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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number 35</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Spring 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Poet as Heroic Thief: Tennyson’s “The Hesperides” Reexamined</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by James D. Merriman</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sainthood and Dorothea Brooke by Robert F. Damm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrative Sequence and the Moral System: Three Tristram Poems</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by Masao Miyoshi</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tennyson, Vestiges, and the Dark Side of Science by Milton Millhauser</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anthony Trollope, or The Man with No Style at All</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by Ruth apRoberts</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morris and Timekeeping by Littleton Long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centripetal Vision in Pater’s Marius</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by James A. W. Heffernan</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent Publications: A Selected List by Arthur F. Minero</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Poet as Heroic Thief: 
Tennyson's "The Hesperides" Reexamined*

James D. Merriman

Of the youthful poems which Tennyson suppressed, perhaps none has attracted more attention than "The Hesperides." Tennyson himself did not see fit either to revise or to reprint the poem in any authorized edition during his lifetime. Readers in the present century, however, have been disposed to take the "The Hesperides" rather more seriously. T. S. Eliot has praised its metrics, and Douglas Bush has described the poem as "the purest piece of magic and mystery ... that Tennyson ever wrote." Just how much mystery the poem does contain is suggested by a number of more or less elaborate efforts at unraveling its difficulties. Stange, in a seminal interpretation, saw "The Hesperides" as one of the fairly extensive groups of poems in which Tennyson examined either directly or covertly the problems of the nature and proper role of poetry and the poet in relation to society and the related tension in himself between a yearning for withdrawal from actuality and a conscience-directed will to serve his fellow men. This view of the subject of the poem has been accepted—at least in its general outlines—by succeeding critics. Jerome Buckley speaks of "The Hesperides" as Tennyson's "most eloquent defense of a pure poetry isolated from the rude touch of men." And Valerie Pitt believes that it expresses "by means of symbol, the need to preserve untouched and inviolate an inner and mysterious world."

But despite such agreement as to the major themes of the poem, despite even my own sense that the general area of discourse in the poem has been properly identified, I continue to be troubled by a feeling that the mystery has not really been solved. The various readings of the poem all end at (perhaps "start from" would be more accurate) approximately the same conclusion, but the routes they take are disturbingly diverse. Thus the golden apples are variously interpreted as a "symbol of something spiritual, an inner treasure which the poet feels must be guarded from the world," "the poetic imagination," "poetry," "the rare genius of poetry" and "the poet's art," and "wisdom." It may be objected, of course, that these variations are only a product of "poetic richness." Perhaps so. Less conveniently justifiable and far more unsettling, however, is the remarkable incidence of misreading and forcing of the "facts" of the poem by its interpreters bent on reaching their conclusion. Thus at least three critics explicitly locate the tree on an island, though nothing in the text can justify such a location.

* This paper and the two that follow by Professors Miyoshi and apRoberts were read originally in December 1968 to Group Ten of the Modern Language Association.

1. According to Hallam Tennyson, it was his father's expression of regret at having excluded the poem from his "Juvenilia" that led to the reprinting of "The Hesperides" in Alfred Lord Tennyson, A Memoir (New York, 1897), I, 61-65. Hallam's text departs markedly from the 1832 text, not only in matters of orthography, punctuation, capitalization and line arrangement and indentation, but also in wording:

Line 2: 1832: voyaging; Hallam: wandering
After Line 13: 1832: Song; Hallam, Song of the Three Sisters
Line 57: 1832, scaled; Hallam, sealed
Line 84: 1832, this; Hallam, the
Line 92: 1832, make; Hallam, keep
Line 95: 1832, day and night; Hallam, night and day
Line 100: 1832, flowering; Hallam, flowerful
Line 109: 1832, bound; Hallam, round

Although the fact that Hallam's text also contains several notions of emphasis, metrical movement, and "accents written by" his father might suggest that Tennyson was responsible for the variants, I am inclined to regard them as Hallam's work, the verbal changes being mere transcription errors. I have accordingly relied on the original text (Poems by Alfred Tennyson [London, 1835]), pp. 101-07). I am indebted to Mr. David Cole for having first drawn my attention to the variations in the texts.


7. Stange (p. 740), interested in seeing the site as an archetypical image, calls it "the garden-isle of the Hesperides." Ryals (pp. 79, 77), tracing recurrent motifs in Tennyson's early poetry, links the island of "The Lady of Shallot" and "the island paradise that Tennyson also uses in 'The Lotus Eaters' and 'The Hesperides'" (it may be noted that nothing in "The Lotus Eaters" justifies its placement on an island either). Valerie Pitt (p. 60) also uses the phrase "island paradise." Although the ancients sometimes placed the garden on an island, they more often gave it a mainland location; Milton's Comus, quoted in the epigraph, placed it "Up in the broad fields of the sky" (l. 578); it is possible, of course, but unlikely that Tennyson might have seen the canceled passage in the Trinity MS. which uses the phrase "blissful Isle."
Even more pervasive in the critics of "The Hesperides" than such simple errors is a tendency toward interpretation that goes well beyond the data of the text.  

All of this is probably best regarded as testimony to the difficulty of "The Hesperides" and goes far toward justifying Elton Smith's view not only that "no complete and coherent interpretation" of it exists, but also that "the poem, as a totality, defies analysis." Nevertheless, there are degrees even of unsucces, and if in the end a new interpretation of "The Hesperides" fails to encompass fully or to exhaust the poem's meaning, it may still come a few steps closer to adequacy.

Like those which have gone before, my interpretation sees Tennyson in "The Hesperides" as moving on two levels: one concerned with poetic art and another dealing with a problem that is both more personal and at the same time more universal. It departs from its predecessors, however, in its reading of the symbolic equivalences and perhaps even more in its assessment of the attitudes stated and implied in the poem.

We may begin by noting that if "The Hesperides" symbolically treats some elements of poetic creation, it need not be regarded as figuring in its brief span the whole process. From the entire myth of the Golden Apples, Tennyson characteristically selected for presentation only one brief vignette. The advantage which such a method of drawing on mythic materials offers to the poet is that, precisely because both origins and outcome are foreknown to the appropriate audience, he is free to concentrate his powers on the single selected aspect. The fragment taken from myth thus functions as a large metonym. The foreknown outcome of the sisters' anxious guarding of the tree is the carrying away of the apples by "one from the East" (l. 42). This theft, the eleventh labor of Hercules, is the climactic event of the myth of the Golden Apples; it is also the counterpart of the climactic event in the creative process, a process of which "The Hesperides" actually presents—in symbolic terms, of course—only an earlier stage.

"The Hesperides," then, insofar as it is a poem about poetry, is not another "Lady of Shalott"; it is not about the actual making of poems. It is rather about what might be called the sources of poetry; that is, it is an account in symbolic terms of where and under what conditions the stuff from which poems are made comes into existence, what its nature is and, by implication, what the poet must do to obtain it for use.

The true location of the garden where this stuff grows is in the human mind, a twilight portion of the mind perhaps most easily describable as the unconscious. It is an area whose activities are detected by most men, as they are by the voyaging Hanno, only as "voices in a dream" (l. 12). In this warm, quiet garden of the unconscious, the central feature is the "hallowed fruit-tree" (l. 55) with its golden apples. With the antiquity of its "gnarled bole" (l. 111), the secret, organic processes in which its sap flows "from the root / Drawn in the dark, / Up to the fruit" (ll. 33-35), and its fertility, the "mystic" (l. 50) tree is an obvious enough romantic symbol of the imagination in its dark and mysterious workings.

If the tree and its organic life stand for the imagination and its activity, then its product, the golden apples, might be taken, as some interpreters have already done, as emblems of poetry, i.e., as so many poems. Yet there are reasons for regarding them rather as the stuff, the imaginative material from which poetry is created. To begin with, it may be doubted that Tennyson, who was among the most conscious craftsmen of verse, would have given, even in symbolic allegory, so little place to the poet's actual labor. Poems, good ones at any rate, one might observe, are made by poets like Tennyson, but the tree can make only the stuff of poetry. A great deal that is said about the apples is consonant with this view of them as emblematic of the poetic stuff. Their sacredness, that "the sea is adored by the Hesperides as being the source of their own creative power, while the land is spurred for its aridity" (pp. 794, 199).

8. For example, while it is true that the three sisters say that the tree produces its apples "to threefold music" (l. 52, italics mine), Stange's assertion that "the burgeoning of the fruit depends on the charmed music of the Hesperides" seems to overstate the matter. Of the further claim that the sisters "draw their vitality and find the source of their song in the root and the tree," it can only be said that nothing like this is stated in the text, nor can the claim be legitimately inferred from anything that is stated. Yet these are the bases of interpreting the poem as in part a figurative of "the connection among the artist, his art, and his inspiration." Stange concedes that Tennyson's "notion is complicated, but," he goes on, "it is conveyed with precision" (p. 735, emphasis mine). A far more striking example of forcing the text can be seen in Adler's assertions—built on nothing beyond the Hesperides' singing that the "warm seawind ripeneth" (l. 84) the flowers and fruit—that the "maidens regard themselves as belonging more to Ocean than to Earth" and claim "to owe allegiance to the sea," and, finally,


10. Stange (p. 734) suggests Hesiod's Theogony (pp. 215, 274-75, 518) as a possible source. Whatever Tennyson's source was, it clearly was not Milton's Comus, from which he seems to have drawn little more than his epigraph. Milton's description (ll. 976-1029) of a joyful place where "day never shuts his eye" has little resemblance to the crepuscular calm of Tennyson's setting.

11. Of the critics I am familiar with, only Smith sees to consider the mythic outcome of any significance: "the moment when the aesthetic ideal is embodied in printed verse and thrust out into a critical and uncaring world" (p. 123). I doubt that Tennyson, even at his most symbolic, would have cast Edward Moxon in the role of Hercules.
their preciousness, their organic growth, the fact that they come into being spontaneously in a mysterious land of passivity and are "mellowed" in that characteristic romantic half-light at the "end of day and beginning of night" (I. 91-94)—all this suggests not the products of the active will toward form, but rather the material generated by the imagination and used by the poet as the substance of poems. Such an interpretation of the apples is confirmed by the underlying source of their preciousness. They are "the treasure / Of the wisdom of the west" (I. 26-27), and "wisdom," for Tennyson, is regularly that aspect of cognition associated with the intuition, as contrasted with "Knowledge," the product of empirical observation and tied to the fallible senses. It is also the first attribute of the goddess of freedom in the youthful poem, "The Poet."

Produced in the dim unconscious and ripened on the tree of the imagination, full of the intuitive spiritual insight that gives value and potency to poetry, the golden apples guarded by the Hesperides serve as images of the poet's inspiration, as the precious stuff from which his poetry is to be wrought. Yet, at least as far as that part of the myth of the Golden Apples covered in the poem goes, the apples remain unused, without issue, assuaging no human hunger, filling no human need. And this despite their potential ability, avowed by the sisters, to make the world wise (I. 64) and even to heal it of its "old wound" (I. 69).

That this potential remains unfulfilled has nothing to do with the nature of the apples themselves, but a great deal to do with their guardians. The central fact about the three sisters, as Tennyson chose to present them, is a chilling lack of concern for mankind, particularly for man's sufferings in a world "wasted with fire and sword" (I. 104), a world where "Kingdoms lapse, and climates change, and races die" (I. 46). Worse than merely indifferent, they are concerned to guard the apples from theft "lest the old wound of the world be healed" (I. 69, italics mine), their only other motive being the possible loss of their own "eternal pleasure" (I. 24). The three sisters have been repeatedly explicated as symbolic of the poet, but those who see them appear to have ignored the appalling callousness and selfishness that mark them. Putting aside the unlikely possibility that Tennyson thought poets a bad lot, it is hard to believe that he would have deliberately portrayed the poet as the enemy of man.

Certainly the sisters stand in total opposition to Tennyson's most direct portrait of the poet (in "The Poet") as one who is so far from withholding his wisdom in a garden in the west that he sends his thoughts eastward to turn into "flower[s] all gold" until "the world / Like one great garden show'd" (I. 24, 33-34).

If the Hesperides resemble any of Tennyson's poet-figures, it is precisely the poète manqué type, whose inadequacies Tennyson either suggests or explicitly condemns. There is a trace of the sisters' indifference, perhaps, in the Lady of Shalott's lack of connection with the world of men, and considerably more than a trace in the "sinful soul" of "The Palace of Art," who finds "peace or wars / . . . one to me," and who prizes her "Godlike isolation" when she contemptuously surveys "the droves of swine" who "graze and wallow, breed and sleep." But these, if poets, are poets who have failed, and in any event they do not seek to withhold man's salvation, and they are far from finding "eternal pleasure" in their condition. What the three sisters most closely resemble—not only in their attitudes but also in a number of remarkable parallels in imagery—are the terrible gods conceived by the lotos-eaters in justification of their abandonment of moral responsibility.

The attitude of the Hesperides toward mankind—if we heed it at all—is bound to give us pause. As human beings we can scarcely sympathize with such indifference to our plight and still less with the withholding of our proper balm. A growing sense of divergence between the attitude of the sisters and the predictable, normal human attitude seems inevitable. This gap, however, represents a difficulty only to the extent that we regard the sisters as the value center of the poem, the source of authoritative (and authorial) judgments—to the extent, in short, that we identify the attitude of the sisters with the attitude of Tennyson and thus with the attitude presumably expected of the reader.

Yet, in fact, there is no necessity for such an identification, and, indeed, there is reason to suppose that Tennyson sought to avoid it. The very method adopted in the song is a clue. Instead of using impersonal narration, which by convention tends to authenticate both information and judgments, Tennyson chose the method of the completely dramatized speaker deeply involved in the situation he presents and by that involvement accordingly conditioned in judgments and perhaps even in his regist-

12. See, for example, Buckley, p. 47, and Ryals, p. 77. Adler (p. 201) seems to be aware of the sisters' selfish indifference, but makes little of it.

13. I. 182-83, 197-202. The three sisters may well have been associated in Tennyson's mind with the sinful soul's morally etiolated view of "Beauty, Good, and Knowledge ... three sisters" in the prefatory verses. I am indebted to Miss Margaret Colo for calling my attention to this possibility.

