of the models Browning chooses. In his earlier works, he used his Romantic predecessors as a source of diction, imagery, and poetic phrasing. But as he experimented with post-Romantic literary forms, he drew on his reading mostly for subject matter. The most celebrated instance is, of course, that Old Yellow Book which prompted him to write his most ambitious poem, and the title of that work introduces Browning’s most famous metaphor.

In the opening verse paragraph of The Ring and the Book, Browning explains how ancient goldsmiths forged a gold ring. They made the hard gold soft by alloying it with honey and wax. Then they formed it into the shape of a ring and repurified the gold by drawing off the honey and wax with acid. This, he explains, “signifies” the way The Ring and the Book was written; the Old Yellow Book is the raw gold, Browning adds a certain “something” of his own to make it malleable, and his own poem is produced like the goldsmith’s ring.

From the book, yes; thence bit by bit I dug
The lingot truth, that memorable day,
Assayed and knew my piecemeal gain was gold,—

Yes; but from something else surpassing that,
Something of mine which, mixed up with the mass,
Made it bear hammer and be firm to file.
Fancy with fact is just one fact the more;
To wit, that fancy has informed, transmeped,
Thripped and so thrown fast the facts else free,
As right through ring and ring runs the djerreed
And binds the loose, one lar without a break.
I fused my live soul and that inert stuff,
Before attempting smithcraft, on the night
After the day when—truth thus grasped and gained—
The book was shut and done with and laid by. (I, 452-66)8

Though the language has changed a great deal since Pauline, and the youthful attempts to think analogically like Shelley have been abandoned long ago, this metaphor nevertheless displays a surprising similarity to that earlier metaphor for the poet’s confrontation with his source. It has a narrative syntax and structure, moving through a process of physical transformation, and it offers a model of engagement, rather than resemblance, between the poet and the antecedent text or writer. Browning “mixes” something of his own with the “inert” gold of the book, just as “creatures of my own were mixed” with the dead Shelley’s creations in Pauline. Moreover, we find that the temporal path of the metaphor moves from the discovery of a private treasure toward the presentation of that treasure, in a more accessible version, to the world at large. Hence Browning begins his poem by invoking the “British Public, ye who like me not,” and ends with a transformed address to the “British Public, who may like me yet.” The process of “smithcraft,” like the journey down the river, is designed to bridge the gap between the private knowledge of the poet and the collective consciousness of his audience. But, as in Pauline, this is more than an attempt to gain favor with the reading public. Browning’s poem, and his metaphor, are more deeply an effort to re-establish linkage with a lost past. The paragraph which first addresses the British public continues:

Truth must prevail, the proverb vows; and truth
—Here is it all i’ the book at last, as first
There it was all i’ the heads and hearts of Rome
Gentle and simple, never to fall nor fade
Nor be forgotten. Yet, a little while,
The passage of a century or so,
Decades thrice five, and here’s time paid his tax,
Oblivion gone home with her harvesting,
And all left smooth again as scythe could shave.
Far from beginning with you London folk,
I took my book to Rome first, tried truth’s power
On likely people. ‘Have you met such names?

Is a tradition extant of such facts?
Your law-courts stand, your records frown a-row:
What if I love and rummage?" "—Why, you'll waste
Your pains and end as wise as you began!"
Every one snickered: "names and facts thus old
Are newer much than Europe news we find
Down in to day’s Diario. Records, quotha?
Why, the French burned them, what else do the French?
The rap- and -rending nation! (I, 408–28)

The reality of the story in his book is lost forever beyond a
gulf of temporal discontinuity. This is the context for the metaphor of the ring, just as the sense of disjunction
between the generation of great Romantic poets and the
world of the 1830’s was the context for the metaphor of the river. Browning’s first response to an ancient story is to desire further knowledge, to find the reality beyond the account. We would have the participants in his murder plot become real people with verifiable histories. But the

intervening centuries are a barrier, an irrevocable and
violent dissociation. The old book may point to a reality, but it will forever be a reality that cannot be known, that
cannot be seen. It is from this absence, and this desire, that
the metaphor of the ring, and the poet’s mixing of fancy
with fact to make “just one fact the more,” derives. Whatever contact with the distant but tantalizing past has been lost the poet must reconstruct through a process of fusion; he desires, as Browning says in the final lines of The Ring and the Book, to create a “rare gold ring of verse . . .
Linking our England to his Italy.” This desire, in one form or another, engages most of the major Victorian poets, and it persists into the twentieth century, though by the time of Pound and Eliot, new problems, new ideologies have interceded to alter radically once again the forms in which a writer is able to “activate” his predecessors.

Stanford University

“The Intricate Evasions of As”: Meredith’s Theory of Figure

Michael Sprinker

"A more severe,
More harassing master would extemporize
Subter, more urgent proof that the theory
Of poetry is the theory of life,
As it is, in the intricate evasions of as . . . .”
—Wallace Stevens, “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”

“There’s nothing like a metaphor for an evasion.”
—Meredith, Beauchamp’s Career

The novels of George Meredith offer an excellent instance of the opposition or tension, formulated by Jacques Derrida in Of Grammatology, between what a text “declares” and what it “describes.” Put simply, the distinction opposes the propositional truths that the text affirms over and over again (declaration) to those situations, events, or conditions that the text articulates without announcing their propositional authority for the text as a whole (description). Each excludes the other according to the rule of logic, and yet neither has priority over the other. “Declaration” and “description” give rise to each other at the moment of the text’s beginning, inaugurating a process of simultaneous cancellation and preservation that creates and sustains the text. The ceaseless process of cancellation and preservation is designated by Derrida “differance.” Differance is, then, the imaginary point of departure for every text and the imaginary limit toward which every reading of a text will tend.

Derrida explains the delicate relationship between a writing structured by “differance” and the critical reading that takes this structural principle into account in the following way:

the writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them only by letting himself, after a fashion and up to a point, be governed by the system. And the reading must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce.

Critical reading thus brings into the open what is at least


3. Ibid., p. 158.
partially concealed in the text itself. The reader "deconstructs" the text by juxtaposing those elements of "declaration" and "description" that are embedded in the text but which the text itself does not openly recognize as opposed. Critical reading is thus grounded in the text but not identical with it. Any reading supplements a piece of writing rather than duplicates its meaning.

Meredith's later novels, beginning with Beauchamp's Career (1877), make a continual "declaration" with respect to three closely related problems: figurative language, the nature of texts, and intersubjective relations. A frequently quoted passage from One of Our Conquerors (1891) introduces these three problems:

The internal state of a gentleman who detests intangible metaphor as heartily as the vulgarest of our gobbledgobblers hate it, metaphor only can describe and for the reason, that he had in him just something more than is within the compass of the language of the meat-markets. He had ... sufficient stuff to furnish forth a soul's epic encounter between Nature and Circumstance: and metaphor, simile, analysis, all the fraternity of old lamps for lighting our abysmal darkness, have to be rubbed, that we may get a glimpse of the fray (XVII:314).

Meredith's difficulty is this: how to represent internal states of mind or consciousness. What kind of language would be appropriate to represent the contents of thought? In the previous paragraph Meredith describes Dudley Sowerby's (the "gentleman who detests intangible metaphor") "disordered deeper sentiments" in an elaborate and characteristically Meredithian conceit: "... his disordered deeper sentiments ... were a diver's wreck, where an armoured livid submarine, a monstrous puff-ball of man, wandered seriously light in heaviness; trebling his hundredweights to keep him from dancing like a bladder-block of elastic lumber ..." (XVII:314). In representing consciousness through the medium of language, only such figurative expressions are adequate for the task; only "metaphor, simile, analysis, all the fraternity of old lamps" provide the necessary illumination to "catch a glimpse" of the depths of thought. Meredith "declares" that no referential language is available to portray consciousness, that only metaphor, however "intangible" it may be, can reflect or describe states of mind. Later in the novel, Meredith reaffirms this passage when he entitles chapter XXXV "In Which We Again Make Use of the Old Lamps for Lighting an Abysmal Darkness." And yet, Meredith in effect confesses to his inability to talk about figurative language itself, except in another figure, when he defines "metaphor, simile, analysis" as "the fraternity of old lamps." Metaphors are truly "intangible," since they are explicable, intelligible, articulable only as other metaphors. An earlier passage in the same novel clarifies this idea:

It is the excelling merit of similes and metaphors to spring us to vault over gaps and thickets and dreary places. But, as with the visits of Immortals, we must be ready to receive them. Beware, moreover, of examining them too scrupulously: they have a trick of wearing to vapour if closely scanned (XVII:189).

The ambiguity or indefiniteness of similes and metaphors is both a blessing and a curse. The "gaps and thickets and dreary places" that figurative language "vaults over" mark a substantial space left vacant by the linguistic sign (figure). The vacancy is situated in the structure of the sign itself, which is subject to explication and elaboration, what Meredith terms "examining too scrupulously" the meaning of any figure. The enterprise of defining or explicating the figure generates merely an infinite proliferation of further figures ("the visits of Immortals," "the fraternity of old lamps"). The metaphor of metaphor, the figure of figure that is beyond the play of figure itself, the zero level of metaphorical discourse perpetually escapes Meredith (and any writer), leaving behind only the endlessly reverberating collision of one figure with another. Meredith's texts thus "declare" that language is originally and irreducibly figurative, that it is structured by "difference."

But to return to my original quotation and the problem of representing consciousness in language. Meredith's difficulty derives from the discontinuity between language and consciousness. The complexity of human thought requires a similarly complex mode of discourse to represent it, metaphor or figure. Representation does not, however, achieve transparency, for figurative language, itself complex and opaque, resists analysis. To attempt to penetrate the depths of thought or emotion plunges one into the infinite play of signification that is language. To comprehend the mind of another person, one must treat his mind as a text, as a configuration of verbal signs requiring interpretation.

Often in Meredith's later novels, one character per-

4. As Derrida has argued, the system of signs in language has no "transcendental signified," no "center," no fixed or simple point of origin from which meaning originates and to which interpretation can be referred. This condition of language "extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum." "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970), p. 249.

5. Similar passages to the ones I have quoted may be found in several of Meredith's later novels, notably in Beauchamp's Career (XI: 121), Lord Ormonde and His Aminta (XVIII:41), and Diana of the Crossways (XVI:275).
ceives another as a book, manuscript, some written or inscribed document, as a text in short. In a striking passage from Beaufchamp’s Career, for example, Madame d’Auffray considers Nevil Beauchamp as an “interesting edition of the Book of Man”:

Madame d’Auffray struck the note of intimacy earlier than is habitual. She sounded him in this way once or twice, carelessly pursuing him, and waiting for the interesting edition of the Book of Man to summarize its character by showing its pages or remaining shut. It was done delicately, like the tap of a fingernail on a vase. He rang clear; he had nothing to conceal; and where he was reserved, that is, in speaking of developed beauty and grace of Renee, he was transparent. She read the sort of man he was . . . (XI:254).

As a text, Beauchamp is, according to Madame d’Auffray, transparent, non-figurative. Madame d’Auffray claims to overcome the usual opacity inherent in any text. But the larger text, the context in which Beauchamp himself “lives,” the novel Beauchamp’s Career, discloses quite a different reading of Beauchamp. He proves to be anything but transparent, for he frequently acts against his own interests, occasionally even against his own principles, wavering between one course of action and another. Nevil Beauchamp turns out to be, like so many of Meredith’s heroes, a virtual enigma, a complicated mixture of diverse and contradictory elements that render his character opaque, his motivations obscure. As a text, Beauchamp is all but unreadable.

Another of Meredith’s readers of character, Willoughby Patterne in The Egoist, presents a paradigm of the liabilities inherent in reading the text of character. “Deeply read in the Book of Egoism” (XIII:196), Willoughby finds himself unable to pierce the mysteries of characters like Clara Middleton:

Miss Middleton’s features were legible as to the mainspring of her character. He could have seen that she had a spirit with a natural love of liberty, and required the next thing to liberty, spaciousness, if she was to own allegiance. Those features, unhappily, instead of serving for an introduction to the within, were treated as the mirror of himself (XIII: 51-52).

