# The Victorian Newsletter

**William E. Buckler, Editor**  
New York University

**Robert A. Greenberg, Associate Editor,**  
Queens College, City University of New York

**Arthur F. Minero, Assistant Editor for Bibliography,**  
Staten Island Community College,  
City University of New York

**Warren R. Herendeen, Assistant Editor,**  
New York University

**Hugh H. Wilson, Assistant Editor,**  
Wagner College

---

**Number 37**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Spring 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1    | Bishop Blougram and the Cardinals  
by Ellen F. Shields |
| 7    | Henry Kingsley and the Governor Eyre Controversy  
by William H. Scheuerle |
| 12   | G. W. E. Russell and the Editing of  
Matthew Arnold's Letters  
by William S. Peterson |
| 18   | Recent Publications: A Selected List  
by Arthur F. Minero |
| 21   | The Warp of Mill's "Fabric" of Thought  
by Wendell V. Harris |
| 24   | Mill on De Quincey: Esprit Critique Revoked  
by James G. Murray |
| 27   | John Stuart Mill on Dogmatism, Liberticide,  
and Revolution  
by Edward Alexander |
| 29   | Pickwick's "Magnanimous Revenge": Reason and  
Responsibility in the Pickwick Papers  
by Fred Kaplan |

---

**English X News**

---

The Victorian Newsletter is edited for the English X Group of the Modern Language Association by William E. Buckler, New York University, New York, N.Y. 10003. Subscription rates in the United States and Canada are $2.00 for one year and $3.00 for two years. Checks may be made payable to The Victorian Newsletter. Copyright 1970 by New York University.
The Warp of Mill's "Fabric" of Thought*

Wendell V. Harris

The influence of Wordsworth's poetry and Coleridge's thought on J. S. Mill, as cited in his Autobiography, implied by the well-known essays on Bentham and Coleridge, and suggested by his essays on poetry, has proved an attractive topic for literary historians. Those closest to Mill, personally or philosophically, have been inclined to describe these influences in rather general and perhaps guarded terms. Thus Leslie Stephen's DNB survey of Mill's life speaks simply of his widening and humanizing Bentham's philosophy. However, in the present century there has been an increasing tendency to emphasize a Coleridgean admixture in Mill's thought, and to discuss it as though systems of thought were totally miscible, as though blends of, say, one-third Coleridge to two-thirds Bentham, or one-fourth Wordsworth, one-fourth Coleridge, one-fourth Bentham, and one-fourth Comte, plus a pinch of Carlyle, were by some intellectual alchemy perfectly attainable. That J. S. Mill's mind came to represent some such mixture and, as a corollary, was muddied by irresolvable, if honorable, inconsistencies is most often assumed by those who wish to emphasize the difference between a humane and sensitive J. S. Mill and a coldly mechanical earlier generation of utilitarians.

A recent and reasonably extreme example of the tendency toward such an interpretation is to be found in Gertrude Himmelfarb's chapter on Mill in Victorian Minds.1 The chapter, entitled "The Other John Stuart Mill," is an examination of Mill's "Coleridgean conservatism," which Mrs. Himmelfarb finds strongest in his early and latest writings and which she wishes to contrast with the better-known "liberal" works of the middle years when he was supervised, influenced, and dominated by Harriet Taylor; when, in short, "he was not entirely a free agent." According to her interpretation, Mill's emancipation from his father's views was begun by a fantasy of his father's death (deduced by Mrs. Himmelfarb from Mill's account of his reaction to MarmonTEL'S MÉMOIRES) but only completed with the father's death in 1835. From about 1840, however, the influence of Harriet Taylor returned him to a predominantly Benthamite position from which he escaped only after her death in 1858.

I cite Mrs. Himmelfarb's account not because I am concerned to refute it in detail but because her interpretation of the influence on Mill's thought of a classic Freudian conflict and an unexampled uxoriousness is one of the latest and most influential among those studies that elevate psychological tensions above all other influences while assuming that the mind, like a universal solvent, can dissolve and keep in solution almost any mixture of thought. In contrast, I wish to urge the importance of the metaphysical assumptions a man makes, to urge that we recognize that commitment to a set of assumptions precludes, insofar as these assumptions continue to be held and the man strives for even moderate consistency, the acceptance of clearly opposed principles and their attendant corollaries and conclusions. Mill's mind was not, I think, a vessel that accepted whatever new contents were introduced into it through the proper psychological conduits, but, to use the metaphor he himself suggests, a constantly rewoven web.

The important question to ask is not how many inconsistencies of detail, how many alterations of specific positions we can find in the corpus of his work, but to what extent he remained true to a consistent set of basic postulates. Mill began his intellectual life with as firm an inheritance of basic principles as any young man ever had, and, despite the fashionableness of viewing Mill as a man whose whole life was a process of discovering the worthlessness of his intellectual inheritance, ordinary care in distinguishing the results of chains of deduction, always liable to errors and incompleteness, from basic postulates shows Mill never to have repudiated his intellectual patrimony. It is of course impossible here to enter into a close analysis of the complexities of Mill's thought in all areas in which inconsistencies have been cited. I must therefore confine myself to outlining (by way of reminder) the core of Bentham's system, examining five of the most famous instances of Mill's apparent divergence from that core, and briefly commenting on the way his method of writing reflects his pursuit of consistency.

To estimate Mill's deviations from the mode of thought in which he was brought up, we must distinguish the root principles of that mode from both second-

---

* This paper and the two that follow by Professors Murray and Alexander were read originally in December 1969 to Group Ten of the Modern Language Association.

ary conclusions and accidental accretions. When Jeremy Bentham came to set out a simple and convincing statement of the principle of utility as the basis of the system set forth in *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, he offered the following famous formulation. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne." For the purpose of his argument, this is undoubtedly the clearest, most effective beginning. However, logically a more basic principle or belief lies behind it: the empiricist principle that there is no source of knowledge other than experience and that generalizations from experience and subsequent deductions from the resulting generalizations are the only valid means of ordering or understanding that experience. Bentham's insistence that the adversaries of utility have nothing to depend upon but the principle of "sympathy and antipathy" is not merely the supporting argument it appears to be, but the necessary denial of all other sources of knowledge that justify the deduction of man's guiding principle from experience. "Moral sense," "common sense," "rule of right," "fitness of things," "natural equity," and "good order" are all dismissed as phrases reducible to an appeal to personal preference and opinion, as are the doctrines of innate ideas, revelation, or transcendent faculties of the mind to which these phrases must ultimately appeal. Three principles, the empiricism that denies all other sources of knowledge, the principle of utility (a generalization from experience), and the faith in ordinary logic demonstrated throughout the conduct of Bentham's argument are then—I beg indulgence for belaboring the point—the root-principles of Bentham's system. It will be found, I think, that Mill never repudiated any of these, and in only one of the five instances I wish to examine did he take a position inconsistent with them.

One may as well look first at the instance of actual apostasy: Mill's well-known introduction of qualitative distinctions into the evaluation of pleasures as formulated in the series of essays in *Fraser's Magazine* that were republished under the title *Utilitarianism* (1863). Bentham had said that "to a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less" according to four circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and pro-

pinquity or remoteness, and in relation to other pleasures or pains, its fecundity (chance of being followed by sensations of the same kind) and its purity (chance of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind). Now all of these properties are, strictly speaking, capable of being described and calculated qualitatively, and necessarily so within Bentham's system, since the sole standard of value in judging experience is the amount ("lot" is Bentham's word) of pleasure or pain produced. To judge the quality of a pleasure would obviously require imposing a standard of value other than and superior to the only one Bentham recognizes. The charge that the principle of utility justified low, mean, or degrading pleasures had obviously troubled Mill long before he published these essays defending utilitarianism. Mill had tried to add an additional dimension to Bentham's system of evaluating pleasures and pains in his essay on Bentham twenty years earlier. There he found it a defect that Bentham never recognized "the desire of perfection" or "the pursuit of any other ideal end for its own sake." But though Mill was trying in the essays on Bentham and Coleridge to say as much as possible for Coleridge while pointing out Bentham's deficiencies, even here whenever it was clear to Mill that to follow Coleridge he must reject the basic assumptions of Bentham, he drew back. The qualitative evaluation of pleasure that Mill introduces in the later *Utilitarianism* is at once more modest and more precise than the earlier attempt to get beyond what Mill saw as Bentham's defects; what Mill had vaguely but grandly referred to as "the desire for spiritual perfection" in the earlier essay now becomes "nobler feelings" and "higher feelings." But neither formulation will serve.

Ringing as is the statement that "It is . . . better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied," it has long been clear that Mill was introducing a palpable inconsistency. It is simply not true that it is "compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable than others." Alexander Bain argued that the proper way of meeting the objection would have been "to have resolved all the so-called nobler or higher pleasures into the one single circumstance of including, with the agent's pleasure, the pleasure of others." Another possibility would have been to give much greater emphasis to the importance of the characteristics "fecundity" and "purity"—that is, to identify the higher pleasures with those that lead to other pleasures, or repetition of the same pleasure, and

3. Works, I, 16.
not eventually to pain. In any case, Mill’s method of attempting to “humanize” Bentham’s calculus led to confusion, and Mill must have come to recognize this, for he never again tried to press his modification, nor rest any other portion of his system on it. Most important, the inconsistency resulted from Mill’s attempt to introduce his modification without challenging Bentham’s postulates.

The four other instances most often pointed out as examples of Mill’s divergence from the strict interpretation of the principle of utility are in the areas of aesthetics (specifically poetry), political economy, government, and religion. I will consider these in the order named, giving greatest attention to his positions on poetry and religion since these are generally regarded as especially significant indices of a rejection of Bentham. The rigor of Mill’s education, his mental crisis, and the role of Wordsworth’s poetry in rescuing him from that crisis are perhaps the best-known facts of Mill’s life. The entire sequence is so pat an apology for poetry that it is no wonder that it has been seized so eagerly by champions of the power of poetry and the imagination, but a careful reading of the chapter on the crisis in the Autobiography and of the subsequent essays on poetry should lead those who make the highest claims for poetry to restrain their jubilation over Mill’s conversion. Wordsworth’s poems did indeed offer Mill the “culture of the feelings” he had desired; but nowhere does he suggest that they offered any kind of imaginative truth, or made possible any grasp of reality not available to the ordinary, logical intellect. Poetry, he finds, is useful as a means of refreshing one’s capacity for feeling, particularly where this has been paralyzed by the habit of analysis. It thus has utility: it offers pleasure from a fresh source, one not dependent on the analytical intellect. Moreover, it would appear to reinforce the beneficial associations that, having been inculcated by education in order to produce the “desires and aversions” necessary for the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, are unfortunately to some extent “artificial and casual.”

It has, thus, a sort of secondary utility in increasing the balance of happiness over pain.

That these are the values of poetry for Mill becomes clearer when we turn to the two essays on poetry of 1833, reprinted as “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties” in Volume I of Discussions and Dissertations (1859). He begins with a bow toward Coleridge and Wordsworth in acknowledging that “the word ‘poetry’ imports some-

thing quite peculiar in its nature, something which may exist in prose as well as in verse,” but when, after “attempting to clear up the conception” mankind attaches to poetry by gradually distinguishing it from all other things—following the Socratic method he admires—we arrive at the final definition, we find that poetry is “man’s thought tinged by his feelings.” This borrowed definition is sharpened by a distinction between poetry and eloquence, poetry being “feeling, confessing itself to itself in moments of solitude, and embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet’s mind.” But attention to the aptness of Mill’s resulting distinction between eloquence as “heard” and poetry as “overheard” should not lead us to overlook the main portion of the definition—“man’s thought tinged by his feelings.” As Mill states earlier in the essay, in his view, “every truth which a human being can enunciate, every thought, even every outward impression which can enter into his consciousness, may become poetry when shown through any impassioned medium, when invested with the colouring of joy, or grief, or pity, or affection, or admiration, or reverence, or awe, or even hatred or terror: and, unless so coloured, nothing, be it as interesting as it may, is poetry.” The important thing to note is that it is presumed that the truth can be enunciated, the thought entertained, before it is transformed into poetry; that is, poetry appears to play no part in helping one to win one’s way to the truth or thought, or even to clarify it.

The limits of Mill’s definition of poetry can be illustrated by comparison with the poetic theory of a man like Shelley who regards poetry as creative and prophetic in the highest sense. For Shelley, “the functions of the poetical faculty are twofold; by one it creates new materials of knowledge, and power and pleasure; by the other it engenders in the mind a desire to reproduce and arrange them according to a certain rhythm and order which may be called the beautiful and good.” The first function Shelley assigns to the imagination, that of creating new materials of knowledge, power, and pleasure, the result of his distinction between the reason and imagination that gives to the latter the ability to grasp “those forms which are common to universal nature and existence itself” so that the poet “participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one,” Mill could not for a moment accept. (Neither could he have accepted

6. Dissertations and Discussions (London, 1867), I, 63, 64, 70.
7. Ibid., p. 71.
8. Ibid., p. 70.
10. Ibid., p. 112.
Coleridge’s more circumscribed and tentative attempt in the *Biographia Literaria* to give powers of transcendence to the imagination.)

The second portion of Shelley’s statement Mill could indeed endorse; in fact it is his own view. Shelley argues the direct, practical moral power of poetry in several ways, but certainly a central argument is that the good man is the one able to “imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own.” Mill implies the same function and value of the imagination in a passage in the essay on Bentham: Imagination is “that which enables us, by a voluntary effort, to conceive the present as if it were absent, the imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it in the feelings which, if it were indeed real, it would bring along with it... the power by which one human being enters into the mind and circumstances of another.”