14. It is significant that the attitude projected onto the gods in "The Lotus-Eaters" is conceived in "a land / In which it seemed always afternoon" (I. 3-4) and where "the full-juiced apple, waxes over-mellow" ("Choric Song," I. 33).
tration of the "facts." The sisters speak not with Tennyson's voice, but with their own; they do not give us "truth," but merely their own view of it. They are, in short, "unreliable narrators." 15

If the method allows unreliability, the content of the sisters' song insists upon it. The precise, repeated revelations of the sisters' indifference to mankind are only one clue to their inadequacy as a value center. Their equally repeated insistence on the delights of secrecy, "hoarded wisdom," "wiles" and the "bliss of secret smiles" (ll. 48, 77-78) also runs counter to our normal cultural ideals of openness and generosity. Nor is their estimate of the garden's uniform delightfulness ("all good things are in the west" [l. 96]) any more acceptable in human terms. For though the garden is in part attractive, it is also repellent, even from the outset, in the images of sterility and torpid, minimal vitality which introduce it:

Round about all is mute,
As the snowfield on the mountain-peaks,
As the sandfield at the mountain-foot.
Crocodiles in briny creeks
Sleep and stir not: all is mute. (ll. 18-22) 16

This sense of reptilian inactivity is reinforced by the image of the guardian dragon, "older than the world" (l. 58) and "drunk with overwatchings" (l. 54), and less strikingly by the stasis of the sisters themselves, who, contrary to expectation, perform no dance to their ritual incantation, but rather refer twice to themselves explicitly as "standing about the charmed root" (ll. 17, 116; italics mine). Considering such clues, it is difficult indeed to see the sisters as Tennyson's archetype of the poet.

The problem of identifying the symbolic function of the three sisters leads us to a second level of meaning in the poem—a level I have referred to earlier as "personal" but perhaps more precisely described as the moral or psychological level, the level in which Tennyson deals not so much with the problems of man as artist, but rather with those of artist as man. On this level the clue to the signification of the Hesperides lies in their motive for singing—namely, retaining their own pleasure at the expense of the world.

Stated in the simplest moral terms, "The Hesperides"

is a poem about selfishness, and that in its extreme and primitive form. In both language and action, the moral archetype evoked by the sisters is the miser, to whom what is "hoarded ... brings delight" (l. 48). Like the miser counting his golden coins, the sisters would "number, tell ... over and number / How many" (ll. 49-50) golden apples their tree holds. And like the miser, they find their joy not in the use of what they hoard, but rather simply in possessing it, retaining it, withholding it from the world outside.

In psychological terms, such a reading of the sisters' role is entirely consistent with the interpretation of the garden as representing the unconscious. As symbols of the ego unconditioned by external ideals or aims, the sisters in their utter selfishness and utter lovelessness quite appropriately withhold themselves and their goods in a silent land of minimal activity, a warm, darkened land reached by crossing a body of water, a land which, in short, recreates as far as possible the conditions of the womb. The sisters illustrate the characteristic features of what in orthodox terminology could be described as the infantile stage of ego development: the inexplicable pleasure in withholding what is essentially useless to the withholder, the delight in secrecy and mystery, and the rejection of the world outside the self as an object of love. 17 Even their song, if we consider its largely self-incantatory nature, its illusioned claims as to its efficacy in preserving the treasure and its formal structure by which it circles back to its beginning, has the quality of a compulsive ritual generated by anxiety and designed to protect the pleasures of the self. In brief, whether we regard the sisters in moral terms or psychologically, their inadequacy as either human ideals or symbols of the poet seems patent.

In the myth-drama of "The Hesperides," of which it must be recalled, Tennyson shows us only one scene, the hero-poet waits in the wings. Anticipated fearfully everywhere in the song and alluded to once explicitly as "one from the East" who will "come and take [the apples] away" (l. 42), it is Hercules who is the true hero of the myth of the Golden Apples of the Hesperides, and it is his theft of the apples that is the central event in that

15. Only Adler seems to be aware of a possible distinction between the attitude of the sisters and what might be called the normative attitude behind the poem as a whole. But if he is aware of the distinction he ignores it, arguing that Tennyson's attraction to the sisters' heartless view of man's sufferings is indicated "by the beauty of the imagery through which he expresses it and by his obvious sympathy with the sisters" and by the "tone of authenticity" he gives to their utterances (pp. 195, 202).

16. Only Smith seems to have noted what a "curiously sterile poetic paradise" this is, but his recognition seems to be based on the fact that the poetic product of the land of the Hesperides has no "possible audience" (p. 123).

17. A convinced Freudian would probably find it significant that what the sisters are bent on retaining is golden, considering the regular association of gold with money and, according to Freud, the subconscious association of money with excrement ("filthy lucre"). A description of the sisters as anal-retentive is, of course, consistent with the interpretation I have proposed, though personally I do not find it particularly helpful in understanding the poem.
myth. As a culture myth, this theft belongs to the very common type in which the half-human, half-divine hero through bravery or cleverness seizes and brings to his people a culture treasure such as fire, grain or the like. His antagonist is usually an Old Man-God figure such as “Father Hesper . . ., / Looking under silver hair with a silver eye” (ll. 43-44), frequently assisted in his withholding of the treasure by ancillary figures such as the dragon and the daughters. The culture goods which the hero steals help to relieve man of his miseries or to further the development of his civilization, and, indeed, may make him in part godlike. All of this, of course, still lies in the future in “The Hesperides,” but it is the destined future, and it is there that we must look for the symbol of the poet in the poem.

The poet-hero must, of course, invade the garden. Ordinary, active men like Hanno can sail by, but, for the poet, the garden, the interior world of dream and darkness, is the place where the intuited, mysteriously grown stuff of wisdom and poetry is to be obtained. Essentially valueless and sterile while they remain in the garden, the apples are properly to be stolen and carried into the world. Their potentiality is rightly to be exploited. The true role of the poet is not that of passive guardian, but rather of active hero. His dangerous task is to make the journey into his own heart of darkness—and to return, bearing the mysterious inspiration with which he will cure the wounds of the world.

The danger that he faces is not really the “redcombed dragon . . . / Rolled together in purple folds” (ll. 51-52) —surely one of the prettiest and least fearsome dragons in literature. The real risk lies in the temptation presented by the sisters themselves, by their life of isolated uninvolved. That such a withdrawal represented a genuine temptation to Tennyson seems beyond doubt, if only in light of the number of times he treated it. But to say so much is scarcely to say that Tennyson was “enamoured of escape.” Tennyson doubtless, like all men, had moments when he longed to escape from a potentially hostile world, “a life of shocks, / Dangers, and deeds” (“Oenone,” ll. 160-61). Perhaps, as a poet he felt even more sharply than most men what Arnold was to call the “strange disease of modern life” with its ceaseless, nerve-wracking change, its constant calls upon the self to give of itself.

But if he felt the temptation, it is important to see that he regarded it as just that—a temptation—that is, an urge toward something inherently evil, something to be struggled against. In both “The Palace of Art” and “The Lady of Shalott”, he is at pains to show the destructive results of such withdrawal, and in “The Lotos-Eaters” the moral evil of the retreat is heavily underscored. His exploration of the theme in “The Hesperides” continues this general moral verdict and contains at the same time an acute delineation of the psychological regression involved in escape. Beyond this, the poem reveals Tennyson’s final insight into the hollowness of the claims of Nirvana. The retreat from reality into the private world was destined, he recognized, to find no place where the self could sit contentedly muttering a song of its own pleasures to itself. For despite the apparent restfulness of the garden, it is for the sisters precisely a place of “eternal want of rest” (l. 25). Their ceaseless watching, their fearful anticipation of the coming of Hercules, represent not inner peace but quite contrarily an extreme form of anxiety. Far from being an “assertion of a desire to retreat from purposive moral activity” or an “eloquent defense of a pure poetry isolated from the rude touch of men,” “The Hesperides” is a hard-headed examination of the moral evil, the psychological inadequacy and the pragmatic failure of retreat.

Narrative Sequence and the Moral System:
Three Tristram Poems

Masao Miyoshi

Events are nothing but themselves, atomic, alone, enclosed, without reference or relations beyond themselves. But in sequence they are more than themselves; they connect, they form a story. The imposition of narrative sequence is, by definition, an interpretive process, involving the author’s moral outlook, indeed his perception


19. Stange, p. 742; Buckley, p. 47.
of the total structure of reality. The discussion that follows will deal with narrative sequence as it appears in versions of the Tristram legend by three Victorian poets. The poems are Tennyson's "The Last Tournament," Arnold's "Tristram and Isolde" and Swinburne's Tristram of Lyonesse.\textsuperscript{1} We shall see how close examination of the narrative technique of the three poems—all of them based on more or less the same events\textsuperscript{5}—provides us an opportunity to infer certain characteristics of the moral system operating in the narrative art of the period.

I

Narrative fragmentation is one of the most conspicuous features of "The Last Tournament." Dagonet's confrontation with Tristram is interrupted as it gets under way and is not continued for some time, and the long flashback describing the tournament of the previous day is broken up by a number of smaller flashbacks. Whenever the scene shifts, the conjunction used for the transition makes the new scene a non sequitur. The second half of the idyll, Tristram's last journey, is for no apparent reason interrupted by Tristram's dream and Arthur's battle, the conjunction for these being thoroughly nonfunctional.\textsuperscript{8} Except for the framework provided by the Tristram-Dagonet contrast, there is no evidence in the poem of any attempt at a compact and coordinated narrative structure; instead the two story lines, the love affair and the decline of the Round Table, crisscross in a way to make for a very disjointed sequence.\textsuperscript{4}

Not unexpectedly, the relationship between these two story lines is very hard to trace: it is not one of main plot illuminated by subplot, nor one of juxtaposed developments glossing each other. Further, the specific degeneration recounted in the one sequence cannot be construed as the cause of the general disintegration which is the subject of the other sequence; and that goes for the converse as well. As for earlier circumstances that may have played an influential role in one or the other sequence, they are not given in "The Last Tournament" nor in the whole Idylls of the King for that matter. Tennyson requires the reader to take it on his word alone that doubts about Arthur's divinity have led to the general moral skepticism in the land and that Lancelot's adultery has induced Tristram's adultery. Since we have, besides this, only the separate occurrences and no causal relations drawn for us, we must either accept Tennyson's understanding of an inescapable and exclusively moral connection between events—a causal system which appears to us somehow arbitrary—or, what is hardly a more satisfactory alternative, take the two story lines as simply concurrent and otherwise unrelated.

Along with these problems of the double plot, there is the overall fragmentation of the narrative, which as it emphasizes the isolation of the separate episodes reinforces the theme of spiritual fragmentation. But, rather than enriching the meaning through paradoxical juxtaposition as the imagist poem does,\textsuperscript{5} the fragments are here merely emphatic and repetitive in effect. There would seem to be no essential poetic reason for Tennyson's chopping up his narrative in this way. As we have seen, the poem gives the reader no ordinary causal clues by which he might infer a chain of events, only the pseudo-causality resulting from the author's persistent moral interpretation.\textsuperscript{8} However, the sequential and temporal disruption, seen here as a technique of obfuscation, does not by itself amount to little more than an impulse, a feeling.\textsuperscript{7}

In the world of "The Last Tournament" man no longer thinks of himself as a being essentially different from the animal. The Red Knight's naturalistic challenge of the hypocrisy of the Round Table is a very modern statement of an age-old human dilemma—morality's unreasonable

\textsuperscript{1} The texts used in this discussion are: the Eversley Edition, the Tinker and Lowry edition and the first edition of Tristram of Lyonesse [London, 1882]. Although Tennyson's work is only one of the idylls that make up the Arthurian cycle, Idylls of the King, it is one of the more independent tales, and thus can be treated separately. The publication dates for the three poems are: "The Last Tournament," 1871, "Tristram and Isolde," 1852 and Tristram of Lyonesse, 1882.

\textsuperscript{2} Although discussion of their sources is irrelevant to my purpose here, there are any number of careful studies on this matter.

\textsuperscript{3} For such non sequitur or nonfunctional conjunctions, see lines 10, 239, 360, 364, 419, etc.

\textsuperscript{4} I am of course not arguing that the poem lacks thematic consistency. But to ignore the facts of form while looking for the "unity" of a poem, as Boyd Litzinger does in his article, seems to me mistaken. See "The Structure of Tennyson's 'The Last Tournament,'" VP, 1 (1963), 53-60.


\textsuperscript{6} The allegorical use of seasonal and animal images is one of Tennyson's chief devices for assuring that his "moral message" gets through. See Litzinger's essay, Jerome Buckley's Tennyson: The Growth of a Poet [Cambridge, 1950], pp. 171-94, and Roy Gridley's "Confusion of the Seasons in Tennyson's 'The Last Tournament,'" VNL, No. 22 (1962), 14-16.

\textsuperscript{7} In connection with the English novel, W. J. Harvey brilliantly discusses the relationship between causality and morality in his The Character and the Novel [London, 1965], to which here and elsewhere I am deeply indebted.
lien on existence. And yet the seriousness of the challenge is minimized by the narrator. Similarly, although Tristram is something of a coward, he is, as the twentieth-century novelist would think of a man like him, a type of moral explorer, an experimentalist in evil and sin. And as such he perceives man’s reality in a way that is still relevant. But instead of using Tristram’s clear understanding of evil toward developing a comprehensive ethical outlook in the poem, the narrator dismisses it: evil, as he sees it, is irrelevant to the consideration of the good, which is his preoccupation. Thus the moral sentiment of the poem, which should be bonded to the perception of the whole of reality, flies high, leaving the poem behind as a self-defeating enterprise. The Red Knight and Tristram prove after all sounder moralists than the poet who created them.

What becomes clear, then, about the famous Tennysonian moralism is that in writing the poet refers simultaneously to two different realities. As he works on the Arthurian material he is more than peripherally aware of that present wasteland in which belief and goodness as he understands them are being steadily eroded. And to the extent that he allegorizes the wasteland world, he tends to connect events in the poem in the moral terms that are applicable to the wasteland reality but not necessarily to the poem’s. The crossover leads him to substitute the world’s moral causation—doubt causes evil—for a morally neutral sequence of events with its implied natural causality. And the more he allows the poem to speak this world’s morality, the more Tristram’s reality is crowded out.

This substituted vision on the part of the poet is not explainable solely in terms of Tennysonian didacticism. For the understanding of evil by the Red Knight and the degenerate Tristram—very much like Guido’s knowledge of darkness in The Ring and the Book and like the evil, too, of many Dickens villains—is only possible in the poem because of the framework of moralism that guarantees rejection of the terrible sight before it shatters the poet’s whole sensibility. To the post-Victorian, for whom the clear perception of reality is an aesthetic as well as ethical responsibility, Tennyson’s hasty closeting of evil in this way may well seem hypocritical. But the Victorian on the contrary sees it as his duty to present reality in terms outside the limits of art, that is, within a moral context. As I have tried to show, the fragmentary form and pseudoplot of “The Last Tournament” are Tennyson’s means of meeting that requirement.