Willoughby fails as reader and interpreter, for everyone, he believes, reflects himself. All books are his book, the Book of Egoism. He can recognize only signs that are part of his own self-conception. With some characters (less complex texts), this habit of reading is somewhat effective. For example, Willoughby manipulates Dr. Middleton with ease because he has grasped the essence of the Dr.’s character, his taste for fine wine. But with characters like Clara, Horace de Craye, and Vernon Whitford, Willoughby fails as a reader, disastrously, for he sees only his own reflection in their features.

Though Willoughby’s misunderstanding of Clara is the principal subject of the novel, other defective readers abound. Mrs. Mountstuart Jenkinson, who bestows the memorable epithets on Clara (“a dainty rogue in porcelain”) and on Willoughby (“he has a leg”), for all her vaunted brilliance in capturing the essence of character in a phrase, at best reads surfaces successfully. Her epithets have “an outline in vagueness” and are “flung out to be apprehended, not dissected” (XIII:51). The density and complexity of a character are inaccessible to Mrs. Mountstuart’s brief and superficial readings. Clara, similarly blinded, remains for the most part as insensitive to Willoughby as he is to her. Dr. Middleton misconstrues everything and misunderstands everyone, most of all his daughter, whose distaste for Willoughby remains a total mystery to him. Everyone in the novel misreads character, as do readers faced with the problem of interpreting and unravelling the web of characters, events, and language of Meredith’s text.

Meredith’s novels “declare” all of these problems of interpretation: the textuality of character, the play of signification to infinity inherent in language, and the opacity of any character/text. At the same time, and in irreconcilable opposition to these declarations, Meredith “describes” a model of intersubjective relations that is outside the pale of language and, seemingly, not subject to the liabilities of interpretation. One brief quotation illustrates the innocent, transparent communication through gesture that Meredith typically opposes to the labyrinth of language. Near the end of One of Our Conquerors, Dartrey Fenellan and Nesta Radnor hold hands, exchange a few words, and eventually sink into a silence in which more passes between them than words can express:

But here is the place of broken ground and tangle, which calls to honourable men, not bent on sport, to be wary to guard the gunlock. He stopped the word at his mouth. It was not in him to stop or moderate the force of his eyes. She met them with the slender unbendingness that was her own; a feminine of inspirted manhood. There was no soft expression, only the direct shot of light, on both sides; conveying as much as is born from sun to earth, from earth to sun. And when such an exchange has come between the two, they are past plighting, they are the wedded one.

6. See Diana of the Crossways (XVI:134, 151, 326-28, 417); One of Our Conquerors (XVII:547-58, 416); and Lord Ormonde and His Amina (XVIII:64-65, 119, 227-58, 289).
7. In a typical moment early in the novel, Willoughby encounters Laetitia Dale and proceeds “to read deeply in her eyes. He found the man he sought there, squeezed him passionately, and let her go” (XIII:29-30). Willoughby’s shame in the second half of the novel is due in large measure to his inability to discern in Laetitia more than a projection of his own desires.
Nesta felt it, without asking whether she was loved (XVII:458-59).

Similar passages occur in a number of Meredith's later novels: in the scene between Clara Middleton and Vernon Whittford at the railway station in *The Egoist* (XIV:324); in the kiss that Diana Warwick bestows on her landlady's children at the end of *Diana of the Crossways* (XVI: 492-93); and in the famous swimming scene near the end of *Lord Ormont and his Aminta* (XVIII:324-25). These passages "describe" a primitive or innocent means of communication (gesture) that takes precedence over language; they depict acts of touching and physical intimacy that are simple, unambiguous, outside the play of figure that characterizes language. Individuals in such situations cease to be complex and opaque texts and become transparent to each other. An extraordinary clairvoyance replaces the possibility of misreading, of misconstruing the language of another. Meredith's novels evince a nostalgia for this pre-linguistic innocence, this language that is no language, this complete interpenetration of one mind with another that would eliminate the pervasive egoism separating characters like Willoughby Patterne and Clara Middleton.

But Meredith openly proclaims, in the very texts in which these passages occur, that individuals are related to each other through acts of interpretation which constitute a reader-text relationship, and that the text presented by one character to another is complicated and dense and resists interpretation. Moreover, Meredith himself "declares," in a number of passages, that consciousness and language are discontinuous, that only by a metaphorical "leap" can consciousness be approached at all, and that in such a leap one forfeits the possibility of transparent representation by falling into the infinite play of figure. Further, the passages "describing" an appeal to non-figurative, non-linguistic communication takes themselves clogged by language as opaque and dense with figure as any other in Meredith's novels. Nesta Radnor and Dartrey Fenellan meet on a "place of broken ground," a metaphor for the discontinuity between feeling and expression. To indicate the magnitude of the feeling that passes between them, Meredith resorts to the age-old topos of the light of the sun shining on the earth. The text expresses a desire that is frustrated by the inability of any text to escape from the universe of discourse into which all texts are born. This paradox of frustrated desire is the ground of all writing, the means by which writing comes into being, but a ground that cannot be posited as an origin, since it is of the nature of this origin to efface itself at the very moment of origination. Meredith's wish to embrace or achieve a pre-linguistic innocence is an intention, a desire, inscribed within a system of discourse (the system of figures and tropes present in the western family of languages from the beginning). This desire is paradoxical because what is inscribed is precisely the will to be free of and thereby to dominate all such systems. The origin of language, the zero level of metaphorical discourse, the language of transparency, must perpetually elude the writer, as Meredith shows. His later novels recognize the impossibility of such a language, while longing for a time and a space in which this language could exist.

In adumbrating the "intricate evasions" of figurative language, Meredith's later novels resemble Victor Radnor in *One of Our Conquerors*. Just as the novels seek vainly to attain a language beyond the play of figure, Victor spends the whole of his life futilely pursuing his great "Idea":

A short run or attempt at running after the idea, ended in pain to his head near the spot where the haunting word punctilio caught at any excuse for clamouring. Yet we cannot relinquish an idea that was ours; we are vowed to the pursuit of it. Mr. Radnor lighted on the tracks, by dint of a thought flung at his partner Mr. Inchling's dread of the Jews. Inchling dreaded Scotchmen as well, and Americans, and Armenians, and Greeks: latterly Germans hardly less; but his dread of absorption in Jewry, signifying subjection, had often precipitated a deplorable shrug, in which Victor Radnor now perceived the skirts of his idea, even to a fancy that something of the idea must have struck Inchling when he shrugged: the idea being . . . he had lost it again. Definition seemed to be an exirpiating enemy of this idea, or she was by nature shy. She was very feminine; coming when she willed and flying when wanted. Not until nigh upon the close of his history did she return, full-swarmed and embraceable, to Victor Radnor (XVII:11).

[ellipsis in the text]

The return of the idea, the definition that eludes Radnor, occurs in the penultimate chapter of the novel, entitled "The Night of the Great Undelivered Speech." Radnor never delivers his discourse on the political destiny of England and his role in that destiny. The "Idea" is never spoken; fame and a permanent place in English history elude Victor Radnor in the same way that an innocent, non-figurative language eludes Meredith's novels. The idea of such a language lies forever buried in an undelivered and undeliverable speech.

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Victorian Philology and Victorian Poetry

Dennis Taylor

The relation between Victorian philology and Victorian poetry has, surprisingly, never been studied. Yet it is as important as the relation, for example, between Renaissance rhetorical theory and Renaissance poetry. Victorian philology can illuminate the poetry and answer some long-standing critical questions, and the poetry can interpret in original ways the implications of the philology. Given the importance of Victorian philology in itself and its special relationship to poetic language, I am not sure why this central topic has been neglected—unless it be the apparent dryness of the topic and the post-Saussurean distrust of the historicist approach to language. In recent years, however, there has been a revival of interest in the relation between the study of mind and the history of language, and between the so-called diachronic and synchronic approaches to language.

My two examples are Hardy and Hopkins. Both believed in something like the "real language of men" as a poetic ideal. Yet the language of both is characterized by startling contrivance and archaism. While they share this paradox, their poetics are also profoundly different. Seeing them in the context of Victorian philology can help explain the paradox and the difference.

Both Hardy (1840–1928) and Hopkins (1844–1889) came to poetic consciousness in the 1860’s, the decade in which the New English Dictionary was begun. The new comparative philology had had a fairly late start in England. In 1786 Sir William Jones had made his famous statement about the relation of Sanskrit, Latin and Greek to "some common source." But only in the 1830's and 1840's did Benjamin Thorpe and John Kemble begin to argue successfully for the new philology based on careful observation and comparison of knowable languages. Their work climaxed in Richard Trench's immensely influential On the Study of Words (1851), reprinted many times. It served as the chief inspiration for work on the new dictionary, while Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon served as its model. The 1860's also saw the founding of the Early English Text Society, the beginning of Skeat's work on Piers Plowman, the Royal Institution lectures of Max Müller, influential publications by William Barnes, George Marsh, Frederic Farrar, as well as studies in other fields where philology served as a powerful metaphor: for geology and paleontology in the Origin of Species (1859), for religious and intellectual history in Essays and Reviews (1860) by Benjamin Jowett and his colleagues. I am citing only those writers whom we know either Hardy or Hopkins read. Both mention Müller, Barnes, Jowett, Darwin, and Liddell and Scott. Barnes interested both Hardy and Hopkins because this Dorset poet and philologist posed for them many of the issues of Victorian philology as it related to poetry. The dialect he studied and used for his poems illustrated a vitality and complexity which rivalled standard English. At the same time, this dialect was an example of a real language of men which had grown obsolescent and obscure. This problem, how to write poetry in a language which is going through historical change, was a major challenge for Hardy and Hopkins.

This poetic challenge was closely related to many philosophical questions of the time. What is the nature of language? Is it like a man-made institution, as Whitney argued, which sets up arbitrary relationships between sound and sense? Or is it more like a natural organism, grown up around roots which are the instinctive verbal equivalents of what is signified—as Müller argued? Does language change as a result of conscious choice or as a result of unconscious organic laws? What is the relationship between language and thought? Obsolescent language was a problem not only for the poet but also for thinkers in other fields—philosophy, religion, culture, politics—where obsolete terms forestall proper understanding. What is the origin of language? Answering this question, of course, would answer the others. Trench expressed well the historicist hope "If we would know what a man really is, we must know his 'antecedents'. . . . This is quite as true about words. If we would know what they now are, we must know what they have been."

It is difficult to recapture the excitement raised by philological issues in the 1860's. To sum up briefly, we can say that philology then was led by a possibility and a paradox. The possibility was that the pedigree of the English language might be constructed, namely the subtle sound and sense changes which had transformed old into modern English. Some hoped that the proto-Indo-European ancestor of English might be reconstructed, and a few (returning to 18th century types of speculation) hoped that Indo-European might lead the researcher to the origin of language itself. The paradox of Victorian philology is that

while the importance of origins for ultimate understanding was asserted, the possibility of recovering ultimate origins was denied: “The path is lost in obscurity as it is traced backwards towards its starting point:—it becomes not only invisible, but unimaginable; it is not only an interruption, but an abyss, which interposes itself between us and any intelligible account of things.”2 Victorian philology succeeded precisely because it had avoided the "etymological metaphysics"3 associated with the 18th century. Trench, who merely assumed a divine origin for language, patiently reconstructed recent historical changes. While this reconstruction made for good philology, it also frustrated philosophy. Philology opened and then closed the doors to ultimate self-understanding. The Victorian who put his hopes in philology was liable to find himself on a darkling plain between a hidden past and a hidden future, caught in linguistic, intellectual, and cultural frames whose ultimate implications were withheld from him.

Hardy is a central poet for Victorian philology because he expresses these implications so well. His poem “The Masked Face”4 presents the conscious mind, caught in a "great surging space" between two doors and asking the ultimate questions: “How do I come here?” The mind gets no answer, but the masked face contemplates the mind to a "goosequill pen" that once "complained . . . To the scribe of the Infinite / Of the words it had to write / Because they were past its ken." The image of a pen asking the meaning of what it is writing captures beautifully the frustration of a mind trying to get outside its own thoughts and words in order to understand their nature. Understanding is "past" the mind’s ken in two senses: outside of its comprehension and temporally past its point of origin. “The Pedigree” is Hardy’s classic statement of the issue:

And then did I divine
That every heave and coil and move I made
Within my brain, and in my mood and speech
Was in the glass portrayed
As long forestalled by their so making it;
The first of them, the primest fuglemen of my line,
Being fogged in far antiqueness past surprize and reason’s reach.