Mill’s definition of poetry as “man’s thought tinged by his feelings” leads directly into and justifies the first assertion of the second portion of Mill’s essay. To write poetry is not the privilege of a few who are born poets; all persons who pursue the proper means and who acquire sufficient intellectual culture may write what will be “unquestionable poetry.” Mill, as is well known, goes on to make a distinction between the poets of nature whose “emotions are the links of association by which their ideas... are connected together” and the poets of culture who are able to invest their thoughts in poetry. In the first, says Mill, “feeling waits upon thought”; in the other “thought [waits] upon feelings.” But though he values the “poets of nature” highly, it turns out that to attain the highest rank, the poet of nature must cultivate philosophic reason. “Because at one time the mind may be so given up to a state of feeling, that the succession of its ideas is determined by the present enjoyment or suffering which pervades it, this is no reason but that in the calm retirement of study, when under no peculiar excitement either of the outward or of the inward sense, it may form any combinations, or pursue any train of ideas, which are most conducive to the purposes of philosophic inquiry; and may, while in that state, form deliberate convictions, from which no excitement will afterwards make it swerve.” The philosopher-poet is clearly superior to the “mere poet” whether the latter be a poet by nature or cultivation. All of which supports the thrust of the first part of the essay: poetry is not a form of thinking, not a form of seeking the truth, but the nevertheless useful tinging of thought with feeling. This conclusion would hardly have disconcerted Bentham. As a source of pleasure, poetry may be no better than pushpin, but both pleasures are permissible, and those who find particular pleasure in poetry would, one supposes, be perfectly welcome to it so long as Mill’s injunction that it not be allowed to confuse strictly intellectual processes is obeyed. Moreover, Bentham smiled benignly on whatever aided the process of establishing and maintaining the proper mental associations, and insofar as it could be shown to do this, poetry could find a place in the utilitarian system.

Mill also specifically calls attention to his divergence from the system of political economy adopted by the utilitarian school, a divergence he describes as in its “general tone,” a product of Harriet Taylor’s influence. This “tone” resulted chiefly from making a distinction between “the laws of the Production of Wealth, which are the real laws of nature, dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of its Distribution, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on human will.” Mill is understating his divergence from the whole previous line of economic thought that his father had summed up in *Elements of Political Economy*, for the consequence of presuming the modes of distribution immutable had been the production of a great many of the injustices that were (properly enough) charged to the economic precepts of the utilitarians. Carlyle had been quite correct when he began *Past and Present* with a vision of the riches of England lying under an enchantment that forbade their wise or humane distribution, and cried in the chapter entitled “Gospel of Mammonism”: “Impossible; of a certain two-legged animal with feathers it is said, if you draw a distinct chalk-circle round him he sits imprisoned, as if girt with the iron ring of Fate.” That “chalk-circle,” that enchantment, was of course the belief in the immutability of the modes of distribution. Having once denied this immutability, the door was at least opened for the modifications of classical laissez-faire rigidity that appeared in the revised editions of Mill’s *Political Economy*. Such an overturning of the received doctrine of the Benthamites, though spectacularly far-reaching in its effects, did not however depend upon a similarly radical overturning of Bentham’s basic philosophical principles. It denied neither the metaphysical principle of empiricism,

nor the prime empirical generalization of man’s being governed by pleasure and pain, nor the faith in logical analysis. The economic system adopted by the utilitarians was not a direct deduction from Bentham’s principle of utility though it was compatible with their other basic assumptions since it depended on generalizations from experience and the deduction of consequences. Mill simply perceived that some of the generalizations were in fact fallacious.

Similarly, Mill’s major modification in the theory of government set forth by his father and godfather is, however influential his presentations of it have been, essentially a correction of their line of reasoning, not a rejection of the principles from which that line of reasoning is suspended. The same argument that drove Bentham and James Mill to defend men against the tyranny of a minority led John Mill to defend them against the tyranny of a majority. James Mill’s essays on government and freedom of the press and his son’s On Liberty equally assume a total empiricism and the principle of utility. The son simply sees that his father’s logic had been faulty to the extent it led him to regard democracy as the government of each by each or all by all; it also meant the government of each man by all men.

Mill’s empiricism is the basis of his belief that truth is a product of the collision of opinions, and that therefore provision must be made for making such collision not only possible but profitable. His belief that there is no other standard of moral judgment than utility, that society should be structured for no other end than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, led him to emphasize the necessity of allowing men to find happiness as far as possible in their own way. Both themes are sounded in the essay on Bentham, argued from first principles in On Liberty, and made to determine forms of government in Considerations on Representative Government. Bentham’s basic postulates will be found intact at the basis of all three.

Mill’s final divergence, the most shocking to the orthodox disciples of the Benthamite succession, was his argument in the posthumously published essay “Theism” that the probability of a Creator can be asserted, and that, if His power is assumed to be limited, the Creator can be regarded as benevolent in his intentions. Now a good bit has been written about the extent to which this essay reverses the conclusions of two others that, written before “Theism,” were published posthumously along with it. Close reading of the three will show that the contrast is not so great as it may seem. Twice in conducting the argument of “Theism,” Mill refers to the central argument of his “Essay on Nature” in support or extension of certain important points. It would seem that he continued to regard the earlier essay as sound, believed it compatible with “Theism,” and intended either to publish it or incorporate it more fully into the later essay. And indeed, in “Theism” Mill is simply affirming and developing a position already advanced in the “Essay on Nature” as logically unexceptionable. Mill’s argument that Nature cannot be regarded as a model of the good or the just leads in the “Essay on Nature” to the development of the point that the only explanation for the obvious evils of the world possible to those who believe in a good and benevolent Creator is the Creator’s imperfect power. “The only admissible moral theory of Creation is that the Principle of Good cannot at once and altogether subdue the powers of evil . . . . could not place mankind in a world free from the necessity of an incessant struggle with maleficent powers . . . . but could and did make them capable of carrying on the fight with vigour and with progressively increasing success.”

Similarly, “Theism” incorporates the argument of the other earlier essay on religion, “The Utility of Religion.” In that essay, after dismissing the larger claims of orthodox religion, and most particularly its claim to be the ground of morality, Mill nevertheless concludes that “the value . . . of religion to the individual, both in the past and present, as a source of personal satisfaction and of elevated feelings, is not to be disputed.” As in the “Essay on Nature” he again sets forth the belief in a benevolent Creator of limited powers as the “one only form of belief in the supernatural” that “stands wholly clear both of intellectual contradictions and moral obliquity.” He continues to reject this belief for himself, this time on the specific grounds that it is “too shadowy and insubstantial . . . to admit of its being a permanent substitute for the religion of humanity,” but is willing to state that “the two may be held in conjunction.”

Between the composition of that essay and “Theism,” Mill lost his optimism about the possibilities of inculcating—that is of forming man’s mental associations

---

19. According to Helen Taylor, Mill had intended to publish “Nature” in 1873 (see the Introduction to Three Essays on Religion, pp. viii-ix).
20. Ibid., p. 39.
21. Ibid., p. 104.
22. Ibid., p. 116.
23. Ibid., p. 117.
fully enough to make possible—the "Religion of Humanity." Indeed, he had suggested in "Utility of Religion" that religion, like poetry, could serve powerfully to reinforce the utilitarian associations, and Mill came increasingly to see that the Comtian Religion of Humanity was not only too authoritarian, but too weak in its appeal to the imagination. In his essay on Coleridge Mill had argued that a major error of the eighteenth-century philosophers had been the assumption that the moral fruits of religious belief could "subsist unimpaired . . . when the whole system of opinions and observances with which they were habitually intertwined was violently torn away," and he came to recognize the same error in the advocates of a secular religion. But as his hopes for that altogether secular religion dimmed, his recognition of the beneficial effect of what he had already proclaimed the only rational and moral form of religious hope increased in importance until it came to occupy the place it does in "Theism."

In "Theism," after examining in Part I the usual "evidence" offered for a Creator, Mill concludes that the argument from marks of design affords a probability, though no more than a probability, of the creation of the world by intelligence; in Part II he follows the course already marked out in "Nature" as the only logical one compatible with any belief in a Creator, finding that though there is some evidence of such a Creator having desired the happiness of his creatures, He cannot both have desired their perfect happiness and have possessed omnipotence. Part III rejects all arguments about the immortality of the soul—no inferences about the matter can be drawn from anything we know. Part IV denies the authority of Revelation. The result to this point is that "The whole domain of the supernatural is thus removed from the region of Belief into that of simple Hope." The question remaining for Part V, then, is "whether the indulgence of hope, in a region of imagination merely, in which there is no prospect that any probable grounds of expectation will ever be obtained, is irrational, and ought to be discouraged as a departure from the rational principle of regulating our feelings as well as opinions strictly by evidence." Actually Mill's question is of the utility of indulging such a hope, and the argument supporting his answer that such hope does have utility is the same he offered in "Utility of Religion."

When finally Mill brought together his analyses of various questions connected with belief in a deity, positions he had already recognized as ones that could be held without dishonoring the intellect or upsetting the delicate calculations of utility were found not only compatible but mutually illuminating. The feeling that one is "a fellow-labourer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife," as it is phrased in "Utility of Religion," is presented as not only reconcilable with but a valuable reinforcement of the Religion of Humanity. Mill's final comment on the hope that there exists a benevolent though not omnipotent creator is: "To the other inducements for cultivating a religious devotion to the welfare of our fellow-creatures as an obligatory limit to every selfish aim, and an end for the direct promotion of which no sacrifice can be too great, it superadds the feeling that in making this the rule of our life, we may be co-operating with the unseen Being to whom we owe all that is enjoyable in life." Thus the arguments of "Nature" and "Utility of Religion" come together in "Theism."

It is no wonder that those of generally Benthamite persuasion who had gone on to give allegiance to positivism felt betrayed, but there is nothing traitorous or even inconsistent in Mill's altered stance. In fact, as in the case of the essay on poetry, the conclusions of "Theism" not only remain within the boundaries of those possible on the initial Benthamite premises, but find part of their force in offering a way to reinforce the system of association on which those of the Benthamite party so heavily relied.

In the Autobiography Mill describes his constant concern that his system of thought remain consistent, speaking of constantly "weaving anew" the fabric of his thought. "When I had taken in any new idea, I could not rest till I had adjusted its relation to my old opinions, and ascertained exactly how far its effect ought to extend in modifying or superseding them." We find there also the account of the rewriting of the long-meditated Logic to bring each of the completed parts wholly in line with his latest insights. Alexander Bain has commented on the way the connecting of previously stated doctrines in Representative Government was made to improve "their statement and bearings," and Helen Taylor has written of Mill's care both in turning a matter over "to the utmost limit of his own thinking powers" and subjecting everything to a revision "peculiarly searching and thorough." The predictable reaction of the

25. Three Essays on Religion, p. 244.
26. Ibid., p. 117.
27. Ibid., p. 256.
Mill undoubtedly never completed his reweaving, but the uncertainty and relative brevity of life are such that a man who is constantly rethinking and adjusting can hardly be expected to leave at the moment of death a totally comprehensive web of thought just completed on the loom. Nevertheless, Mill came closer to doing so than most men, and the basic Benthamite principles and methods of thought that form the warp and frame of his thought were never discarded. Neither can critics attempting revaluations afford to discard the fundamental axioms through which his constantly refining analysis drove the shuttle of his thought.29

University of Colorado

Mill on De Quincey: **Esprit Critique** Revoked

*James G. Murray*

I should have thought that the querulous question that Carlyle put to Mill had at least in part been answered by the crisis and conversion sections of the *Autobiography*. "Shall your science," the Scourge of Scotland wanted to know, "proceed in the small, chink-lighted, or even oil-lighted, underground workshop of Logic alone; and man's mind become an Arithmetical Mill, whereof Memory is the Hopper, and mere tables of Sines and Tangents, Codification, and Treatises of what you call Political Economy, are the meal?"31 And yet as late as 1869 an anonymous and vicious reviewer for Blackwood's was still mistaking the new Mill for the old, still attacking both the man and his method for "intense arrogance, his incapacity to do justice to the feelings or motives of all from whom he differs, his intolerance of all but his own disciples... and his want of playfulness in himself and repugnance to it in others."32

The fact is, however, that Mill did undergo a profound change, whether because of Carlyle or in spite of the reviewer; that this change was at once something more specific and less romantic than that described in the *Autobiography*; that the letters, dating from 1812 to 1845, more precisely define the change; and that both a relatively obscure review of De Quincey (1845) and a major statement in *Principles of Political Economy* (1848) confirm, demonstrate, and illustrate the nature of the change.

In order to understand the difference in Mill which this change meant we need to know two things: what he was like before conversion and what he said he was like after conversion. First, how better grasp the end result and final product of a "chrestomathic educational scheme" than to calculate the intentions of its architects?—The simplistic intentions of a Bentham who differentiated between prose and poetry by claiming that the former "is when all the lines except the last go on to the end," the latter "when some of them fall short of it,"3 or the logical positivism of a James Mill who vowed that "if I had time to write a book, I would make the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St. Paul's."34

---

29. In regard to the general tendency of these changes, Professor Robson, the scholar who has collated them most closely, places the emphasis in his summary of them not on substantive inconsistencies but on the fact that "Principles of Political Economy" is not simply a textbook; it is also a measured polemic. As such, it was open to endless revision, always in the direction of clarity and effective persuasion, and also in response to the changing climate of opinion" (Collected Works of John Stuart Mill [Toronto, 1965], II, Lxxix). Robson effectively argues for the unity of Mill's social and political thought in *The Improvement of Mankind* (Toronto, 1968).

30. Sartor Resartus, chap. X.

31. "Mr. Mill on the Subject of Women," Blackwood's, No. 647 (September 1869).

Such intentions, rigorously and relentlessly applied, could do nothing less than shape an over-simplifier, an insufferably certain logician, a rhetorician interested more in winning a debate than in getting at truth, a mathematical genius convinced that social problems could be solved like theorems, and a cock-sure, sharp-tongued, intellectual egotist whose characteristic "hang-up" was the "put-off" (such as, "I never meant to say that the Conservatives are generally stupid. I meant to say that stupid people are generally conservative."). Second, relying on the Autobiography alone, we are asked by Mill to witness just these signs of conversion: the opening of the parochial sight to the vision that travel (specifically in France) bestows; the opening of the scientific mind to the ministrations of poetry; and the opening of the head to the heart—as evidenced in the redeeming tears Mill shed over Marmontel's Mémoires. Regeneration, then, so Mill insists, is the passage from analysis to feeling.

I submit that there were other openings, other passages. Less dramatic and personal than the ones described, they were nevertheless very important to the maturation of Mill's character and scholarship. In essence they were logical and rhetorical changes affecting principally his method of argumentation. At the very least they signalized the real revolt against chrestomathy, the severing of the parental cord, and the pilgrim's progress from boy to human being.

Two key passages in the Autobiography and one in an early issue of the London and Westminster Review provide the first clues to how a "logic chopping machine" transformed himself into "the saint of rationalism."