II

Arnold’s “Tristram and Isult” is in some respects more disarrayed than the Tennyson poem. There is no double plot to be concerned about, but the narrative sequence is perhaps even more fragmented than that of “The Last Tournament.” In Parts I and II, the mode shifts frequently from dramatic dialogue to third person narrative to first person reverie. Temporal juxtapositions occur, and at the end of each part there is a coda, a typical Arnoldian device which also operates to break up the story line. One could also say that, given Arnold’s propensity for obscurantism, the noticeably varying degrees of irrelevance and inexplicitness in several passages amount to a conscious technique of sequential disruption. I will be considering first the modal variation of Part I, then the coda to Part II and finally the whole of Part III, which has been the object of critical focus for some time.

The poem opens with a dialogue which is to all appearances purely informational. But almost before we notice the dramatic deficiency of this section there is a shift to a predominantly third person narration, presumably to explain the background and current situation of the tragedy. This time the express informational intent is deceptive, for it does not provide a straightforward story. The poem alternates between the narrator’s commentary, which supposedly gives the background story, and Tristram’s first person reverie, which highlights particular moments in the account. The four first person passages, presented as flashbacks to Tristram’s earlier life, contrast sharply in movement and immediacy with the drab uneventfulness of the narrator’s passages. The striking juxtapositions divert our attention from the fact that there is no explanation as to the how and the why of the love tragedy or the narrator’s attitude toward it.

Arnold’s codas are an even more subtle diversionary tactic. In the coda to Part II, which takes us away from the main line of action, we see a timeless figure in a tapestry looking out at the dead lovers. This is of course the

8. Arnold’s critics—Trilling, Tinker and Lowry, E. D. H. Johnson, W. Stacy Johnson, Culler, and Stange—worry about the unity of this poem in particular, and the Arnoldian codas in general. Some, like E. D. H. Johnson, despair at not being able to find cohesiveness (The Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry [Princeton, 1952], pp. 188-90), while others, like J. L. Kendall, keep trying (“The Unity of Arnold’s Tristram and Isult,” VNL, 1 [1965], 140-45). But to my mind this “unity” is a ghost which we see or not depending on our frame of mind. I find it much more productive to see the sequence of the poem as is and draw implications from that. What comes closest to my approach to this poem is Robert A. Greenberg’s “Matthew Arnold’s Refuge of Art: ‘Tristram and Isult,’” VNL, No. 25 (1964), 1-4.

9. For reasons of limited space, I will have to forgo analysis of the modal variation in Part II which functions to the same effect. The flatness of the lovers’ dialogue, for example, is a deliberate device to stall the climax of the poem that comes in Part III.
reverse of the situation in Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" where the poet-speaker gazes at the timeless figures of art. But in the Arnold scene the contrast between timelessness and time is resolved. There is a peace in it common to both the timeless seer and those tragic lovers who are of time and yet no longer in it. The reader, too, as he is lifted out of the narrative sequence, is brought to this quiet place to stand like the tapestry figure outside time altogether. Here he suspends all judgment in its cool description of the dichotomous possibilities, passion or resignation, neither of which is really satisfying.

Part III devoted to the leftover life of Isis of Brittany does not display the modal variety of the earlier parts, but there is the same narrative disruption: we are told that Isis of Brittany tells her children about Merlin and Vivian, but the reader isn't tuned in to the story until the very end. More important than the broken sequence, though, is the manipulation of degrees of implicitness and explicitness in the narrative. The opening section of Part III, the "green cirque" passage, symbolizes a resigned but serene Isis portrayed in one of Arnold's most striking word-pictures. Then the narrator intrudes to comment on the monotonity and joylessness of Isis's life, which of course corrects the serene impression created by the garden scene. He gets increasingly explicit about the two ways of love and life represented by the two Isis: the "gradual furnace of the world" that sings the "bloom, the youth, the spring," and that "tyrannous single thought," that "fit / Of passion" that "subdues" the soul. The narrator gives ample commentary to the effect that either alternative would be undesirable and ultimately destructive.

I mentioned earlier that the narrator had all along avoided assigning reasons for events, establishing a causal framework or passing moral judgment on behavior. What led up to the adultery? Was it drug-induced, the effect of the potion? Or was it pure sensuality? Why did Tristram marry Isis of Brittany? Was it wrong of him to do so? The absence of such questions, not to say answers, has not so far been obvious owing to the modal variation and the chopped-up effect of the narrative sequence. But at this point, although the narrator is still noncommittal on the causal system, he does disclose an attitude toward the characters. His editorial intrusion into the poem here is so forceful that it seems in retrospect as though the poem's earlier obscurity was only a device for hiding the narrator's opinion. Yet when his judgment is finally delivered, there is an obscurity about it, too: the syntax is confusing, and the references are indefinite. He is apparently indifferent to the adultery even here. There is the tone of personal involvement ("It angers me . . ."), yet he is not involved. There is the seeming urgency of his entry on the scene, yet when he arrives he is not prepared to make up his mind. The commentary addressed to "Dear saints" is neither oracular nor confessional in tone, but a detached discussion of a matter on which in the nature of things there can be no position except "disinterestedness." What he seems to be saying is that he has no opinion on the dilemma of passion and resignation. There is then the posture of timelessness, this same "being-out-of-the-time-stream" which, we recall, was proposed in the coda to Part II. It is of course curious to observe that even in this section where the narrator seems most explicit he is in fact both obscure and ambivalent.

The nursery tale at the end of the poem can be thought of the same way. The story is suggestive of several parallels: the one between Merlin's passion and Tristram's, between Vivian's guile and Isis of Ireland's and between the magic circle imprisoning Merlin and the perfect circle isolating Isis of Brittany. It also suggests a contrast between Vivian's rejection of her lover and Isis of Brittany's acceptance of hers. The coda is there no doubt to gloss on the main story. But exactly what kind of gloss it offers is not clear, nor apparently meant to be. Rather, even more than the other two, this coda employs such a strategy of disjunction and obscurantism as to give the reader no option but to stand aside and look disinterestedly on the circumstances of this insoluble dilemma.

With its medley of narrative modes, its broken sequence and its many thicknesses of obscurity, the poem in these ways expresses Arnold's own dilemma and his poetic means of avoiding it. But it also recommends a program of disinterestedness to the reader. By refusing to side with one Isis over the other, the poem poses the
dilemma without distortion; by not drawing out the causal connections it staves off the too quick judgment of the moral compulsive, and by itself keeping its distance from commitment, it effects in itself a certain mood of calm and serenity. And although the passion-resignation dilemma has not been resolved, we must remember that Arnold’s program is not to “solve the Universe,”13 but to achieve personal health and happiness. His “psychophysiology”14 teaches avoidance of ultimate questions and practice of a serene art. “Tristram and Iseult” successfully neutralizes those disturbing dichotomies of man’s moral and metaphysical reality.

III

Swinburne’s Tristram of Lyonesse is a much more ambitious work than both “The Last Tournament” and “Tristram and Iseult,” since it unfolds the whole legend from beginning to end on a huge scale. Swinburne had seen Arnold’s work as an utter transformation of the medieval romance and Tennyson’s as a debasement of it,15 and he was determined to make his version a faithful rendition. He apparently believed that his poem, no “Mort d’Albert” if he could help it, could amount to a candid, very un-Victorian piece: “By the grace of the Devil,” he said, “I hope to make the copulative passages of the poem more warm and provocative of sinful appetite than anything my chaste Muse has yet attempted.”16 This was fulfilled in a limited sense17 despite the fact that fleshliness is hardly a dominant medieval trait. At the same time, Swinburne’s continual reminders of the lovers’ faithfulness are suspiciously Victorian. Although his boast to Burne Jones that he would “adhere strongly to Fact and Reality”18 remains of necessity (regardless of what he may have meant by “fact” and “reality” in this context) little more than a boast, Tristram of Lyonesse its somewhat closer to its medieval sources than the Tennyson and Arnold poems, if only for its straightforward narrative sequence and richer detail work. All told, there is no doubt that it is a better chronicle of the events.

As for good chronicle, however, it would seem to require, for one thing, a more explicitly interpretative attitude in the causal structure of the narrative. For instance, is it free choice, providence or inscrutable fate that brings the lovers together? And, as to values, is the adulterous love moral, immoral or amoral? Swinburne once referred to this poem as a “moral history,” but it is difficult to discover its implicit value system. Despite a recent attempt at this, Tristram of Lyonesse does not stand examination on ethical ground.19 The “love” to which the poem is dedicated is ultimately incoherent. One learns that a counter-Tennysonian moral view is not for that reason alone interesting or viable. Swinburne’s poem is surprisingly conventional in being suffused with a sweetish moral feeling while at the same time wanting a definable moral view.

Swinburne’s famous “diffuseness” derives, I think, from his impulse to suspend the narrative at many points and simply sing. One cannot read the poetry, only listen to it. The poem’s attraction indeed lies in its separate musical episodes, scenes and even single lines: we will often feel a scene without really knowing what is going on. A certain redundancy of sense as well as of sound is the inevitable result. But interestingly, this dissociation of sound from sense serves to obscure the problem of the nonexistent causal system and related ethical point of view.

IV

Narrative poetry is a typical Victorian genre. The Romantics started the fashion,20 but as the novel enlarged its existence by absorbing poetic techniques, poetry conversely studied the novel, and narrative poetry became a widely practiced form. We remember, for instance, that Browning first tried to give the Roman murder story to his novelist friend and that Arthur Hugh Clough, complaining about Arnold’s poems, remarked how novels lately, unlike poetry, are “devoured.”21 To realize that Victorian narrative poetry is a hybrid is to understand some of the serious difficulties of the form. There is so much it has to do as the novel does—recount the way things happen, establish the narrator’s point of view, reconcile the causal sequence of events with the temporal sequence of narration—while at the same time maintaining the metric pattern and sensory texture of poetry. These are often contradictory demands: verisimilitude tends to reject formalization. The question, why did Victorians so

20. The relationship of Romantic narrative poetry—Scott’s, Byron’s, Southey’s, Keats’s, for instance—to the much more ancient tradition of epic is in itself a subject worthy of book length treatment. Unfortunately, Karl Kroeber’s Romantic Narrative Art (Madison, 1966) hardly touches the question.
love a story? is too complex to be adequately treated here, and yet a few remarks can be made. We have just seen from our look at the three Tristram poems how the form of the narrative poem—indeed the form of the story itself—will allow the poet to present a semblance of interpretation, at the same time that certain techniques of narration and sequential manipulation help him disguise the lack of a clearly established causal system. Acknowledging the public irrelevancy of their lyricism and yet feeling their deficiencies in a full-fledged interpretative literature, the Victorians (Tennyson, Arnold and Swinburne, as well as Browning) found a compromise in narrative poetry.

We observe that in the twentieth century when both poetry and the novel have undergone fundamental changes vis-à-vis reality, narrative poetry is no longer written. *The Waste Land*, *The Bridge*, the *Cantos* and *Patterson* are not narrative poems. But the Victorian poetic vision was different. To modify Geoffrey Hartman’s reference slightly, it needed Athene’s mirror. Instead of confronting directly Medusa’s terrible shape, the Victorians, like Perseus, looked at her in the mirror.\(^{22}\) By their art, a reflection of reality, they would slay a real monster. But did they? Did the Victorian Perseus kill his Medusa, or even tame her? The question will be asked anew from each new historical perspective and will be answered yes or no or maybe depending on the way we see our own Medusas and slay them in our art.

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### Anthony Trollope, or The Man with No Style at All

**Ruth apRoberts**

In the theory of fiction this is a time of revolution: old orthodoxies and not-so-old orthodoxies are being thrown over, and there is much casting about for new criteria. Jamesian formalism has been frontally attacked by more than one operative, while symbolist interpreters are often finding themselves hoist on their own petards. A new kind of talk is heard, with a strange new vocabulary, “characters,” “the sense of life”—“nature,” even—as we search about for ways to support our approval of novels the old criticism could not defend. We have always known they were good, writers such as Tolstoi and Trollope, but it has been hard to say why.

One sector of the revolution concerns *style* in the novel. Philip Rahv, in a general manifesto, has asserted that the old orthodoxy fails because it tests fiction by the criteria of poetry, having deduced a “prosaics” from a poetics.\(^1\) One of the resultant errors, he says, is to consider “style as an essential activity of fiction.” He makes an example of John Crowe Ransom “proving” that Jane Austen is a greater novelist than Tolstoi, on the basis of little snippets from each. One may sympathize with the problem of Ransom and the others: it is desirable to argue from an exhibit, and one cannot quote a whole novel. One can be more precise about sentences than about a panorama of life in three volumes. But Rahv’s objection is valid.

Style must hold a different place in fiction from what it does in poetry. Speed reading is conceivably legitimate, even proper, for *Clarissa Harlowe*, but it is no more proper for *Paradise Lost* than for “The Skylark.” Certainly style cannot be considered so essential to fiction as to poetry.

There is a relevant study in the case of Anthony Trollope, because it already shows, in fact, a reversal of critical opinion that is quite in line with Rahv’s program. The reversal, I think, indicates a trend in the study of Trollope, as well as in the general study of fiction. The main traditional pronunciation has always been that Trollope’s style is plain, dull and flat. Lord David Cecil went so far as to say it is *nothing*. Trollope has *no style*. And of course this is taken to be a lack and a fault. Philip Rahv would invite us to a reconsideration of this judgment. He reminds us that Balzac, Stendhal and Dostoevsky are all indifferent stylists and that evaluation of novels on the basis of style is, then, hardly defensible. Of course, just as some novels have their being in the symbolic mode, so there are also some that live on style. Flaubert is the great exemplar: that he combines the more usual merits of fiction with a prose where every cadence is exquisite and every *mot* is *juste* is his own particular marvel. In English, Meredith is a case in point. His novels

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were much admired for their "poetic" quality for a long time. I think now more readers are put off by this quality than attracted. However lovely the effects at times, very often his matter is obscured by a great weight of figurative speech and overpowered by an excess of manner. It is hard to hear, through all this, the voice of the honest man telling us something. He, in his time, was one of those who accused Trollope of want of style and assumed a poetic value for fiction.

But novelists do not typically use words as poets do. The poem, asserts Rahv, is organized according to the structure of language, while the novel is organized according to the structure of the reality portrayed. This is why, he declares, the novel translates so well. A "jeweled" style is positively a disadvantage to the novelist, for novels "are not composed of words. They are composed of scenes, actions, stuff, and people." The critic's function, then, is most properly to investigate the translatable qualities of fiction.

But for now, what of Trollope's English? The old objections to his nothing style have recently been rejected. Critics have rallied behind Rahv's banner, I think all of them without knowing it. And that they have worked independently in the same direction makes the direction itself the more significant. It is for us to correlate their various studies and see what are the implications, both for the criticism of Trollope and for the general theory of the novel.