Hardy is controlled by ancient words which he cannot know. His self-understanding is endlessly forestalled, deferred. Words continue to diversify and point back to a receding point of origin which is real but unrecuperable.

Hardy dramatizes this theme in his choice of language. His choice of rare, archaic and obsoleten words usually fits his theme. Where the obsolescence of religious creeds is described, they will be called “sacred, deceased Catholics.” The lover caught by an aging myth is called “faint of my joyance.” The secret of words which bind the mind is lost because the past keeps changing, leaving us in “riddles of years ago” as in “Neutral Tones.” Even the present is forestalled in archaic linguistic forms: “I scarcely witted what/Might pend” Hardy writes in “An Experience.” For that matter, even the future becomes forestalled, already over, because of the linguistic forms in which it is projected: “What I foreframed in thought / Grew substanted by force of affinity.” Hardy’s words for knowing, like “warefulness,” “wot of,” “witted,” “forethinking,” “weeted” are puns on the stealthy obsolescence latent in the act of consciousness. In “On an Invitation to the United States,” Hardy describes the trammels of inherited words and attitudes which have given him his life:

For, wonning in these ancient lands,
Enchased and lettered as a tomb,
And scored with prints of perished hands,
And chronicled with dates of doom
Though my own being bear no bloom
I trace the lives such scenes enshrine,
Give past exemplars present room,
And their experience count as mine.

Hardy does more than use old words as contributing metaphors. His style is characterized by an awkwardness which has traditionally puzzled his readers. The awkwardness seems to consist in his anomalous vocabulary and contrived phraseology. We can see the motivation of these stylistic features if we relate them to Hardy’s philological interests.

Hardy’s anomalous vocabulary reflects his sense that current language is a compound of many kinds of language at many stages of evolution. “It is no wonder, then,” Hardy read in Leslie Stephen, “if the belief, even of cultivated minds, is often a heterogeneous mixture of elements representing various stages of thought; whilst in different social strata we may find specimens of opinions derived from every age of mankind.”5 For Hardy the real language of men, once made into poetry, must reflect the fact that our thoughts are mediated through words which represent multiple classes and stages.


5. Hardy, Complete Poems, 390.
6. Quotations in this paragraph are, in order, from The Complete
Poetic language, for Hardy, must also reflect the fact that words segment reality in artificial ways. His notebooks contain many entries on the distortions contained in our "habitual classifications." Like Lewis Carroll, whose Alice books are an important part of this philological period, Hardy is intrigued by the language user's belief in the naturalness of language and the language analyzer's sense of its artificial complexity. We find that Hardy uses adverbial prepositions, for example, which pointedly divide up place, motion, and direction in order to dramatize the necessary awkwardness of words. "Downstairward," "shopward," "yonderwards," "thereacross," "elsewhither" are typical. The same can be said of his verbs: "upsyum," "upclomb," "outcreep," "ondrew," "outroughed." Other distinctions of language intrigue Hardy: temporal distinctions like "aherehand," "somewhiles," "anywhren," "as whilom," "thencweise"; self-world distinctions, inside-outside distinctions (ghosts are "withoutside," we are "withinside"); positive-negative distinctions ("unbloom," "unbe," "unblind," "unsight"). It is difficult to tell which of these words is coined, which archaic. This confusion fits Hardy's theme that the distinctions language makes do not immediately mirror reality but build on earlier distinctions. Each word form is a mixture of the inherited and adapted and represents a blend of old and new assumptions which it is impossible to sort out. In a sense, our minds are strung out over the centuries.

Hardy's experiments in language represent, then, his original response to philological issues heatedly debated in the 1860's. His response to these issues help explain the paradoxical artifice and sincerity of his poetry. His language comes to seem "inevitable" (Hardy's term for it) because it is rooted in Hardy profound awareness of how language grows and roots itself in the mind. For Hardy language is an institution but an institution made before we were born and which binds us in frames we have not chosen. Whatever motivated the first language—whether conscious plan or instinctive imitation—is now lost. This language, controlled by hidden roots, evolves by endless modifications whose ultimate implications cannot be gauged. It thus both like an institution, of which we have lost control, and like an organism, whose growth we cannot predict.

I lipped rough rhymes of chance, not choice,
I thought no what my words might be.  

If Hardy dramatizes the gloomy paradox of Victorian philology, Hopkins dramatizes its optimistic possibility. Hopkins reacts to a somewhat different set of Victorian philologists such as George Marsh and Frederic Farrar who were willing to speculate about the ultimate origin of language, and so clarify the relation of language to thought.

Hopkins is intrigued by the possibility that the language he speaks now is linked by steady gradations with the first language whose relation to life was immediate and spontaneous. In George Marsh, he reads: "Some philologists maintain that the laws of germination and growth of the organs are so constant, that if the structure and powers of the organs of speech, and all modifying outward conditions affecting the internal or external life of a particular race, could be precisely known, their entire language might be predicted and constructed beforehand." Hopkins' poems recapitulate the history of language and so connect its beginnings with its beginnings. The evolving elements of English evoke some ur-speech. If Hopkins could recover this primal speech, he would have spoken with God and have recovered the sources of his identity and the meaning of its history. When Hopkins addresses God, his language contains this underlying philological hope:

past all
Grasp God, throned behind
Death with a sovereignty that heeds but hides, bodes but abides.

(The Wreck of Deutschland, 82)

Hopkins is well known for his coalescence of syntactic functions. In "past all / Grasp God," for example, God is past all grasp, or we are called on to grasp God, or past all there is God's grasp. Our striving for him, in the verb, is identical with His possession of us, in the noun. Hopkins probably knew Farrar's claim that in the original innocence of language, "grammatical formulae are fused and calcined in the flame of passion." Semantic distinctions are also fused in Hopkins. Farrar describes the evolutionary phenomenon of "the same root serving for two directly opposite meanings." Consequently we cannot well reach the primitive force of the term unless we know the precise gradations through which it has gone." Hopkins' opposition between "heeds" and "hides" seems controlled by some primitive root where heeding and hiding are the same, just as God's seeming absence is really His presence. This fusion is vividly apparent in "bodes but

abides” where the meanings crisscross and coalesce. The phrase can mean “bodes invisibly but abides with us.” Conversely it can mean “announces his will [the older sense of “bode”] but abides without interfering.” Hopkins’ play on language seems to overcome the distinctions which have evolved in time and return us to a primal unity where the divisions between himself and God are overcome.

In closing, I would offer three conclusions—one relevant to Victorian studies, one relevant to all literary study, and one relevant to linguists and philosophers of language. 1) The relation of Victorian philology and Victorian literature is a rich and unexplored field. For example, Hans Aarsleff’s The Study of Language in England 1780–1860 (now out of print) should be much more important for Victorian studies than it now seems to be. 2) Stylistics, like that done for Victorian writers by Holloway, Miller, and the contributors to Levine and Madden’s The Art of Victorian Prose, can be fruitfully related to contemporary theories of the nature and history of language. 3) Three themes widely discussed in recent decades—the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the relation between the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of language, and (most recently) the origin and development of language—can be brought together and rewardingly explored in the texts of those masters of language called poets.

Boston College

The Unpleasantness at the Garrick Club

Albert Borowitz

The controversy at London’s Garrick Club over the expulsion of member Edmund Yates in 1858 led to the rupture of the fragile friendship of Dickens and Thackeray. Since the Garrick Club was organized by patrons of the theatre, it is fitting that the Club’s cause célèbre assumed the features of tragicomedy and it is in that form that it will be presented in this article.

The Setting: The Garrick Club, Covent Garden, 1858

The Garrick Club (named for the great actor David Garrick) was founded in 1831 at No. 55 King Street, near the northwest corner of the Covent Garden Market. The purposes and membership of the Club were later described in a Club report as follows:

[It was founded] for the purpose of bringing together the ‘patrons’ of the drama and its professors, and also for offering literary men a rendezvous. . . . Nearly all the leading actors are members, and there are few of the active literary men of the day who are not upon the list. The large majority of the association is composed of representatives of all the best classes of society.

Despite the snobbish tone of this announcement, the Club’s purpose to allow actors to mingle with their aristocratic admirers on equal terms was truly revolutionary in view of the fact that “theatricals” had generally been denied admission to respectable social establishments. In the very year of the formation of the Garrick Club, actors were excluded from London’s “Beefsteak Society,” although the door was open to lawyers, authors, painters and even theatre managers—so long as they resisted the temptation to appear on stage. Now the Garrick provided actors a noble home, under the titular presidency of the Duke of Devonshire. The roster of charter members included the famous actors William Macready, Charles Kemble, and Tyrone Power, as well as the architect Sir John Soane, and the author of The Ingoldsby Legends, Canon Barham, who served as Club rhymer.

In view of the association of the Club with the theatre, its location in the heart of London’s theatre district was appropriate. Thackeray has left us a beautiful picture of the Garden as it existed at the time of his Garrick membership—a description now doubly poignant because of the ravages which modern city planning have wrought:

The two great national theatres on one side, a churchyard full of mouldy but undying celebrities on the other; a fringe of houses stuffed in every part with anecdote and history; an arcade, often more gloomy and deserted than a cathedral aisle; a rich cluster of brown old taverns—one of them filled with the counterfeit presence of many actors long since silent, who scowl or smile once more from the canvas upon the grandsoms of their dear admirers; a something in the air which breathes of old books, old pictures, old painters, and old authors; a place beyond all other places one would choose in which to hear the chimes at midnight. . . .

Dramatis Personae and Prologue: Dickens, Thackeray and Yates

Dickens and Thackeray had known each other since 1836. Their first encounter was distinctly disappointing from Thackeray’s point of view. Thackeray, who was a

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clever caricaturist, submitted some proposed sketches for *Pickwick Papers*, but Dickens rejected them. "Strange to say," Thackeray recalled in a speech in 1858 (the year of the Garrick Club affair). "[Dickens] did not find [the sketches] suitable." Over the years the two men appeared to establish a friendly personal relationship, although the degree of their congeniality remains a matter of varying interpretation. They exchanged household visits and we read of one Christmas party which Thackeray and his children attended at Dickens' Tavistock House. At the end of this party Young Charley, at his father's instruction, led the Dickens children in a chorus of cheers for the departing Thackeray. Thackeray was also invited to a performance of *Tom Thumb* by the Dickens family. The two authors appeared at public dinners together and Dickens chaired a farewell dinner for Thackeray prior to his second American tour. On another occasion Thackeray smoked a cigar with Dickens before leaving on a walking tour of Scotland. The Dickens and Thackeray families appeared to become closer after they found themselves near neighbors in Boulogne in 1854. Katie and Mary Dickens became fast friends of the two Thackeray girls, and Thackeray commented that he was always inclined to think well of "anybody who is kind to my women."

However, there were many sources of incompatibility between Dickens and Thackeray, public, literary and personal, which posed continuing threats to their friendship. Although their shared disgust with the conduct of the Crimean War brought them into brief political alliance in the service of the Administrative Reform Society, their general social views were divergent. Thackeray was not, like Dickens, dedicated to basic reform. It may have been of himself he spoke when he gave the words to Henry Esmond: "I can't but accept the world as I find it, including a rope's end, as long as it is in fashion." Dickens' attacks on the materialistic roots of Victorian society reflected a degree of rebelliousness Thackeray could not share, although many of Dickens' insights into contemporary social phenomena appear akin to his own. When Thackeray fought successfully against Douglas Jerrold's brand of radical journalism on *Punch* in the 1840's, he found that Dickens rallied to the aid of his adversary. Many years later, they again found themselves in controversy over what Dickens judged to be Thackeray's overly sentimental praise of the work of the Charterhouse Charity.