Referring to Macaulay's devastating attack on James Mill's "Essay on Government" but consciously and in conscience rejecting his father's dismissal of the attack as simply "irrational," Mill admitted both that "Macaulay's conception of the logic of politics was erroneous" and that "there was truth in several of his strictures on my father's treatment of the subject." Macaulay was not to be dismissed simply because he was Macaulay; James Mill was not to be defended simply because he was John's father and teacher. Each man was partly right, partly wrong.

Then, again, analyzing his own rejection of the tenets of philosophical radicalism in favor of something more tolerant and tolerable, Mill quite significantly cautioned both leftists and rightists in this manner: "I am asked what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which, as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, no system: only a conviction that the true system was something much more complex and many-sided than I had previously any idea of." The admission is enormous, amounting to nothing less than a kind of new-found intellectual latitudinarianism, a planet of logical relativism swimming across the ken of an absolutist.

Finally, in the context of the first year of the London and Westminster Review—which softened and refined Bentham's theory of Utility, which was less defiantly argumentative and more broadly speculative, and which not so much fought the cause of radicalism as it sought to resolve differences within the radical ranks and to effect reconciliations without—Mill dramatically pitted Bentham against Coleridge (to the benefit of the latter), order against progress, the creative mind against the critical, "the imperative against the interrogative mood." And the difference between these antagonists, Mill now concedes, is that between full truth confidently held and partial truth to be found in the midst of error. As he put the matter, "For our own part, we have a large tolerance for one-eyed men, provided their one eye is a penetrating one: if they saw more, they probably would not see so keenly, nor so eagerly pursue one course of inquiry. Almost all rich veins of original and striking speculation have been opened by...half-thinkers."

These, therefore, are the emblems of conversion: the notion that error has some rights; the notion that truth, a complementary variable, should not be systematized; and the notion that "one-eyed men" should be coddled, not killed. But, as the letters from 1812 to 1848 and especially those of the 1830's will show, Mill was fast turning such emblems into a code. To put this another way, although he will be seen in strong reaction against orthodox Benthamism during these years, he will also be seen developing a new orthodoxy. As he said: "I found the fabric of my old and taught opinions giving way in many fresh places, and I never allowed it to fall to pieces, but was incessantly occupied in weaving it anew." This reweaving process, as discussed in the letters, depends on the formulation and trying out of four new (to Mill) ideas: about debate, about logic, about error, and about truth.

7. Ibid., p. 113.
8. Packe, p. 245.
In resolving "hereafter to avoid all occasions for debate," his accustomed approach to controversy, Mill puts forth a negative and a positive reason, determining that "debate cannot strengthen my sympathies with those who agree with me" and is "sure to weaken them with those who differ." He continues to recognize divergence of opinion (as with Carlyle) but admits, as a debater would not, that "that may be my loss and fault," the fault precisely of "the dogmatic disputatiousness of my former narrow and mechanical state." A mere "collision of opinions" does not advance argument, is not the chief advantage of "free discussion." Rather he comes to believe that "truth is sown and germinates in the mind itself, and is not to be struck out suddenly like fire from a flint by knocking another hard body against it: so I accustomed myself to learn by inducing others to deliver their thoughts, and to teach by scattering my own, and therefore I eschewed occasions of controversy." Debate, then, no longer satisfies him; but if rarely one is forced to engage in it, one should not debate in the manner of George Bentham's engagement with Whatley's Logic but should realize the fundamental requirement of the form: that "one not only be superior but prove himself to be superior, in knowledge of the subject, to the author whom he criticizes. He should let people see that if he differs from Whatley, it is not because Whatley knows more than he but because he knows more than Whatley." In short, debate should not be used as a weapon. If it is, it should be a sharp rather than a blunt instrument.

Logic, which he called "the theory of the processes of intellect," is not the cure-all he once thought it was. He can still say that "he who has legs can walk without knowledge of anatomy, yet you will allow that such knowledge may be made substantially available for the cure of lameness." Now, however, he begins to widen the domain of logic. The fallacies that logic supposedly gets at, it must be understood, "seldom arise from our assuming premises which are not true, but generally from overlooking other truths which limit and modify the effect of the former." Moreover, a logic that is habituated to "insisting on only one side of the question when really there are several, or of perceiving only one fact of an object, from a single viewpoint, when there are several others equally essential to the true appreciation of that object" must become, be allowed to become, more speculative, less analytical, more open to variables, and willing even to acknowledge "the subordinate role of the intellect as the minister of the higher sentiments." That is, if logic as a science is limited to the usual precepts and practices of science, then it will surely fail. For, in being too scientific, it will not be scientific enough. Specifically, it will fail in the service of human nature, as Comte's Discours sur L'Ensemble du Positivisme failed, because it is "ignorant of the laws of the formation of character."

Both the old Mill and the new Mill would, of course, rather be right than wrong. But the new Mill, unlike the old, saw some use—historical and methodological—in error. Thus he praised the St. Simonists for their treatment of historical error as this might be found in "mischievous institutions" (such as the Catholic Church), claiming that "such may yet, at a particular stage in the progress of the human mind, have not only been highly useful but absolutely indispensable; the only means by which the human mind could have been brought forward to an ulterior stage of improvement. A due attention to this great truth, which is the result of enlarged view of the history of mankind, is also thereby a necessary condition to these." With men as with nations there is some good in evil, some possible employment of evil (such as to put down other evils), some moving straight by crooked lines. As for the methodological use, which can be applied in any area of controversy, Mill worded the new formulation quite succinctly: "A proposition, though false as a whole, may comprehend as part of itself, may logically include the negation of some prevailing error." If Faust could make a ladder out of his vices, Mill was now prepared to concede that failure of any sort (wrong-headedness, for example) is "but the second degree of success. The first and highest degree may be yet to come." The last and most important of the new conceptions that figured in the reweaving process, while it may begin in notions of debate, logic, and the uses of error, actually is bigger than any of these and in fact encompasses all of them. It is a broader view of truth, a more generous idea of how to arrive at truth. In trying to explain the matter to Carlyle, Mill gives yet another example of what

15. Letters, XII, p. 36. To Gustave D'Eichthal, October 8, 1839.
18. Letters, XII, pp. 43-43. To Gustave D'Eichthal, November 7, 1829.
19. Mill's comment on Lord Durham's apparent mishandling of the "Canadian rebellion."
he termed "a state of reaction from logical-utilitarian narrowness": to try to "go all round every object I surveyed"; to regard "one-sidedness (as) almost the one great evil in human affairs"; and, consequently, to look for similarities rather than differences in the truths espoused by his nominal opponents. These attempts would find him stressing the poetic as well as the metaphysical aspects of truth in the new logic, would find him content with an "imperfect and dim light." In fine, he can now settle for less, even for delusions and diminutions. As he said, for example, "He who paints a thing as he actually saw it, though it were only by an optical illusion, teaches us, if nothing else, at least the nature of sight." Or, gently reproving Carlyle: "You call Logic the art of telling others what you believe. I call it the art, not certainly of knowing things, but of knowing whether you know them or not; not of finding out a truth, but of deciding whether it is the truth that you have found out." Ultimately, truth is a matter of breadth. For, Mill concludes, "every circumstance which gives a character to the life of a human being carries with it its peculiar bases: its peculiar facilities for perceiving some things, and for missing or forgetting others. . . . No whole truth is possible but by combining the points of view of all the fractional truths." 21

Now these remarkable admissions of a change of mind about debate, logic, error, and truth are not merely theoretical. He exemplified them in a number of practical ways, the two most striking of which can be found in his review of De Quincey's Logic of Political Economy and his use of De Quincey materials in his own much greater Principles of Political Economy.

If we bear in mind a typical Victorian view of a typical Romantic (Macaulay on that "ultra-servile sack-guzzler" Southey, for example22), and consider what a Radical might think of a Tory, we have to be surprised, initially and superficially, at Mill's generous treatment of De Quincey in the review and the Principles.

Mill had never met De Quincey. In the Letters he referred to him just three times: once guessing that the author of English Opium Eater was also the author of "the clever gossiping paper on Hannah More"; once remarking that he (Mill) had five articles ready on political economy "not more abstract, however, than De Quincey's" article in the 1824 London Magazine on "Dialogues of Three Templars"; and once asking Carlyle's opinion about De Quincey.24 That opinion, by the way, was typically harsh: "He is as bankrupt in purse and as nearly as possible in mind . . . one of the most irreclaimable Tories now extant."25 In short, there was no reason of friendship or special interest for Mill to pull his punches and every political reason not to.

For in addition to his Tory prejudices and general illiberalism, De Quincey was clearly an amateur in Mill's highly specialized field. Before the 1842 publication of The Logic, itself a restatement rather than a creative effort, De Quincey had published only four other minor articles in the field, all esteeming Ricardo and damning Malthus in direct opposition to Mill's own estimation. As for his performance in The Logic, one can charitably summarize it as insufficiently grounded in scholarship, illogical, eccentric in its allusions, and patentely unfair to James Mill's Elements of Political Economy.

In general and particular, then, Mill had good grounds for disposing what De Quincey proposed. Perhaps the old Mill would have dismissed or demolished him. But in fact the new Mill was not only gracious and restrained toward De Quincey but also in a mood to apply his changed views of debate, logic, error, and truth. His review is virtually a test case of the application.26

The treatment is judiciously balanced. Calling The Logic "pleasant and useful," he claims that it will satisfy those "who are not content with being, as they think, substantially right" but who feel the necessity of "the coordination of detached principles." He finds it missettled (logic means a method, whereas this is only a set of elementary principles) but "we agree in his estimate of its importance—though not for the reason which he indicates." He expresses a "dissent from the opinion that political economy does not advance" but he can praise this amateur for seeing and saying "in what respect some received mode of expressing a scientific principle misses the mark." He takes issue with De Quincey's notion of value but appreciates "the full theoretical explicitness" of this notion. He finds that De Quincey can make "a most inordinate overstatement" of economic perplexity and still seem capable of "sensible resolutions." He discovers "Mr. De Quincey in the wrong" on the issue of supply and demand, surely "a mortifying example of how little the acutest intellect can be depended on for being always present." And yet he is at pains to point up the good in De Quincey's bad, to point out the ways

27. Mill's first two printed pieces, in the 1822 Traveller, were defenses of Ricardo.
in which De Quincey’s errors can be put to useful purposes. He concludes that “this book is enriched with many acute remarks, some of a logical, some of a miscellaneous character, on any subject—important or trifling—from the qualities of turbot to the laws of thought” but does not fail to note that “it is deformed by ultra-Tory prejudices.” He even gives De Quincey the last word, citing the latter’s remark that “errors in the first intention come round upon us in subsequent stages, unless they are met by their proper and commensurate solutions.”

The point is not alone that the old Mill probably would have been harsher on De Quincey. It is also that the new Mill deliberately avoids debate, uses logic as a way of discerning similarities among obvious points of disagreement, finds methods of building upon rather than simply rejecting De Quincey’s errors, and—by applying “proper and commensurate solutions”—is willing to wait upon, even to embrace, De Quincey’s fractional truths for whatever contribution they may make to the whole truth.

Favoring De Quincey in the review, he then took a significant further step toward the complete ratification of the change that had come over him. That was to make a similarly judicious use of De Quincey materials in his own Principles of Political Economy.

This work, begun in 1844 (perhaps triggered by De Quincey’s inadequacies) and completed in 1848, much more influenced by Smith and Malthus than by Ricardo,27 and actually doing what De Quincey had merely promised to do (namely, to interwince the basically technical matters of economics “with the many other branches of social philosophy”28), contains five references to De Quincey, all of which continue to illustrate Mill’s determination to reform himself along the lines suggested in the Letters and demonstrated in the review.

First, noting Smith’s ambiguity about the meaning of “value,” he accepts De Quincey’s refinement regarding the difference between “exchange” and “teleologic” value. More, he builds upon that refinement—until the matter becomes substantially and inimitably his own. Second, he quotes De Quincey at length and without further constructions on the difficulty of establishing the difference between an object’s rarity and its intrinsic utility as determinants of price. Third, he corrects De Quincey’s failure to interpret properly the interrelationship of supply and demand, arguing that “a complete non-recognition and implied denial of it are incompatible with great intellectual ingenuity.” Fourth, accepting De Quincey’s notion that if silk handkerchiefs were cheaper, men would buy them in quantity lots—as well as the exception of locomotives—he nevertheless maintained that De Quincey missed his own point, which is that the price and value of both handkerchiefs and locomotives would be lowered by “a diminution of their cost of production.” Fifth, alluding to De Quincey’s famous illustration of the value of musical snuffboxes in the wilds of America, he admits that a salesman of these has “a monopoly value” but makes the following crucial distinction: that “monopoly value does not depend on any particular principle but is a mere variety of the ordinary case of supply and demand.”29

The Principles of Political Economy could have been written without reference to, much less reliance upon, the Logic of Political Economy. Mill could have done without De Quincey. But the new Mill, choosing to do with him, quite obviously is preferring conciliation to debate, interpreting logic broadly rather than narrowly, discovering sense in nonsense, and viewing truth as a set of partial contributions, not an absolute, consistent whole.

It would appear no mere fluke, then, that Mill handled De Quincey as kindly as he did. The reason may have been—although this cannot be proved—that in his period of change he had absorbed some of the more sensible De Quincey points of view, technical matters apart: those, for instance, which offered stipulations with which a reformed Mill could agree (such as, “the first duty of a disputation is to make himself master of what it is that his antagonist says”)30 or “nothing in the shape of a logical nodus can ever occur in mere politics; consequently no room for subtlety of solutions, or of evolution from remote a priori grounds. In Political Economy, on the other hand, properly so-called, and kept apart from mere empirical statistics, there is nothing else.”31

More likely the reason is to be found, however, in three decisions he had made for himself in areas distinct from De Quincean economics. One, as did Matthew Arnold after him, he ceased to believe—as once he had believed—in the efficacy of any one party or class or system (the Bible Society, Puseyism, Socialism, Chartism, Benthamism)—“though doubtless they have all some elements of truth and good in them”—in bringing about the “mental regeneration” that must precede the needed “social regeneration.”32 Therefore, one must be ready to

---

29. The references in the Principles are, respectively, to: III-1-$^2$; III-2-$^4$; III-2-$^4$; III-3-$^2$; and III-2-$^5$.
30. Quarterly Review (October 27, 1827).
respond to suggestions for improvement whatever their origin. Two, coming to “see less and less prospect of drawing together any body of persons to associate in the name and belief of any set of fixed principles,” Mill resolutely looked for and toward “the general reconstruction of the openness of the civilized world” to be formed out of basic disagreements within the closed portions of that world. Three and most important, he decided on the grounds of both reason and experience to reject what he called esprit critique, which he defined as that which “makes men unwilling to look for truth in the midst of error.”