The most thoroughgoing of the recent studies is David Aitkin's, "A Kind of Felicity," modestly subtitled "Some Notes about Trollope's Style." Aitkin marshals past commentary, assesses it and makes his own careful analysis. Above all, he urges this point:

It is to the matter of his books—their characters and stories, and their freight of moral implication—that he wants his audience to pay attention, not to the manner. ... He is always a little contemptuous of the self-conscious literary artist, the "man who thinks much of his words as he writes" (Autobiography, 148-149). "Style is to the writer,—not the wares which he has to take to market, but the vehicle in which they may be carried." (Duke's Children, XVI)

Aitkin remarks on the apparently effortless simplicity of the writing, and the informality of the vocabulary and the occasional spells of formal or ponderous words which were partly the humor of the time, partly Trollope's own little game. These spells of "officialese," as Bradford A. Booth has called it, may function, Aitkin suggests, to "alter the light in which we see familiar human problems." The sentences are remarkably simple in structure, and often elegant; and Aitkin reminds us of Trollope's avowed care that he "so train his ear that he shall be able to weigh the rhythm of every word as it falls from his pen" (Autobiography, 197)." No jarring sound, that is, may be allowed to distract from the matter. In wit, in "speed and tautness," he is often like Jane Austen. The tone is intimate, and there is "the flavor of easy talk." His imagery is occasionally brilliant: Aitkin quotes an example from the tersely drawn character of Lord Fawn:

Within the short straight grooves of Lord Fawn's intellect the remembrance of this supposed wrong was always running up and down, renewing its own soreness. (Eustace Diamonds, XVI)

But on the whole, Aitkins insists, imagery is "rather unimportant in the general scheme of his art." Many of his images are repeated so often, and are so commonplace anyway—I would add—that they simply do not function as images; the world is one's oyster, the beautiful woman is the candle that singes the moth's wings, people row in the same boat, and so on. I might further add that this is a way Chaucer also had, in his stories—to draw on the common stock of conventional figures of speech. Such images are hardly what we are used to call poetic, as all they do is maintain an air of comfortable ordinariness between teller and reader. The sum of all these things indicates a style that pointedly refuses to call attention to itself. As Aitkin says, Trollope scorns the novelist "who thinks much of his words as he writes." As though to support Philip Rahv, Trollope himself makes clear that he is speaking of fiction when he says this; he himself insists in the Autobiography that the case of poetry is altogether different.

Geoffrey Tillotson, in a little essay called "Trollope's Style," is not so searching as Aitkin, nor does he intend to be. What is of great interest in the essay is the way in which he addresses himself to the problem. As he sees it, Trollope "stands firmly among the dozen or so giants of English fiction," and yet criticism strangely neglects him. Tillotson feels the time is ripe for analysis of Trollope, and he himself makes an opening into this problem of style. He acclaims Trollope's style for its lack of pretensions, and says, "It reveals its honesty in its preference for monosyllables... It abhors the high-sounding," but does not abhor grace. "Rather it is the style of one who knows how best to sustain grace without its seeming too much a thing of art... It is a style for all purposes, being capable of handling the

2. NCF, XX (1966), 337-53.
trivial and commonplace, and also the noble and splendid — it can indeed also handle the complicated when used by one who, like Trollope, always masters complexity so that it is reduced to its elements [my italics]."

Can it be we have been so interested in poetic style that we have been unable to appreciate a great achievement in discursive statement, in prose? So often Trollope's rather tongue-in-check comments on his methods have been taken at face value; we have believed his work is like that of the shoemaker he is forever comparing himself to, when all he intends is to deflate the waiting-for-inspiration theory of composition, and to recommend a valiant discipline. Because his prose is easy to read, and because it was produced on time, we think it must have been easy to write. It is so simple and so clear that we incline to slight it. Of course that is just what he aimed at. He masters complexity; he makes us forget the words while we apprehend effortlessly the most tenuous delicacies of nuance in psychology, or social situations of the most extreme complexity. We grasp these and then cheat him of his praise. It is a technique he practiced tirelessly; every day he whittled and sharpened it. One can still see the journeyman in The Warden and Barchester Towers; here are manner and archness and uncertainty, at times. But the later writing hardly ever falters in its efficiency. Trollope himself says, in the terms of the latest technology of his day, "The language used should be as ready and as efficient a conductor of the mind of the writer to the mind of the reader as is the electric spark which passes from one battery to another" (Autobiography, p. 196; my italics). And again, lucid, or the intensive pellucid, is the word he uses most often to describe the best way for the novelist to write. Lucid. Let the medium be as glass, through which everything shows clear. Let the medium be as nothing. Trollope, says Lord David Cecil, has no style.

Tillotson says Trollope's style is like Dr. Johnson's. And he thinks that Dr. Johnson, much as he deprecated novels, would have approved of Trollope's. I think so too. Johnson and Trollope have a similar sense of the decorous; they are both devoted conventional Anglicans, both great moralists; they both combine a grand and wide humor with a sympathetic sense of the tragic in life, and a sense of the doubleness of things. W. P. Ker noted the likeness a long time ago, observing by the way that Johnson's "A man may write at any time if he will set himself doggedly to it," is very close to the message of Trollope's Autobiography, and it is an attitude not only to art but also to life.4 "It's dogged as does it," is the sole theme of comfort to Josiah Crawley in agony in The Last Chronicle. Johnson and Trollope have indeed very much in common, in their grand basic moral attitudes. Not so much in style, I think. A great Lexicographer can never be so unselfconsciously about words as to write as plain as Trollope. Aitken rejects the comparison to Johnson, and he proposes Macaulay instead. And there is some point in this, too, for both Macaulay and Trollope are remarkable for beautiful clarity. Indeed, Trollope credits Macaulay with having simplified English sentence structure "with his multiplicity of divisions" (Autobiography, p. 149). But Macaulay also is really too great a stylist, too polished and carefully cadenced, to be comparable to Trollope. We would do better to listen to Trollope, for he himself tells us where to look; he tells us who his master is.

I hold that gentleman to be the best dressed whose dress no one observes. I am not sure but that the same may be said of an author's written language. Only, where shall we find an example of such perfection? Always easy, always lucid, always correct, we may find them; but who is the writer, easy, lucid and correct, who has not impregnated his writing with something of the personal flavour we call mannerism? To speak of authors well-known to all readers—Does not The Rambler taste of Johnson; The Decline and Fall, of Gibbon; ... The History of England, of Macaulay ...? I have sometimes thought that Swift has been nearest to the mark of any—writing English and not writing Swift.5

That is what Trollope aimed at—the style so lucid that it does not show at all, writing which refuses attention to the words. By reason of this, "the reality portrayed," the stuff of the novel, is so much more insistently itself. Surely Gulliver is remarkably prosaic, bald, clean of rhetoric, and translatable. And surely it is because of this deliberate unremarkableness that Swift can manipulate so well the facets of his reality, and impose his extraordinary vision.

In this passage on Swift Trollope goes on to say, "But I doubt whether an accurate observer would not trace even here the 'mark of the beast.' Thackeray [who is the occasion of these remarks], too, has a strong flavour of Thackeray." It seems for a minute here that style is something like original sin—the mark of the beast, indeed! One longs to tell Philip Rahv about it. We might object to Trollope's comment on the ground that he too has a flavor of himself. But it is rather that we recognize


his voice, by its honest sound. Thackeray actually was often hiding himself in his writing, rather than revealing, and it was this, I suspect, that led to the manneredness.

Besides Tillotson's and Aitkin's, there has been yet another noteworthy approach to Trollope by way of style, by Hugh Sykes Davies. He, like Aitkin, reviews the criticisms of Trollope's style, remarking by the way how Trollope's critics “have been able to define his weaknesses far more clearly than his strengths.” He, too, asserts that the plain style of Trollope is not at all a weakness but a strength; and he makes an interesting attempt to define Trollope's typical cadence in terms of syntax. The sentences are simple, and the characteristic structure depends on a but and “the adversative and.” This structure functions to various ends, Davies says. It works for qualification, or exception to a generality; it lays bare perplexities of motive in conflict, or unconscious motive; it reveals indecision; it contrasts a man’s estimate of himself with our estimate; and, finally, it points the discrepancy between theory and practice. It seems to me that if grammatical analysis can tell all this about Trollope, we could do with more of it. I suspect, however, that Davies' sense of Trollope's art is so acute that he could say these things anyway, and his analysis is only a tentative search for support of views he is convinced of. For all these characteristics that are ostensibly deduced from a study of style are linked, Davies himself says, with “a cast of mind, a quality of moral conception.” Trollope is “a passionate casuist, an observer of the relation between principles and practice,” and he is remarkable for “the constantly veering irony of his outlook.” The grounds for these insights are to be found in Trollope’s content, and in the way he organizes it, his “scenes, action, stuff, and people.” “The constantly veering irony of outlook” is characteristic of his work, certainly; it is what he himself apprehended in his beloved Cicero—whose style is many things and none of them Trollopian. This quality in Cicero Trollope acclaims more than once as the way his mind “turned on the quick pivot on which it was balanced.” ? Both Cicero and Trollope are writers who insist on the many-sidedness of things, and this can be done in either grand baroque eloquence, or bald plain short statements. I should say the very discontinuity of Davies' argument is serviceable. His fine grasp of Trollope's distinguishing qualities does not follow on analysis of style, and therefore it must be the more clear to us that the content, not the style, is the essential.

But these analyses of Trollope's style have, I believe, established its qualities. And I think it very significant that these three critics have concertedly overthrown the old stylistism that Philip Rahv deplores. The plain, dull, flat style, the no-style style, has been declared to be a positive artistic advantage; in refusing to draw attention to itself it can the better display the reality of the content. I think we can now build on this achievement. We can now interest ourselves in what Aitkin calls “the freight of moral implication,” what Tillotson calls the “mastering of complexity,” and what Davies calls “veering irony.” However excellent the style is, it is still only the vehicle; in fiction, the medium is not the message. Let us turn to what Trollope calls “the wares he takes to market,” or what Rahv calls “the structure of the reality portrayed.” Let us try to understand the translatable virtues of this translatable genre.

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Centripetal Vision in Pater's Marius

James A. W. Heffernan

It is tempting to see a good deal of intellectual autobiography in Marius the Epicurean. As A. C. Benson describes him, the young Pater was very much like the young Marius: reticent, reflective, austere, and sensitive. Raised as an Anglican, he became religious in a solemn, ritualistic sense, and his love of ceremony often prompted him to organize “processional pomps” within the family circle. On the other hand, Pater also strove to be universally responsive. Like Goethe, and like Marius himself when he discovers Cyrenaicism, Pater yearned to be “virgin” to all experience—“one to whom every moment of life brought its contribution of experimental, individual knowledge; by whom no touch of the world of form, colour, and passion was disregarded.”


to sensual experience may seem a little incongruous with contemplation, austerity, and religious ceremony. But under the influence of Otto Jahn’s *Life of Winckelmann*, which affected him as Apuleius affects Marius, Pater managed to reconcile these inclinations by developing a highly refined and moral aestheticism. He became a student of beauty rather than a hedonist. His rooms at Brasenose College, Oxford, revealed the deep-seated asceticism of a man whose habits were regular, whose instincts were refined, and who, like Marius, gave his mornings to creation and his afternoons to correction.

Though correspondences such as these will not permit us to identify Pater with Marius, they do suggest a certain kinship in temperament and intellectual aims. The kinship becomes clearer when we realize that in his own life, Pater tried to achieve a kind of aesthetic equipoise. In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant defines the aesthetic experience as a thing midway between cognition and pleasure, and it was precisely this midpoint that Pater strove to reach: the golden mean, the aesthetic center, the point at which every experience, refined of its grosser qualities, yields a beauty both sensuous and intellectual. *Marius the Epicurean* seems to embody this dedication to the aesthetic ideal. In fact, the intense seriousness with which Pater regarded the book prompts us to read it almost as an *apologia*—a fictionalized defense of Pater’s own centripetal vision. But Marius in fact is something else. Whether Pater realized it or not—and I for one simply do not know—his book ironically reveals the crucial weaknesses of the centripetal approach to all experience. We can see these weaknesses when we consider Pater’s treatment of two things: first, the problem of evil, and second, ethical economy, which determines what is lost and what is gained by the taking of a moral position.

The opening chapter of *Marius* introduces several of Pater’s most important themes. The immediate occasion is the Roman ceremony of the Ambarvalia, the blessing of the fields; and within this setting, sacred, solemn, steeped in a long tradition of pagan reverence, the character of Marius is first presented. The young boy has piety, austerity, and solemn religious fervor, qualities which distinguish and even isolate him from the others, who see in religious usages no intrinsic value. But what is especially significant is Marius’ desire to distill from the ritual “a devout, regretful after-taste of what had been really beautiful” in it. For not all of the ceremony is equally beautiful; the aesthetic elegance of Marius’ experience is marred by a certain part of the program:

One thing only distracted him—a certain pity at the bottom of his heart, and almost on his lips, for the sacrificial victims and their looks of terror, rising almost to disgust at the central act of the sacrifice itself, a piece of every day butcher’s work, such as we decorously hide out of sight; though some then present certainly displayed a frank curiosity in the spectacle thus permitted them on a religious pretext. The old sculptors of the great procession on the frieze of the Parthenon at Athens, have delineated the placid heads of the victims led in it to sacrifice, with a perfect feeling for animals in forcible contrast with any indifference as to their sufferings. (I, 9)

The sacrifice of the animals is the central action in this solemn and “beautiful” ceremony, but in Marius it provokes feelings not only of pity, but also of disgust. The graciousness of the proceedings degenerates into a naked spectacle of bloody butchery, and he is repelled by it. But what is important to notice is the reason for Marius’ feelings of revulsion. Primarily, he is reacting not to the moral cruelty of killing, but rather to the visual ugliness of what he is forced to see: a spectacle that grievously afflicts the eye and should be decorously concealed from view. Unfortunately, because he moves in a world where butchered animals are often exposed to view by insensitive people, Marius is frequently subjected to ugly sights, sights acutely painful to one who reveres beauty above all else. And the feelings of revulsion with which he beholds such sights play a crucial part in his conception of evil.