In the course of their careers, Thackeray and Dickens also took opposite positions in many controversies affecting the literary profession. When Thackeray fell out with their mutual friend John Forster in 1847, Dickens supported Forster but was able to arrange a Reconciliation Dinner without impairing his own friendship with Thackeray. The two men also dueled over the status of the literary profession and its rights to public financial support. Dickens was a strong defender of the dignity of the profession and advocated the grant of pensions to authors. Thackeray, as secure in his Anglo-Indian birth as in his sense of his literary talent, argued that the able writer needed no special protection. He irritated his fellow writers by lampooning the disorder of journalists' life in *Pendennis* and burlesquing the styles of some of his contemporaries in *Punch*. Dickens appears to have awaited with trepidation a parody of his own writing. In fact, Thackeray intended the series to end with burlesques of Dickens and—the final turn of the screw—of Thackeray himself, but the *Punch* proprietors vetoed the idea. It is generally accepted that Dickens' concept of Thackeray's alternately cynical and enthusiastic attitudes towards life and art is incorporated in the portrait of the fake Bohemian Henry Gowan in *Little Dorrit*. Thackeray may not have recognized the resemblance, but he is known to have remarked that "Little D. is damned stupid."

The responses of Dickens and Thackeray to each other's books were quite different. With the exception of *Denis Duval* (which appeared after Thackeray's death), Dickens praised only one of Thackeray's works warmly, *The Curate's Walk*, a minor sentimental London sketch. Even in the letter to Thackeray in which he recorded the tears he shed over *The Curate's Walk*, Dickens reveals how he held back from exploration of major Thackeray:

> I have nothing more to confess but that I am saving up the perusal of *Vanity Fair* until I shall have done Dombey.

Thackeray, on the other hand, was a great and generous admirer of Dickens' works and praised them enthusiastically, not only in public lectures but (where praise really counts) in private correspondence and conversation. Not all of Dickens' books pleased Thackeray equally. If he rated *Pickwick* below the work of Fielding, we must remember Thackeray's rejected illustrations. Thackeray also attacked *Oliver Twist* as falsely glamorizing crime and low life. But of *A Christmas Carol* he said: "It seems to me a national benefit, and to every man or woman who reads it a personal kindness." In separate letters to his friends the Brookfields he urged them to read *David Copperfield*, in which he found "those inimitable Dickens touches which make such a great man of him." However, this praise was mixed with a sense of rivalry and inferiority. He added in his letter to Rev. Brookfield that *David Copperfield* beat the current number of *Pendennis* hollow but commented to Mrs. Brookfield that *Copperfield's* simplified style showed the influence of *Vanity Fair*. And even his masterpiece *Vanity Fair* seemed to him less powerful than *Dombey*. He exclaimed to Mark
Lemon, the Punch editor, pounding on his table for emphasis, "There's no writing against such power as this—One has no chance! Read that chapter describing young Paul's death; it is unsurpassed—it is stupendous!" Thackeray's love for Dickens' books was shared by his daughters. In manuscript reminiscences he wrote that his daughter Minnie named her cats after Dickens characters, and in a public lecture in New York he reported his rueful answer to her question as to why he did not write books like Mr. Dickens: "Who can?"

After the appearance of Vanity Fair Thackeray's feeling of rivalry with Dickens sharpened. "Dickens mistrusts me," he had already written ten years earlier, and now he commented: "I am become a sort of great man in my way—all but at the top of the tree; indeed there if the truth were known and having a great fight up there with Dickens." The literary adherents of the two men took every opportunity to push their chieftains into opposition.

In addition to professional rivalry, the difference in the family origins of the two men may also have played an inhibiting role in their relations. Dickens, a grandson of house servants and grandson and namesake of an escaped embezzler, was haunted by a fear of the snobbery of others, and Thackeray was a self-confessed snob. In 1849 Thackeray wrote to Mrs. Brookfield:

I met on the pier . . . the great Dickens with his wife his children his Miss Hogarth all looking abominably coarse vulgar and happy . . .

One of the social settings of the friendship of Dickens and Thackeray was the Garrick Club, which Thackeray entered in 1838 and which Dickens first joined in 1837 during the triumphant appearance of the Pickwick installments. By the 1850's the Garrick Club seems to have been split into two factions, the older members with whom Thackeray was on cordial terms (and over whom, according to one memoirist, he reigned as "a sort of Dictator"), and a more Bohemian element which tended to look to Dickens as one of their leaders. Despite the attachment of this latter group to Dickens, it is apparent that the Garrick Club was of only peripheral interest to him. Although he loved the theatre and was an amateur actor, he seldom came to the Club and his membership history was quite spotty. We sometimes hear of people who join organizations in the hope that some day they will have an opportunity to resign in righteous indignation. Whether or not that was the case with Dickens, we do not know. However, the record shows that he resigned from the Club in November of 1838, the year after his admission. He joined again six years later in January, 1844, and withdrew in June, 1856, rejoining once more in November of the same year.

Thackeray, on the other hand, was an ardent clubman. This was only a natural development since his home life was tragically destroyed early in his marriage by the hopeless mental illness of his wife, who was committed to an institution in the winter of 1841-1842. Although Thackeray was touchingly devoted to his two daughters, Annie and Minnie, his great gregariousness caused him to find a substitute for the domestic hearth in the clubs of London. The Garrick Club, famed for the high spirits and wit of its members, was his favorite. In a speech at the Club in its early days, Thackeray said:

Do we, its happy inmates, ever speak of it as 'The Garrick Club'? No, but as 'The G.,' the little 'G.,' the dearest place in the world.

Percy Fitzgerald, a historian of the Club and a friend of Dickens and Forster, writes that Thackeray was during his time the Club itself—its centre, its soul, its cynosure. It was his very home, not a mere 'house of call' . . . It seemed to be a sort of whetting-stone for his wit; it kept his humour bright, keen, and polished.

In view of Thackeray's attachment to the Garrick and to London club life, it is not surprising that we find in his writings many descriptions of London clubs and their oddly-assorted members. In his Book of Snobs (to whose title Thackeray added a characteristically insightful tag "By One of Themselves") he devoted several chapters to a discussion of Club Snobs. Two of the Club Snobs, Colonel Bludyer and Ranville Ranville, look askance at the admission of literary men into their Club. Bludyer, glaring at "the present Snob" (Thackeray), warns: "Infernal impudent jackanapes! If he shows me up, I'll break every bone in his skin." Ranville comments: "These people are very well in their proper places, and as a public man, I make a point of shaking hands with them, and that sort of thing; but to have one's privacy obstructed upon by such people is really too much."

In a chapter of Mr. Brown's Letters To His Nephew, Thackeray's series of London sketches, Mr. Brown the Elder introduces Mr. Brown the Younger into a club, the Polyanthus, into which young Pen is also admitted in Pendennis. One would hope that the Polyanthus did not resemble the Garrick, since its members' activities are limited to smoking, billiards, cards, hogging the daily newspapers, and tyrannising the poorer members. Thackeray also wrote a short sketch in which the immediate impact of the French Revolution of 1848 on the English public is measured by the rumors exchanged at a London club, and in a chapter of a travel book he reports clubhouse gossip in Gibraltar. One of Thackeray's last sketches, "Strange To Say, On Club Paper," reports clubmembers' baseless slanders on a deceased member who was reported to have drawn up a codicil at his country
home, on Athenaeum Club stationery. If a man could take Club stationery for personal use miles away, they murmured, how could the spoons be safe? But these pieces are minor Thackeray. English literature is in his debt for his humorous love and observation of club life as they are reflected in the famous opening scene of Pendennis. In the following passage, Thackeray describes the quiet mastery with which Major Pendennis made a favorite Club table his own:

He always took possession of the same table in the same corner of the room, from which nobody ever thought of ousting him. One or two mad wags and wild fellows had, in former days, endeavoured to deprive him of this place; but there was a quiet dignity in the Major's manner as he took his seat at the next table, and surveyed the interlopers, which rendered it impossible for any man to sit and breakfast under his eye; and that table—by the fire, and yet near the window—became his own.

Of course, it would be foolish to assert, without preparing to face the just wrath of the spirit of Mr. Pickwick, that there are no clubs in Dickens. But they are not the great London clubs, but small, idiosyncratic groups founded by dominant figures. Besides Mr. Pickwick's scholarly company, we have Master Humphrey's Clock and its below-stairs spinoff, Mr. Weller's Watch. It can be said accurately that in the imaginative world of his fiction Dickens does not join clubs—he creates his own. I do not think it is accidental that Dickens did not write of the London clubs. They did not mean as much to him as they did to Thackeray, and there lay the seed of the unhappy confrontation which was to follow.

The tenure of Edmund Yates at the Garrick, which ended in uproar, began in subterfuge. Having the appearance of a full-grown man while still adolescent, he entered the Club at 17, under the age prescribed by the regulations. His father, the actor Frederick Yates, was an original member of the Club. The elder Yates performed as Mantalini, Quilp and Fagin in successful adaptations of Nicholas Nickleby, The Old Curiosity Shop, and Oliver Twist, and Dickens praised him highly. Frederick's talent, and the celebrated beauty of Mrs. Yates, a gifted actress whom Dickens also admired, predisposed Dickens favorably towards the young Yates. Edmund early embarked on a career of gossipy journalism and his column, "A Lounger At The Clubs," advertised that he intended to use club rooms as a principal source of his tittle-tattle.

Yates was a devoted follower of Dickens and a reliable ally in his personal and literary conflicts. However, in his memoirs Yates also expressed great admiration for Thackeray and attributed his choice of a career in journalism to his reading of Pendennis. Act One: Epsom and the Garrick Club

The year 1858 was a difficult one for Dickens, and the personal strain under which he labored may have obscured his judgment in assessing Thackeray's sensitivities in the controversy which was to arise at the Garrick. Dickens had carried out his painful decision to separate from his wife and was upset by many wild rumors linking his name with Ellen Ternan and his sister-in-law Georgina Hogarth. Bound as intimately as any author has ever been to the hearts and judgments of his audience, Dickens felt a compulsion to put before the public his denial of these slanders, which he attributed to the hostility of his mother-in-law and his sister-in-law Helen. Friends and publishers who opposed his wishes to publish his apology felt the full weight of his frustration and anger. Dickens never forgave Mark Lemon for his refusal to insert his personal statement in Punch, although Lemon may have believed with justification that the statement did not meet the magazine's standards of humor. Dickens extended his resentment to Bradbury & Evans, publisher of Punch and of Dickens' books, and ultimately severed all business relations with the firm, returning to his former publisher, Chapman & Hall.

While this storm was gathering, Thackeray added new ground for Dickens' irritation. On May 14 while visiting the Derby race at Epsom, Thackeray first learned from an acquaintance rumors which were circulating regarding Dickens' involvement with Ellen Ternan. A few days later at the Garrick, Thackeray was told of Dickens' impending separation. When it was suggested to him that Dickens was leaving his wife "on account of an intrigue with his sister-in-law" Georgina, Thackeray drew on the Epsom rumors and came to the clumsy defense of his friend: "no says I no such thing—its with an actress."

For an equally maladroit defense against rumor one would have to go back to the days of the Roman epigrammist Martial, who wrote:

He who fancies that Acerra reeks of yesterday's wine is wrong. Acerra always drinks till daylight.

Dickens' campfollowers, who lost no opportunity to exacerbate his suspicion of his rival, reported Thackeray's blunder to him as evidence of malice. "We shall never be allowed to be friends that's clear," Thackeray wrote to his mother.

Act Two, Scene One: A Printer's Office

The controversy at the Garrick was actually due to the need for newspaper column filler—a need which, fortunately, is customarily supplied by "many cheerful facts" about the height of Mt. Everest. Edmund Yates, in the third week of his employment with the little periodical
Town Talk, went to the printer's office. There he heard to his horror that because of illness, Watts Phillips, a cartoonist and political contributor, had not sent in his usual quota and that another column of original material was necessary. "There was no help for it," Yates later recalled, "I took off my coat—literally, I remember, for it was a warm evening—mounted a high stool at a high desk, and commenced to cudgel my brains." Having had great success with a sketch of Dickens during the previous week's number, Yates made a fatal choice—he would follow up with a similar portrait of Dickens' great rival Thackeray.