Ours is undoubtedly an era of disagreement. Lest we think that Mill’s conversion, so applicable to our times, is simply a matter of adopting a broadmindedness that, as Chesterton said, leads to flatheadedness, let Mill supply the corrective. If he could listen to De Quincey, we can listen to him.

A part of the objection I have to controversy is that it keeps up the esprit critique. I am averse to any mode of eradicating error, but by establishing and inculcating (when that is practicable) the opposite truth; a truth of some kind inconsistent with that moral or intellectual state of mind from which the errors arise. It is only thus that we can at once maintain the good which already exists, and produce more. And I object to placing myself in the situation of an advocate for or against a cause. I will read the books of those from whom I differ, I will consider patiently and mature in my own mind the ideas which they suggest, I will make up my own opinion, and set it forth with the reasons. When I see any person going wrong, I will try to find out the fragment of truth which is misleading him. And when this is done, no one would feel impelled by the ardor of debate and the desire of triumph, to reject, as almost all now do, whatever of truth there really is in the opinions of those whose ultimate conclusion differs from theirs.

Adelphi University

---

John Stuart Mill on Dogmatism, Liberticide, and Revolution

Edward Alexander

I am reading that terrible book of John Mill’s on Liberty, so clear, and calm, and cold: he lays it on one as a tremendous duty to get one’s self well contradicted, and admit always a devil’s advocate into the presence of your dearest, most sacred truths. . . .

Caroline Fox

In an essay of 1836 where he is discussing the problem, not unknown today, of sectarian teaching in the universities, John Stuart Mill asserts that the evil will not be removed by altering the form of sectarianism taught, and that “the principle itself of dogmatic religion, dogmatic morality, dogmatic philosophy, is what requires to be rooted out; not any particular manifestation of that principle.” The statement is of importance both as a denial of dogmatism and as an assertion of the importance of principle, of the human ability to espouse truth rather than party. “Let us not fail to observe,” Mill wrote four years later in defense of Coleridge and his Conservative followers, that “they rose to principles, and did not stick in the particular case.” If Mill has something to say to us today, and I think he does, it concerns the primacy of principle over party, even when the party happens to be one’s own, even when it happens to proclaim itself the party of Humanity and of Altruism. I would like to show that in his own life Mill practiced what he preached, and that, when the dogmatic principle was invoked by people he admired, on behalf of a religion he accepted, a group he sympathized with, or a social philosophy he endorsed, he was as firm in rejecting it as he had been when his philosophical antagonists invoked infallibility.

Mill was both a social reformer and a lover of liberty. It is not therefore surprising that On Liberty is generally thought of as an assertion of individual liberty in the face of attempts by defenders of the status quo to stifle it. Yet Mill’s own account of the origin of his most

34. Letters, XII, pp. 45-46. To Gustave D’Eichthal, February 9, 1830.

famous work locates the chief threat to liberty and individuality not in governments but precisely in movements of social reform. Writing from Rome in 1859 he told Harriet that "On my way here. . . . I came back to an idea we have talked about, and thought that the best thing to write and publish at present would be a volume on Liberty. So many things might be brought into it and nothing seems more to be needed—it is a growing need too, for opinion tends to encroach more and more on liberty, and almost all the projects of social reformers of these days are really libertinism—Comte's particularly so." Mill was grateful to Comte for many things, including a theory of history, the so-called law of the three stages, the conception of altruism (Comte's word), the theoretical groundwork of sociology, and above all the Religion of Humanity, in which the great benefactors of the human race would inspire the devotion previously called forth by supernatural figures. But Mill had learned at an early age that in the realms of intellect and politics, especially idealistic politics, the corruption of the best is the worst. As early as 1829 he had warned that if Comte and his friends insisted upon forming a sect, "which is a character above all to be avoided by independent thinkers, and imagine themselves under a necessity, if they belong to the sect, to take all its dogmas without exception or qualification, they will not only do no good but I fear immense mischief." By the time he came to compose his definitive estimate of Comte and positivism (published in 1865) Mill's worst fears had been realized. He now saw that the dogmatic principle had rooted itself in the very "religion" he had adopted from Comte. For once Comte had laboriously traced the slow development of the natural and physical sciences from the theological through the metaphysical and finally into (and within) the positive stage, he leapt to the conclusion that "the mere institution of a positive science of sociology [was] tantamount to its completion." Since the time had arrived for the final truths of sociology to be formulated, and since Comte had acquired a powerful conviction in his own infallibility, he proposed the establishment of an intellectual dictatorship, headed by himself, that would enforce distinctions between strictly indispensable and merely frivolous intellectual pursuits and would direct all the mental resources of a nation to the solution of one question at a time. What terrified Mill in the imaginative world of Comte and other social reformers of his day was the way in which a beautiful vision of the highest result of the evolution of Humanity had always to be realized by entire subjugation and slavery. If, as Mill suggests, the libertinistic tendencies of social reformers caused him to compose On Liberty, it was because they revealed to him that the conviction of a High Priest of Humanity in his own infallibility is as incompatible with individual liberty as is the same conviction in a Supreme Priest of the Church or in a Roman Emperor. The first principle in Mill's eloquent defense of the liberty of thought and discussion is that "All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility." No doubt, says Mill, there are plenty of people who refuse to allow a hearing to an opinion because they are certain it is wrong; nevertheless, "their certainty is [not] the same as absolute certainty." The simple denial of infallibility to human beings and their creations might be a cliché to ordinary people, but to progressive intellectuals nourished by Comte or by Marx it has often seemed a challenge and a battle cry and even a crime against the human status. Arthur Koestler tells how he once outraged a Communist audience in Paris by making a speech that contained no single word of criticism of the party or of Russia: "But it contained three phrases, deliberately chosen because to normal people they were platitudes, to Communists a declaration of war. The first was: 'No movement, party or person can claim the privilege of infallibility.' . . . you might as well have told a Nazi audience that all men are born equal regardless of race and creed." The only respect in which Mill's denunciation of the idea of human infallibility seems dated is that among the groups of persons who feel sublime confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects because they "are accustomed to unlimited deference" within their limited world he fails to include university professors. Nowadays we are quite accustomed to hearing such people as Professor Marcuse, a fervent practitioner of what Comte called cerebral hygiene, advocate "educational dictatorship," attack tolerance as a rationale for maintaining the status quo, and urge his acolytes to suppress "regressive" elements of the population who threaten to impede "liberation." Professor Chomsky has buttressed this high argument with the rhetoric of petulant moral outrage: "By entering the arena of argument," he tells us in his latest

6. Ibid., p. 168.
book, "by accepting the presumption of legitimacy of debate on certain issues, one has already lost one's humanity."

Once we have admitted the need for Mill even to argue against the presumption of infallibility, we can appreciate the force of his three instances of the very grave fallibility of those who persecute their protagonists. He recounts the executions of Socrates, of Jesus, and of Marcus Aurelius. The last of the three is the most important both for Mill's argument and for mine, for Marcus Aurelius is the classic case of a well-intentioned, highly moral, and deeply religious persecutor; and he is also a man whose character and writing Mill passionately admired. The example of his life and tragedy is adduced to prove what Mill has said a few pages earlier of the intellectual bully who presumes to decide questions for others without letting them hear more than his side of the question: ". . . I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions." If a man of Marcus' consummate moral and intellectual purity could err so grievously in persecuting those he supposed to be promulgators of false, dangerous, and regressive ideas, is it likely that any mortal—even one of the professorial variety—can take for granted his infallibility in persecuting men who promote opinions he thinks pernicious?

If the dangers of invoking the dogmatic principle on behalf of the Religion of Humanity seemed to Mill to loom in the distance when he wrote to Harriet in 1855 of the threat posed by the ideas of social reformers, the dangers of invoking it in support of socialist revolution were far more immediate and moved him to far stronger language. To institute socialism, of which he was a qualified adherent, by insurrectionary violence was for Mill morally tantamount to establishing the Religion of Humanity, of which he was also an adherent, by suppression of opinion and intellectual dictatorship. There is no more constant theme in the writings of Mill than the moral arrogance of all revolurions. In 1838 he praised Alfred de Vigny's portraits of "the terrorist chiefs" Robespierre and Saint-Just as "men distinguished, morally, chiefly by two qualities, entire hardness of heart, and the most overweening and bloated self-conceit: for

nothing less, assuredly, could lead any man to believe that his individual judgment respecting the public good is a warrant to him for exterminating all who are suspected of forming any other judgment, and for setting up a machine to cut off heads, sixty to seventy every day, till some unknown futurity be accomplished, some Utopia realized." Over thirty years later, in the post-humously published "Chapters on Socialism," he excoriated the revolutionary socialists for their readiness to exchange whatever good is realized under the present system of society and whatever possibilities of improvement it offers for a wholesale plunge into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying out the complex operations of social life without the motive power that had previously worked the social machinery:

It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification—who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted—must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just . . . scarcely came up to."

Mill's views on violence as a means of achieving social change were formed long before he ever considered the problem of socialism. In the 1830's his defense of representative government is based to a large extent upon the argument that it affords the only peaceable mode in which a political faith can declare itself and obtain predominance. Writing in 1834 he gives thanks that "the English revolution will be a revolution of law, and not of violence," and insists that reforms which result from violence are of little use because "they leave behind them the feelings not of reconciliation but of victory and defeat." Mill believed that where violence was concerned only fools believed and only scoundrels pretended to believe that ends were separable from the means used to attain them. With Carlyle he very early concluded that "Insurrection usually 'gains' little; usually wastes how much! One of its worst kinds of waste . . . is that

of irritating and exasperating men against each other, by violence done; which is always sure to be injustice done, for violence does even justice unjustly."\textsuperscript{15}

When the great political crisis of the 1860's, agitation for passage of the Second Reform Bill, arrived, Mill was more severe than ever in his condemnation of violence precisely because the threat of violence was now being invoked by his fellow-reformers. In 1867 Mill withdrew his support from the Reform League itself when some of its members advocated revolutionary violence to achieve their objective, an objective he fully shared. In writing to W. R. Cremer, first secretary of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association, in which Marx was a luminary, Mill recalls what occurred at the meeting: "The speeches delivered at the meeting were characterised by two things; a determined rejection beforehand of all compromise on the Reform question, even if proposed by the public men in whose sincerity and zeal as reformers you have repeatedly expressed the fullest confidence; and a readiness to proceed at once to a trial of physical force if any opposition is made either to your demands or to the particular mode, even though illegal, which you may select for the expression of them." Mill describes as "monstrous" the doctrine set forth by one of the speakers that since superiority of physical force constitutes right, the people are justified in riding down the ministers of the law; and he argues that the only two things which justify an attempt at revolution are personal oppression and tyranny—personal suffering "of such intensity that to put an immediate stop to it is worth almost any amount of present evil and future danger" and a government which does not permit redress of grievances to be sought by peaceable and legal means. "No one," he asserts, "will say that any of these justifications for revolution exist in the present case," and with a decisiveness as characteristic of Mill as it is alien to liberals who find themselves in comparable positions today, he dissociates himself from the Reform League.\textsuperscript{16}

Just two years later, Mill decided to write a book on socialism because, as his stepdaughter has told us, he thought it of great practical importance that someone define the means by which sound socialist theories "might, without prolongation of suffering on the one hand, or unnecessary disturbance on the other, be applied to the existing order of things." More particularly, Mill wished to raise the question of how far the socialist creed was compromised by its addiction to violence. His general strategy is to contrast two forms of socialism and two groups of socialists. First there are the socialists whose plans for the replacement of private property and individual competition are on the small scale of a village community, and who would apply the new form to the entire country gradually, by multiplying these self-acting units. On the other side are the revolutionary socialists who envision "management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government." Mill, as we might expect, prefers the first kind because it can come into operation progressively and experimentally, and "would not become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction." As always, he contends that "great and permanent changes in the fundamental ideas of mankind are not to be accomplished by a coup de main."\textsuperscript{17} But Mill's most profound reason for rejecting revolutionary socialism comes from his recognition of the nature of the revolutionaries themselves. Mill maintains that the introduction of socialism by the revolutionaries' taking over the whole property of the country "could have no effect but disastrous failure, and its apostles could have only the consolation that the order of society as it now exists would be involved in the common ruin—a consolation which to some of them would probably be real, for if appearances can be trusted the animating principle of too many of the revolutionary Socialists is hate."\textsuperscript{18}

When I read such passages in Mill I am tempted to ask, in the ironic tones of Matthew Arnold: "What is this? here is a liberal attacking a liberal. Do not you belong to the movement? are not you a friend of truth?"\textsuperscript{19} But nowadays we must all ask, and in tones other than ironic, why Mill was able to dissent from what Lionel Trilling calls the "orthodoxies of dissent,"\textsuperscript{19} why, as a reformer and a socialist, he was so firm in condemning reformers who invoked the aid of tyranny and socialists who invoked the aid of terror, and why he could recognize barbarism even when it wore the guise of liberation. I believe that the answer to these questions must be sought in the quality of his personal experience. It will have been noted that into his eloquent condemnation of the revolutionary socialists Mill has introduced a new, personal element. He has suggested that in the revolutionary ideology there lurks not merely intellectual error but the spectre of emotional disease. Of all the elements in the writings of Marx that are antipathetic to

---

the spirit of Mill, none is so deeply antipathetic as Marx's sadism. Can anyone imagine Mill, who was considered more sympathetic by workingmen to the interests of their class than almost any other British public figure, addressing the working class as Marx did when he told the Communist League in 1850 that "far from opposing so-called excesses, the vengeance of the people on hated individuals or attacks by the masses on buildings which arouse hateful memories, we must not only tolerate them, but even take the lead in them"? In designating hatred the motive power of revolutionary zeal, Mill was saying only what Dostoevsky had recently shown in *The Possessed* and what Conrad was later to confirm in *Under Western Eyes*: that ideology can become a disease and that intellectuals who allow abstractions to replace their concrete sense of the actual life of individuals, including themselves, tend to fall in love with terrorism as a means of filling the void they have created in their own souls. That Mill should be at one with the great imaginative writers in recognizing the link between ideological desperation and emotional disease is hardly surprising, for it was his own experience of literature that had rescued him from the desert of political abstraction and taught him that the world was made up not of classes but of individuals.