In the second chapter, we learn that Marius has “a certain vague fear of evil” (I, 22), and the fear becomes more specific later, when a heavy mass of stone falls just behind him as he makes his way to Rome. But it is in his response to snakes that Marius first reveals his conception of evil. He sees them near his home, on a street corner in Pisa, and again in Rome; and each time they cause him pain and repugnance. For Marius, the serpent is evil simply because it is ugly: not ugly because it is evil, as Duessa proves to be in *The Faerie Queene*, but evil because it is ugly, because it afflicts his eyes. Thus, where Spenser makes an aesthetic inference from a moral fact, Marius makes a moral inference from an aesthetic fact. At one end of his spectrum of values, the Apuleian Cupid and Psyche are ideally beautiful, and therefore they achieve a “perfect imaginative love” which is far above the sordidness of man’s actual loves (I, 92–93). But the serpent, even when taken as a type for the health-giving Aesculapius, embodies all that is hideous, all that hinders Marius’ pursuit of the beautiful, all, in short, that is evil.

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3. *Marius the Epicurean: His Sensations and Ideas*, 2 vols. (Lon-
For evil, in the Epicurean perspective, is that which offends the aesthetic sense.

Marius is capable of more than revulsion in the face of ugliness. He can feel pity, as he does for the sacrificial beasts above, because to him all ugliness, whether of snakes, cattle or men, exemplifies the inescapable suffering of the human condition. The nakedness of the snake that Marius sees in Pisa has a "humanity" to its aspect, evoking compassion for its plight (I, 23-24), and his sympathies also rise for the suffering of animals in the amphitheatre at Rome, when he attends a "manly amusement" there with Cornelius. Marius in fact is proud of his capacity for compassion, and because of it he thinks himself morally superior to the emperor Aurelius, who sits through the bloody slaughter with Stoic impassiveness. Aurelius, Marius observes, averted his eyes from the ugly spectacle and seemed indifferent to it. But he himself, "the humble follower of the bodily eye, was aware of a crisis in life, in this brief, obscure existence, a fierce opposition of real good and real evil around him, the issues of which he must by no means compromise or confuse..." (I, 241-42).

The statement is admirably high-minded. But it contains, I think, the essence of the book's irony, because "real good and real evil" are precisely the issues which Marius consistently compromises and confuses. Throughout the book it is the animals—snakes, lions in the amphitheatre, a racehorse on its way to be slaughtered ("the very symbol of our poor humanity"—II, 174-75)—who win the lion's share of Marius' sympathy. Human beings are not always so fortunate. Sometimes, in fact, their suffering and their ugliness can be aesthetically pleasing. On his way to the banquet given at Tusculum in honor of Apuleius, Marius notices that a crowd of laborers had gathered in the marketplace of the town; oddly enough, the man who commiserates with snakes and horses finds in his heart no pity for these working people who have borne the heat of a long day, and whose wretched clothing reveals the perpetual poverty they suffer: "Those wild country figures, clad in every kind of fantastic patchwork, stained by wind and weather fortunately enough for the eye, under that significant light inclined him to poetry" (II, 77). Human suffering here is somehow dissipated by aesthetic charm, for rags and poverty can be poetic, just as the opulent clothing of the guests at the banquet, described with such reverent sensitivity in the very next paragraph, has a grace and elegance which delight the eye. But Marius' sensitivity to the picturesque values of the peasants' clothing betrays in him a profound insensitivity to the very evils he professes to recognize.

Marius is sensitive to evil—but only in a peculiarly detached way, which makes doubly ironic his condemnation of the emperor's detachment above. Marius' response to evil is rigorously aesthetic. In the chapter, "Sunt Lacrimae Rerum," he reasons that since evil and suffering are inevitable, man must counter these forces by his capacity for sorrow, and men should be evaluated according to their powers of sympathy. Sympathy can absorb pain. Indeed, the consoling sweetness of sympathy "can actually [justify] to us, the fact of our pain" (II, 183). Consequently, the spectacle of pain becomes an opportunity for aesthetic pleasure.

This formula is very similar to the one that David Hume borrowed from L'Abbé Dubos to explain in part how tragedy, which contains evil and suffering, could nevertheless be pleasurable; and shortly after the appearance of Marius, Santayana said much the same in The Sense of Beauty. But it is a measure of Pater's aestheticism that a formula previously applied only to art is now extended to the entire human condition. For here, in the organ recital to the tender significance of the Virgilian "lacrimae rerum," we find the centripetal vision at its most intense, struggling to experience beauty even in the face of evil. Ever "on the alert" for opportunities to feel sympathy, for an injured boy, a senile woman, or a frail young child condemned to a life of drudgery (II, 175-76), Marius is anxious to milk all human suffering of its emotional pleasures. But the "sympathy" so carefully cultivated never expresses itself in a charitable act. If it did, it would break the aesthetic distance and the delicate equipoise so essential to the centripetal vision.

Certain kinds of ugliness, however, can offer Marius neither picturesque beauty nor emotional release. Such spectacles as the butchering of animals in the name of Diana must be avoided, for they violate the purity of the centripetal vision, and not even sympathy is strong enough to make them aesthetically pleasing:

Those cruel amusements were, certainly, the sin of blindness, of deafness and stupidity, in the age of Marius; and his light had not failed him regarding it. Yes! what was needed was the heart that would make it impossible to witness all this; and the future would be with the forces that could beget a heart like that. His chosen philosophy had said,—Trust the eye: Strive to be right always in regard to the concrete experience: Beware of falsifying your impressions. And its sanction had at least


been effective here, in protesting—"This, and this, is what you may not look upon!"—Surely evil was a real thing, and the wise man wanting in the sense of it, where, not to have been, by instinctive election, on the right side, was to have failed in life. (I, 242-43)

Earlier Marius objected because Aurelius averted his eyes from the bloody slaughter at the Roman amphitheatre. Now, even as he repeats his favorite proverb, "Trust the eye," and assures himself that his own light has found out "the sin of blindness," Marius wishes to blind himself to the ugly spectacle before him. What is needed, he says, is not a heart that will put an end to further slaughter, but a "heart that would make it impossible to witness all this," a philosophy that would declare, "This, and this, is what you may not look upon!" What we see in Marius, then, is the cruelly self-deceptive identification of aesthetic value with ethical value: anything pleasant to look upon is intrinsically good, while anything unpleasant to look upon is intrinsically bad, and must be avoided rather than opposed. Indeed, what the centripetal vision excludes from its perspective, what, in other words, is too ugly to look upon and therefore evil, is at least as significant as what it includes. From this point of view, Pater's description of Christianity under the Antonines is one of the most revealing parts of his book. Christianity is presented here as a religion of "debbonair grace" (II, 111), whose precepts are set forth by the "dainty conscience" (II, 113) of a Christian apologist, whose growth was "guided by a wonderful tact of selection, exclusion, juxtaposition" (II, 116), and whose members during this charmed period happily avoided "tasteless controversy" (II, 118). It is difficult to associate "tact" with the person who threatened to vomit lukewarm followers out of his mouth (Rev. 3:16), and difficult to see "divine urbanity and moderation" (II, 121) in one who came to set sons and daughters against their fathers and mothers (Matt. 10:35). But these aspects of the personality of Christ are, after all, somewhat unpleasant, and, like the butchery of sacrificial victims at the Ambarvalia, must be decorously hidden out of sight. Pater's deftness in concealing the flesh and blood of that sacrifice which is central to Christianity is indeed a tribute to his tact, for the crucifixion is simply described as "a certain historic fact" which manifested "some immeasurable divine condescension" (II, 110-11). If man is going to be saved, the important thing is that he be saved politely.

The "martyrdom" of Marius, in which the centripetal vision rises to a kind of epiphany, is the supreme irony in the book, linking as it does the equivocal position on evil with Marius' whole attitude toward the economy of ethical belief, the "loss and gain" of his approach to life. Early in the book, Marius' researches into the doctrine of Heraclitus, who denied the validity of any principle based upon the presumed constancy of sense impressions, bred in him a distrust of all abstract theories, a determination to rely exclusively upon the validity of his personal and present impressions, a solipsistic conviction that "we are never to get beyond the walls of this closely shut cell of one's own personality" (I, 146). And so, filled with the desire to be "absolutely virgin towards . . . experience" (I, 141), and to make "actual moments as they passed . . . yield their utmost" (I, 146) in aesthetic pleasure, Marius proposes his own ethical economy—the striking converse of Pascal's famous "bet":

One's human nature, indeed, would fain reckon on an assured and endless future, pleasing itself with the dream of a final home, to be attained at some still more remote date. . . . On the other hand, the world of perfected sensation, intelligence, emotion, is so close to us, and so attractive, that the most visionary of spirits must represent the world unseen in colours, and under a form really borrowed from it. Let me be sure then—might he not plausibly say?—that I miss no detail of this life of realized consciousness in the present! Here at least is a vision, a theory, θεόπως, which reposes on no basis of unverified hypothesis, which makes no call upon a future after all somewhat problematic. (I, 148-49)

In other words, Marius bets on an actual finitude rather than a possible eternity, upon the present moment rather than future or past, upon life as an end rather than a means. Throughout his life he is true to that economy, never permitting his obsession with the value of the moment to be distracted by anything—or anyone. At his mother's death, the most important fact for Marius is not the loss of her but the violation of the moment, the depriving of aesthetic propriety by a "slighting word," the cruel offense against his affections (I, 41-42). But Marius is skillful in eradicating this incident from his memory, just as he erases the memory of the dying Flavian, a sight which he vows to remember (I, 119) and yet never mentions again; for like the aesthetic man in Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Marius is a specialist in the art of forgetting and remembering, of sifting the beautiful from the gross in his detached reminiscence. To the very end, Marius clings to the aesthetic preciousness of the moment, "with a jealous estimate of gain and loss" (II, 219). And this is precisely why his "martyrdom" is a hoax.

It will be remembered that when he and Cornelius are arrested with certain other Christians, they begin a journey to Rome under military guard. In Sydney Carton fashion, Marius pretends to be a Christian so that Cornelius may be released. The description of his decision—a "risk," a jump from "so terrible a leaping-place in the dark" (II, 213)—uses the same vocabulary that Kierkegaard uses in discussing ethical commitment and ultimate choice. But in this context, the words are emasculated of their power and significance. Marius has no intention of risking anything, of sacrificing one moment of aesthetic satisfaction for the sake of a possible eternity. Some people, like the Christian martyrs Vettius Epagathus, Pothenus, Blandina, and Ponticus, who were viciously treated, might be willing to surrender everything for the sake of a perilous hypothesis. But somewhere, between a selfish, atheistic materialism on the one hand, and an utterly selfless submission to a tasteless slaughter on the other, Marius must find a delicate compromise. At all costs, he must fastidiously eschew vulgarity and ugliness, the great evils. He must rigorously pursue the beautiful and the elegant—unmistakable hallmarks of the good:

To him, in truth, a death such as the recent death of those saintly brothers, seemed no glorious end. In his case, at least, the Martyrdom, as it was called—the overpowering act of testimony that heaven had come down among men—would be but a common execution: from the drops of his blood there would spring no miraculous, poetic flowers; no eternal aroma would indicate the place of his burial; no plenary grace, overflowing for ever upon those who might stand around it. Had there been one to listen just then, there would have come, from the very depth of his desolation, an eloquent utterance at last, on the irony of men's fates, on the singular accidents of life and death. (V, 214-215)

We are confronted here with the spectacle—at once comic and pathetic—of a man obsessed with centripetal vision, a man who will not choose between heaven and earth, but must have both. In sedulously avoiding the false evil of an ugly execution, he unwittingly embraces the real evil of presumption, the profoundly selfish conviction that God's kingdom is of this world. Marius is called an "anima naturaliter christiana," but he clearly fails to realize that the founder of the faith which he "naturally" professed was executed as a common criminal.

Fortunately for his delicate sensibilities, Marius is spared the cruel fate of an ugly martyrdom. Because of his deteriorating health on the journey to Rome, he is committed to the care of some Christians living in the country, and in their cottage his life can end gracefully. But he dies with the reluctance that we would expect of him, feeling at the bottom of his mind "a genuine clinging to life" (II, 216), hopeful that his body will always be cared for. His last recorded thought is one of relief that the day of his death is not dark or rainy, that the sunlight is streaming through the doorway. Happily, Pater was above the temptation to send him on his way with organ music and a village choir; it is throughout a tastefully executed demise.

But of loss and gain, the reader wonders. If it is true that the Christian must lose his life in order to save it, the fate of the man who refuses to lose his life, to break his attachment to aesthetic propriety, is at best in doubt. The one fact which Marius has resolutely refused to face in his ethical economy is that one must choose to bet either on life or on eternity; one cannot bet on both, any more than one can truly combine the Stoic and Epicurean positions as Pater himself suggests, without doing violence to both of them.

Ultimately the centripetal vision, jealously guarding its freedom from the tyranny of all abstract theories, becomes a slave to its own aesthetic detachment, a prisoner of its obsession with the beautiful. The obsession of Marius, therefore, is just as vulnerable to the attack of a skeptical Lucian as was that of the young Stoic Hermotimus. This, in fact, is the central irony of their "Conversation Not Imaginary," and it is an irony which lies at the heart of Marius the Epicurean.
The concept of sainthood in *Middlemarch*, though of obvious importance, is more often discussed indirectly than directly. For example, when Joan Bennett suggests that the marriage of Dorothea Casaubon and Will Ladislaw is a necessary compromise, although the best possible under existing conditions, of Dorothea's ideals, she implies that both Dorothea and Will have been measured by a standard of goodness, and that Will has been found so markedly inferior to her as to be incongruous as a companion.¹ When Professor Haight speaks of readers who feel that Dorothea should want someone else,² he is touching upon essentially the same problem. The element of goodness in Dorothea's character, her aspiration for sainthood, seems to make it difficult to accept her second marriage as a credible choice. There is an important question that we should ask at this point: against whose conception of sainthood are the two characters being measured? In all likelihood, we would be forced to admit that the conception is our own, not that in the novel, and certainly not that of Dorothea. We tend to retain Dorothea's original conception of sainthood, the one which led her to marry Mr. Casaubon, because it carries all of the nonworldly, ascetic connotations which tradition has attached to the word. We fail to recognize that Dorothea herself transcends this narrow view by recognizing that she, unlike St. Teresa, will not find “her epos in the reform of a religious order” or in the vaguely abstract ideals which led her to marry Mr. Casaubon. The purpose of this paper, then, will be to show that Dorothea’s conception of sainthood changes in the course of the novel from *attainment* of abstract ideals to *pursuit* of ideals which are defined in terms of human values in a physical world.