The major part of the little article dealt with Thackeray's literary career and mingled praise with criticism. Yates extolled Vanity Fair: "This great work—... with perhaps the exception of The Newcomes, is the most perfect literary dissection of the human heart." However, Yates noted a falling off of Thackeray's later work in popularity and interest. He went on to criticize Thackeray for trimming to the taste of his audience by flattering the aristocracy in England, while worshipping George Washington and attacking the "Four Georges" while in America. Yates also asserted that there was a "want of heart in all he writes."

Had Yates limited himself to literary criticism, the Garrick Club might have remained at peace. But for some unaccountable reason he chose to begin his column with an unflattering description of Thackeray's appearance and an even less favorable appraisal of his personality:

His face is bloodless, and not particularly expressive, but remarkable for the fracture of the bridge of the nose, the result of an accident in youth... No one meeting him could fail to recognise in him a gentleman; his bearing is cold and uninviting, his style of conversation either openly cynical or affectedly good-natured and benevolent; his bon-homie is forced, his wit biting, his pride easily touched... .

The literary reservations of such an unimportant young journalist Thackeray would probably have ignored. But the personal attack stung him to the quick. Later, in his essay "On Screens In Dining-Rooms" (1860), in which he responded to an article submitted by Yates to The New York Times concerning the prospects of The Cornhill Magazine, Thackeray stated his feelings about journalists whose stock in trade is not literary criticism but the personal conversations of writers:

Attack our books, Mr. Correspondent, and welcome. They are fair subjects for just censure or praise. ... But Mr. Nameless, behind the publisher's screen uninvited, peering at the company and the meal, catching up scraps of the jokes, and noting down the guests' behaviour and conversation—what a figure he is! Allons, Mr. Nameless! Put up your notebook; walk out of the hall; and leave gentlemen alone who would be private, and wish you no harm.

The offense in Yates' Town Talk column was all the greater since this article appeared to capitalize on private conversations of Thackeray at the Garrick, where he was, in Percy Fitzgerald's words, "cock of the walk." Fitzgerald adds, with more psychological understanding than the literary historians have shown: "To be flouted in this style by 'a stripling' would never do. He would lose all his authority."

And if matters were not bad enough, an unhappy coincidence added an element of possible conspiracy. Yates' article appeared on the very day on which Dickens' defense of his martial conduct appeared in the journal named (quite aptly, in this case) Household Words. Thackeray's adherents saw Yates' piece as a flanking attack on Thackeray to neutralize his supposed participation in the gossip about Ellen Ternan.

Act Two, Scene Two: The Garrick Club

Two days after the appearance of his article, Yates received a strongly worded letter from Thackeray asking that in the future Yates "refrain from printing comments upon my private conversations; that you will forego discussions, however blundering, upon my private affairs; and that you will henceforth please to consider any question of my personal truth and sincerity as quite out of the province of your criticism." The heart of Thackeray's attack was his resentment over what he saw as intrusion into the privacy of Club conversations:

We meet at a club, where before you were born, I believe, I and other gentlemen have been in the habit of talking without any idea that our conversation would supply paragraphs for professional vendors of 'Literary Talk;' and I don't remember that out of that club I have ever exchanged six words with you.

Thackeray later made similar observations to Charles Kingsley in defense of his response to the Yates article:

[The Garrick Club] is a social Institution quite unlike other clubs, ... where men have been in the habit of talking quite freely to one another (in a little room not 15 feet square) for this 1/4 of a century or more. If the penny-a-liner is to come into this sanctum, and publish his comments upon the conversation there held and the people he meets there, it is all over with the comfort and friendliness of our Society.

Despite the merit of Thackeray's invocation of Club privacy, I sometimes wish he had written Yates the pithy response subsequently suggested by Thackeray's staunch friend, Shirley Brooks:
Dear Yates next time you want a guinea write to me not of me.

Yates’ immediate reaction to Thackeray’s letter was to draft a reply suggesting that Thackeray was an old pot lecturing a young kettle. He listed a number of Thackeray’s fellow clubmembers whom Thackeray had attacked in print, including Bulwer-Lytton. Before sending the letter which Yates still felt a quarter-century later would have ended the row, the young man consulted his friend Dickens. If Thackeray erred, as most commentators suggest, by excessive severity to a young journalist, Dickens at this critical juncture appeared to make a mistake equally great. He disapproved Yates’ proposed letter, but, instead of attempting to mediate between his two friends, he concurred in Yates’ sending a curt rejection of Thackeray’s complaint.

Thackeray turned over copies of the exchanged letters to the Committee of the Club and requested a ruling as to whether the practice of publishing articles such as Yates’ “will not be fatal to the comfort of the Club, and is not intolerable in a society of gentlemen.”

The Secretary of the Club notified the antagonists that the Committee would meet on the following Saturday to consider Thackeray’s complaint. Yates responded with a letter challenging the Committee’s jurisdiction. He observed that “the article makes no reference to the Club, refers to no conversation that took place there.” He added that the “article may be in exceedingly bad taste; but . . . the Committee is not a Committee of taste.”

The Committee held its meeting and ruled that Yates was to make ample apology to Thackeray or to retire from the Club, and that if Yates declined to do either, a General Meeting of the Club would be called to consider the matter. Yates submitted a letter to be read before the General Meeting, offering to apologize to the Club but not to Thackeray. Yates stated that he had equal right to an apology from Thackeray, who had in the interim inserted an irrelevant allusion to his foe as “Young Grub-Street” in a current number of The Virginians.

On July 10 the General Meeting was held and adopted, by a vote of 70 to 48, a resolution holding Thackeray’s complaint well founded and referring the matter to the Committee for appropriate action while at the same time expressing the hope that “a most disagreeable duty may be spared it by Mr. Yates making such ample apology to Mr. Thackeray as may result in the withdrawal of all the unpleasant expressions used in reference to this matter.”

How one would have loved to be “behind the screen” at the meeting. Yates was supported by speeches by three novelists, Dickens, Wilkie Collins and Samuel Lover, and by Sir James Ferguson who (according to Yates) hurried home from Palestine to speak and vote in Yates’ favor. But the influential Thackeray had the votes.

_Act Three, Scene One: The Chambers of Edwin James, Q.C., and the Steps of the Garrick Club_

Yates, endowed with the virtues which are much in need by the gossip columnist—aggression and love of battle—sought an opinion of counsel as to the right of the Club to eject him and to erase his name from the Club roster. Gordon Ray, Thackeray’s modern biographer, passes over this phase of the Garrick Club Controversy as “tedious to trace.” It is hard to agree with his judgment, in view of the ironic literary overtones of the legal maneuvers in behalf of Yates.

The strategy of Edwin James, Q.C., whom Yates consulted, was sound from both the legal and the Dickensian point of view—he sought to prevent Yates’ case from following the dismal course of Jarnyde v. Jarnyde, the eternal Chancery proceeding made famous by Dickens in _Bleak House_ (which had appeared six years earlier). James advised that the case be shaped to fall within the traditional common-law tort category of trespass. Plans were made to file the action against the secretary of the Club as the delegate of the Club’s trustees authorized to commit the tort. Yates arranged that the secretary would meet him at the front door of the Club and eject him. Yates turned up at the foreordained time accompanied by his solicitor, and on his saying to the secretary that he must enter, the secretary “replied good-humouredly, ‘I suppose this is what you want Mr. Yates—will this do?’ and laid his hand on my shoulder, to prevent my going further.” Despite the fact that this charade at the Club door was a worthy successor to such earlier English legal ceremonies as delivery of the peppercorn, and the fine and common recovery, the polite trespass was ineffective. The court held that Yates’ sole remedy was against the Club trustees, who could be pursued only in the Court of Chancery. Although Yates’ solicitor replied cheerfully, on inquiry, that the cost of a Chancery proceeding would probably not be more than 200 or 300 pounds, this did not strike the young Yates as a great bargain. He dropped the case.

However, creative men may find a rich lode in others’ misfortunes. Yates took Dickens to one of his consultations with Edwin James. While the “fat, florid” James tried vainly to be “specially agreeable,” Dickens was “quietly observant.” The observation was to transform James into the lawyer Mr. Stryver of _A Tale of Two Cities_, “a man of little more than thirty, but looking twenty years older, stout, loud, red, bluff and free from any drawback of delicacy; had a very pushing way of shouldering him-
self, morally and physically, into companies and conversations that argued well for his shouldering his way up in life..."

In November, 1858, while the legal battles were still in mid-course, Dickens returned to London after an absence of several months on a lecture tour. Following up "six words" he had said to Thackeray at the Athenaeum when he last saw him, Dickens wrote a letter to Thackeray in which he belatedly made what appears to have been a sincere attempt to end the quarrel, as he had years before succeeded in doing in Thackeray's feud with Forster. Perhaps it is a signal of their growing estrangement that Dickens preferred to follow up his brief introduction of the subject by correspondence instead of in a face-to-face meeting with his old comrade. In any event, the tone of Dickens' letter was not warm, and its author made two crucial blunders. First, Dickens referred to the retention of Edwin James and to the opinion of that legal worthy that the expulsion of Yates was unlawful. Still worse, he made reference to his own previous consultation with Yates. Dickens proceeded to inquire whether a conference could be held for the purpose of reaching "some quiet accommodation of this deplorable matter." But even in making this tardy initiative, Dickens maintained his alignment with Yates' side—he did not offer direct mediation between the adversaries but proposed that he meet as a representative of Yates with an "appointed friend of yours, as representing you." What an insulting suggestion this must have been to Thackeray, to have his peer and supposed friend persevere in the role of second to an unworthy opponent! Dickens ended his letter with the suggestion that if the proposed meeting could not take place, his letter and Thackeray's reply should be burned. Thackeray's letter of reply was brusque. He "grieved" to note that Dickens had been Yates' adviser in the dispute and further did not believe that the Club would be frightened by the opinion of any lawyer. To emphasize his full rejection of Dickens' overture, Thackeray, instead of burning the correspondence as suggested, delivered copies to the Club. He subscribed his letter to Dickens rudely, "Yours, &c, W. M. Thackeray." The break between the two men was now complete. But perhaps Thackeray had from the very beginning fancied he saw the hand of Dickens behind the controversy. Taxed by a young friend with forgetting his dignity in condescending to quarrel with the insignificant Yates, Thackeray responded: "You may not think, young'un, that I am quarreling with Mr. Yates. I am hitting the man behind him."

And so it was that Edmund Yates, a literary pygmy, was expelled from the Garrick Club, leaving behind him a shattered friendship of two giants.

**Act Three, Scene Two: The Athenaeum Club**

Lovers of Dickens and Thackeray are grateful that the two men were ultimately reconciled. The reconciliation, like the feud, had its setting at a club. The initiative appears to have come from Thackeray. In the spring of 1868 Thackeray told Katie Dickens (with whom he remained on friendly terms) that it was ridiculous that Dickens and he "should be placed in a position of enmity towards one another," but added that he could not apologize: "You know," he said, "he is more in the wrong than I am." The diplomatic Katie replied that Thackeray should nevertheless make the first move since her father was "more shy of speaking than are you." Later that year (possibly in May) Thackeray saw Dickens at the Athenaeum Club and held out his hand to him, saying: "We have been foolish long enough," and Dickens grasped his hand "very cordially."

In December Thackeray died and Dickens stood at the graveside of his great rival. Thackeray's last visit to his beloved Garrick Club was made during the last week of his life. His friend Shirley Brooks fittingly included an account of the visit in his obituary in *Punch*:

On the Tuesday he came to his favorite club, 'The Garrick,' and asked for a seat at the table of two friends, who, of course, welcomed him, as all welcomed Thackeray. It will not be deemed too minute a record by any of the hundreds who personally loved him, to note where he sat for the last time at that club. There is in the dining-room in the first floor a nook near the reading-room. ... [Here] ... Thackeray took his seat, and dined with his friends. He was afterwards in the smoke-room, a place in which he delighted. ... Before the dawn of Thursday he was where there was no night.

**Epilogue: Hyères, France**

With Thackeray's death, one of the three protagonists of the Unpleasantness at the Garrick Club was gone. A few notes must be added on the other actors in the drama before the final curtain falls.