Everybody knows how young John Mill, having been trained by his father and Bentham to believe that in the total mobilization of virtue for the purpose of reforming the world lay the only prospect of happiness for himself and others, awakened from what he calls this "dream" in 1826 at the behest of a terrifying question: "Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" "And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!'" To feel the unique force of Mill's candor we need to imagine a contemporary version of the same question: "Suppose that all the objects for which you and your fellow radicals are working were realized; that marijuana was legalized and abortion made available on demand and euthanasia blessed by the National Council of Churches and separate but equal systems of education established in every northern city and Eldridge Cleaver elected President: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" To how many who now posed this question, I wonder, would an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answer "No!?"

Because Mill had the rare courage to tell himself the truth about his own politics, he was able to see that ideology unleavened by emotion has a destructive tendency. The literature that enabled him to recover from his mental crisis—Marmontel, Wordsworth, Coleridge—taught him the value of feeling and imagination. He now saw what was mainly lacking in the Benthamite creed was precisely imagination, "that which enables us . . . to conceive the absent as if it were present, . . . the power by which one human being enters into the mind and circumstances of another." Imagination, he now maintained, was necessary not merely to the poet and historian but to every man, because "without it nobody knows even his own nature, further than circumstances have actually tried it and called it out; nor the nature of his fellow-creatures." The experience of literature had given Mill the wonderful ability to imagine the existence of individuals, starting with himself. Having discovered a void in his own soul, he did not attempt to fill it by wallowing in fantasies of blood and revolutionary violence, but by cultivating within himself those powers of human nature that his education had neglected. Once he had learned from the experience of literature that "we have real power over the formation of our own character," he "ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to the ordering of outward circumstances" and "gave its proper place, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual."

To learn the truth about himself was simultaneously to learn that the vision of society as a conglomeration of social forces and contending classes in which the individual is merely a function of his circumstances is a travesty. A few pages after describing the onset of his crisis and its cure, Mill recalls how, in the latter stages of his "dejection," the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity or determinism "weighed on my existence like an incubus" and made him feel as if he and all other people were the helpless slaves of antecedent circumstances:

I often said to myself, what a relief it would be if I could disbelieve the doctrine of the formation of character by circumstances; and remembering the wish of Fox respecting the doctrine of resistance to governments, that it might never be forgotten by kings, nor remembered by subjects I said that it would be a blessing if the doctrine

---


24. Ibid., pp. 118-19.
of necessity could be believed by all quoad the characters of others, and disbelieved in regard to their own.\textsuperscript{24}

Eventually Mill went beyond this charming illogicality to discover a logical strategy that would enable him to affirm the doctrine of free will. But what is important here is that logic is secondary to the conviction, which has come to him from felt experience, that to escape depression and paralysis he must deny deterministic thinking.

Mill’s discovery that individuals exist, recounted so movingly in the \textit{Autobiography}, affected all his subsequent writing. It can be seen in his literary criticism when he exalts Shakespeare as the creator of “human beings” at the expense of those dramatists who make their characters coextensive with a social or class function and so produce “logical abstractions.”\textsuperscript{25} It explains his denigration of Bentham’s ethical system for failing “to aid individuals in the formation of their own character.”\textsuperscript{26} It supplies the underlying premise of \textit{On Liberty}, which is that “the initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals.”\textsuperscript{27} It also accounts entirely for Mill’s views on a subject that was of paramount interest to progressive intellectuals of the nineteenth century, as it is of their counterparts today: the subject of race.

These views may be summarized briefly, for the simple reason that Mill denied the very idea of race. “Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind,” he wrote in \textit{Principles of Political Economy}, “the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences.”\textsuperscript{28} Here again, as when we recite Mill’s denial of human infallibility, we might seem merely to be warming over a truism, if it were not for the fact that nowadays, in almost any issue of the \textit{New York Review of Books} or the \textit{New Republic}, we can listen to the champions of liberation and progress proclaiming that, as one of them recently put it, “The Negro doesn’t feel the way whites do, nor does he think like whites. . . . Negro suffering is not the same as ours.”\textsuperscript{29} Mill, who loved principle better than party, would have been as indifferent to the intention behind such a statement and to the fact that its author was literary editor of the \textit{New Republic} as an orthodox disciple of Wimsatt and Beardsley. For at a time when the race idea was being propounded not only by the defenders of Governor Eyre and the theorists of the white man’s burden but by scholars and scientists and men of misplaced goodwill, Mill’s belief in the existence of individuals made him scorn all wholesale attribution of qualities to men other than as individuals, regardless of the intention of the attributor. His attack on Governor Eyre and on the racists and authoritarians who defended Eyre’s brutal treatment of the Jamaicans is justly famous, but here as elsewhere Mill did not “stick in the particular case,” but rose to principles. All of his acquaintances who purported to employ the race idea for “good” purposes were dealt a gentle yet firm rebuke: “I think you ascribe too great influence to differences of race.”\textsuperscript{30}

I have mentioned Mill’s views on race because they afford another illustration of his intellectual integrity and because they point back to the underlying reasons for his disaffection from Comtists and revolutionary socialists and other ambitious and impatient theorists of world betterment: their denial of individuality and their monstrous moral arrogance. For Mill, the race-thinker who denied that all human beings have individual traits was but a variant of the revolutionary who made the bourgeois into a social abstraction lacking both free will and the right to live,\textsuperscript{31} and both were near cousins of the would-be dictators of education and scholarship, the High Priests of Humanity who would guarantee that there shall be no opinions and no exercise of mind but such as they approve.\textsuperscript{32} Mill remained a social reformer until he died, but his acquired ability to imagine that individuals exist forestalled him against the various kinds of dogmatist and deterministic thinking to which many of his reformist and socialist brethren were addicted. For in the determinism of race, of social class, and of economic interest, Mill saw the spectre of endless irresolvable conflict, issuing in violence. He might, as we say nowadays, “understand” the hatred that animated revolutionaries. It was, after all, “a very excusable hatred of existing evils, which would vent itself by putting an end to the present system at all costs even to those who suffer by it, in the hope that out of chaos would arise a better Kosmos, and in the impatience of desperation respecting any more gradual improvement.” But Mill, though he might understand, could never forgive such hatred because he knew from experience that social reformers could find, if they tried, less drastic means of


\textsuperscript{26} “Bentham,” \textit{Dissertations and Discussions}, I, 363.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{On Liberty}, p. 324.


\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Letters of John Stuart Mill}, II, 44. See also I, 235; II, 190.


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Auguste Comte and Positivism}, p. 170.
psychotherapy, and because he also knew that those who seek to relieve the chaos within themselves by extending it to society can never be the instruments of social reconstruction: "They are unaware that chaos is the very most unfavourable position for setting out in the construction of a Kosmos, and that many ages of conflict, violence, and tyrannical oppression of the weak by the strong must intervene; they know not that they would plunge mankind into the state of nature so forcibly described by Hobbes, where every man is enemy to every man. . . ."33

University of Washington

Pickwick’s “Magnanimous Revenge”: Reason and Responsibility
in the Pickwick Papers
Fred Kaplan

The mansions of eighteenth-century rationalism include a room whose interior decoration and maintenance exemplify a fondness for law and harmony. One such room appears in the Pickwick Papers:

Mr. Pickwick’s apartments in Goswell Street, although on a limited scale, were not only of a very neat and comfortable description, but peculiarly adapted for the residence of a man of his genius and observation. His sitting-room was the first floor front, his bed-room the second floor front; and thus, whether he were sitting at his desk in his parlour, or standing before the dressing-glass in his dormitory, he had an equal opportunity of contemplating human nature in all the numerous phases it exhibits. . . . Cleanliness and quiet reigned throughout the house; and in it Mr. Pickwick’s will was law. To any one acquainted with these points of the domestic economy of the establishment, and conversant with the admirable regulation of Mr. Pickwick’s mind. . . . (chap. XII)

That the domestic economy of Pickwick’s Goswell Street apartment contrasts with that of other interior establishments in the novel, especially those of the Fleet Street Prison, is a point worth making.1 Indeed, this description of Pickwick’s apartment introduces what is generally thought to be the key initial episode in the series of episodes that gives the novel its major plot—the misunder-stood proposal, Bardell versus Pickwick, Pickwick’s pseudo-Thoreauvian passive resistance, the Fleet Street Prison scenes, and finally the retreat to suburban Dulwich. However, to my mind, the opening passages of Chapter XII are connected directly to another major motif of the novel, establishing the Pickwick Papers as, among other things, a satire on the sporadic rationalism and economy of Pickwick’s mind.

Gazing down on Goswell Street (chap. II), Pickwick deprecates “the narrow views of those philosophers who, with examining the things that lie before them, look not to the truths which are hidden beyond.” Those “philosophers” whose methods of research Pickwick condemns as epistemologically unsound are exemplified by the “elderly gentleman of scientific attainments” (chap. XXXIX) who in the process of writing a “philosophical treatise” from the safe confines of his study sees strange lights in his garden. They are, he assumes, “some extraordinary and wonderful phenomenon of nature, which no philosopher had ever seen before. . . . Full of this idea, the scientific gentleman . . . committed to paper sundry notes of those unparalleled appearances . . . which were to form the data of a voluminous treatise of great research and deep learning.” These lights, of course, are the swinging lanterns of Pickwick and his party. Nevertheless, “the scientific gentleman . . . demonstrated, in a masterly treatise, that these wonderful lights were the effect of electricity . . . which demonstration delighted all the Scientific Associations beyond measure and caused him to be considered a light of science ever afterwards.” The naïveté and unsoundness of this “scientist,” of the eighteenth-century armchair rationalist who prefers a priori assumptions to hard fact, are shared by Pickwick.2

Dickens presents us with a main character who, determined to be a modern social scientist, embodies all the mental fustiness and naïveté of the very philosophers he condemns. It seems quite plausible that despite the impromptu nature of the Pickwick Papers Dickens in-

33. “Chapters on Socialism,” p. 749.
1. There has been a focus in Dickens criticism on interior establishments and their significance as symbols, especially the use in the later novels of buildings in various states of maintenance. Lionel Trilling in his essay on Little Dorrit in The Opposing Self (New York, 1955), pp. 52-55, and Edgar Johnson in Charles Dickens, His Tragedy and Triumph (New York, 1952), pp. 884-

85, among others, have commented on Dickens’ use of the prison and prison room as symbols.
2. J. Hillis Miller writes that “when Dickens ‘thought of Mr. Pickwick,’ he thought of someone who was to have the motivations of a scientist. The scientist is a special case of the fixed character who fits his experience into a preconceived mold” (Charles Dickens, The World of His Novels [Cambridge, Mass., 1958], p. 6).
tends us sometimes to see Pickwick as an embodiment of armchair rationalism who makes the comic mistake of deceiving himself into believing that he is an objective observer with sound methods of analysis. Certainly Dickens the romanticist who boasted in his Preface to *Bleak House* that “I have purposely dwelt upon the romantic side of familiar things” would have found Pickwick’s pseudo-Augustan values and assumptions a likely and exciting target.

No sooner does Pickwick leave his rooms on Goswell Street than his unfitness for the role of social scientist becomes obvious. In the first of many incidents in which comedy results from a demonstration of the gap between Pickwick’s assumptions and values and those of men whose minds are less admirably “regulated” than his, Pickwick is mistaken for an inspector from the hack bureau. Having asked some questions of the cab driver who has given preposterous answers which Pickwick has recorded in his ubiquitous notebook, he is astonished when the cab driver and the crowd that gathers think him an informer. He is incapable of understanding that his questions represent a threat and that his credulity in believing that the horse is forty-two years old and is kept out weeks at a time confirms the cab driver’s suspicions.

The cab driver indeed represents the normal world of testing and verification of hypotheses. Without even knowing that he is being tested Pickwick fails the examination. It is Pickwick the “social scientist” who does not understand the conditions of credibility or the peculiarities of the specimens he examines. Just as the swinging lanterns in the garden are to be the symbols of the gap between reality and the assumptions of the gentleman scientist, so here Pickwick’s notebook becomes the symbol of the credibility gap between Pickwick and the cab driver. It also becomes a symbol of Pickwick’s mind. Indeed, Mr. Pickwick had “entered every word of his statement in his note-book, with the view of communicating it to the club, as a singular instance of the tenacity of life in horses, under trying circumstances.”

At the beginning of Chapter XXII, which concludes with Pickwick’s embarrassment at being mistaken for a potential rapist by the lady in yellow curlpapers, Sam Weller tells Pickwick “that poverty and oysters always seems to go together,” and Mr. Weller senior adds that “It’s just the same with pickled salmon.” “Those are two very remarkable facts, which never occurred to me before,” said Mr. Pickwick. “The very first place we stop, I’ll make a note of them.” Pickwick’s belief that whatever men say must be so combines the nineteenth-century satirical version of the credulity of eighteenth-century optimistic rationalism with what might be seen as a romantic’s criticism of an oversimplified associational psychology.

Like the armchair philosopher and the gentleman scientist Pickwick simply assumes that nonrecaitrant matter could not contradict his mental assumptions. Though he is to become somewhat less trusting under the repeated onslaught of contradiction, he is never to challenge his belief in his own methods. When his assumptions fail him, it is seen not as his failure but as the aberrational perversities of a number of individuals, such as Mrs. Bardell, Jingle, and Dodson and Fogg, who have stepped outside the laws that govern normal behavior. Pickwick’s notebook, the blank slate on which he records the strange “facts” he encounters in his journey of discovery, is an unorganized list. Like Pickwick’s mind, though committed to order and truth, it is an unstructured juxtaposition of fact and fancy in which each element, as good as any other, is an experience the significance of which Pickwick cannot see.