Sainthood as Dorothea understands it and seeks it at the outset of the novel requires total abstraction from the physical world. She can see nothing for itself; everything is part of some abstract principle or conception. “She could not reconcile the anxieties of a spiritual life involving eternal consequences, with a keen interest in guimp and artificial protrusions of drapery. Her mind was theoretic, and yearned by its nature after some lofty conception of the world which might frankly include the parish of Tipton and her own rule of conduct there…” (p. 6). This tendency is shown in even the commonest of incidents such as Sir James’s offer of a small Maltese puppy. She refuses it not because of a dislike for gifts, and not because of her momentary anger at the giver, but because of an abstract principle which “was forming itself at that moment.” Because pets in general are helpless and parasitic, “The objectionable puppy, whose nose and eyes were equally black and expressive, was thus got rid of, since Miss Brooke decided that it had better not have been born” (p. 22). She is incapable of seeing the puppy as anything other than an abstract “pet,” and she is incapable of basing her refusal on the momentary irritation from which it arose; in both cases, she must appeal to an abstraction. As the author points out, Dorothea is not the only one who is guilty of this; at times we all do the same. In her case, however, the necessity “for regulating life according to notions” is exceptionally strong. As Jerome Thale points out, she never does manage to see Mr. Casaubon as a human husband.³ To her he is a manifestation of her own conception of goodness and greatness simply because he has little concern for the world about him. Studies and great work, she points out in reference to him, necessitate and justify a renunciation of the world because of their extraordinary demands and their greater importance (p. 28). Her own life, where she strives to eliminate all sensuous experience, is little more than this idea in operation.

To Dorothea her own motives are unimpeachable, but to the reader they often are not. Eliot’s reference to the “theoretic mind,” for example, was not intended as a straightforward compliment, even though Dorothea herself would have accepted it as such, because to her that was an ideal. The plans for the cottages also reveal the author’s ambivalent attitude toward her character. We constantly hear of the plans being drawn up and we repeatedly hear of the time Dorothea devotes to them, but the author is very careful not to make reference to any cottagers in connection with them. We never see Dorothea considering her project in terms of individual human values, but always in the abstract. The time she devotes to this she gives up willingly, not grudgingly, for as Celia says, “She likes giving up” (p. 73).

Dorothea quickly denies this, because if it were true her renunciations would become self-indulgence, and her mo-

tives would be selfish rather than altruistic. Her denial shows a lack of self-knowledge, not dishonesty, for she really does feel that she acts from selfless motives. The author, however, goes on directly to support the suggestion that her motives might be more complex than she is aware of. Upon Dorothea’s request, Mr. Casaubon, himself less ambivalent on the question of selfish action, grants her permission to learn a classical language so that she might assist him. “Dorothea seized this as a precious permission. She would not have asked Mr. Casaubon at once to teach her the languages, dreading of all things to be tiresome instead of helpful; but it was not entirely out of devotion to her future husband that she wished to know Latin and Greek. Those provinces of masculine knowledge seemed to her a standing-ground from which all truth could be seen more truly” (p. 47). This makes it abundantly clear that Dorothea does have personal motives for wanting to help her husband, and they are not wholly noble. But of perhaps greater importance is the fact that it is in antiquity—the study of Latin and Greek—that she hopes to find truth, an essential element of sainthood.

In this instance, as in the previous ones, Dorothea believes that she is following her conception of sainthood. Ironically enough, she is, but it does not achieve the ends which she hopes it will. By working with Mr. Casaubon she thinks that she is devoting herself to an abstract cause for the good of mankind. She fails to recognize, however, that devotion to the abstract, such as Mr. Casaubon’s devotion to his manuscript, neglects man entirely. Each of her actions involving the puppy, the cottages, and Mr. Casaubon considers not the feelings of anyone else, but only her own insatiable desire for sainthood, a desire which Walter Allen so appropriately terms “a lust after goodness.”

Dorothea is aware of her propensity toward asceticism, and the reader quickly recognizes that it is the most obvious facet of her character, but combined with it is a latent sensuous impulse of which she is unaware. This impulse is greatly overshadowed by her ascetic tendency early in the novel, but it is actually present throughout. In it we can see the first link in the chain of causes which eventually lead Dorothea to accept the worldly Will Ladislaw.

Most men thought her bewitching when she was on horseback. She loved the fresh air and the various aspects of the country, and when her eyes and cheeks glowed with mingled pleasure she looked very little like a devotee. Riding was an indulgence which she allowed herself in spite of conscientious qualms; she felt that she enjoyed it in a pagan sensuous way, and always looked forward to renouncing it. (p. 7)

This bothers her more and more, until, prompted by Sir James’s offer of a horse, she finally announces her intention to give up riding altogether. Significantly, it is the ascetic Mr. Casaubon who defends her intention here against Sir James’s urging (p. 16). This sensuous undercurrent appears also in the scene in which Celia prevails upon her to divide between them their late mother’s jewels. Dorothea willingly gives them all up to Celia because she knows that she cannot wear them herself. Then, to the amazement of her sister, she expresses such a fascination for emeralds that she not only consents to keep a bracelet and ring, but even fails to remove them before going back to work on her cottage drawings (p. 10). Later, the author again brings the sensuous impulse to our attention by giving us a profile of Dorothea alone: “But there was nothing of an ascetic’s expression in her bright full eyes, as she looked before her, not consciously seeing, but absorbing into the intensity of her mood, the solemn glory of the afternoon with its long swathes of light between the far-off rows of limes, whose shadows touched each other” (p. 20).

Because her ascetic tendency dominates this sensuous impulse early in the novel, it may well be a partial cause for Dorothea’s inability to see the world in anything other than abstractions. While sensuousness leads toward the concrete physical world, asceticism leads away from it and toward abstractions. But as the novel develops, these two forces gradually come into greater balance, until Dorothea finally rends the veil of abstractions and begins to see the world in concrete terms. This gradual development can be seen in the series of three suitors that she faces, each of whom represents a particular stage of development and at the same time assists her in moving beyond it.

Sir James Chettam, whom Dorothea rejects outright, is the least logical choice. Dorothea sees her ideal as the vague abstraction which we have referred to as her early conception of sainthood, while Chettam, whose only answer to her every utterance was, “exactly,” has no conception of what the term ideal can mean. Because he considers Dorothea to be “more clever and sensible” than Celia, he offers to indulge her idealism by implementing her plan for tenants’ cottages on his own estate. But he does so for one reason only: it will further his suit with her. Consideration for the welfare of his tenants hardly enters his mind. His inability to distinguish between ideals and egoistic goals remains relatively unchanged.

He fights Mr. Brooke’s decision to stand for parliament, not because of any real interest in the reform issue, but because he does not want his relation to make a fool of himself. His opposition later to the relationship of Dorothea and Will, also, is not on the basis of principle so much as on the basis of traditional aristocratic habits. With his youth and health Chettam might have appealed to the latent sensuousness of Dorothea; instead, he overlooks his strength and tries to promote his suit upon ground which he himself does not understand, ground upon which his rival, Mr. Casaubon, is strongest—abstract ideals.

And Mr. Casaubon is indeed strong there. His entire life has been devoted to compilation of an endless series of notes which are to appear eventually as the Key to All Mythologies. In this way he provides a parallel for Dorothea’s uncle, Mr. Brooke, who has a library full of miscellaneous documents that are in need of cataloging. The parallel extends farther. Neither Mr. Casaubon nor Mr. Brooke ever manages to synthesize his acquisitions into a form which would benefit man. Thus the Key to All Mythologies remains unpublished and the library at Tippton remains an orderless assortment of curiosities. Further, the efforts of both men seem to have been misdirected: while Mr. Brooke “roars himself red at rotten boroughs, and does not mind if every field on his farms has a rotten gate,” Mr. Casaubon works diligently at a book which even the archdeacon would not read. The real distinction between the two is in awareness. Mr. Brooke moves irregularly from project to project, completely unaware that he is accomplishing nothing; Mr. Casaubon, on the other hand, is painfully aware that he is falling short of what is expected of him, and he is afraid to let anyone else “know how backward he was in organizing the matter for his Key to All Mythologies.”

Dorothea can recognize the ineffectiveness of her uncle’s idealism by simply observing the disparity between what he advocates on a large scale and what he actually practices on his own estate. It is probably this which leads to her original plans for tenants’ cottages. She can not, however, see the ineffectiveness of Casaubon. She meets him when she is a nineteen-year-old girl seeking a cause to which she can devote her energies and feel that they are being spent in the quest for sainthood. He is a clergyman with a reputation for knowledge; he is engaged in work which no one else really understands, and he takes the attitude of condescension toward others that she also feels it necessary to take from time to time. In these ways he seems to fit her conception of sainthood quite well. She can see that in marrying him she is moving away from ineffectiveness, but she can not see that she is moving toward total abstraction from any concern for humanity. While working with Sir James on the cottages, though she seldom, if ever, thinks of the cottagers, she is at least accomplishing some good; and even Mr. Brooke who can never fix himself on a worthwhile cause long enough to carry it through does have some slight influence upon his neighbors through issues such as capital punishment; but Casaubon’s energies are directed toward a more abstract and more selfish end. At this point, then, it would seem that Dorothea is headed directly for her abstract, ascetic and selfish conception of sainthood.

Paradoxically, however, Mr. Casaubon is the ideal husband for Dorothea at this time, because he affords her two opportunities which she has not previously had. By marriage, first of all, he puts her in a position to observe the futility of his abstuse studies as well as his own lack of human warmth. Secondly, and more important, he introduces her to the person who is capable of pointing out those flaws—his relative, Will Ladislaw. They are opposites in character, Mr. Casaubon an inhuman example of ascetic, abstract ideals, Will Ladislaw a very human commentator upon those ideals; but they have the same function in the novel. In his own way, each strengthens the sensuous and human element of Dorothea’s character.

Will Ladislaw may be a character failure, as a number of critics have pointed out, but in the structure of the novel he fills his role perfectly. When Dorothea is in that period of abstract idealism during which she marries Casaubon, she is quite unaware of her own latent capacity for sensuous passion. Will, however, does notice—and he is the only person who does—that the ascetic-saint role she is playing is not in consonance with her nature.

There was too much cleverness in her apology; she was laughing both at her uncle and himself. But what a voice! It was like the voice of a soul that had once lived in an Aeolian harp. This must be one of Nature’s inconsistencies. There could be no sort of passion in a girl who would marry Casaubon. (p. 59)

The image of the Aeolian or wind harp is not accidental on the part of George Eliot, for when Ladislaw next sees Dorothea it is used again.

She was not coldly clever and indirectly satirical, but adorably simple and full of feeling. She was an angel march,” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, VIII (1953), 165, among others.

5. See Allen, p. 159, and Henry James, “George Eliot’s Middle-
beguiled. It would be a unique delight to wait and watch for the melodious fragments in which her heart and soul came forth so directly and ingenuously. The Aeolian harp again came into his mind. (p. 155)

These observations by Ladislaw look backward to the earlier references to Dorothea's unrecognized sensuousness as well as forward to her marriage with him, but their most significant aspect is within the nature of the image itself. On one level, it emphasizes that sensuousness is intrinsic to Dorothea's nature just as the capacity for melody is latent in the harp; on another level, it asserts that the sensuous capacity requires an outside force to call it forth just as the wind is necessary to the harp. Neither of these suggestions negates the other: the harp can sustain a note for some time after the wind has passed but it cannot call the note up by itself. Will Ladislaw's function in the novel is to be that outside force, and it is through him that Dorothea's major reassessment of values begins.

One facet of this reassessment is the gradual but steady crumbling of Dorothea's willingness to accept Mr. Casaubon's sterile researches as her purpose in life. When Will suggests, while in Rome, that those researches are worthless in terms of lasting quality, he evokes only "a look between sorrow and anger" from Dorothea. He is too understanding and too cautious to force the issue to a crisis immediately, but there is no real necessity to do so. Once the suggestion has been made, it is already being examined in Dorothea's own mind as a doubt. Dorothea, however, is far too dedicated to give up her husband's occupation after a mere suggestion. Not even a lack of love can bring her to speak disrespectfully of him, for as Ladislaw observes: "She has obstinacy and pride enough to serve instead of love, now she has married him..." (p. 165). The process, however, is inevitable, and by the time the Casaubons have returned to Lowick "The very furniture in the room seemed to have shrunken..." and the "polite literature in the bookcase looked more like immovable imitations of books" (p. 201). "All existence seemed to beat with a lower pulse than her own..." (p. 202). The life which she had sought so avidly before, she now begins to recognize in all of its sterility and desiccation. She shows her disenchanted by hesitating to promise obedience to Mr. Casaubon's request when he will not specify what the request is to be. Even though she does decide later to make the blind promise but is prevented from doing so by his death, the significance of her action remains: blind obedience would have been easy at the time of their marriage, but she finds it extremely difficult now. She reacts even more strongly to his final attempt to solicit her obedience through a codicil on his will. After learning of it, she puts aside his notebook with the epitaph: "I could not use it. Do you not see now that I could not submit my soul to yours, by working hopelessly at what I have no belief in,—Dorothea" (p. 393). She has recognized that what she had thought were ideals are merely vague and useless abstractions.

As Dorothea loses her enchantment with abstractions, she begins to recognize to a greater extent the sensuous possibilities of life. When she first learns of the codicil, she undergoes "a metamorphosis in which memory would not adjust itself to the stirring of new organs" (p. 359). "One change terrified her as if it had been a sin; it was a violent shock of repulsion from her departed husband, who had had hidden thoughts, perhaps perverting everything she said and did. Then again she was conscious of another change which also made her tremulous; it was a sudden strange yearning of heart towards Will Ladislaw" (p. 360). The thought of Will as her lover had never occurred to her; but now that she is conscious of the possibility and capable of emotional response the recognition continues to develop:

The longing was to see Will Ladislaw. She did not know any good that could come of their meeting; she was helpless; her hands had been tied from making up to him for any unfairness in his lot. But her soul thirsted to see him. How could it be otherwise? If a princess in the days of enchantment had seen a four-footed creature from among those which live in herds come to her once and again with a human gaze which rested upon her with choice and beseeching, what would she think of in her journeying... (p. 393)

The imagery of this passage is especially significant. It is perhaps the first time in the novel that animal images have been used in connection with Dorothea; and coming as it does after Dorothea's ascetic propensity has been well established, it clearly suggests the change which is taking place in her character.

But we should be careful not to interpret this change in Dorothea as a movement from a cold, abstract ideal of sainthood to warm, physical reality. She had encountered her problem not because she sought sainthood, but because her ideal of sainthood was an abstraction that tried to consider life aside from people and personalities. Finally, through experience she begins to balance the ascetic or abstract ideal and the sensuous impulse which she feels, and through this balance she comes to recognize her ideals as they appear in the world about her. For example, she spends a bad night after finding Rosamund and Will together at Lydgate's, but she awakens feeling "as if her soul had been liberated from its terrible conflict; she was no longer wrestling with her grief, but could sit down with it as a lasting companion and make
it a sharer in her thoughts’’ (p. 577). At last she is capable of acknowledging a personal emotional grief, something she could not have done earlier. Her resolution this time comes not from abstract generalization, but through the recognition that humanity is something greater than she, and that it is there that her efforts should be directed.