Dickens, who, as we have seen, had resigned from the Garrick Club twice before, tendered his final resignation in 1865, enraged over the blackballing of his friend and subeditor, W. H. Wills. Percy Fitzgerald observes respectfully that Dickens no doubt found the enjoyments of the Club incompatible with his work.

Edmund Yates continued his career of gossip and scandal. That he delighted in conflict is suggested by lines from Tennyson's *Ulysses* which Yates chose as the epigraph for his *Recollections and Experiences* published in 1884:
Much have I seen and known: cities of men
And manners, climates, councils, governments,
And drunk delight of battle with my peers.

His fellow journalist Harry Furniss writes that
Yates was, perhaps, the most hated man in town, for which
his repulsive manner and repellent pen must be held to accoun

Furniss adds reassuringly:
Personally, I liked him.

In 1883 Yates was prosecuted criminally for libel

Against the Earl of Lonsdale in an article commenting on
the "Yellow Earl"’s romance with the stage beauty Violet
Cameron. Yates served seven weeks of a four-month prison sentence. When the news of Yates’ conviction reached
Robert Louis Stevenson in Hyères, France, Stevenson was
so happy that he ordered a bonfire to be built in his gar-
den and he, Fanny and their maid danced madly around
it hand in hand. Typically, the exertion proved too much
for Stevenson and he took to his bed for days.

Cleveland, Ohio

Vision of Evil: The Influence of Wilde’s Salome on
Heart of Darkness and A Full Moon in March

Christopher S. Nassaar

To trace the influence of Oscar Wilde on later authors
would require a whole book, and a rather lengthy one at
that. In this brief essay, I propose simply to chart the in-
fuence of one of Wilde’s most important works, Salome,
on two subsequent works which also strove for a Vision of
Evil. My thesis is that Heart of Darkness and Yeats’ A Full
Moon in March have both been partly misunderstood from
a failure to note that they were written against the back-
ground of the decadent movement of the 1890s in general,
and Salome in particular. In 1961, Ian Fletcher called the
1890’s “a lost decade,”1 and he was right at that point in
time. Since then, however, a good deal of illuminating cri-
ticism of decadence has appeared, and it has become pos-
sible to read Heart of Darkness and A Full Moon in March
intelligently against a decadent background.

I

Heart of Darkness first appeared in Blackwood’s Maga-

zine in February, March and April of 1899—approximately five years after the publication of the English ver-
sion of Salome by Elkin Mathews and John Lane. Several attempts have been made by critics to relate Heart of
Darkness to earlier literary models. Lillian Feder has
connected the tale with the visit to Hades in the sixth book
of the Aeneid.2 Robert O. Evans has argued that Mar-
low’s journey “closely resembles a skeletalized version of
the Inferno.”3 Guy Owens, Jr., has found an interesting
Arthurian allusion in the book.4 And William Bysshe
Stein has read it as a kind of Buddhist sermon.5

While all these views are very interesting and partly
correct, I would suggest that Conrad, as a beginning writ-
er of Polish origin, is more likely to have looked to Eng-
lish literature than to the classics or Buddhism for his
basic model, and would have turned in particular to the
famous writers of his own day. The scene where Marlow
comes across the sick and starving blacks in the grove of
death, for instance, recalls to my mind a similar scene in
Tess of the D’Urbervilles, where Tess discovers a group of
shot, dying birds. At any rate, one of the major literary
figures of the 1890s was Oscar Wilde, and the decadent
movement he headed was the dominant one of the de-
cade. I suggest that it was in Wilde’s Salome, that quin-
tessence of the English decadence, that Conrad found his
chief model for Heart of Darkness.

The external evidence supports this view. Leo Gurko
has written that “Conrad was familiar with the work of
the mid-nineteenth century decadents, Gautier, Baude-
laire, Hysmans,” and that he also knew well the decadent
writings of Oscar Wilde and his circle.6 Conrad left the sea

1. Ian Fletcher, “The 1890's: A Lost Decade,” Victorian Stud-
ies, IV (June, 1961), 545-54.
2. Lillian Feder, “Marlow's Descent into Hell,” Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Fiction, IX (March, 1955), 280-92.
Studies, II (May, 1956), 56-62.
4. Guy Owens, Jr., “A Note on Heart of Darkness,” Nineteenth-
Century Fiction, XII (September, 1957), 168-69.
5. William Bysshe Stein, “The Lotus Posture and Heart of Dark-
ness,” Modern Fiction Studies, II (Winter, 1956-57), 167-70.
6. Leo Gurko, Joseph Conrad: Giant in Exile (London: Frederick
permanently and settled in England in January 1894, at a time when the decadent movement was at its height and Oscar Wilde a celebrated literary figure, but fated soon to be destroyed. He also contributed to the short-lived Savoy, edited by his friend-to-be Arthur Symons, a journal that was publishing decadent literature and which came under attack for reproducing Beardsley's illustrations to Wilde's Salome. Thus, although Conrad never met Wilde personally, he was no stranger to Wilde's works or to the decadent milieu of the 1890s. Ian Fletcher has observed that "we tend to forget . . . that Conrad's beginnings are there [in the 1890s]; and that such a phrase as 'My reasons were not moral but artistic' does not come from the bar-talk of some crepuscular hanger-on of the Rhymers' Club, but from the preface to Nostromo." Despite the stylistic gulf that separates the two works, Heart of Darkness is largely a thematic repetition and partly a criticism of Salome.

In both works, for instance, human nature is presented as entirely evil at the core but shrouded in a veil of illusion, with Christianity a solid shield blinding human beings to their prime character. In Salome, Wilde presents Salome as a symbol of human nature, lustful and murderous because uninhibited by any restraints. The prophet Iokanaan, on the other hand, totally represses his nature and speaks of the coming of Christ. As a result, he dwells in darkness, both figuratively and literally, while Salome's element is the clear moonlight. Wilde presents Iokanaan as symbolically blind, and Salome toward the end says to his severed head: "Ah! wherfore didst thou not look at me, Iokanaan? . . . Thou didst put upon thine eyes the covering of him who would see his God." As Salome observes, the scales on the prophet's eyes are those of religion.

Similarly, Kurtz in Heart of Darkness begins in a state of illusion about his own nature and goes to Africa imbued with the high ideals of a Christian civilization. In the jungle, however, he discovers his true, elemental self, recognizes that it is totally evil, and yields without restraint to this evil. Marlow also discovers, through Kurtz, that he too is evil at the core, and comes to despise the people in the "sepulchral city" because of their illusions about human nature. It is worth noting that Iokanaan's dark prison, to which he returns voluntarily after Salome releases him, is compared to a tomb, the suggestion being that the prophet has entombed his nature. In Heart of Darkness, Brussels is compared to a large sepulcher in which human nature is entombed. Both the unveiled Salome and the evil Kurtz, moreover, are presented by their creators not simply as individuals but as symbols of human nature. Viewed thematically, then, the two works are basically alike at their most fundamental level. I would also like to suggest here that the heads on the stakes in Heart of Darkness, and the reference to "certain midnight dances ending with unspeakable rites" that Kurtz presides over, are obliquely reminiscent of Salome's dance and her subsequent terrible request.

In both Salome and Heart of Darkness, moreover, the procedure is to lift by stages the barriers obscuring human nature until its hidden, pulsing essence is reached. In both works, the movement toward truth is a gradual one which ends in a revelation that leaves the reader in a state of shock. Salome begins with two opposed visions of the princess, one angelic and the other demonic. It is only as the play moves to its climax that the demonic vision is totally confirmed. The entire play, in fact, can be seen as a dance of the seven veils, and it is not until the last veil falls that Salome is revealed completely as the chilling terror she is. Similarly, Heart of Darkness moves progressively through varieties of human evil—the gentle inhumanity of the chief accountant, the avarice of the manager, the cowardice and bloodthirstiness of the pilgrims—until it reaches the center of human darkness and Kurtz himself.

I would add that in presenting his Vision of Evil Wilde takes us to the distant past, to biblical and mythic times. Conrad takes us in the same direction, for Marlow's journey is really a return to the primeval past of man. Both writers, then, turned to the remote past, where they felt the roots of human nature to be, for a clear, unobscured expression of this nature.

The idea that one must maintain a point of balance between evil, on the one hand, and renunciation or blindness, on the other, is also common to Salome and Heart of Darkness. The "moral" of Dorian Gray and Salome is that one must not yield excessively to evil but must rather exercise some restraint and remain in balance. Dorian perishes because he goes too far in his pursuit of evil. Salome is destroyed for the same reason, while Iokanaan dies as a consequence of clinging to the opposite extreme of total blindness and renunciation. Herodias, however, emerges as a sort of norm, for she constantly maintains a delicate balance between evil and renunciation. As a result, she remains alive and well at the end of Salome.

Conrad in Heart of Darkness also proffers the idea of balance between evil and blindness or renunciation. His compromise, however, is really a combination of two extremes: total knowledge and total restraint. Human na-
ture is thoroughly evil in its essence, and Conrad advocates a full awareness of this fact: he has no patience with the illusions of the "sepulchral city." On the other hand, he feels contempt for people who cannot exercise self-control—who, discovering the evil in themselves, yield to it without restraint. Marlow repeatedly states that Kurtz's fault is his lack of restraint, and it is for this reason he calls him hollow at the core. When the helmsman is killed, for instance, Marlow says: "Poor fool! If he had only left that shatter alone. He had no restraint, no restraint—just like Kurtz—a tree swayed by the wind." A while later, Marlow sees the heads on the stakes, and reflects: "They only showed that Mr. Kurtz lacked restraint in the gratification of his various lusts, that there was something wanting in him—some small matter which, when the pressing need arose, could not be found under his magnificent eloquence." What saves Marlow from sharing Kurtz's fate is precisely his ability to exercise self-control, to stop himself—or allow external restraints to stop him—from going ashore for a howl and a dance, no matter what the temptation.

Marlow's lie to the Intended is a necessary postscript to Heart of Darkness, for it shows him still in balance a full year after his return from the Congo. Had he told the truth to the Intended, his act would have been an evil one—"too dark—too dark altogether"—for it would have shattered her illusions and caused her to share Kurtz's fate. Kurtz and the Intended are very closely associated in the tale's final pages, both through the imagery and the action. Like Kurtz, the Intended has no self-control, for she expresses her sorrow and admiration with no restraint whatsoever. When Marlow meets her, she blends in his mind with the figure of Kurtz:

I saw her and him in the same instant of time—his death and her sorrow—I saw her sorrow in the very moment of his death. Do you understand? I saw them together—I heard them together. She had said, with a deep catch of the breath, 'I have survived'; while my strained ears seemed to hear distinctly, mingled with her tone of despairing regret, the summing-up whisper of his eternal condemnation.

What Marlow sees before him in the final pages, then, is a female version of Kurtz—she was, after all, Kurtz's Intended—but still heavily in a state of illusion, and surviving because of her illusions. To have revealed the truth about human nature to a person so weak would have been an act of evil, leading to the creation of another Kurtz, so Marlow exercises self-control and tells a lie. He leaves the tomblike drawing-room of the Intended still in balance, possessing total knowledge of human evil but refusing to yield to any Satanic impulses. His Buddha-like pose as narrator, moreover, serves on one level to stress even more his state of balance.

Even stylistically, Salome and Heart of Darkness have something in common, for they are both highly symbolic works, seeking to make their statements about human nature through images and symbols.

There is, however, a major thematic difference between Salome and Heart of Darkness, for the attitudes of the two works toward evil differ markedly. Wilde in Salome celebrates evil and recommends a slightly restrained pursuit of evil beauty. He builds a religion of self-expression around the figure of Salome and offers it as an alternative to Christianity. Conrad in Heart of Darkness, on the other hand, regards evil as an "abomination," but is fascinated by it nevertheless. His final resolution of the problem of evil has affinities with Buddhism, for Marlow, like Buddha, recognizes the world as evil and rejects it completely, but remains in it to teach self-knowledge and self-control to others. Heart of Darkness, then, is a criticism of Salome and of decadence in general—an entirely pessimistic reply to the decadent delight in human evil.