Pickwick’s confidence in the correlation between what he writes in his notebook and the facts is matched by an even more dangerous assumption: his confidence that what he says will be what his listener hears. The description of Pickwick’s apartment in Goswell Street with which Chapter XII begins picks up the theme of the armchair philosopher of the second chapter, amplifies it to a description of Pickwick’s mind, and introduces a key episode of the novel: Pickwick, believing that he is thinking out loud in the presence of Mrs. Bardell, discourses on the wisdom of hiring a man servant; Mrs. Bardell, hearing a proposal of matrimony, accepts. Just as Pickwick is nondiscriminating in placing credibility in the words of others, he also presents and arranges his own words in such a way as to assist others in forming er-

---
3. Perhaps this is a less graceful but more specific way of stating Miller’s thesis that “Pickwick Papers itself, seemingly so closely linked to eighteenth-century optimism, is really a farewell to the eighteenth century” (pp. 34-35). John Killham, in “Pickwick: Dickens and the Art of Fiction,” *Dickens and the Twentieth Century*, eds. John Gross and Gabriel Penson (Toronto, 1963), pp. 35-47, refers briefly to the other side of the coin, Dickens’ relation to the eighteenth-century sentimental novel.
raneous opinions about his intentions. Not only does Pickwick misinterpret the world but the world also misinterprets Pickwick, and, certainly, if there is any blame to cast, part of the blame is his. He brings to other people's utterances a context that forces him to misunderstand them; he fails to understand the context into which he places his own words and permits others to misunderstand him.5

The result of the misunderstood conversation is the trial for breach of promise, initiating Pickwick's exposure, for the first time in his life the narrative implies, to the world of Dodson and Fogg. The trial results in Pickwick's conviction and incarceration. The darkening of the novel that readers have noted in the Fleet Street Prison episodes seems significant mainly for two reasons. First, for the initial and only time in the novel Pickwick and his readers are presented with an environment which in its disorder, disharmony, and unreasonableness contrasts strikingly with the order, harmony, and rationality of Pickwick's apartment on Goswell Street. The rooms that represented Pickwick's mind and values are now shown to be hothouse products that can exist only when protected from the weather of reality; the gap between Pickwick's armchair world of scientific and philosophic assumptions and the hard facts of reality is too obvious and depressing to permit Pickwick to keep up his usual smile of good cheer or for Dickens to keep up the comedy that has dominated the novel until Chapter XLII. Secondly, the episodes in debtor's prison contain a complication that forces Pickwick for the first time to confront the possibility that his actions and/or words, no matter how well-intentioned, may have serious consequences in which the honor, fortunes, and deepest needs of others may be compromised. As a direct result of Pickwick's refusal to pay damages, Mrs. Bardell, who naively has signed an affidavit of responsibility for costs, has been imprisoned by Dodson and Fogg.

The key prison scenes present Pickwick confronting a moral problem: whether or not to pay the costs to prevent Mrs. Bardell from suffering what most readers of the novel would feel she does not deserve. The theme of interdependence or irresponsibility of all elements of society may receive its most intense dramatic presentations in Bleak House and the later novels, but it certainly seems present in Pickwick Papers. Though Dickensian legalists argue that Dodson and Fogg's causing Mrs. Bardell to be imprisoned is a purposeful attempt to put pressure on Pickwick to pay their costs, since Mrs. Bardell could not have paid from her own meagre resources, it seems likely that Dickens intends the dilemma confronting Pickwick to be a test of his sense of responsibility. The lawyers' motivations and actions are always nefarious. It is Pickwick who has attempted to mold his life on principles of law, reason, and benevolence. His refusal to pay the costs is most unreasonable, so everyone tells him, and even he himself does not defend it; it is simply a manifestation of his frequent irrationality and stubbornness, despite his superficial commitment to order and reason. That "Mr. Pickwick's will was law" in his apartment on Goswell Street not only argues for the apartment as an expression of his mind but suggests that his will is an overriding force that must shape the world in its own image or avoid confronting the unshapable.

In Chapter XLVII Pickwick is forced to confront the world's normal standards, and it is his attorney Mr. Perker, the very antithesis of Dodson and Fogg and a counterexample to those who maintain that Dickens never presents the legal profession favorably, who represents the full force of commonsense morality:

"Well, well," said Mr. Pickwick, with a sigh, but softening into a smile at the same time. "Say what you have to say; it's the old story, I suppose?"

"With a difference, my dear sir; with a difference... Mrs. Bardell, the plaintiff in the action, is within these walls, sir." "I know it," was Mr. Pickwick's reply.

"Very good," reported Perker. "And you know how she comes here, I suppose; I mean in what grounds, and at whose suit?"

"Yes; at least I have heard Sam's account of the matter," said Mr. Pickwick, with affected carelessness.

This contrast of Pickwick's complacency and self-righteousness with Perker's clarity of language and thought on moral issues is followed by a passage that seems satire on Pickwick's pretentious rationalism and armchair scientism ('Such,' thought Pickwick, "are the narrow views of those philosophers who, content with examining the things that lie before them, look not to the truths which are hidden beyond"). His attitude of moral superiority throughout the novel, based upon his belief in his superior vision and intellect, is brought down upon him with a vengeance that gives the comedy a touch of pathos and a hint of tragedy:

"Well, now, my dear sir, the first question I have to ask, is, whether this woman is to remain here?"

5. William Axtom, "Unity and Coherence in The Pickwick Papers," Studies in English Literature (1965), presents this basic assumption of Pickwick criticism and remarks that in "Mr. Pickwick's 'proposal' to Mrs. Bardell there is a superbly double confusion between appearance and reality" (p. 673). He then proceeds to place responsibility precisely where it belongs, though he does not develop the implications for the novel as a whole.

"To remain here!" echoed Mr. Pickwick.
"To remain here, my dear sir," rejoined Perker ... looking steadily at his client.
"How can you ask me?" said that gentleman. "It rests with Dodson and Fogg; you know that, very well."
"I know nothing of the kind," retorted Perker, firmly.
"It does not rest with Dodson and Fogg; you know the men, my dear sir, as well as I do. It rests solely, wholly, and entirely with you."

Having struggled with his rising indignation, Pickwick regains his composure; seemingly immune to the force of Perker’s argument, he “mildly” asks Perker, “Is this all you have to say to me?” Perker, who has a great deal more to say, proceeds to lecture Pickwick on the nature of the jury system, the good opinion of society, and the obligation of gentlemen to transcend “brutal obstinacy” and vengeful justice in the interests of civilization and the needs of innocent people. In a fine phrase, Perker refers to the “magnanimous revenge . . . of releasing this woman from a scene of misery and debauchery, to which no man should ever be consigned” (my italics).

But Dickens relieves Pickwick of the difficulty of making the crucial decision. An interruption occurs; at the door is Sam Weller, announcing Arabella Allen, who desires to see Pickwick immediately. Ironically, the annoyance proves the solution and allows Pickwick to save face expeditiously, though his response to Perker’s plea suggests that his sense of his own goodness and warm-heartedness might have allowed him to procure Mrs. Bardell’s release. Arabella Allen, assisted by Winkle, Tupman, and Snodgrass, appeals to Pickwick’s sense of responsibility to his friends. Flattery works wonders on an aroused, not to say ripe, heart, and Pickwick concludes that “he could never find it in his heart to stand in the way of young people’s happiness, and they might do with him as they pleased.”

That Dickens permits Pickwick to avoid deciding Mrs. Bardell’s fate on the relevant issues—those of responsibility, common sense, and justice—is far from a fault. It is the essence of comedy, and the later Dickens, without it, though a great writer certainly, is not a happier one. Indeed, only in Pickwick’s world is such an evasion possible: the context is consistent with Pickwick’s character and needs, and the solution does much to characterize, without deserting humor for tragedy, the fundamental unreality of Pickwick’s “rational” mind and the world it has made.

Queens College

Bishop Blougram and the Cardinals

Ellen F. Shields

Since its first appearance in 1885 in the volume Men and Women, “Bishop Blougram’s Apology” has been one of Browning’s most interesting and most controversial dramatic monologues. The main argument has centered around the character of the Bishop. One school holds that Blougram is “brilliant but comfort-loving and temporizing,” while other school believes that Blougram is essentially an honest man who “has conscientiously sought answers to his questions.” Since these two schools of thought are based on different readings of the Bishop’s argument and on different interpretations concerning which half of what the Bishop spoke he actually believed, they will probably continue to exist without the question being resolved one way or another. However, as C. R. Tracy points out, “Bishop Blougram’s Apology” stands apart from the other poems in Men and Women by “its obvious references to the immediate situation in England.” In view of this fact, it seems profitable to study the poem in light of its historical setting in an attempt to clarify the basis of Browning’s characterization of Blougram.

Although Browning was in Italy when he wrote “Bishop Blougram’s Apology,” internal evidence from the poem indicates that he was quite familiar with the Catholic situation in England. According to Browning’s own testimony, the model for Bishop Blougram was the newly appointed Archbishop of Westminster—Nicholas Cardinal Wiseman. Such lines as the reference to Pugin (l. 6), the reference to “as we say at Rome” (l. 45), the reference to articles on a variety of topics (ll. 913-15), the reference to magazines in Dublin and New York (l. 957), and the reference to the change in the hierarchy (ll. 972-75), all point to Cardinal Wiseman. But these are mainly surface similarities. Concerning the actual character of Blougram, there are few critics—if any—who assert that Blougram is an accurate depiction

of Wiseman. As Wiseman’s biographer, Wilfred Ward, points out, “subtle and true as the sketch is in itself, it really depicts someone else.”4

If this is true, and if Blougram’s character is not actually Wiseman’s character, what led Browning to depict Blougram as he did? Shortly after the publication of the poem, Browning was accused of hostility toward the Roman Catholic faith. Surprised, Browning replied that he did not consider the poem a satire and that he felt there was nothing ungenerous about it.5 Richard Simpson, reviewing Men and Women for the Catholic journal The Rambler, found in the poems “an undercurrent of thought that is by no means inconsistent with our religion” and observed that “we should never feel surprise at his [Browning’s] conversion.”6 How are we to explain these comments? There is always the possibility, of course, that Browning was being ingenuous while Simpson was being obtuse. Since the surface details obviously connect Blougram with Wiseman, we might assume that Browning deliberately distorted Wiseman’s character in order to present the Roman Church (and its new English head) in the most unfavorable light possible. If this view is correct, then Browning in this poem abandoned his role as “special-pleader,” a role that entails—as Donald Smalley points out—defending the main character’s actions “as he must have defended them to himself in the inner recesses of his mind.”7 Yet, such an action does not seem consistent with Browning, and if we look more closely at the Catholic situation in the middle of the nineteenth century, we can find the basis of his portrait of Blougram in the contemporary view of Roman Catholics and in the contemporary interpretation and understanding of Catholic beliefs.

From the time of the Reformation, the prevalent English attitude toward Catholics had not been a favorable one, and the restoration of the Hierarchy in 1850 revived much of the dormant animosity. In the November 25, 1850, issue of the Times, no less a person than the Archbishop of Canterbury described the members of the Catholic priesthood as “subtle, skillful, and insinuating.”8 The reputation of Catholic priests was not enhanced when, in 1845, John Newman left the Anglican Church in order to become a Roman Catholic. Many people doubted Newman’s sincerity and devotion to truth, and Lord Acton called him a “sophist, the manipulator, and not the servant, of truth.”9 This attitude toward both Newman and the Catholic clergy is exemplified by Kingsley’s now famous review of Froude’s History of England: “Truth, for its own sake, had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole ought not to be; that cunning is the weapon which Heaven has given to the saints wherewith to withstand the brute male force of the wicked world which marries and is given in marriage.”10

In the Preface to his Apologia Pro Vita Sua Newman states that he wrote the Apologia in an attempt to explain the development of his religious beliefs and to defend the Church from the charge of untruthfulness. Newman states that Kingsley was not alone in his attitude, nor were his charges a recent development:

It is now more than twenty years that a vague impression to my disadvantage has rested on the popular mind, as if my conduct towards the Anglican Church, while I was a member of it, was inconsistent with Christian simplicity and uprightness.11

Similarly, in his Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England in 1851, Newman discusses the Protestant view of the Catholic Church: “She is considered too absurd to be inquired into, and too corrupt to be defended, and too dangerous to be treated with equity and fair play.”12 In a later lecture he mentions an Englishman who claims “that at least one in twelve of our Priests in large towns doubts or disbelieves.” According to Newman, the Englishman’s only support for this statement was the fact that there were infidel priests in the last century in France and Spain, so there must be infidel priests in England (p. 352).

The commonly held belief that Catholics were not interested in truth for its own sake and were not overly scrupulous in following the course of truth, was further enhanced by the advocacy, especially by Newman, of the principle of “Economy.” Newman felt it was necessary to defend himself and the Church against misinterpretations of the practice, and although the Apologia was written more than ten years after “Bishop Blougram’s Apology,” the accusations that Newman disputes in the

5. Ibid., 179.
6. The Rambler, January 1856, p. 71. Although Wiseman was long thought to be the author of this unsigned review, Esther Rhodes Houghton recently identified Richard Simpson as the actual author. See The Victorian Newsletter, No. 33 (1968), 46.
8. Ward, I. 549.
11. Ibid., p. 3.
Apologia had been prevalent long before. Newman first discussed the principle of “Economy” in his History of the Arians, published in 1833. In the Apologia, he writes: “There is only one other subject, which I think it necessary to introduce here, as bearing upon the vague suspicions which are attached in this country to the Catholic Priesthood. It is one of which my accusers have before now said much,—the charge of reserve and economy” (p. 253). Newman goes on to say that the rule of “Economy” never went beyond

(1) the concealing the truth when we could do so without deceit, (2) stating it only partially, and (3) representing it under the nearest form possible to a learner or inquirer, when he could not possibly understand it exactly. (pp. 253-54)

It is easy to see how the advocacy of such a practice could lead people to believe that Newman and the Catholic Church were advocating equivocation and the manipulation of truth. In “Bishop Blougram’s Apology,” this attitude of suspicion and distrust on the part of non-Catholics is obvious in the person of Gigadibs. The Bishop is well aware of his attitude, and he disarms Gigadibs at the beginning by referring to it in a matter of fact way: “So, you despise me, Mr. Gigadibs” (l. 13).