Upon looking out the window, she realizes that “She was a part of that involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining” (p. 578). As Professor Daiches points out, it is significant that she looks out of a window, not into a mirror.

Thus, in her movement from abstract ideals, which she felt had to be attained, toward sensuous reality, which she felt as an impulse, Dorothea arrives at a humanistic middle ground. In terms of her character this can be seen in the balancing of ascetic and sensuous tendencies, and in terms of her experience it is represented by her movement from Casaubon to Ladislaw. The fruitless marriage with Casaubon gives way to a fruitful one with Ladislaw, and while she dedicates her efforts to her husband’s occupation in both cases, only in the second are those efforts meaningful in human terms. There she is working for social reform, not a pedantic compilation of antiquated facts.

It should also be pointed out that Dorothea’s changing conception of sainthood does not violate the structure of the novel as a whole. Mr. Lyons has noted that each of the major characters, to some extent, gradually comes to accept a religion of work modeled on that of Caleb Garth. Dorothea has always had a religion of work, but only after the death of Casaubon does her work become beneficial to mankind. Other interesting parallels open up. Both Dorothea and Fred Vincy lose a fortune and lower their social position in order to achieve a purpose in life. Dorothea, however, does so consciously while Fred does not. But even more important, the two approach from opposite directions: Dorothea is originally too far from sensuous reality while Fred is too much in it. But perhaps the strongest support for this changing conception of sainthood comes from George Eliot herself.

Still, she never repented that she had given up position and fortune to marry Will Ladislaw, and he would have held it the greatest shame as well as sorrow to him if she had repented. They were bound to each other by a love stronger than any impulses which could have marred it. No life would have been possible to Dorothea which was not filled with emotion, and she had now a life filled also with a beneficent activity which she had not the doubtful pangs of discovering and marking out for herself. (p. 610)

Her ideals have been neither achieved nor compromised; they have been quite literally realized.

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Tennyson, Vestiges, and the Dark Side of Science

Milton Millhauser

We know from Hallam Tennyson’s Memoir of his father that the poet asked his publisher, Edward Moxon, to get him a copy of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (by Robert Chambers, but published anonymously) almost as soon as it appeared—that is, early in November 1844. It is now possible to dot the i’s of that transaction. Moxon’s 1846 account with Tennyson, preserved in the Tennyson Research Centre at Lincoln, includes under the date 16 November 1844 a debit of five shillings eightpence for “1 Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,” along with one “Modern Painters” at nine shillings. Although the correspondence contains no further reference to Vestiges, we may now be certain that he received it promptly and read (or at least began) it while it was still in the first flush of popularity.

Slight as it is, this crumb of information is worth having. At the very least, it reminds us that our knowledge of Tennyson’s reading and of his intellectual interests generally, particularly during the early years, is still incomplete. Vestiges does not appear on the shelves of the Tennyson library at Lincoln; neither is it included in Lady Tennyson’s catalogue of her husband’s books (dated 1874), which is accessible for inspection there. (Also missing from the library, though recorded by Lady Tennyson, is Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, which, Eleanor B. Mattes has argued, was a sig-


significant influence on the later sections of In Memoriam. On the other hand, the library does testify to a lively interest in science on the part of a young and not particularly prosperous poet. In the years before 1840, we find: Neil Arnott's Elements of Physics (1833), Charles Babbage's Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (1838), Sir David Brewster's "debunking" Letters on Natural Magic (1834), Cuvier's Animal Kingdom, in six volumes (1834), John Lindley's Ladies' Botany (1834), Percival B. Lord's Popular Physiology (1834), Lyell's Elements of Geology (1838) and a second-hand Principles of Geology (1830-1833), John Nichols' Views of the Architecture of the Heavens (1838), Peter Mark Roget's Bridgewater Treatise on Animal and Vegetable Physiology (1834), two copies of Mary Somerville's Connection of the Physical Sciences (both fourth edition, 1837, 1838), and Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences (1837). To these, it is reasonable to assume on the evidence of Vestiges and Herschel, a number of other titles should be added. These were the years when Tennyson was setting about his systematic study of the sciences; one notes the frequency, in this list, of popular expositions, or of works, such as those by Lyell, Roget, and Whewell, addressed to a professional audience but with some concern for general intelligibility. By the 1840's (so far as one can judge by the present state of the library) the frequency of such purchases falls off sharply, though he did buy volume I of Humboldt's Cosmos in a translation of 1845. The reader of these volumes, no longer Whewell's pupil, was moving on the level of the informed layman; and that, when all allowances have been made, was the level of Vestiges. The point, to one who asks again how, and how much, the work influenced Tennyson, is worth considering. Vestiges was a plausible book that "took" with the general public but was easily derided by experts; the poet, whose reading in science was eager but not deep, was presumably prepared to give it a tolerant reception.

It may also be significant that he received a copy of Vestiges (which he was eager to look into) before the end of 1844. The first reviews of that work were neutral or cautiously favorable. Only when it had been out for a number of months did the clamor of vituperation (which included some telling hits at its real inadequacies) begin. Supposing the poet to have cared at all for the opinions of others, he was more likely to read it uncritically—to be receptive to its ideas—in December 1844 than halfway through the next year.

Just what influence Vestiges exercised over In Memoriam must remain conjectural, but it would clearly have operated only over very late stages in its composition. There is, however, evidence (including statements by Tennyson about the progress of his work, an early and incomplete manuscript, and an incomplete trial issue) that he composed a number of sections—perhaps as many as ten or a dozen—after 1845. (Among sections that do not concern my thesis, 127 appears, despite the poet's disclaimer, to refer to the French Revolution of 1848; Dr. Mattes dates 121 as late as 1849.) Of particular interest are the Epilogue and 118, which Dr. Mattes assigns to 1845; the Epilogue being placed rather precisely in summer of that year, rather than 1842.

What is suggestive here is that 118 reintroduces the theme of evolution, somewhat more explicitly than before (56 refers merely to succession of species) and in terms which recall Vestiges; as in that work, biological development is linked with the nebular hypothesis, and looks forward to the emergence of a "higher race." The Epilogue, too, hopes for a "crowning race," apparently of perfect human beings, and associates this prospect with an argument for evolution, the recapitulation phenomenon, then generally unfamiliar except among professional biologists. Tennyson knew of recapitulation as early as his Cambridge days; nevertheless, its implications are stressed in Vestiges. The fact (if indeed the Epilogue was composed in 1845) is worth noting. Whether the exciting new book sug-

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3. This was the decade when Tennyson began studying the various sciences systematically (Memor, I, 124); it seems probable that the works listed were purchased not long after the dates of publication. The program of study also included German, Italian and Greek; the library contains German dictionaries dated 1829 and 1832, Greek lexicons dated 1830 and 1831, a French-Italian grammar dated 1831 and a French dictionary, 1831—not to mention a Spanish dictionary, 1836.) A few additional scientific titles antedate the thirties, and suggest either second-hand purchase or transfer from the father's library: Henry Baker, On Microscopes, 1785; the Rev. William Bingley, Useful Knowledge, a Familiar Account of Nature, 1821; [Walter Hamilton], Notes to Assist the Memory in Various Sciences, 1827; [John Leonard Knapp], Journal of a Naturalist, 1829; Carl Linnaeus, Elements of Natural History, 1800.

4. See Milton Millhauser, Just Before Darwin (Middletown, 1959), chap. V.

5. Mattes, in the Appendix, dates the various sections by both internal and external evidence. The greater part of the poem—some 310 sections—was, according to her account, completed before 1845. Sir Charles Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson (New York, 1949), pp. 177-78, makes a suggestion that Dr. Mattes does not follow, but in general his account agrees with hers.


7. The Prologue, of course, is known to have been composed in 1849. Two sections, 39 and 59, were added after 1850.

8. Mattes, p. 123, appears to imply that 118 was composed in 1845 (and this fits my thesis) though she does not include it in her Appendix. The evidence on which she dates the Epilogue in 1845 does not impress me as decisive; internal evidence justifies us in believing (against my thesis) that at least a draft existed in 1842.

gested a new train of thought to Tennyson, or merely, as his letter to Moxon implies, reinforced a line of speculation that had already occurred to him independently, it seems clear that he composed the optimistic evolutionary sections (or at the very least one of them) shortly after he had had an opportunity to read and mull over Vestiges of Creation.

The optimistic section 118, however, is followed by others which mark a mood of revulsion against, or minimization of, science, and which appear by their location within the series to be of still later date. Thus, 120 reads like a repudiation of Vestiges. And so it may be. The “Particular Considerations” chapter of that work includes a passage suggesting that life may be basically an electrochemical phenomenon; the final chapter, “Purpose . . . of the Animated Creation,” reduces morality to a compound of statistics, racial survival, and raw pleasure-pain utilitarianism, and the afterlife to an unreliable hypothesis; its tenor, though it politely makes room for an “absentee God,” is a bleak materialism. A lyric that refuses to see mankind as “clay” or “magnetic mockerys,” or to accept the moral pattern of “the greater ape,” is a direct denial of this extreme mechanism. (“Ape,” of course, associates this philosophy with evolution—another link with Vestiges; “magnetic” may refer to Chambers’ notion, conspicuously developed, that life and mind may be basically electrical rather than spiritual.) This denial may have been the consequence of mature reflection, or of the hostile reviews of Vestiges (including one by his former tutor Whewell) that began to appear as 1845 wore on, or of both. It may be worth noting that in 1846—again on the evidence of Moxon’s accounts—he purchased John Nichol’s Thoughts on the System of the World, a rather conservative treatment of cosmology by a reputable astronomer. In any case, the evidence on which the poet takes his stand is internal: “What matters Science . . . to me? . . . I was born to better things.” This attitude is reiterated in a number of the following sections. In a geological lyric, 123 (“There rolls the deep where grew the tree”), the final position is, “But in my spirit will I dwell, / And dream my dream.” In 124 (“I found Him not in world or sun”), which sounds rather as though the poet had tired of Bridgewater Treatises, the response to “Believe no more” is “A warmth within the breast.” Section 122, balancing astronomical law against imagination, is a minor variation on the same theme. As for the final sections, beginning with 125, they are one uninterrupted dithyramb honoring Love and Hope, and, in the Prologue, Faith: the Pauline trinity. Science has disappeared from consideration, except for one curious passage in 123, which mentions, without repugnance, the “electric force, that keeps / A thousand pulses dancing,” and the rather condescending passages on knowledge (it is “of things we see . . . A beam in darkness: let it grow”) in the Prologue. The poet has by this stage made his peace with science; but only by limiting its sphere, subordinating its evidence to the inward testimony of the soul. A plausible explanation for this change in mood—at any rate a significant contributing cause—is the association, in Vestiges, of evolutionary hope with mechanistic doubt.

The intellectual history thus inferred is supported, in some measure, by a separate set of facts. Tennyson may have begun work on The Princess as early as 1839; he had made substantial progress by April 1845, when he read portions of his “University of Women” to Aubrey de Vere.11 Now, there are passages in this poem that, in various points of detail, specifically recall Vestiges; one, “This world was once a fluid haze of light” (II, 101ff.), is virtually a capsule summary of the cosmological-evolutionary thesis of that work.12 (It leads into a survey of human history, anticipating continued progress in the future, that might almost be a feminist parody of Chambers’ “progressivist” chapter on “The Early History of Mankind.”) If in summer 1845, Tennyson had “hardly advanced” beyond Book I, as Edward Lushington tells us,13 it would appear that this passage, early in Book II, was completed either about that time or shortly thereafter. On the face of it, it seems highly probable that this light-hearted acceptance of biological evolution, social progress, and the nebular hypothesis was sketched out under the influence of the same early reading of Vestiges that produced the hopeful section 118 (“Move upward, working out the beast”); and the dates fit this assumption. We might then suppose that the later, darker reflections were appropriately confined to the meditative poem, but not permitted to intrude upon the playful one.

To recapitulate: As well as we can make out from the data available to us (and there is now one additional iota of fact14) Tennyson’s first encounter with the specter of

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20. Note, inter alia, Adam Sedgwick’s magisterial denunciation in the Edinburgh Review, July 1845; Sir David Brewster in the North British Review, 1845; and such pamphlet volumes as S. R. Bosanquet, Vestiges, etc., Its Arguments Examined and Exposed, 1845; William Whewell, Indications of a Creator, 1845. Reviews were anonymous, but authorship was more or less an open secret; Sedgwick, Brewster and Whewell had impressive reputations in geology, physics, and philosophy, respectively.


14. Moxon’s records deserve further examination. Aside from the rather murky light they shed on Tennyson’s career (the 1846 account shows the poet owing his publisher £9½/4) there are further indications of his intellectual interests. In September
Morris and Timekeeping

Littleton Long

... the minutes crept
Round to the twelve again

In the wake of *Time and Western Man* by Wyndham Lewis in 1927, Georges Poulet's *Studies in Human Time* (1950) and Jerome H. Buckley's *The Triumph of Time* (1966) have shown that man's concept of time alters with the centuries and even within a century. Once implanted in one's ways of thought, such concepts seem so natural and right that they may unwittingly be transferred to eras or areas that have a different time sense.¹ I shall indicate below how this unconscious transfer occurred in one of Morris' poems of the Middle Ages, "The Haystack in the Floods."

The realization that Time is part of one's culture, not merely something measured by a clock, is common knowledge among anthropologists and travelers. Diplomats in foreign lands do well to find out local equivalents for their own time sense when making appointments with native dignitaries. Of such meetings Edward T. Hall points out that there are cultures where ten minutes of tardiness equal one minute in our time, and ratios of five to one are common.² Within a single culture, one's sense of annoyance

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¹ Gulliver's first two voyages treat a parallel problem of carry-over in one's sense of space. An amusing lapse occurs in Chap. 1 when Gulliver finds himself in a Brobdingnag field surrounded by a hedge 120 feet high. He reaches a stile through the hedge, but "It was impossible for me to climb this stile, because every step was six feet high," and the "stone to cross over when you came to the uppermost" was twenty feet high. Why didn't Swift make Gulliver walk through under the steps?
² *The Silent Language* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1966), pp. 136-37. See "Time" in Index for many more examples.
over tardiness increases in proportion to one’s expectations of promptness, and promptness in turn will flourish as a virtue only where timepieces of reasonable accuracy are available. Accustomed as we are to exceedingly accurate timekeeping, we may fail to recognize how approximate were the clocks of another day. Willis I. Milham says “... the clock of 1360 did not keep time much nearer than two hours a day” because of the inherent inaccuracy of the crown-foliot escapement. Even when clockworks were refined down to pocket watch size, some early ones had “a sundial on the case, by which they could be reset from time to time.”