Read within the framework of the 1890s, Heart of Darkness loses the claim to extreme originality that many critics have made for it, but it remains a great work of literature nonetheless, an important link in a major literary line. It is to Conrad's credit that he recognized the importance and profundity of the English decadence at a time when people saw in it merely a commitment to sexual perversion and artificiality. While restating the main themes of decadence against an African background, Conrad also offered a criticism of the movement, for Kurtz's discovery that human nature is totally evil, and his abandoned embrace of that evil, suggests the literature and painting of such decadents as Wilde, Beardsley and Symons. Kurtz is typically decadent also in his ultimate recoil from evil and his final judgment—"The horror! The horror!" Conrad's attitude to decadence is really Marlow's toward Kurtz. For Marlow, Kurtz was a great and fascinating figure, for he discovered the truth about human nature. And yet Kurtz lacked the necessary strength to accept this truth without being destroyed by it. To the cult of Cybele recommended by Wilde in Salome, Conrad countered by offering a kind of Western Buddhism that

11. Ibid., p. 52.
12. Ibid., p. 58.
13. Ibid., p. 79.
14. Ibid., p. 76.
15. The drawing-room is dark, "with three long windows from floor to ceiling that were like three luminous and bedraped columns." It contains a massive piano that gives the impression of "a sombre and polished sarcophagus." The idea, of course, is that the real nature of the Intended is entombed in the drawing room.
16. Ibid., p. 71.
The Victorian Newsletter

preaches the full but totally restrained experience of the decadent Vision of Evil. The correctness of this Vision is never questioned in Heart of Darkness: what does come under fire is simply the attitude and the weakness of the decadents.

II

In “The Tragic Generation” chapter of his Autobiographies, William Butler Yeats made the following observation:

The critic might well reply that certain of my generation delighted in writing with an unscientific partiality for subjects long forbidden. Yet is it not most important to explore especially what has been long forbidden, and to do this not only 'with the highest moral purpose,' like the followers of Ibsen, but gaily, out of sheer mischief, or sheer delight in that play of the mind? Donne could be as metaphysical as he pleased, and yet never seemed unhuman and hysterical as Shelley often does, because he could be as physical as he pleased; and besides, who will thirst for the metaphysical, who have a parched tongue, if we cannot recover the Vision of Evil?

Yeats does not mention Wilde by name, but it is safe to assume that he was thinking primarily of him and of Synes. During his final years, Yeats became obsessed with the idea of recovering the Vision of Evil, and he wrote two plays with only this purpose in mind. These are The King of the Great Clock Tower (1935) and A Full Moon in March (1935).

The latter play is largely a reworking of the former and is strongly influenced by Salome. There are, for instance, unmistakable verbal parallels between the two plays. Here is how Yeats' play begins:

First Attendant. What do we do?
What part do we take?
What did he say?

Second Attendant. Join when we like,
Singing or speaking.

First Attendant. Before the curtain rises on the play?
Second Attendant. Before it rises.
First Attendant. What do we sing?
Second Attendant. ‘Sing anything, sing any old thing,’ said he.
First Attendant. Come then and sing about the dung of swine.

Compare this with a passage from the beginning of Salome and the similarities become obvious:

The Young Syrian. How beautiful is the Princess Salome tonight!
The Page of Herodias. You are always looking at her. You look at her too much. It is dangerous to look at people in such fashion. Something terrible may happen.
The Young Syrian. She is very beautiful tonight.
First Soldier. The Tetrarch has a sombre aspect.
Second Soldier. Yes; he has a sombre aspect.
First Soldier. He is looking at something.
Second Soldier. He is looking at someone.
First Soldier. At whom is he looking?
Second Soldier. I cannot tell.

Yeats is more economical in that he reduces the four characters of the beginning of Salome to two, but the rhythmic sentences and subtle, haunting repetitions link the two openings closely.

Apart from verbal parallels, there is extremely strong internal evidence that the two plays are related. The basic confrontation between Salome and Iokanaan is recast by Yeats as a conflict between the Queen and the Swineherd. Both are symbolist dance plays dominated by a full moon. Princess Salome was attended by a Captain of the Guards, a young Syrian who obeyed her command to release Iokanaan and bring him to her. Similarly, the Queen has a Captain of the Guards whom she orders to admit the Swineherd into her presence. Herod swore an oath, promising Salome marriage and half his kingdom if she would dance for him. Yeats' Queen also swears an oath, making exactly the same promise to any man who can offer her a satisfying song. And so on.

There is also external evidence linking Yeats' two plays with Salome. Hone, Yeats' friend in the 1930s, has written of The King of the Great Clock Tower: “It was more original than Yeats thought, for upon referring to Salome he found that Wilde's dance was never danced with the head in her hands.” Even in the first play, then, Yeats was thinking of Salome.

In both The King of the Great Clock Tower and A Full Moon in March, the Queen exists in the fifteenth phase of the moon, a symbol of total perfection, yet paradoxically imperfect because she has no direct, overpowering knowledge of evil. As in Salome, the style of both plays is a ritual that moves toward a climactic Vision of Evil. Yeats needed this Vision to complete his art and "system," and he borrowed Salome's mood and style for his own purposes while largely rejecting its thematic content.

In A Full Moon in March, unquestionably the more powerful of the two plays, the Queen is meant to symbolize Yeats' poetry and his "system."

21. See Helen Hennessey Vendler, Yeats' Vision and the Later
teenth phase of the moon, she nevertheless feels incomplete, and therefore seeks a husband. What she requests of her suitors is a song, and she declares that she will judge it in a purely subjective manner:

_The Swineherd._ Kingdom and lady, if I sing the best?
But who decides?
_The Queen._ I and my heart decide.
We say that song is best that moves us most.
No song has moved us yet.22

What the Queen seeks is a poet-husband who will render her complete on the symbolic level, filling the gap in the art and metaphysical system she stands for. She will judge the adequacy of his song purely in terms of her own needs. She is also proud and cruel, however, and has often punished suitors whose singing she found offensive. The Queen, it seems, is incapable of tolerating pretentious poets whose art is really worthless, but “None I abhor can sing.”23

The Swineherd, as Frank Kermode has rightly observed, is clearly the Accursed Singer,24 and he has come not to claim the Queen for his wife but to deliberately insult, desecrate and destroy her. When he first confronts her, he says:

Queen, look at me, look long at these foul rags,
At hair more foul and ragged than my rags;
Look on my scratched foul flesh. Have I not come
Through dust and mire? There in the dust and mire
Beasts scratched my flesh; my memory too is gone,
Because great solitude has driven me mad.
But when I look into a stream, the face
That trembles upon the surface makes me think
My origin more foul than rag or flesh.25

The outward filth of the Swineherd symbolizes the state of his soul, and the final lines suggest that his nature is rooted in a more-than-human evil entity. The Swineherd is surely meant to suggest the decadent artist, and especially the Oscar Wilde of _Salome_, whose influence is clearly discernible throughout the play.

The Queen and the Swineherd stand at antithetical poles, and their confrontation is really between purity and evil, Yeats’ poetry and Wilde’s art in _Salome_, with its hint—in the myth of Cybele—of a metaphysical evil with which human nature should be in harmony. As _A Full Moon in March_ absorbs _Salome_ stylistically without ceasing to be Yeatsian, so the Queen seeks to unite with the Swineherd without losing her own nature. It is impor-

tant to note that it is she who woos him, not _vice versa_. From the beginning, she recognizes that he is capable of offering her a good song, and she repeatedly urges him to sing. His response is always insulting, however, and in the end she asks for his head in revenge.

After the Swineherd has been beheaded, the Queen picks up the severed head and confesses her love:

Great my love before you came,
Greater when I loved in shame,
Greatest when there broke from me
Storm of virgin cruelty.26

Earlier, she had been afraid that the Swineherd, her antithetical Mask, would tarnish her purity, and this is a basic reason why she orders him killed:

I owe my thanks to God that this foul wretch,
Foul in his rags, his origin, his speech,
In spite of all his daring has not dared
Ask me to drop my veil. Insulted ears
Have heard and shuddered, but my face is pure.
Had it but known the insult of his eyes
I had torn it with these nails.27

It is significant, therefore, that the Queen drops her veil before taking up the Swineherd’s head. She develops in the play, rejecting her earlier “virgin cruelty” and opening herself without hesitation to the full experience of the antithetical self. She descends from her “emblematic niches”28 and dances a dance of adoration before the severed head. Finally, she presses her lips to the head’s and her body shivers in delight. The Swineherd had offered her the one thing she lacked—a direct, powerful knowledge of evil—and she takes the head for her husband, thereby rendering herself entirely complete.

The metaphysical and artistic nature of the Swine-
herd’s gift is emphasized by his ability to sing a startling Song of Experience after his beheading. Yeats, who had long rejected the decadent movement, felt in the end that he had to incorporate its Vision of Evil into his poetry and “system”—“who will thirst for the metaphysical, who have a parched tongue, if we cannot recover the Vision of Evil?” Appropriately, he turned in his attempt to Oscar Wilde’s _Salome_, the greatest masterpiece of the decadent movement, and succeeded in absorbing its terrible Vision into his own. _Salome_, then, functions as Yeats’ antithetical Mask in _A Full Moon in March_, and the result is a unity that strengthens Yeats’ art and “system.”

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22. Yeats, _A Full Moon in March_, p. 623.
23. Ibid.
24. Kermode, p. 80.
25. Yeats, _A Full Moon in March_, p. 623.
26. Ibid., p. 628.
27. Ibid., p. 626.
28. Ibid., p. 629.
Love and Strife in “Dover Beach”

D. S. Neff

“DOVER BEACH” erects a stunning monument to certain aspects of Greek thought. It contains well-known references to Sophocles and Thucydides, but it also owes a debt to the philosophy of Empedocles for its sweeping imaginative scope. A cursory investigation of the Empedoclean influence upon this celebrated lyric reveals that the first twenty-eight lines of its MS were found “on the back of a folded sheet of paper containing notes on the career of Empedocles.”¹ and that Paull F. Baum sees Fragment 121 of The Purifications as a possible source for the famous conclusion of the poem.² Stanley Feshback also delves more deeply into the issue at hand in his examination of various passages from Empedocles’ writings in order to explain the impact of Empedoclean thought on “Dover Beach.”³ Feshback’s study is valuable, but it is also limited in that it overlooks Fragment 20 of On Nature as a direct source for the poem’s specific philosophy, setting, and situation.

Empedocles’ On Nature states that the world exists through the constant transformation of the four elements by two primal, dialectical powers, Love and Strife.⁴ Love represents the forces of stasis, harmony, and unity in the universe, while Strife embodies the principles of separation, plurality, and movement. These two forces form an endless cycle of creation, with one periodically dominating over the other. When Love rules, the four elements mingle in perfect harmony in the form of a sphere. The power of Strife “makes the elements many,” engendering the active processes of life. Love and Strife interact in the following manner:

During the period of plurality and movement the elements are first increasingly separated by Strife and then, as soon as they have been fully separated into four distinct wholes, they begin to be increasingly united by Love. In this way the elements pass through varying stages of separation and combination. In one of these is the world in which we are living now.⁵

Since the fullest phase of Love lies beyond human experience and comprehension, the world as man knows it passes through some form of the phase of Strife.⁶ The ideality of Love exists only as an unknowable condition which serves as a boundary for the cyclical creation and dissolution of the material world. It is incorrect to assume that the principle of Love can be totally absent from life during the controlling phase of Strife. Since every unit of matter and spirit in existence is governed by this endless shifting of Love and Strife, man can hope to come to grips with his dialectical universe only by recognizing its vicissitudes, thereby finding his place in the eternal scheme of things.

Arnold utilizes Fragment 20 of On Nature to enrich and consolidate the aesthetic impact of Empedoclean thought in “Dover Beach” because it forms a specific statement of the interactions of Love and Strife on human and cosmic levels of experience while providing a physical setting which shapes the dramatic tension that is a primum mobile in his poem. This fragment reads as follows:

The world-wide warfare of the eternal two [Love and Strife]
Well in the mass of human limbs is shown:
Whiles into one do they through Love unite,
An mortal members take the body’s form,
And life does flower at the prime; and whiles,
Again disviewer by the Hates [Strife] pervers,
They wander far and wide and up and down
The surf-swept beaches and drear shores of life.⁷

These ancient, metaphorical “surf-swept beaches” become the actual ground of existence in “Dover Beach,” shaping the poem’s structure and setting. In four progressively abstract stanzas, the persona of “Dover Beach” speaks to his lover in an attempt to resolve two differing perceptions of a moonlit beach. The struggle for comprehension presents a dramatic explication of the mysteries of Love and Strife in the flux and reflux of an uncertain world.