The Bishop is also aware that Gigadibs believes him to be either a “fool or knave” (l. 404); a fool if he actually believes what he professes to believe, and a knave if he does not believe. That this was a prevalent attitude toward such men as Wiseman is shown by Newman’s defence against it in his Apologia:

I am defending myself here from a plausible charge brought against Catholics. . . . The charge is this:—that I, as a Catholic, not only make profession to hold doctrines which I cannot possibly believe in my heart, but that I also believe in the existence of a power on earth, which at its own will imposes upon men any new set of credenda, when it pleases, by a claim to infallibility. (p. 233)

Not only is the attitude of Gigadibs toward the Bishop typical of the period, but the Bishop’s method of argument is also typical of the type of casuistry generally expected from Roman Catholics in general and from Jesuits in particular. The Bishop starts his argument on the grounds of the skeptic, nonbeliever Gigadibs. If Gigadibs’ view is correct and if this life is all, who, then, has achieved the greater satisfaction in this life, Gigadibs or Blougram? After he gets Gigadibs to accept the apparently harmless analogy of the ship, Blougram goes on to show that he, and not Gigadibs, has accommodat-

ed himself to the reality of life, provided, of course, that this life is all there is. By getting Gigadibs to accept certain premises, Blougram is able to show how he has achieved more in this life than could Gigadibs’ three idealistic heroes. As Edward Dowden points out, Blougram shifts “the pea of truth dexterously under the three gilded-thimbles.”

Besides displaying the subtlety and casuist skill commonly attributed to Roman Catholic priests, Blougram also, in the third part (ll. 555-748), argues for faith by using arguments very similar to those of Newman. While the Bishop is obviously an intelligent man, his argument for faith is basically an antiintellecual one. Blougram argues that the desire for faith is the most important thing. Doubts are secondary and serve mainly to prove the strength of the faith:

You call for faith:
I show you doubt, to prove that faith exists.
The more of doubt, the stronger faith, I say,
If faith o’ercomes doubt. (ll. 601-4)

Newman, on the other hand, would not use the word “doubt,” since this meant to him an actual questioning of the truth of a doctrine. He would, however, use the term “difficulty.” To Newman, “ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt,” but there are certain “difficulties” involved with every article of faith: “I am far of course from denying that every article of the Christian Creed, whether as held by Catholics or by Protestants, is beset with intellectual difficulties; and it is simple fact, that, for myself, I cannot answer those difficulties” (Apologia, p. 227).

Both Newman and Blougram, then, have a somewhat antiintellectual approach to religion. Both men resort to the authority of the Church in deciding which matters they are to believe. Blougram argues that even though it might not be true “about the need of trial to man’s faith” (l. 737), he will not decrassify his faith by eliminating those doctrines concerning which he has doubts.

Similarly, Newman holds that reason can turn against man and can lead him away from the truth. Therefore, it is necessary to depend on faculties other than reason. Newman confesses that once he believed that the Roman Church was the Church of God, he believed all the doctrines that the Church taught. Concerning the doctrine of transubstantiation, he writes in the Apologia: “People say that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is difficult to believe; I did not believe the doctrine till I

was a Catholic. I had no difficulty in believing it, as soon as I believed that the Catholic Roman Church was the oracle of God, and that she had declared this doctrine to be part of the original revelation” (p. 228).

Basically, when Blougram says that he is not the master to take the first step to cut away those beliefs about which he has doubts (I. 748), he is arguing from a correct Catholic viewpoint. According to the Church, the individual is not capable of deciding what doctrines are true and what doctrines he should believe. It is the role of the Church to decide this, and if an individual decides to discard any of the doctrines officially held by the Church, the individual is guilty of heresy.

The similarity of Blougram’s opinions to those of Newman is most apparent in the section on miracles in which Blougram refers to Newman by name:

Here, we’ve got callous to the Virgin’s winks
That used to puzzle people wholesomely:
Men have outgrown the shame of being fools.
What are the laws of nature, not to bend
If the Church bid them?—brother Newman asks.

(ll. 699-703)

A little later he says:

I have read much, thought much, experienced much,
Yet would die rather than avow my fear
The Naples’ liquefaction may be false.

(ll. 726-28)

Newman was a firm believer in miracles and had written essays on them in 1826 and 1842. In The Present Position of Catholics in England he writes: “I think it impossible to withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the Madonna in the Roman States” (p. 312). In arguing not only for the possibility but also for the probability of miracles, Newman points out that the basic tenet of Christianity is based on a miracle:

Many men, when they hear an educated man so speak [in favor of miracles], will at once impute the avowal to insanity, or to an idiosyncrasy, or to imbecility of mind, or to hypocrisy. They have a right to say so, if they will; and we have a right to ask them why they do not say it of those who bow down before the Mystery of mysteries, the Divine Incarnation. If they do not believe this, they are not yet Protestants; if they do, let them grant that He who has done the greater may do the less. (p. 313)

As the similarity between the views expressed by Blougram and those expounded by Newman shows, Browning was familiar not only with the surface events involving the Catholic Church in England, but also with the dogmatic and moral issues that were currently under attack. To say that Browning understood the Church’s position is not to say that he agreed with it or even sympathized with it. But his role as special-pleader required him to know his background material, and it was apparently this knowledge that Simpson was referring to when he noted the “undercurrent of thought” consistent with Catholic belief. If Browning was ungenerous in presenting Blougram as an excessively clever and crafty casuist, his portrait can be defended in reference to the contemporary non-Catholic concept of Catholic clergyman, a concept that found apparent justification in Newman’s advocacy of the principle of “economy.” In creating Bishop Blougram, Browning assigned himself an exceptionally difficult task as special-pleader, for Blougram exemplified many of the characteristics that non-Catholics found most objectionable in the Roman Church. The success of Browning’s presentation is indicated by the debate that is still being argued over Blougram’s soul.

University of Waterloo

Henry Kingsley and the Governor Eyre Controversy

William H. Scheuerle

 Although the notorious Jamaica uprising of 1865 and the subsequent Governor Eyre controversy involved many of England’s greatest Victorian literary figures, scientists, and philosophers, there was no extended study of the reaction of opinion in England to the revolt and its suppression until Bernard Semmel’s The Governor Eyre Controversy.1 Because of its uniqueness, Semmel’s book will, no doubt, be used as a basis for future studies of this important historical incident. For that reason, I should like to take issue with Semmel’s account of Henry Kingsley’s role in the controversy.

Early in his book, Semmel asserts that Kingsley

“served as one of the most active members of the Eyre Defense Committee” (p. 30), but he does not attempt either to substantiate that assertion or to define Kingsley’s role. In fact, the other three brief references to Kingsley are to his article on Edward Eyre’s earlier Australian explorations which had appeared in *Macmillan’s Magazine* a few weeks before the uprising (pp. 30, 93, 99). It is true, of course, that Henry Kingsley was a member of the Eyre Defense Committee, but it would be more correct to state that he was on the fringe of the controversy instead of at its center. Also, Kingsley’s motivation for defending Eyre was radically different from the motivations of the other members of the group.

The Jamaican incident that roused the controversy began in October 1865, when the Negro peasantry rebelled against the white authority, killing about twenty Europeans. Within a month, the Governor of Jamaica, Edward Eyre, ruthlessly suppressed the revolt by having nearly five hundred Negroes killed, many more flogged and tortured, and, at least, one thousand native homes burned. In November of that year, news of the revolt and suppression reached England, and immediately public protest against Eyre’s actions led to the formation of an investigating Royal Commission, which first met on the island of Jamaica on January 20, 1866. After months of deliberation and several thousands of pages of testimony, the Commission reported on April 9, 1866. It praised Governor Eyre for “the skill, promptitude and vigour” he exercised in ending the riot, but censured him for the prolonged use of martial law that had deprived the natives of their constitutional privileges and for the excessive punishments inflicted upon the natives.

When the report was published in England, the aroused intellectuals split into two camps: the Jamaican Committee that wanted Eyre prosecuted for murder; and the Eyre Defense Committee that regarded Eyre as a hero. Mill, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Goldwin Smith, and Thomas Hughes spirited the former, while Carlyle, Ruskin, with Tennyson and Dickens lending their names, marshalled forces for the latter. For six years the case dragged on, as the two committees hurled bitter accusations at each other, and formerly close friendships, such as that of Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes, ruptured, never to be mended. Finally in July 1872, ex-governor Eyre was vindicated, with the Government defraying his legal expenses. A year later he was granted a pension as a “retired” colonial governor, which supported him until he died in 1901.

Henry Kingsley’s introduction into this controversy was more coincidental than intentional. In 1862, three years before the revolt, Kingsley, a successful novelist, had begun to write a series of articles dealing with famous Australian explorers, starting with an account of a year-long exploratory march (1840-1841) around the desolate terrain in Southern Australia known as the Australian Bight. The daring explorer of that march had been Edward Eyre. An Australian sheep rancher in the 1830’s, Eyre had—ironically enough in light of future events—first made a reputation for himself in Australia as the “Protector of the Aborigines,” because of his consideration of their rights when Resident Magistrate for the Murray River Territory. Then, as the only white survivor of that hazardous expedition around the Bight he was (and still is) acclaimed a hero in Australia. Kingsley himself admired Eyre the explorer because this young novelist knew firsthand how rough and desolate the Australian terrain was. From 1853 to 1858 he had struggled, mainly as a gold prospector, in Australia but, unlike Eyre, had come home a failure.

Busy with other writings, Kingsley did not finish his article on “Eyre’s March” until July 1865, and then, as fate would have it, the first half of it was published in *Macmillan’s Magazine* early in October 1865; the second half appeared the following month. The narrative concentrated on Eyre’s expedition, but early in the article Kingsley had briefly referred to Eyre’s treatment of the Australian natives:

He knew more about the aboriginal tribes, their habits, language, and so on, than any man before or since. He was appointed Black Protector for the Lower Murray, and did his work well. He seems to have been . . . a man eminently kind, generous, and just. No man concealed less than Eyre the vices of the natives, but no man stood more steadfastly in the breach between them and the squatters (the great pastoral aristocracy) at a time when to do so was social ostracism. The almost unexampled valour which led him safely through the hideous desert . . . served him well in a fight more wearing and more dangerous to his rules of right and wrong. He pleaded for the black, and tried to stop the war of extermination which was, is, and I suppose will be, carried on by the colonists against the natives in the unsettled districts beyond reach of the public eye. His task was hopeless. It was easier for him to find water in the desert than to find mercy for the savages.

When Kingsley republished his two-part article seven years later in *Hornby Mills and Other Stories*, he added two footnotes: “These words were published in Macmil-
lan’s Magazine one month before we heard of the Jamaica rebellion. I have not altered one word of the narrative”; “This narrative was written... at a time when the author believed Mr. Eyre to be dead; not in the least degree knowing that Eyre, Governor of Jamaica, was the old hero Eyre of his youthful admiration. Both parties, therefore, in the great Eyre controversy may read it without prejudice.”

In its lead article on November 29, 1865, The Times—which became increasingly pro-Eyre—quoted Kingsley’s comments and, unintentionally, set up a public correspondence between Kingsley and a Mr. W. Bakewell, who identified himself as “a resident in South Australia during all the time that Mr. Eyre lived in that country.” Bakewell’s letter, published on November 30, called Kingsley’s suggestion that Eyre had been socially ostracized in Australia the “purest and unmitigated fiction” and denied that the squatters had ever waged war against the blacks.

Kingsley answered Bakewell’s exceptions in The Times of December 2, 1865:

I reassert with emphasis that Mr. Eyre stood in the breach between the natives and the outlying colonists “in the unsettled districts beyond the public eye” (as I have carefully said), and with the greatest success, as far as his influence went and as long as it lasted. I repeat my assertion that the snubbing, bullying, and misrepresentation at head-quarters which the black protectors received as a general rule from the squatters amounted to what we in our funny language call “social ostracism.” I said no more than that this was the general fate of those who took up the cause of the blacks against the squatters, and that Eyre risked it. What sort of a life the outlying squatters led him I cannot say. He was too big a dog to be bayed down by any small bush clique, for he had the humanity and intelligence of Adelaide at his back. That he personally was ever “ostracised” by the whole colony I have never asserted. He was too well-known and too deeply respected to share the fate of ordinary black protectors in outlying districts.

I wonder that Mr. Bakewell did not take umbrage at some still stronger language of mine further on. I will give him the advantage of quoting it: “His task was hopeless,” and so on. I am perfectly ready to back up that language. Who knew that the task was hopeless better than Eyre? Who knew better than Eyre that the blacks would, by hook or by crook disappear before the whites? May I ask the indignant Mr. Bakewell what has become of those blacks?

Kingsley continued by offering examples to substantiate his assertion that the South Australian colonists had committed outrages against the blacks.

Bakewell answered Kingsley’s letter in The Times of December 5; acknowledged that some rare instances of outrages had existed but that the squatters were more “concerned in the preservation not the extermination of these useful people”; requested proof that Eyre had been personally ostracized; and, finally, accused Kingsley of attacking him personally.

Kingsley’s last letter appeared two days later. He reasserted his position; cited more examples, some from Eyre’s own account of his life in Australia; praised “the beautiful things” Eyre had done for the Australian natives; and ended with a retort to Mr. Bakewell: “If Mr. Bakewell thinks my letter personal to himself in any way, he has only himself to thank for the extreme discourtesy of his first rejoinder. To estop any more personal reflections I will say this, and say it most heartily: If I have offended him personally, I most humbly beg his pardon; but from one comma of what I have written I will not depart for 50 Mr. Bakewells.”

Mr. Bakewell did not reply further.

It is important to note that Kingsley’s letters in The Times did not defend, or even mention, Eyre’s actions in Jamaica; Kingsley, in fact, states in a letter to Alexander Macmillan, the publisher, during the time of the correspondence with Mr. Bakewell that “I shall keep carefully clear of the Jamaica business.” His letters—both public and private—attack only the injustices dealt the Australian natives by the squatters, especially “those short-sighted idiots,” as he confides to Macmillan in the same letter, “who have made fortunes on soil drenched with the blood of the natives, and have come home here and turned saint.” Bakewell, Kingsley considered to be such an idiot: “His class treated those unfortunate natives most horribly. That is what makes him so angry.”

Eyre’s critics may have considered Kingsley’s description of the Australian squatters to be a perfect one for the Governor of Jamaica, but Kingsley never made that comparison. He was not discussing the Jamaica question nor was he defending Governor Eyre; he was exalting Edward Eyre, the Australian explorer.

Therein lies the difference between Henry Kingsley’s motivation and those of the other important members on both sides for joining the committees. As Semmel’s book shows, the others were fighting for a cause, whether humanitarianism and radicalism (Jamaica Committee) or colonialism and anti-radicalism (Eyre Defense Committee). Huxley, for example, wrote that the case of Gov-

5. Ellis, pp. 141-42.

Governor Eyre is essentially “one of the most important constitutional battles in which Englishmen have for many years been engaged.” On the other side, Carlyle and Ruskin saw Eyre’s persecution as an attack upon the whole English tradition. For both sides, Eyre was a symbol; for Henry Kingsley, however, he was a man for whom he had “a strong personal feeling . . . and so my name stands on his Committee. He may or may not have been wrong, but he must have fair play, a thing he would never have gotten if we had not clubbed together.”