Under these circumstances, what expectations of promptness might medieval people—say Chaucer’s contemporaries—entertain? In the first place, the terms were not yet available; the NED cites 1430-50 for the first use of prompt, 1490 for promptly, c. 1450 for promptitude, and 1526 for promptness. While “little Lewis, my son” would learn to master the astrolabe, a very accurate instrument and hence used “for the governance of a clocke,” he was also cautioned not to expect exact readings between eleven and one at midday in his latitude. Further complications involved “hours equales” and “inequales” of “the day artificiall” and the day “natural.” On the continent arose three systems of hour numbering and measuring: Babylonian Hours began their numbering at sunrise; Italian Hours began at sunset; and Jewish Hours were of twelve equal daylight parts, but stretched to cover sixteen hours at midsummer and shrank to eight hours in midwinter. Chaucer’s characters normally go by the canonical hours, but the evidence of the concordance suggests that they do not measure time very precisely. They do not say, as we do, “I’ll meet you in an hour,” or “Come at half-past nine.” Kottler and Markman’s Concordance to Five Middle English Poems corroborates the Chaucerian attitude toward time; there are five references to hour, two for hours, none for minute or minutes, none for second (of time). Even early and late are general and indefinite rather than specific.

If fourteenth-century authors are so casual about time, can we expect a nineteenth-century author to view events from a fourteenth-century outlook? The Victorians were anything but casual in their attitude towards time. The term anachronism appears in the technical sense of mis-calculating a date in 1646, according to the NED, but in the modern sense of “anything done or existing out of date” only in the nineteenth century, along with eight other terms formed with anachro—. Victorian concern with time, with the age of the earth, with evolution, with the restoration of old churches, is reflected in these and other new terms (e.g., triassic, neolithic, paleolithic, etc.). William Morris seems to have been keenly sensitive to the passage of time and the succession of styles in the arts and architecture. His address at the second Annual Meeting of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, 28 June 1879, shows his understanding of the quite different time sense of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century workmen. “Neither the chroniclers nor their audience could conceive of their forefathers being different from them in any way. ‘Such and such things happened then, such and such happen now, but men’s thoughts and aspirations are the same now as then, and the ways of life that followed from those thoughts must have been the same.’” The consequence of this early time sense is that early workmen used contemporary techniques on older structures with perfect integrity; but we in the nineteenth century know better. We cannot with integrity use our modern techniques in restoring old churches. Over and over again in the “Papers on Art and the Crafts” he insists on integrity within the era, whether the topic be carpets, tapestries, stained glass, or printing. Miss Morris notes her father’s ability to catch convincingly the life of the past as well as the crafts of the past. This ability, she writes, rose from “his own power of realizing what he himself has read and enlarged upon out of a sympathetic imagination; he has lived with his chroniclers while reading, like them an eye-witness of the struggles and miseries of the English wars in France.” To this ability of his we owe the unusually down-to-earth medieval poems of poverty, revenge, ambush and murder, such as “Concerning Geffray Teste Noire,” “Shameful Death,” “The Judgment of God” and “The Haystack in the Floods.”

In the last-mentioned poem occurs the anachronism that shows Morris not quite able to shake off his nineteenth-century time sense and relive events of 1356 like a man of the period. So successful was Morris in memorably sketching the scene of the ambush, the feelings of the principal persons, the aura of lawless cruelty, the hopeless choice offered Jehane that I need only cite a line or so to recall the anachronism. Wishing to force Jehane to become

3. Time and Timekeepers (New York, 1941), pp. 59-60. Plans for this tower clock devised by Henry deVick for King Charles the Wise still exist. A 500-lb. weight drove the works.
5. J. S. P. Tatlock and A. G. Kennedy, A Concordance to the Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer and the Remanu of the Rose (Washington, 1927). The Astralabe furnishes all uses of minute(s) and half the uses of hour(s), including all that measure.
7. Ibid., I, 101-374.
8. Ibid., I, 38.
his mistress, Godmar waylays her and her escort, Sir Robert de Marny. He warns her that "if this very hour / You yield not as my paramour, / He will not see the rain leave off."
Jehane dismounts, pillows her head on a heap of wet hay and sleeps; "and while she slept, / And did not dream, the minutes crept / Round to the twelve again."9 Godmar's giving her precisely an hour to make up her mind fails to ring true as a fourteenth-century way of dealing with time. And dare one ask how Godmar could time her hour for decision? No hourglass is likely to accompany a knight on an ambush; no portable clock will be constructed for a century or more; no sundial or astrolabe will work under rainy skies.10 Godmar's castle "on yonder hill" might conceivably boast one of the new tower clocks, though kings, dukes, monasteries, and municipalities owned the early ones. Even if he had one, he could not have read its face clearly, for its single hand registered hours only; nor would the single hand go "Round to the twelve again."11

No. The teller who sees the minutes creep around is a Victorian gentleman, a busy one, a dutiful one who keeps an eye on his nineteenth-century pocket watch so as not to be late for his appointments. Morris has here unconsciously thrust back into the Middle Ages the time-keeping habits of his own age. Though, as Jerome H. Buckley says, "Victorian historical painters and novelists undertook much conscientious research in order to reproduce the past with a literal and, in effect, often pedantic accuracy,"12 Morris' slip here, in a poem not the least pedantic and surely accurate in atmosphere, shows how deeply ingrained our habits are. The fact that the slip has gone unnoticed by readers for over a century demonstrates that what was habitual and unconscious in the time sense of the author was also habitual in his readers.

In his later writing appear two works where Morris seems to have dealt—consciously this time—with his characters' time sense in a special way. In The Earthly Paradise the wanderers set their departure from the plague-ridden Norwegian town for midnight. Creeping out the postern gate, they embark and rowing hard "swept from out the firth, and sped so well / That scarcely could we hear St. Peter's bell / Toll one."13 Here fourteenth-century men within earshot of the local clock legitimately time their activities by it. From this point on, as is literally and symbolically proper, they range farther and farther from timepieces in their search for the Earthly Paradise and an escape from Time. At one of their stopping places they pick up rumors of this timeless land, "a fair abode of bliss / Where dwelt men like the Gods, and clad as we, / Who doubtless lived on through eternity / Unless the very world should come to naught."14 The wanderers are later trapped by a youth who claims he lives where time has no effect, where old age sloughs off. In proof he shows them his brother, three years his elder, who left his home and looks eighty years old. Sailing to the island, they find they have been tricked and are still subject to the passing years. Pressing on to their final stopping place, they cease trying to escape time. Morris seems to suggest through the fortnightly feasts where fine tales are told, that man may not escape time save through the eternity of literature.15

The other area where Morris seems deliberately to loosen time's grip on man is in the socialist future of News from Nowhere. Surely part of the delight of life sketched here is the freedom from bondage to time. Who will bother to keep Big Ben tolling the hours after the Houses of Parliament have become the Dung-Market? Men and women who like their work cease to be slaves to clocks or capitalism. In the story their exuberance shows in their early rising to get the most out of the day ahead, whether it be visiting, haying, road-repairing, or just swimming and sight-seeing. This one time theme runs through the work from the beginning, "I'm glad you got up early; it's barely five o'clock yet," to their last day's journey up the Thames. "We started before six o'clock the next morning, as we were still twenty-five miles from our resting place."16

When they arrive to help with the haying, Morris has his stately lady welcome them with a speech reflecting in its mild irony the author's disdain for nineteenth-century, old-fashioned promptness. She says, "Dick, my friend, we have almost had to wait for you! What excuse have you to make for your slavish punctuality? Why didn't you take us by surprise, and come yesterday?"17 And in this new, time-free world, the watch like other aspects of the past has become

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10. Some historians think the hourglass a later invention. The portable clock was probably first made by Peter Henlein (c. 1479-1541) and was so big it had to be slung from a strap or carried by a page boy (Palmer, Romance of Time, p. 9).
11. While many early clocks had minute hands, they were on separate dials and would go round to the sixty again. The earliest minute hand concenetered with the hour hand dates from 1673. See Harry C. Brearley, Time Telling Through the Ages (New York, 1919), p. 280.
12. The Triumph of Time, p. 16.
15. Ibid., pp. 72ff. Some of the tales contribute to the sense of timelessness, e.g., "The Lady of the Land" (IV, 128-42). The hero finds on a deserted island a secluded court where "It seemed that time had passed on otherwhere, / Nor laid a finger on this hidden place" (p. 136), but he fails to rescue the ladydragon and cannot bring her into his own world and times. Doomed by Diana to be a woman but one day a year, the ladydragon remains alone, as she has been for the past four hundred years.
17. Ibid., p. 199.
associated with ugliness. Traveling up the Thames they come upon a lockgate of local materials counterpoised by a long beam. Dick explains its virtues and says it's not like "your machine-lock, winding up like a watch, [which] would have been ugly."  

There is for me a touch of irony in the concern Morris showed for time-freeness and escaping the touch of time. Tied subconsciously and consciously to the clock like most people in Europe and much of North America, he writes mostly of a relatively clockless past and a clock-free future.

University of Vermont

Recent Publications: A Selected List

Arthur F. Minerof

SEPTEMBER 1968-FEBRUARY 1969

I

GENERAL


Duncan, Robert W. "William Jordan: Early Literary Agent." *Notes and Queries*, September, pp. 346-47. Editor of the London Literary Gazette 1817-1850, he was possibly the earliest literary agent.


The Series shows the 1890's in perspective, with Hardy, not Wilde or Pater, exercising the greatest influence.


Mathew, David. Lord Acton and His Times. Eyre and Spottiswoode. Rev. TLS, 26 December, p. 1451.
Neale, R. S. "Class and Class-Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century England: Three Classes or Five." Victorian Studies, September, pp. 4-32. Prefers the five.

II

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS

ARNOLD, Allott, Kenneth. "The Death of Arnold." TLS, 24 October, p. 1210. Confronts some of Ronson's conclusions. (See entry below.)
Townsend, R. C. "Matthew Arnold, H. M. I., on The Study of Poetry." College English, December, pp. 212-30. Arnold was the best of the Victorian literary critics and one of the most important nineteenth-century writers on education.


Gridley, Roy. "Browning's Caponsacchi: How the Priest Caponsacchi said his say." Victorian Poetry, Autumn-Winter, pp. 281-95. Pompilia is a symbol to which Caponsacchi can respond with a mixture of priestly adoration and masculine love.
Loschky, Helen M. "Free Will Versus Determinism in The Ring and the Book." Victorian Poetry, Autumn-Winter, pp. 333-52. The issue is a major theme of the poem.
40. Thomson believed Browning’s reputation was not as great as it should be.


BRONTËS. Fike, Francis. “Bitter Herbs and Wholesome Medicines: Love as Theological Affirmation in Wuthering Heights.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, September, pp. 127-49. The novel is more theologically affirmative than generally thought.


Shapiro, Arnold. “In Defense of Jane Eyre.” Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 681-98. Protests the accusation that Jane is a coward and the novel is inconsistent.


DICKENS. Bell, Vereen M. “The Emotional Matrix of David Copperfield.” Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 633-49. The emotional growth symbolized by David’s marriage to Agnes was not achieved by Dickens himself.


HARDY. Coleman, Terry. “Thomas Hardy and Horace Moule.” TLS, 30 January, pp. 110-11. Contests some of Evelyn Hardy’s findings. (See following entry.)


Keith, W. J. “Thomas Hardy and the Name ‘Wessex.’” English Language Notes, September, pp. 42-44. Kingsley, and possibly others, anticipated Hardy in use of the name.


Smith, Julian. “Hopkins’ ‘Spring and Fall: To a Young Child.’” Explicator, January, No. 36. The poem is an irregular sonnet.


LEAR. Davidson, Angus. Edward Lear: Landscape Painter and
Lougé, Robert E. “Swinburne’s Poetry and Twentieth-Century Criticism.” Dalhousie Review, Autumn, pp. 358-65. This criticism has been mainly unfavorable because of its dislike for and misunderstanding of Romantic poetry.
Peters, Robert. “A. C. Swinburne’s ‘Hymn to Proserpine’: The Work Sheets.” PMLA, October, pp. 1400-06. The work sheets show that the central wave image was carefully wrought.
Fredeman, William E. “‘A Sign Betwixt the Meadow and the Cloud’: Tennison’s Sr. Simeon Stylites.” University of Toronto Quarterly, October, pp. 69-83. The aberrant psychology of a man who perverts the moral system of his world and time.
Wiggins, Louise Dugas. “Tennison’s Veiled Statue.” English Studies, October, pp. 444-45. The close relationship between the veiled statue of In Memoriam lyric 103 and Schiller’s “veiled image at Sais.”
THACKERAY. McMaster, Juliet. “Theme and Form in The Newcomes.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, September, pp. 177-88. The novel has a unifying theme to which style, imagery, character and action contribute.
Taub, Myron. “The Puppet Frame of Vanity Fair.” English Language Notes, September, pp. 40-42. The frame, an afterthought, disrupts the unity of the novel.
TROLLOPE. Chamberlain, David S. “Unity and Irony in Trollope’s Can You Forgive Her?” Studies in English Literature, Autumn, pp. 669-80. The novel is considerably more interesting, historically and artistically, than critics have allowed.

PROJECTS—REQUESTS FOR AID


JOHN GIBSON LOCKHART. John Cameron is looking for correspondence or other documents relating to Lockhart’s biography of Scott. TLS, 13 February, p. 164.

CHRISTINA ROSSETTI. H. B. de Groot seeks manuscripts, letters or other material concerning text, dating and interpretation of the poems for a new critical edition. TLS, 3 October, p. 1136.

Staten Island Community College
City University of New York
English X News

Committee News

Officers for 1969 are John D. Rosenberg, Chairman; Ronald E. Freeman, Secretary

The following nominations were approved at the 1968 meeting: U. C. Knoepflmacher and Michael Timko, Advisory and Nominating Committee Members, 1970-1971; G. B. Tennyson, 1969 Program Chairman. All inquiries concerning the program should be addressed to Mr. Tennyson (Department of English, University of California, Los Angeles, California).

Correspondence

Norman White (University of Liverpool) writes: "It has been suggested that a Society should be formed to further the understanding and appreciation of the life and works of Gerard Manley Hopkins. Will those interested please write to either Rev. A. Thomas, S.J., St. Ignatius' Presbytery, 27 High Road, London, N.15, or Tom Dunne, 115 Long Lane, Breightmet, Bolton, Lancashire, England."