To realize the complexities of structure and symbolism philosophy was adapted from Dennis O’Brien’s Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments and Secondary Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 1-4, 127-96; and William E. Leonard’s Introduction to his translation of The Fragments of Empedocles (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1908), pp. 4-8.

⁵ O’Brien, p. 1.


in “Dover Beach,” it is first necessary to grasp its argumentative character. The center of the poem, where the persona states that “we/Find also in the sound a thought” (ll. 18–19), forms the basis for the divergence in perception between the speaker and his lover that initiates his presentation of the subjective interpretation of the tidal interaction between the sea and the shore. This central, double-edged “thought” serves as the bridge between the rather objective view of the beach in moonlight in the first stanza, and the subjective musings on the “Sea of Faith” (l. 21) that lead into the climactic final section of the poem. The puzzling shifts in perspective that occur throughout “Dover Beach” can be explained as being necessary to its argumentative structure. The persona pointedly emphasizes the difference between his subjectivity and his lover’s objective perceptions with “Listen! you [Italics mine] hear the grating roar/Of pebbles” (ll. 9–10). A merging of perspective occurs in the center of the poem with “we [Italics mine]/Find also in the sound a thought” (ll. 18–19) that leads the way for the persona’s persuasive explication of his individual philosophical views in the passage which concludes with “I [Italics mine] only hear/Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” (ll. 24–25), and confronts his lover with a more abstract, subjective, and metaphorical glimpse of a beach at night. The return to a unified point of view in the fourth stanza, which is signalled by “Ah, love, let us [Italics mine] be true/To one another” (ll. 29–30) and the famous “we [Italics mine] are here as on a darkling plain” (l. 35), represents the persona’s final attempt to unite the objective and subjective viewpoints which shape the structure of the poem.

The “surf-swept beaches” of Empedocles’ Fragment 20 comprise a metaphor for the ruling phase of Strife in the world. The waves in “Dover Beach” sound an “eternal note of sadness” (l. 34) in every stanza, expressing the regrettable, but necessary loss of total stasis in existence on four distinct levels of comprehension. The first stanza emphasizes the dichotomy between man’s illusory perception of harmony in nature and his unsettling realization of the continuous mutability in life. The persona’s vision of the calm bay in moonlight is interrupted by the “grating roar” (l. 9) arising from the frenzied commingling and separation of the elements within “the long line of spray/Where the sea meets the moon-blanch’d land” (ll. 7–8).

The probable reference to passages in Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone in the second stanza of “Dover Beach” (ll. 15–18) represents the persona’s initial flight into abstraction in his efforts to come to grips with some isolated glimpses of human endeavor in a world governed by the perplexing interactions of Love and Strife. Sophocles’ Oedipus spans the heights and depths of human experience, moving from king, to outcast, to immortal, to unwitting scourge throughout Oedipus Rex, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone. The persona’s statement that

Sophocles long ago
Heard it on the AEgean, and it brought
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow
Of human misery... (ll. 15–18)

is an attempt to place the uncertainty of man’s role in a life of mutability in a static, comprehensible context, where it can be examined within the stable framework of history and art, free from the disequilibrium of the Empedoclean vision of the natural world.9

The third stanza of “Dover Beach” exhibits an even greater metaphorical leap. The objective observation of ebb tide in the opening of the poem suddenly triggers the persona’s recollection of a cosmic type of tidal interaction. The withdrawal of the “Sea of Faith” (l. 21) in the third stanza may refer to the anomic engendered by the decline of Christianity, but it is also subject to a much different interpretation. The persona’s statement that

The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl’d, (ll. 21–23)

could possibly be an evocation of the phase of perfect Love in “the alteration between the world of increasing Strife which leads away from the Sphere, and the world of increasing Love which leads back to the Sphere.”10

The objective view of the turmoil within nature during the ebb tide at Dover brings a corresponding “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” (l. 25) to mind, which signals a gradual dispersal of the cosmic tide of Love—a dispersal which necessarily marks a subsequent advance in the developing tide of Strife in the life of the world. Thus, the passage of thought in the third stanza leads from the ideal roundness of the “Sea of Faith... round earth’s shore” (ll. 21–22) to the concluding angularity of human isolation in “the vast edges drear/And naked shingles of the world” (ll. 27–28).

The impact of the Empedoclean philosophy reaches

8. Feshbach (p. 275) interprets the structure of “Dover Beach” in a somewhat different manner, writing that the poem progresses from the observations of natural man to cultural man on the beach in moonlight.
9. Norman N. Holland’s “Psychological Depths and ‘Dover Beach’” PS, 9 (1965), 5–28, contains a somewhat similar view of the second stanza, emphasizing the persona’s psychological motivations for his reference to Sophocles, rather than the possible philosophical ones. The specific allusions to Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone may be found in The Poetry of Matthew Arnold: A Commentary, pp. 176–78.
its fullest extent in the concluding stanza of “Dover Beach,” where the interaction of Love and Strife is dealt with on an intensely personal level. The cosmic perspective is established in stanza three, allowing the persona to reconcile the ideal of human love with his visions of a world governed by Strife. He first pleads for the stability of love amidst constant natural and spiritual mutability (ll. 29–30), and then presents his enlightened view of the uncertainty of existence:

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain. . . . (11. 29–34)

This definition of the phase of Strife leads to a concluding allusion which links the four stages of argument and revelation that form the substance of the persona’s disturbing night-vision. The famous

And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. (11. 35–37)

is a reference to the uncertainties of night warfare that are described in Thucydid’s account of the battle of Epipolae in The History of the Peloponnesian War. This powerful image of the ancient “darkling plain” of Epipolae is the final, culminating denial of the illusion of natural harmony that opens “Dover Beach.” The persona moves from his vision of a tranquil bay in moonlight to a terrifying image of bloody warfare beneath the same shining moon. The battlefield of Epipolae becomes a unifying metaphor for the confused uncertainty that runs throughout the poem. The elemental struggles on Dover Beach, the cosmic interaction of the “Sea of Faith,” and the search for love in a mutable world become comprehensible forms of the timeless battle by moonlight that mystifies man in a world whose essential characteristics, according to Empedocles—and to Arnold, mirror a timeless process of uncertain but perpetual change.

University of Illinois

Recent Publications: A Selected List

Arthur F. Mineroj

AUGUST 1977–JANUARY 1978

I

GENERAL


Parssonin, Terry M. "Mesmeric Performers." *Victorian Studies*, Autumn, pp. 87-104. Mesmerism was spread less by books and more by a small army of mesmeric performers.

Rubenstein, David. "Cycling in the 1890s." *Victorian Studies*, Autumn, pp. 47-71. Cycling had an important impact on both economic and social life.

II

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS


Considerable common ground between the criticism of Arnold and Eliot.


Hovams, Margaret. "Repression and Sublimation of Nature in Wuthering Heights." *PMLA*, January, pp. 9-19. The destructive reality of nature must be repressed; the figurative use of nature redirects the dangerous force into a safe channel.

BROWNING. Adler, Joshua. "Structure and Meaning in Browning's 'My Last Duchess.'" *Victorian Poetry*, Autumn, pp. 219-27. The speaker uses an outer frame of aesthetics and an inner one of social convention to describe his relationship with the Duchess.


Lecker, Robert A. "The Crisis of Meeting: Mediation and
Synthesis in Browning’s _Sordello_.” _English Studies in Canada_, Fall, pp. 301-25. Sordello’s ideals are destroyed by the frailty of his own flesh and will.


McGillis, Roderick F. “Tenniel’s Turned Rabbit: A Reading of _Alice_ with Tenniel’s Help.” _English Studies in Canada_, Fall, pp. 326-35. Tenniel’s illustration in Chapter eight is a searching comment on the social and sexual concerns of Carroll’s story.


Davies, James A. “Negative Similarity: The Fat Boy in _The Pickwick Papers_.” _Durham University Journal_, December, pp. 29-34. Joe in his isolation is an important unifying force.

Hutter, Albert D. “The High Tower of His Mind: Psychoanalysis and the Reader of ‘Bleak House’.” _Criticism_, Fall, pp. 296-316. The novel enables the reader to reexperience a basic and pervasive pattern of psychological growth.


Lankford, William T. “‘The Parish Boy’s Progress’: The Evolving Form of _Oliver Twist_.” _PMLA_, January, pp. 20-32. Dickens progressively transforms the controlling conventions of the novel to explore deeply rooted moral tension involving innocence, evil, and law.


Linehan, Thomas M. “Rhetorical Technique and Moral Purpose in Dickens’s _Hard Times_.” _University of Toronto Quarterly_, Fall, pp. 22-36. The novel’s moral purpose is revealed through Dickens’s rhetorical technique.


Zimmerman, Bonnie S. “Radiant as a Diamond: George Eliot, Jewelry and the Female Role.” _Criticism_, Summer 1977, pp. 212-22. Eliot’s consistent use of jewelry is a remarkable example of her control of imagery.


HALLAM. Kolb, Jack. “They Were No Kings: An Unrecorded Sonnet by Hallam.” _Victorian Poetry_, Winter, pp. 373-76. Published in _Fraser’s_, February 1833.

HARDY. Casagrande, Peter J. “Hardy’s Wordsworth: A Record and a Commentary.” _English Literature in Transition_, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 210-37. Hardy’s debt to Wordsworth is greater than assumed.


Schweik, Robert C. “Fictions in the Criticism of Hardy’s
Fiction.” English Literature in Transition, Vol. 20, Number 4, pp. 204-209. Critical weaknesses result from a narrow view of Hardy’s work.


HOPKINS. Korg, Jacob. “Hopkins’ Linguistic Deviations.” PMLA, October, pp. 977-86. Hopkins’ original methods give language dominance over experience and use it to reshape reality according to linguistic principles.


KINGSLEY. Harrington, Henry R. “Charles Kingsley’s Fallen Athlete.” Victorian Studies, Autumn, pp. 73-86. The fallen athlete and the manly Christian are one in a fictional world redeemed by Kingsley’s faith in “feminine virtue.”


Robson, John M. “The Rhetoric of J. S. Mill’s Periodical Articles.” Victorian Periodicals Newsletter, September, pp. 122-29. Mill was appealing to different periodicals in different periods.


NEWMAN. Kane, Eileen. “John Henry Newman’s Catholic University Church in Dublin.” Studies, Summer/Autumn, pp. 105-9. The basic ideas for both the building and the decorating of it were Newman’s.


RUSKIN. Imman, Billie Andrew. “Ruskin’s Reasoned Criticism of Art.” Papers on Language and Literature, Fall, pp. 372-82. Ruskin’s conscious desire to make his art criticism consistent with his idea of history and conducive to the religious and moral welfare of mankind.

SWINBURNE. Davis, Mary Byrd. “Swinburne’s Use of His Sources in Tristram of Lyonesse.” Philological Quarterly, Winter 1976, pp. 96-112. Swinburne gave an individual interpretation to the events in his poem he took from various medieval versions.


THACKERAY. Harden, Edgar F. “Thackeray’s Miscellanies.” The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 497-508. The author’s failure to have his language faithfully published or kept in obscurity when he so wished.


Vann, J. Don. “Unrecorded Reviews of Thackeray’s Paris Sketch-Book.” The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 344-46. Thackeray was familiar with all six reviews, which were favorable.

TROLLOPE. Butte, George. “Ambivalence and Affirmation in The Duke’s Children.” Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 709-27. Palliser’s burden is to make an accommodation to the past which will permit forgiveness, love, and some celebration.


PROJECTS—REQUESTS FOR AID

CARLYLE’S LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS (1850), Jules Siegel needs manuscripts for a critical edition. TLS, 5 August, p. 962.

JOHN RUSKIN. J. S. Dearden wishes photographs or portraits. TLS, 5 August, p. 962.

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