Unlike the vitriolic and intolerant leaders of the committees, Kingsley maintained a sense of fairness and reasonableness during the entire controversy. He was horrified at the rancor that developed between the two committees (Carlyle had called the Jamaica Committee a “knot of nigger philanthropists”). Not only did Kingsley defend the Jamaica Committee’s right to bring proceedings against Eyre, although he questioned the Committee’s accusation of “murder,” but he also became infuriated when Alexander Hamilton Hume, secretary of the Eyre Defense Committee, termed in *The Times* those proceedings “disgraceful”: “Fancy his daring to characterise a business in which [Thomas] Hughes and [J. M.] Ludlow were embarked as ‘disgraceful’! I shall speak out about it.”

But Kingsley did not speak out, at least publicly, about Hume’s attack as he did not speak out publicly about the controversy itself. His correspondence with Bakewell was the extent of his active participation in the whole affair, and there, as we have seen, his argument was of a different nature. No evidence exists, therefore, to substantiate Semmel’s assertion concerning Henry Kingsley’s role in the controversy. His letters suggest, to the contrary, that he might never have been drawn into the controversy at all if the Governor of Jamaica had not been Edward Eyre, the Australian explorer.

*State University System of Florida*  
*Tallahassee*

---

**G. W. E. Russell and the Editing of Matthew Arnold’s Letters**

*William S. Peterson*

Victorian writers feared public scrutiny of their private lives with an intensity that occasionally approached irrationality. Examples of this compulsive terror of self-exposure are by now so familiar that one need recite only the dreary litany of names and episodes: Harriet Martineau begging her correspondents to burn her letters; Robert Browning tossing letters and unpublished poems into a fireplace before the horrified eyes of T. J. Wise; Dickens defiantly feeding a bonfire at Gad’s Hill with the private papers of a lifetime; Tennyson (and a host of others) entrusting the “official” biography to a loyal son, after which the family papers were to be destroyed or locked up; and the astonishing uproar of disapproval from readers and the Carlyle family when James Anthony Froude dared to write an honest biography of that moody, irritable genius.

Even Matthew Arnold, apparently the sanest of all men, decreed that no biography was to be written of himself—an injunction that has to this day been obeyed in spirit, if not literally—and after his death the Arnold family consequently authorized, in lieu of the biography, a selection of his letters, which was to be edited by George W. E. Russell (1853-1919). Russell, a politician and historian, appeared to be an ideal choice, for in addition to a reputation for scholarship, he could claim a personal acquaintance with Arnold that dated from 1868 when he had met Arnold’s son Thomas at Harrow. Mrs. Arnold soon became “Aunt Flu” to him, and “Uncle Matt” he regarded as “the one person whom, if one could fashion oneself, I should most like to resemble.” But despite his qualifications, Russell’s editing of the Letters of Matthew Arnold (1895) satisfied few, particularly himself, because Arnold’s widow and sister imposed a heavy-handed censorship on the book that

---

7. Ellis, p. 164.
8. Ibid.

I wish to acknowledge the permission of the University of Liverpool Library and the Harvard College Library to quote several unpublished letters in this article.

2. MS letter, Russell to Mrs. Humphry Ward, November 30, 1918 (Liverpool).
was designed to conceal his "lighter side" but that in fact gave the world a seriously distorted view of Arnold the private man.

Frances Arnold ("Aunt Flu") was painfully aware of the Froude-Carlyle cause célèbre and was obviously determined that her husband would not be treated in a similar manner. When Professor Charles Eliot Norton of Harvard sent her his "corrected" edition of Carlyle's Reminiscences (which had previously been edited by Froude), Mrs. Arnold reported to him that "they are delightful reading, & seem to make one feel so differently about Carlisle [sic], & to wipe out the unpleasant impression left by Mr. Froude." In 1893 she was able to tell Professor Norton that "we are publishing some of dear Matt's letters," primarily those addressed to herself and Arnold's sister Frances ("Aunt Fan"). Even though the two women strictly supervised Russell's editorial decisions, however, they felt some apprehension, for when the letters were at last published, Mrs. Arnold wrote to Norton: "I have had many anxious moments about the Letters, which your most kind words have done much to dispel..."

Russell, we may surmise, did not take very kindly to the excisions demanded by the family. His preface to the letters phrases his protest in the mildest of language: "Here and there, I have been constrained, by deference to living susceptibilities, to make some slight excisions; but, with regard to the bulk of the Letters, this process had been performed before the manuscript came into my hands." On the other hand, in a critical study of Arnold published in 1909, Russell spelled out in plainer language the full extent of the censorship imposed upon the letters by Arnold's survivors:

Yet in reality my functions were little more than those of the collector and the annotator. Most of the Letters had been severely edited before they came into my hands, and the process was repeated when they were in proof.

A comparison of the letters addressed to Mr. John Morley and Mr. Wyndham Slade with those addressed to the older members of the Arnold family will suggest to a careful reader the nature and extent of the excisions to which the bulk of the correspondence was subjected. The result was a curious obscuration of some of Arnold's most characteristic traits—such, for example, as his over-flowing gaiety, and his love of what our fathers call Railly. And, in even more important respects than these, an erroneous impression was created by the suppression of what was thought too personal for publication. Thus I remember to have read, in some one's criticism of the Letters, that Mr. Arnold appeared to have loved his parents, brothers, sisters, and children, but not to have cared so much for his wife. To any one who knew the beauty of that life-long honeymoon, the criticism is almost too absurd to write down. And yet it not unfairly represents the impression created by a too liberal use of the facing pencil.

In 1918 Arnold's niece, Mrs. Humphrey Ward, also made an unflattering remark in print about Russell's edition of the letters. "Every little playful note to friends or kinsfolk he ever wrote was dear to those who received it," Mrs. Ward observed in her autobiography; "but he—the most fastidious of men—would have much disliked to see them all printed at length in Mr. Russell's indiscriminate volumes." Russell, who was gravely ill and approaching death, found the strength to write a letter of self-defense to Mrs. Ward that tells his unhappy story of family censorship in even more graphic terms:

I do not the least demur to your remark about the Letters; but I wd. have you see all the facts.

Mrs. A. wished me to edit them; and I wished to make them as much of a biography & a portrait as might be. But hardly anyone except Mrs. A. & Miss A. supplied me with any material; Mrs. A. deleted every admiring reference to herself, & Miss A. every trace of humour. This was done deliberately—she said, "Everyone knew my brother's lighter side; but few his serious & domestic side."

I felt that if only his serious side were presented in the book, the world wd. never know in the least what he was like. So I was constrained to insert the very few playful letters which reached me, although I fully realized that they were, in quality, inferior to the serious ones.

Unfortunately for Russell, the interference of the Arnolds did not become generally known, and as a result he has had to bear most of the blame for the deletions in the letters. As recently as 1962, for example, Professor Arthur Kyle Davis, Jr., who has been collecting Arnold's correspondence at the University of Virginia, remarked that "with most of the autograph letters at hand, I am able to say that Russell's cuts were considerably more than either his Prefatory Note or his inserted dots would indicate." Yet Russell's own testimony indicates that it was not so much a case of "dual censorship," as Professor Davis puts it, but rather arbitrary suppression.

3. MS letter, May 18, 1889 (Harvard bMS Am 1088 [271]).
4. MS letter, November 22, 1893 (Harvard bMS Am 1088 [273]).
5. MS letter, February 26, 1896 (Harvard bMS Am 1088 [276]).
8. MS letter, November 30, 1918 (Liverpool).
by the family to which Russell was an unwilling accomplice.

In any event, the real damage was done to Arnold’s reputation, not Russell’s. The first reviewers of the letters were not slow to detect their lack of humor and charm, and this of course led to certain conclusions about Arnold’s character. The Sewanee Review (February 1896) complained that in the letters “there is seldom a gleam of humor”; the Catholic World (July 1896) noted their “frequent dulness and occasional commonplaceness”; the Athenaeum (November 30, 1895) found no “inexhaustible fun”; and Book Reviews (December 1895) concluded that “nothing is more evident to the reader of these letters than the fact that Arnold’s excellence [vivacity] became excellence by intention; he lacked flow, spontaneity, exuberance of all kinds....” There seems to be a fierce irony in this, that Matthew Arnold, the embodiment of wit and charm and satirical vivacity in his prose, should in his own letters have been presented to the world as a dull, unsniling man of affairs. Surely the family’s activities in this case represent Victorian timidity in its most unpleasant form, and the time is ripe—as Professor Davis has pointed out—to re-edit the Letters of 1895 with the excisions restored and with the whole man, including his intimate affections and his good humor, exposed to view.

Andrews University

Recent Publications: A Selected List
Arthur F. Minerof

September 1969—January 1970

I. General


More, D. C. “Political Morality in Mid-Nineteenth Century England: Concepts, Norms, Violations.” Victorian Studies, September, pp. 5-36. Reformers believed that whatever weakened the traditional structure of society was corrupt.

Roxburgh, Sir Ronald. “Miss Nightingale and Miss Clough: Letters from the Crimea.” Victorian Studies, September, pp. 71-89. Miss Clough’s diary letters reveal the life of a nurse and the rivalry between herself and Miss Nightingale.

RELIGION. Anderson, Olive. “Women Preachers in Mid-
Victorian Britain: Some Reflexions on Feminism, Popular Religion and Social Change." Historical Journal, Vol. XII, No. 3, pp. 467-84. Feminism explains less and popular religion more about the course of social change.


Harrison, Brian, and Barrie Trinder. "Drink and Sobriety in an Early Victorian Country Town: Banbury 1830-1860." English Historical Review, Supplement 4, pp. 1-72. The Temperance Society was not the main reason for the decline in drinking.


II

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS


Shapiro, Arnold. "Wuthering Heights as a Victorian Novel." Studies in the Novel, Fall, pp. 284-96. The book is in the same ethical and moral tradition as the other great Victorian novels.

BROWNINGS. Carrington, C. E. "My Last Duchess." TLS, 6 November, p. 1288. Suggest source for the duchess.

de L. Ryals, Clyde. "Browning's Fifine at the Fair: Some Further Sources and Influences." English Language Notes, September, pp. 46-51. Biographical origins and the influence of Tennyson and Moliere.

Fleissner, Robert E. "My Last Duchess." TLS, 4 December, p. 1405. Disagrees with Carrington.


Greenberg, Robert A. "Ruskin, Pugin and the Contemporary Context of 'The Bishop Orders His Tomb.'" PMLA, October, pp. 1588-94. As with Pugin and Ruskin, Browning's concern was to search out in the past the roots of his own age.


CLOUGH. McGhee, Richard D. " 'Blank Misgivings': Arthur


Patten, Robert L. "Box, Phiz, and Pickwick in the Pound." ELH, September, pp. 575-91. Browne's illustrations emphasize and elaborate the themes of Pickwick Papers.


Haight, Gordon S. "George Eliot and John Blackwood." Blackwood's Magazine, November, pp. 385-400. Except for Lewes, no one did more than John Blackwood to develop and sustain Eliot's genius as a novelist.


Wilson, Jack H. "Howells' Use of George Eliot's Romola in April Hopes." PMLA, October, pp. 1620-27. Howells' fascination with the character of Tito Melema is important in understanding his work.


Gissing. Selig, Robert L. "A Sad Heart at the Late-Victorian Culture Market: George Gissing's In the Year of Jubilee." Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 703-20. The novel suggests that mass culture provides an unofficial education in false values.


Morris. Silver, Carol G. "The Defence of Gueverre: A Further Interpretation." Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 693-702. Although the queen intends a defense, she half-confesses her crime through the ambiguity of her most important statements.

Stallman, Robert L. "Rapunzel Unravelled." Victorian Poetry, Autumn, pp. 221-32. The poem is an archetypal mythic quest from childhood to maturity.

Patmore. Dunn, John J. "Love and Eroticism: Coventry
Patmore’s Mystical Imagery.” Victorian Poetry, Autumn, pp. 203-19. After his conversion to Catholicism, Patmore made increasing use of human love to symbolize the mystical union of the soul with God.


Nelson, James G. “Aesthetic Experience and Rossetti’s ‘My Sister’s Sleep.’” Victorian Poetry, Summer 1969, pp. 154-58. The poem is a unified work of art, an attempt to create an aesthetic domestic idyl.


Waller, John O. “Christ’s Second Coming: Christina Rossetti and the Premillennialist William Dodsworth.” Bulletin of the New York Public Library, September, pp. 465-82. The poet was influenced in her early life by the ministry of William Dodsworth.


Chandler, Alice. “Tennyson’s Maud and the Song of Songs.” Victorian Poetry, Summer 1969, pp. 91-104. The Song of Songs is a biblical analogue to Maud and helps clarify its meaning.

Gray, J. M. Man and Myth in Victorian England: Ten-
English X News

Committee News

• Officers for 1970 are Ronald E. Freeman, Chairman; David J. DeLaura, Secretary.

• In accordance with the MLA Executive Council's recommendation, the old Advisory and Nominating Committee has been renamed the Executive Committee. John D. Rosenberg is the new Chairman, and the new members (1970-1972) are G. B. Tennyson and Richard C. Tobias. Martin Svaglic will remain on the Executive Committee, as will all future retiring Chairmen of the Committee, for one year after their chairmanship in order to preserve continuity.

• Thomas J. Collins will serve as Program Chairman for the 1970 meeting, and the topic will be "Revaluations of Victorian Poetry and Poetics." Papers as well as inquiries should be addressed to Mr. Collins (Department of English, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario).

Correspondence

• Robert B. Partlow announces that Dickens Studies, which ceased publication in 1969, is to be succeeded by the Dickens Studies Annual, a hardbound volume of about three hundred pages, issued in the fall of each year. Manuscripts are desired having to do with any aspect of Dickens' life, work, relationship with other writers and the age. Papers and inquiries may be sent to Mr. Partlow (Department of English, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois).

• George Perkins writes of the birth of a new scholarly periodical, The Journal of Narrative Technique, devoted to narrative literature in English, both prose and verse, with emphasis on authorial technique. Three issues a year are planned, the first to appear by the close of the current year. Manuscripts may be forwarded to JNT, care of Department of English, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan.