The Victorian Newsletter

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Pater, Hopkins, and the Self

Gerald Monsman

For all his love of Duns Scotus in later years, G. M. Hopkins' metaphysics was essentially Victorian and was in large measure formed during his undergraduate years at Oxford. Though it might be an uncomfortable admission for some critics, one major influence on Hopkins was Walter Pater, the "aesthetic" don of Brasenose.1 The first record of Hopkins' awareness of Pater is in 1864 when he relates to Canon Liddon the denial of a future life in an Old Mortality paper by Pater,2 and the first recorded meeting of the two is in 1866 when Hopkins began coaching that term with him.3 Long before the publication of Pater's Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873) and the public outcry against its apparent neoehedronism ("deification of passion" as the Saturday Review called it), Hopkins had ample opportunity to gauge his tutor's sentiments on the score of religious belief. The curious fact remains that their friendship was uninterrupted by Hopkins' conversion to Catholicism (1866) and continued even after his ordination as a priest (1877). In 1878 and 1879, when Hopkins was attached to St. Aloysius' Church in North Oxford, "Pater was one of the men I saw most of," he later told a friend.4 This relation between the moral iconoclast and the priest who sacrificed so much for the sake of his religious scruples would be puzzling were it not for certain common metaphysical preoccupations that united them.

Hopkins' interest in the distinctive "design" or "pattern" of selfhood, which he called "inscape," seems inescapably linked to Pater's metaphysics of the self. The starting point of Pater's definition of selfhood is the new science being proclaimed by men such as Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley: namely, the new spirit of relativism, of flux. The first paragraph of Pater's "Conclusion" to The Renaissance examines the implications of the flux for physical life and the second paragraph its implications for mental life. The physical body, said Pater, is the confluence of random physical forces soon parting, and the human psyche is a solipsistic nexus of fleeting impressions. The distinction that the man in the street supposes is so easy to make between the physical or mental self and the not-self does not exist, Pater implies. Instead of the stable paradigm of a sharply bounded circle of self within the larger circumference of not-self, Pater suggests a paradigm of process in which there is no enduring circle of self (only an asterisk, a star-bright center) since at every moment the self is being defined anew as the elemental threads (physical properties or mental impressions) are added and subtracted. Within the flux there is simply a succession of selves, each of which contains only "a relic" (Ren., 236) of the self that preceded it.5 Any given person or thing—Pater, let us say—is but a centripetal crossing of elements beginning in 1839 and shifted by the centrifugal thrust of the flux moment by moment, year by year, until finally in 1894 the constituents are too radically altered to have any viable coherence left. What temporarily remains of that nexus of elements is then buried in Holywell Cemetery, Oxford, and eventually reappears in "the springing of violets from the grave" (Ren., 234).

A year before Pater first published his "Conclusion," Hopkins, in an undergraduate essay on "The Probable Future of Metaphysics" (1867),6 professed himself dissatisfied with "the prevalent philosophy of continuity or flux" for, he said, it cannot explain "certain forms which have a great hold on the mind and are always reappearing and seem imperishable, such as the designs of Greek vases and lyres, the cone upon Indian shawls, the honeysuckle moulding, the fleur-de-lys, while every day we see designs both simple and elaborate which do not live and are at once forgotten." These forms enjoy "an absolute existence" because of the Platonic archetypes that guarantee their existence. "One sees that the ideas so rife now of a continuity without fixed points, not to say saltus or breaks, of development in one chain of necessity, of species having no absolute types and only accidentally fixed, all this is a philosophy of flux opposed to Platonism and can call out nothing but Platonism against it." Borrowing terminology from music, Hopkins claims that for the proponents of the...
perpetual flux “nature is a string all the differences in which are really chromatic but certain places in it have become accidentally fixed and the series of fixed points becomes an arbitrary scale.” He rejects this evolutionary chromatism (a sliding series of semi-tones with a shifting key center) and prefers in its stead the diatonic music of the Platonists (a fixed scale in a certain key) in which the inscapes of Indian cones and fleurs-de-lis, deriving from a sort of Christianized realm of Ideas, correspond to a predetermined pattern of organization.

In contrast to Pater, Hopkins claims for himself a fixed Hopkinesis inscape although in his outward “accidental” properties he changes through the years. Consequently, Hopkins’ paradigm of self is precisely that which Pater rejects: “If the centre of reference [i.e., the self] has concentric circles round it, one of these, the immost, say, is its own, is of it, the rest are to it only. Within a certain bounding line all will be self, outside of it nothing: with it self begins from one side and ends from the other. I look through my eye and the window and the air; the eye is my eye and of me and me, the windowpane is my windowpane but not of me nor me. A self then will consist of a centre and a surrounding field, the latter set out, as surveyors etc say, from the former.”

Hopkins’ paradigm might profitably be contrasted not only with the “Conclusion,” but also with the opening paragraph of “A Child in the House” in which Pater speaks of “the gradual expansion of the soul” by means of which the child’s physical dwelling place “had actually become a part” of its very selfhood, “inward and outward being woven through and through each other into one inextricable texture—half, tint and trace and accident of homely colour and form, from the wood and the bricks; half, mere soul-stuff, floated thither from who knows how far” (Miscel. Stud., 173). This Paterian “expansion” of the circle of self into the “belonging field” is again described in Marius the Epicurean: “The house in which she lives ... is for the orderly soul ... only an expansion of the body; as the body ... is but a process, an expansion of the soul. For such an orderly soul, as life proceeds, all sorts of delicate affinities establish themselves between herself and ... her outward dwelling-place, until she may seem incorporate with it—until at last ... there is for her ... between outward and inward, no longer any distinction at all” (Marius, II, 98). This expansion of the soul, as we shall see, constitutes the “dissolving away” or assimilation by self of what initially had been felt to be “that close, impassable prison-wall” (Marius, II, 70) of the material world.

But although their chosen paradigms differ, Pater does not deny an Absolute substratum of being as enduring as Hopkins’ extrinsic power of organization. Almost as if taking his cue from Hopkins’ chromatic analogy, Pater writes: “In this ‘perpetual flux’ of things and souls, there was, as Heraclitus conceived, a continuance, if not of their material or spiritual elements, yet of orderly intelligible relationships, like the harmony of musical notes, wrouth out in and through the series of their mutations—ordinances of the divine reason, maintained through the changes of the phenomenal world” (Marius, I, 131). And in Plato, using the same musical analogy, Pater writes that Heraclitus sought for “the notation, if there be such of an antiphonal rhythm, or logic, which, proceeding uniformly from movement to movement, as in some intricate musical theme, might link together in one of those contending, infinitely diverse impulses” (Plato, 17-18). Thus if the “things and souls” in Pater’s flux undergo chromatic “mutations,” their existence, although defined as less a product than a process, is not considered by Pater to be the result of some accidental transformation as implied by Hopkins.

In an important unfinished essay, Pater writes that there has always been

a distinction between what we may call the greater and the lesser reason, between the minor reason of the finite, and transient, individual, and some greater system of reason, a building of more complete architecture, with which it is in vital communication, rounding, supporting, supplementing, explaining its (weakness) and permanent while the individual is so transient ... The idea of sleepless reason which assists and rounds our sleepy, intermittent, intelligence, in which the eternal and (finite) ideas of things have a durable, permanent, free, independent, existence, bending itself and lifting for a little time our transient, individual intelligence, for us actually translates into [the] conception of collective humanity.

In neo-Hegelian terms it is the Absolute Self that underlies and includes all the narrow, limited selves and constitutes their relatedness. The real Self is an unseen core of spiritual relationships, and the visible person is simply the shell of an infinite companionship of like-oriented spirits (or Spirit) that pervade and shape the personality.

In any given instant the “key center” of Pater’s chromatic flux may be fixed anywhere—perhaps in a humble flower or a seashell, enriching it by the “colour and expression of the whole circumjacent world, concentrated upon, or as it were at focus in, it” (Plato, 158); or perhaps in a work of art that “presents us with a kind of profoundly significant and animated instant, a mere gesture, a look, a smile, perhaps—some brief and wholly concrete moment


—into which, however, all the motives, all the interests and effects of a long history have condensed themselves, and which seem to absorb past and future in an intense consciousness of the present. Such ideal instants . . . [are] exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fulness of existence, and which are like some consummate extract or quintessence of life" (Ren., 150). But above all the "key center" is manifest in the human form. To paraphrase Pater, one could say that, as he conceived it, all physical life constantly aspires to the condition of human culture, and, additionally, all culture aspires to the expression of bodily form. Pater believed that the art of each period—sculpture in antiquity, painting in the Middle Ages, poetry in modern times—chose the human image as its preeminent subject because it is the ultimate manifestation of the Absolute in the culture of an age. Pater encouraged the young men of Oxford to burn with the "hard, gemlike flame" (Ren., 286) of Heraclitus' divine fire, becoming thereby in themselves or in their art that star-bright point through which the Divine Self manifests the personality of being.

Because for Hopkins the selfhood of the universe had already attained its highest pitch in the person of Christ, his diatonic universe assumes a fixed key that imposes down upon inscapes a predetermined selfhood: all things "are charged with love, are charged with God,"9 notes Hopkins in a prose equivalent to his sonnet "God's Grandeur." Or again, in The Wreck of the Deutschland, he says that Christ is what "Heaven and earth are worded of, worded by" (st. 29). The idea is given its most elaborate expression in his fifty-seventh sonnet ("As Kingfishers") where "each mortal thing," he says, "selves" itself, asserts its own nature and that nature is also the person of Christ. The just man

Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is—
Christ—for Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men's faces.

In an 1881 meditation on the grace of man in communion with Christ, Hopkins noted: "It is as if a man said: That is Christ playing at me and me playing at Christ, only that it is no play but truth; That is Christ being me and me being Christ."10

Because Christ is the definitive ground of every inscape, all creation, as Hopkins describes it in "The Windhover," repeats the "here / Buckle" of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Atonement at every instant of existence: the flash of the buckling falcon echoes the beauty of Christ humbled on the cross, the plowshare tearing through the earth reenacts the nails driven through the flesh of Christ, the gash of gold-vermilion mirrors the blood of Christ's wounds. Indeed, so pervasive is the selfhood of Christ that even the correlative positioned words "Shine" and "Fall" in the final lines of the sonnet become a patterned reflection, by being dropped one line below the images each describes, of the cosmic felix culpa of the crucifixion—to fall is to shine. In short, the total form of the poem is the affirmation and actualization of Christ. In his poetic theorizing Hopkins even takes this a step further by suggesting that the poem's sound alone, apart from its meaning, carries a comprehensible inscape. All selves, even sound-shape selves, are echoes of Christ.

Unfortunately, though Hopkins' inscapes and Pater's selves are windows on a permanent reality, in themselves they are highly perishable. "I wished to die and not see the inscapes of the world destroyed any more,"11 cried Hopkins at the felling of a favorite ash-tree (a similar poetic lament occurs in "Binsey Poplars"), and in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" this destruction when it befalls man brings the poet to the pitch of real terror as he envisions how 'self in self' is "steeped and pasado." Pater also experiences an overwhelming sense of loss at the physical death of the hero—his passing and the passing of all his beauties with him: "Such thoughts seem desolate at first; at times all the bitterness of life seems concentrated in them. They bring the image of one washed out beyond the bar in a sea at ebb, losing even his personality, as the elements of which he is composed pass into new combinations. Struggling, as he must, to save himself, it is himself that he loses at every moment."12 Another consequence of the finitude of inscapes and selves is their potential isolation from the rest of creation. Both Hopkins and Pater had struggled to describe in what precise way the solipsistic prison of the self could be opened to the higher life, and in confronting this problem the two writers are most typically alike. "My selfbeing," says Hopkins, "my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things . . . is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incomunicable by any means to another man." Consequently, writes Hopkins, "when I compare my self, my being-myself, with anything else whatever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff me with blank unluckiness."13 In his so-called "Terrible Sonnets," Hopkins laments this isolation, this paralyzing and inescapable taste of self. For Pater also the self is

10. Ibid., p. 154.
"ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced"; all selves are thus isolated within the dizzying flux of impressions, "each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world" (Ren., 235).

Although Pater's and Hopkins' paradigms of self differ, both are philosophical personalists and they approach the solution to their common problem in tantalizingly similar (yet different) ways. Certainly Pater's "transient, individual intelligence" rounded and supported by the unsleeping universal mind is not unlike Hopkins' man disappearing in the burning of the Heraclitean fire but triumphantly transfigured at the last in the personality of Christ:

In a flash, at a trumpet crash,
I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what
I am, and

This Jack, joke, poor potsherder, patch, matchwood,
immortal diamond,
Is immortal diamond.14

The distinction between Pater and Hopkins is that whereas Hopkins' inscapes participate in the time-transcending and eternally complete nature of Christ, Pater's selves participate in a gradually self-realizing World-Spirit, "collective humanity," which the Paterian hero gains not by a sudden Hopkinsian flash but by a gradual "self-surrender to the suggestions of an abstract reason or ideality in things" (Appreciations, 79).

In Pater's early essay "Diaphanéité" (Miscel. Stud., 247–253), this collective selfhood is described as the attainment of a balanced cultural existence by the subordination of the nonessential aspects of being to the "spiritual ray within," in which "the veil of an outer life not simply expressive of the inward becomes thinner and thinner." This diaphanous condition is what Idealistic philosophy described as the perfected outcome of a continuous struggle by which the self transcends its lower forms and identifies the external world as no longer foreign but as its own and as that in which its life consists. Such a "clear crystal nature" is the final expression of the gradual expansion of the circle of self in which, as Pater elsewhere described it, "the material and spiritual are fused and blend; if the spiritual attains the definite visibility of a crystal, what is material loses its earthiness and impurity" (Appreciations, 212; Plato 135). In Pater's chromatic flux the shifting "key centers" are the diaphanous heroes of each age who advance the collective Ideal on its way to perfect realization:

"they give utterance to that great consensus, though they also partly lead it."15

That "consensus" is cultural and artistic, the ultimate expansion of the circle of self. Art expands the walls of personality infinitely outward so that there is, finally, no external world left—inner and outer light are one. If one regards art in this fashion, the strategy of Pater's "Conclusion" becomes clear. Because "the best sort of criticism" is that which "penetrates, through the given literary or artistic product, into the mental and inner constitution of the producer" (Guardian, 29), by practicing one's function as critic, one penetrates the work of art and the consciousness behind the work (the consciousness both of the artist and of the "great consensus" that he embodies) and so breaks from the solipsism of the self. This happens because the aesthetic object represents "the summing up of an entire world of complex associations under some single form, like the Zeus at Olympia" (Martius, II, 128). Because the collective Ideal can only be apprehended in terms of the individual self, Pater's studies, always focused through a specific personality, are all attempts to define the artist's individual "expression," which he describes in his essay on Luca della Robbia as "the impress of a personal quality . . . some subtler sense of originality—the seal on a man's work of what is most inward and peculiar in his moods, and manner of apprehension . . . [and] is the quality which alone makes works in the imaginative and moral order really worth having at all" (Ren., 150). As against orthodox Hegelianism and in agreement with the Oxford Personalists, the most notable of which was Pater's good friend T. H. Green, Pater held to a pluralistic view of the universe and made great efforts to show that the Absolute, far from negating finite selves, has indeed no meaning except in experienceable qualities of human selves.

This is why in the final analysis Pater does not deal in rarified, exotic emotions, for the secret of his art lies in keeping close to life, in giving to simple, perishing things a full measure of pity and care. Not one of Pater's young heroes, nor anything else of human worth, is denied its share of that pietas that treasures up the memory of its existence. "The essence of humanism," he writes in The Renaissance, is the belief "that nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality—no language they have spoken, no oracle beside which they have hushed their voices, no dream which has once been entertained by actual human minds, nothing and quite possibly the gem-like flame and the sonnet's star/spark/diamond imagery are originally both indebted to the Heraclitean metaphor of the soul as a spark of starry essence.15 Ward, p. 66.
about which they have ever been passionate, or expended time and zeal” (49). All perishing selves, by contributing no matter howsoever humbly to the cultural continuity of the human community, have gained thereby a durable existence in the greater Self. Even the humblest individual can share in that light by placing himself in the “great order” of collective humanity, “by conceiving his isolated apereus under the terms of that, by admitting their just complement, by passing out of himself with them into an external world, which as he conveys into it something of personal and peculiar (understanding) so affects him in turn by its support.”¹⁰

Whereas for Pater this identification of self and Self happens within the temporal process, as part of the ongoing self-realization of the World-Spirit, Hopkins’ inscapes participate in the multiple enrichment of creation only by anticipating their future redemption into the inscape of Christ. Typically for Hopkins the experience of self and nature is not that of an expansion into Self, but rather, as in “Pied Beauty,” an institution of the counterpointing and rhyming of all selves in God:

All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;
He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change:
Praise him.

Change and Changelessness in *Bleak House*

Dianne F. Sadoff

Readers have long admired Dickens’ concern with progressive social change and especially his attack on Chancery and the ruling class in *Bleak House*. But critics have not examined the ways Esther’s narrative relates to the omniscient narrator’s demands for apocalyptic destruction of oppressive social institutions that refuse to change.¹ Whereas we once thought of Esther as a healthy alternative to the chaos and corruption of the social world of Bleak House, we now tend to think of her as a neurotic anal-retentive with identity problems.² Actually, Esther’s inability to deal with experience as process, her need to be possessive of others, and her desire to create stability by refusing to allow change in her own life and in those of the people she loves allies Esther with Chancery’s “perpetual stoppage”: her changelessness mirrors that of Chancery and does not provide an alternative to it. Because of his investment in Esther as character and narrator, Dickens also undercuts the omniscient narrator’s demands for social change, and as a result, the novel closes with irony, ambivalence, and moral irresolution rather than with

¹. Ibid.

comic transformation and viable social renewal.\(^3\)

Esther Summerson changes radically during the course of *Bleak House*. When she and Charley Neckett go out to nurse Jo, she experiences "... for a moment an undefinable impression of myself as being something different from what I then was."\(^4\) Her premonition is equivocal with regard to the qualitative nature of that change: is it physical, spiritual, or both? The possibilities of spiritual transformation reside certainly in the conflicts of her disease-ridden dreams. Her obsessive relationship to time reveals itself in her first hallucination: she confusedly experiences "little or no separation between the various stages of my life which had been really divided by years"; she fears life's shortness, and struggles to overcome a conflict between process and separation: "The way in which these divisions of time became confused with one another, distressed my mind exceedingly. At once a child, an elder girl, and the little woman I had been so happy as, I was not only oppressed by cares and difficulties adapted to each station, but by the great perplexity of endlessly trying to reconcile them" (XXXV, 488). Esther's hallucinations also express her sexual conflicts: she toils up "never-ending stairs," and is terrified at finding herself one of the beads on a "flaming necklace" in "great black space" (XXXV, 488-489). By facing these conflicts Esther could perhaps free herself from her obsessive routinizing of time through "duty" and experience her own sexuality, but she chooses to avoid the pains of confrontation.

After her illness, Esther finds it difficult to look in a mirror because her face is so "very much changed" (XXXVI, 504). Despite her physical change, however, Esther's values do not change substantively but become instead intensified, even rigidified, even and rigidified. Although the "change of heart" is central to Dickens' novels, Esther's disease creates physical alteration without a spiritual referent.\(^5\) She becomes the passive victim of a sexual, "social" disease, and her "change" affirms changelessness and spurious transformation.

Because the disease destroys her beauty, Esther fears isolation and alienation: those she loves will no longer love her now-scarred face. She so fears Ada's response that she hides behind a door, only to have her fears dissipated by Ada's passionate and supportive response. Esther cries "Ah, my angel girl! the old dear look, all love, all fondness, all affection. Nothing else in it—no, nothing, nothing! O how happy I was, down upon the floor, with my sweet beautiful girl down upon the floor too, holding my scarred face to her lovely cheek, bathing it with tears and kisses, rocking me to and fro like a child, calling me by every tender name that she could think of, and pressing me to her faithful heart" (XXXVI, 517). Woodcourt also proves himself devoted to Esther; despite its dreadful alteration, her "scarred face was all unchanged to him... What I had thought was pity and compassion, was devoted, generous, faithful love" (LXI, 832-833). Esther, then, finds those who truly love her "so unchanged" despite her own alteration (XLIV, 610). Dickens physically embodies this changeless love in Esther's symbolic lifting of her veil after the illness. Guppy reveals his true lack of regard when he "changed so much" at the sight of her face (XXXVIII, 542). Only those who are totally unaffected by her physical alteration are worthy of Esther's love.

Despite Esther's need to find those around her unchanged, she and Jarsnyce often speak of the need for individuals to grow and change, even if that change endangers secure relationships. Jarsnyce advises Ada and Richard on the future when they discover they love each other: "If you do change—if you do come to find that you are more commonplace cousins to each other as man and woman, than you were as boy and girl... don't be ashamed still to confide in me, for there will be nothing monstrous or uncommon in it" (XIII, 179). Jarsnyce wants his little family to be on "equal terms," "that we might be open as the day" (XXIV, 339), since human growth is facilitated by open and honest relationships. When Jarsnyce asks Esther to be "the mistress of Bleak House," he stresses the honesty of their relationship: "Then see, my love... am I at this moment quite as plain and easy—I do I seem as open, as honest and old-fashioned, as I am at any time?... Do I look as if I suppressed anything, meant anything but what I said, had any reservation at all, no matter what?... Can you fully trust me, and thoroughly rely on what I profess, Esther?" (XLIV, 608).

But Jarsnyce's belief in openness, honesty, and growth breaks down when he manipulates Esther's life. His letter dooms Esther to a relationship in which she will always be secure, childish, and changeless; he will "be unchanged in his old relation, in his old manner, in the old name by which [Esther] called him. And as to his bright Dame Durden and little housekeeper, she would ever be the same, he knew" (XLIV, 611). Before writing the letter, Jarsnyce assures Esther that "nothing can change me as you know me"; Esther fully trusts her Guardian, saying, "I can no more be changed in that conviction, than you

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can be changed towards me” (XLIV, 609). Jarndyce fears time and change, and Esther, the obsessive orderer and cleaner, provides for him as much changeless security as he provides for her. He asks Esther to “become the dear companion of his remaining life, superior to all lighter chances and changes than Death” (XLIV, 611). Here Dickens motivationally connects constancy and death, as he does implicitly throughout the novel; changelessness becomes a needed protection against process, impermanence, inevitable flux, and ultimately, though vainly, death.

Ironically, Jarndyce’s offer makes Esther feel not secure and safeguarded against change, but frightened of a loss that she cannot understand. Because she owes him allegiance, however, Esther forces herself to do her “duty” to Jarndyce; because she fears change and needs stability, she will marry her Guardian: as long as she sits in her little chair by his side, donning his socks and being his Dame Durden, her security will not be threatened. When Jarndyce offers to tell her what he knows of her past, she refuses him, and that refusal to know makes her feel secure, “quite unreserved, quite content to know no more, quite happy” (VIII, 99). Esther says about her future status as Mrs. Jarndyce (does the novel allow us to think of her in these sexual terms?): “What quiet, old-fashioned people we are, and how I have settled down to be the discreetest of dames. . . . How happily and peacefully my life is all marked out for me” (L, 688). No choices need be made, no risks taken, no changes effected in the ways Esther relates to those around her.

Esther’s desire for security infects her relationships with her small “family” group. She continually attempts, for example, to change Richard’s profligate habits with regard to money and vocation. When he finds medicine monotonous, Esther asks Richard to be “quite in earnest without any reservation” (XVII, 231); he must work with “constancy, fortitude, and perseverance” (XIII, 178). Jarndyce supports Esther’s position, demanding Richard’s “constancy in every kind of effort,” since “fits and starts” do not create “real success” (XIII, 180). Esther encourages Richard’s choice of the law as his second career because she thinks it “best to encourage him in any project of continuous exertion” (XVII, 283); here Esther preaches constancy as a moral exercise: perseverance becomes the duty itself while the content of that duty means nothing.6

At this point in the novel, however, Richard seems obsessed with the opposite of constancy; he must continually change in order to feel alive because unconsciously he connects perseverance with stagnation and death: “I wish to Heaven I were a more constant sort of fellow. . . . If I were . . . I should have held on, either to Badger, or to Kenge and Carboy, like grim Death; and should have begun to be steady and systematic by this time” (XXIII, 322). When Richard ironically becomes obsessed by Jarndyce and Jarndyce, Esther anxiously asks Woodcourt (her self-appointed anchor for Richard), “Do you think him so changed?” and Woodcourt responds, “He is changed” (XLIV, 625). Ironically again, Richard’s constancy to the case confirms his suspicions: his perseverance does indeed cause his death. But in this instance Esther maintains that constancy to a wholesome career rather than to the case would have saved Richard. This continual shifting of terms reveals Dickens’ ambivalent feelings about constancy and death: unlike Jarndyce’s protection against painful process, Richard’s final changelessness becomes the very death of process. Obsessive change and obsessive changelessness conflict throughout the novel because Dickens feels divided about these opposing values.

Esther enjoys more success preaching constancy to Caddy. When Caddy marries Prince Turveydrop, her life becomes a more orderly and acceptable version of “mere drudgery” than it was when she copied her mother’s African letters.7 As Caddy outlines her daily tasks, Esther responds, “Why, what a laborious life! . . . I [could] have cried” (XXXVIII, 587–588); yet she encourages Caddy’s “natural, wholesome, loving course of industry and perseverance” despite her consciousness that Caddy is living a limited, self-deluded life. Caddy’s reward for her version to constancy—the wizened, blind little Esther she gives birth to—again associates perseverance with pain and imminent death.

Esther loves Ada, her pet, for the security Ada’s “unchanging heart” offers her. When Jarndyce asks Richard and Ada to break their engagement, Richard is outraged, but Ada responds, “You may trust in me, cousin Richard. I am not at all changeable; but I am not unreasonable” (XXIV, 340). After she marries Richard, Ada tells Esther that “Richard’s being thereafter prosperous or ruined, befriended or deserted, could only make this difference to her, that the more he needed love from one unchanging heart, the more love that unchanging heart would have to give him” (XXXVII, 538). Ada’s marriage appears both honorable and at the same time outrageous; her constancy, like Esther’s, becomes at least partially a moral exercise in futility. Ada remains devoted to Richard because she loves him despite his faults, but also because she knows he will soon die, and her devotion protects him against

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6. Alexander Welsh, *The City of Dickens* (Oxford, 1971), Ch. 7, applies the concept of moral exercise to Dickens’ attitudes toward forgiveness; it is an approach which I think applies much more widely to Dickens’ work, and I use it here.
7. Smith, p. 13, also thinks Caddy’s marriage and Esther’s influence on Caddy ironic.
awareness of this ultimate change. After his death she will
care for and save his child as she could not save the
father.

In order to secure themselves against the ravages of
human process, then, Esther, Ada, and Jarn dyce attempt
to possess each other fully and forever; no amount of
change in the world around them can shake the secure
foundations on which they build their relationships.
Because they fear change, they need to settle for the surety
of the past rather than take risks with the future. Esther's,
Ada's, and Jarn dyce's struggle with change and their
choice of changelessness reveals Dickens' ambivalent and
often regressive motivations, and creates ironies through-
out Esther's narrative which Dickens must deal with in
order to achieve a comic resolution to the novel.

When Esther, Ada, and Jarn dyce do endure change,
you experience loss, separation, isolation, and insecurity;
their efforts, they find human process inevitable.
As Esther and Ada grow older, they begin to withhold
intimate information from one another, and then delude
themselves about the openness of their relationship.
After her face is scarred by the disease, Esther feels guilt at
having kept Woodcourt's flowers, meant for a girl to be loved,
not (as Esther thinks) pitted, and so she presses them in
a book in memory of what is irrevocably past, and "nobody
knew this, not even Ada" (XXXVI, 504). Of her engage-
ment to Jarn dyce, she "said nothing to [her] precious pet"
(XLIV, 613). Esther avoids the "disclosure" (and there-
fore feels less worthy of Jarn dyce's love) because it reveals
her own hidden ambivalence about the marriage, and be-
cause Ada might confirm her fears by experiencing similar
ambivalence.

Esther's secrets weigh heavily on her, however, and her
guilt eventually forces her to confide in Ada again by "cast-
ing this last idle reservation away" (L, 682). Despite her
grave revelation, she senses that the old openness has not
returned to her relationship with Ada, in whom she senses
a "quiet sorrow" and "some hidden regret." Blinded by
her own fears of her upcoming marriage, she gives Ada
"no encouragement to confide" in her, and instead enacts
a grotesque parody of busyness and contentment that pre-
vents Ada "from saying more." Esther selfishly and self-
deceivedly assumes that Ada cares only for Esther's wel-
fare, and therefore cannot comprehend that Ada also fears
a marriage that threatens to destroy the secure "old rela-
tions among us." Yet Ada remains "a little changed," and

Esther feels, "still there was the same shade between me
and my darling" (L, 685–88).

When Ada and Rick announce their marriage, Esther's
and Jarn dyce's first impulse is to pity Ada. They experi-
ence her marriage not as a new beginning, but as a perso-
nal loss; it is a loss not only because she marries the un-
fortunate Richard, but because the mere act of marrying
means Ada must leave Bleak House and their "present
mode of life must be broken up" (XLIV, 611). Esther at-
ttempts to console Jarn dyce by announcing her resolution
to make up for their loss of love and security, but although
its mistress remains to "do all she can to make it happy,"
Bleak House is "thinning fast" (LI, 700).

Esther's experience of Ada's marriage and the resulting
change at Bleak House is more extreme than is Jarn-
 dyce's. Loving Ada more than she does any of the men,
Esther experiences Ada's marriage as the loss, even the
death, of a lover: "It was only natural that I should not be
quite accustomed to the loss of my darling yet... I so
longed to be near her, and taking some sort of care of her,
that I determined to go back in the evening, only to look
up at her windows... I put my lips to the hearse-like
panel of the door, as a kiss for my dear... I somehow felt
as if it had diminished the separation between Ada and
me, and had brought us together again for those mo-
moments" (LI, 699). Esther's extreme love for Ada sug-
gests Dickens' ambivalence about Esther's right to become
a woman loved by a man. Dickens avoids confronting
the depths of emotion he invests in Esther's love for Ada
because the lesbian implications of the relationship must be
disguised as sisterly devotion. Uncertain about Esther's
sexuality, he creates for her a shifting marital bargain: he
first refuses her the right to grow into a woman and marry
Woodcourt; he then discovers that by engaging her to
Jarn dyce he has unintentionally transformed that rela-
tionship into an implicitly sexual one. Thus, what looks
like a refusal to change becomes a significant, even sub-
stantive, change: a lesser change—Esther's marrying
Woodcourt—is more acceptable than the transformation
of Jarn dyce's fatherly role into that of husband. Dickens
therefore allows Jarn dyce to hand Esther over lovingly
and apologetically to Woodcourt as though she were his
personal portable property. The transfer protects Dickens
against the threat of incest he discovers in Esther's and
Jarn dyce's proposed marriage, and maintains Esther's re-

8. Alex Zwerdling. "Esther Summerson Rehabilitated," PMLA,
LXXXVIII (1973), 429–439, calls Esther's attachment to Ada
"irrational and mysterious," and believes Ada an idealized second
self for Esther. Though this is undoubtedly true, Zwerdling too
readily desexualizes the relationship in his interpretation. Welsh,
Ch. 9, explains such sexual undertones (although not the Ether-

Ada relationship in particular) as a Victorian desire to experience
sexual role-multiplicity.

9. According to William Axton, "Esther's Nicknames: A Study in
Relevance," Dickensian, LXII (1966), 158–168, the nickname
"Dame Durden" parodies Esther's lack of a mate, while everyone
around her, including Ada, finds one.
ture. This “parting” restores Jarndyce to his “old place” in Esther’s affections (LXIV, 859); this loss creates security, not threat.

In another irony on the metaphysics of change in the novel, Esther experiences a feeling of indefinite loss when she mediates the terms of Jarndyce’s letter. When Woodcourt admits his love for her, this loss becomes definite: it is “too late” for love, and she and Woodcourt must remain separate. But she defends against the pain by feeling guilt and by denying she feels loss at all; she will be “good, true, grateful, and contented. How easy my path; how much easier than his! . . . I felt so sorrowful for the loss he had sustained” (LXI, 835, 834). Esther apparently sustains no loss because she would rather adhere to an accepted course of action than deal with the need to reevaluate and change it. Esther sustains no loss because Dickens so represses her sexuality that she feels no physical desire for a man she loves.

Ada, Esther, and Jarndyce also experience Richard’s death as a loss, since it changes the structure of the social groups they have constructed. Dickens suffuses Rick’s death scene with overtones of loss and separation: they are “all bewildered”; it was a “troubled dream”; Jarndyce will “forgive and pity the dreamer” (LXV, 869–70). Like Esther’s constancy, however, Jarndyce’s forgiveness is a hollow moral exercise since he must never act on his fine sentiments. Without knowing it, Jarndyce has described the vulnerability and fragility of all human process, even of his overbearing fatherly authority. But Dickens paradoxically creates an acceptance of the loss of Rick, who will “begin the world” (LXV, 869): whereas Esther’s loss of Ada was tortured and painfully rendered, Ada, Esther, and Jarndyce accept quite readily, although sadly, that Richard will die. Dickens accepts this loss narratively because this change, like Jarndyce’s restoring Esther to her rightful asexual position as his ward, restores the old order. Richard’s divisive influence on the “settled down” little society ends, and Richard fulfills his role as scapegoat: his death frees Ada to return to Bleak House and take Esther’s place as the little woman. Jarndyce, in fact, courts Ada beside Rick’s deathbed: “I am a solitary man now, you know, and it will be a charity to come to me . . . my love!” he repeated to Ada, as he gently passed his hand over her golden hair, and put a lock of it to his lips.” Esther parenthetically desexualizes the action: “(I think he vowed within himself to cherish her if she were left alone).” The two Bleak Houses, then, are motivationally one; Richard says of the new Bleak House as he is dying, “It will be like coming to the old Bleak House again” (LXV, 870).

After Rick’s death and Ada’s return, Esther magically achieves a dreamed-of fulfillment that obviates the need to make choices to create a future and destroy a past: she possesses (without encountering the nastiness of striving) an adult, womanly life with Woodcourt, as well as a childlike, regressive life that reunites her with Ada and her fatherly guardian. Esther emphasizes that her relationship to Jarndyce has not changed since his restoration to father-figure: “I have never lost my old names, nor has he lost his; nor do I ever, when he is with us, sit in any other place than in my old chair at his side. Dame Troth, Dame Durden, Little Woman—all just the same as ever; and I answer, Yes, dear Guardian! just the same” (LXVII, 879). The novel’s ending combines what looks like growth with regressive changelessness, an ambivalence that surfaces strongly in the last paragraph and final unfinished sentences of the novel (LXVII, 880). Metaphorically, Woodcourt’s love transforms Esther beyond—or is it back to?—her original beauty. Like the other changes at the end of the novel, this transformation functions ambivalently as transcendence and as regression. Esther is restored to her beauty through love, but she is really restored to her old self and all its appurtenances, including the safe, secure society she did not want to leave. Dickens’ ending allows Esther the traditional functions of wife and motherhood, while at the same time allowing her the sublimated fulfillment of her relationship to Ada, who remains her “beautiful darling.”

The relationship of Esther’s narration to the omniscient narration reinforces Dickens’ ambivalent attitudes toward change. Despite the omniscient narrator’s strident demands for the destruction of Chancery and of ruling class prerogative, the novel’s apocalyptic motivations are as undercut by Dickens as are Esther’s, Ada’s, and Jarndyce’s attitudes toward personal change. Although in these “altered days” Chesney Wold has become a “waste of unused passages and staircases . . . abandoned to darkness and vacancy” (LXVI, 875), and although the sterile Dedlock family will end when the present Lord dies, Dickens cannot fully accept his own revolutionary desires. He suddenly softens his hatred for Sir Leicester Dedlock; a flop and exploiter throughout the novel, Sir Leicester proves generous, loyal, and honest in the end. Instead of jealously guarding his ruling class heritage, Sir Leicester wishes Lady Dedlock to return to him despite the taint she has brought upon herself and the family. George Rouncewell, renouncing well the middle class, returns to Chesney Wold to carry on his family’s tradition of domestic service: “You are not used to being officered; I am,” he tells his steel-and-iron brother; “Everything about you is in perfect order and discipline; everything about me requires to be kept so” (LXIII, 850). After the apocalypse, those who belong in oppressed positions of servitude must choose to return to them, as industrial capitalism looms menacing-
ly on the northern horizon.

The recurrent apocalyptic imagery associated throughout the novel with Chancery also remains unfulfilled. Although the omniscient narrator would like to see Chancery burned on a funeral pyre, although Boythorn would like to see it dynamited to smithereens, Chancery goes on to ingest more suitors into its perpetual stoppage. Although Krook self-combusts, the real Lord Chancellor for whom he is surrogate does not. Jarndyce and Jarndyce consumes itself in costs, and Miss Flite frees her birds on the day Rick dies—an ironic and attenuated Judgment Day. In a narrative concerned with apocalyptic revolutionary destruction, little is destroyed and virtually nothing changes.

Although seemingly a novel about the need for social change and transformation and for personal growth and mutual trust in human relationships, *Bleak House* is actually about the questionable viability, even the futility, of change. Through Esther and those she loves, Dickens creates a motivation in the novel to hoard and preserve order at all costs, which wars with the motivation in the omniscient narration to destroy institutions that fixate on the past to create order. The dual narrative allows Dickens as author to have his cake and eat it too: he alternatively imagines apocalyptic destruction and then static and secure changelessness. Dickens finds each motivation so fulfilling, enacts each so completely, that the novel does not progressively create a viable, earned alternative that can transform the bound-up, corrupt world he has imagined. Because he cannot decide whether change means healthy growth or loss, frustration, and separation, Dickens and his characters vacillate between experiencing those alternatives, and as a result he and they always confront change with trepidation. At the heart of Dickens' masterpiece about the need for revolutionary social change lies moral irresolution, regression, and the desire for changeless stability.

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**Argument and Strategy in Mill's *The Subjection of Women***

*Rise B. Axelrod*

*The Subjection of Women* has been dismissed by some (and praised by others) as solely a tract for the enfranchisement of women; that it certainly is, but it is much more besides. As the last book Mill published, it incorporates most of the major themes that preoccupied him throughout his career. The essay is a "sustained exposition," as Mill's friend and biographer Alexander Bain says, "of Mill's lifelong concern with the abuses of power"; it is "a powerful and deeply-felt plea against endowing any man, be he king, slave-owner or husband, with power without accountability." In order to make this plea effectively, the *Subjection* begins by undermining the philistinism of its audience. Its strategy is to confront the reader's compliant, dogmatic faith in custom with a rational analysis of the bases of established institutions and accepted opinion. The essay then attempts to reveal the contradictions among popular chivalric attitudes toward women, liberal-humanistic values, and the sociopolitical reality of the woman's situation. Of renewed interest in our time because of its political themes, the *Subjection* is equally valuable for its sensitivity to human psychology, to what Mill in his essay on Coleridge called the basis of all other philosophy, the philosophy of the mind. Mill's approach to the woman question, as well as his solutions, are indicative of his characteristic attitude of mind. The *Subjection of Women* is not a freak of circumstances but a logical de-

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2. The book, according to Mill's account in the *Autobiography* (Chapter 7), was originally written in 1861, revised occasionally over the years, and ultimately published in 1869 to coincide with the acceleration of the woman's movement. Mill gives much credit for the composition to conversations with his wife, Harriet Taylor, and also to certain passages contributed by her daughter, Helen Taylor. An analysis of the relationship between Mill and his wife and a reprinting of their joint and individual works on women's issues appear in J. S. Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill, *Essays on Sex Equality*, ed. Alice S. Rossi (Chicago, 1970).

development of Mill's lifelong thought.

As Walter E. Houghton has noted, Victorian essays were usually intended to tell readers what to think, to furnish them with respectable opinions and the "veen of culture" in a "rapid and simple style." From the first sentence of *Subjection*, it is obvious that Mill's essay will not fit into this typical mold. It is neither simplistic nor superficial, nor does it offer the reader a predigested theory based on hackneyed beliefs and attitudes:

The object of this Essay is to explain, as clearly as I am able, the grounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period when I had formed any opinions at all on social or political matters, and which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly growing stronger by the progress of reflection and the experience of life: That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other. (S, 427)

The use of the term "opinion" in this opening sentence indicates both Mill's intellectual method and his critical attitude toward the popular dogmatic process of mind. If for his contemporaries "opinion" was treated as "dogma," for Mill the two were diametrically opposed. The *System of Logic*, his earliest major work, was written, in Leslie Stephen's words, "to provide a logical armoury for all assailants of established dogmatism." Mill's opposition to a *priori* intuitionist theory represents an adaptation of the new empirical sciences to ethical and sociological study, and is a touchstone of his career. *On Liberty* advances the argument that an "opinion" can never be known to be absolutely true or absolutely false, and that to judge conclusively either way is tantamount to an "assumption of infallibility" (OL, 24–29). The most man can hope for is a relative certainty based on a perpetual process of testing. This conception of man's limitations and the ambiguous nature of his universe is strikingly different from the more traditional Victorian concept that truth is both absolute and attainable.

In *Subjection* (as in his essay on Coleridge), Mill characterizes the basic and unchanging component of the British condition of mind as its assignment of "infallibility" to whatever factor is commonly used to acquire truth. He explains that the nineteenth century can best be understood as a reaction against the eighteenth century's extreme rationalism (S, 430). As a result, this Victorian bias has developed into an almost religious faith in *feeling*, which becomes especially intense and deeply rooted when related to old institutions, a trust that counter argument cannot weaken, only strengthen: "When [an opinion] rests solely on feeling, the worst it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that their feelings must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach" (S, 427). Mill realizes therefore that before he can even begin his argument in *Subjection*, he must show his readers that their faith in feeling is not the spiritual inspiration that they think, but, at bottom, a reliance on and glorification of the baser elements in man. He claims that this dependence on feeling is really an "idolatry of Instinct" and as such is "infinitely more degrading" than faith in reason which, at least, uses those faculties that differentiate man from the apes (S, 430). This mode of attack on the popular attitude of mind is specifically calculated to appeal to an age still reeling from the Darwinian blow to mankind's self-esteem and aspirations. Mill argues that the idolatry of instinct is "the most pernicious of false worships of the present day" and if examined analytically would certainly be revealed to be the main support of most cherished Victorian institutions and customs (S, 430).

The ultimate effect of this reliance on instinct is to establish traditional institutions (such as the social subordination of women) as symbols of truth, morality, and the British way of life. Such symbols give authority and stability to the otherwise terrifyingly confusing quality of modern life, but they are symbols without a solid foundation, operating in an illusory fashion, through what is called in *On Liberty* "the magical influence of custom" (OL, 259).

The object of much of Mill's lifework was to institute a firmer foundation for Western thought. From this desire came his studies of epistemology, human psychology, and the social-economic-political organization of society, all of which are reflected to some extent in *Subjection*. His intellectual approach is based, as indicated above, on relativism, the belief that absolute truths are not attainable by fallible man. Yet in order to attain the ultimate degree of certainty possible, Mill indicates (in the opening sentence of *Subjection*) that he tests his opinions in two interrelated ways: philosophically and practically. He submits his opinion to "the progress of reflection and the experience of life." Like Bentham and Coleridge, he makes it his "occupation to recall opinions to first principles" (C, 102). This kind of examination constitutes the primary method applied in *Subjection*, as Mill attempts to prove that the established institution under discussion is based


5. See Houghton, Chapter 6, on dogmatism.

on a principle that is invalid for modern times. After discovering the grounds of the traditional opinion, the thinker must build on these foundations, inductively examining all possibilities and synthesizing them into a new opinion.

Mill's practical procedure of attaining optimum certainty for an opinion involves subjecting it to the test of experience, so as to determine its relationship to actuality as well as to discover if the opinion has utility, if it is a benefit to humanity. This test consists chiefly of close empirical observation of the patterns of human psychology and history. In the System of Logic Mill calls this process inverse deduction, that is, generalization from history, followed by verification by deduction from the laws of human nature. In an approach typical of all of his essays, the Subjection offers a variety of concrete examples from the history of social institutions and the present conditions of society as evidence in its arguments against the inferior status of women, relying to a great extent on the assumption that much of his audience shares with him the progressive conception of history. It is essential for the persuasive success of his essay, and for the spirit of reform generally, that Mill's readers no longer cling to the traditional idea of history as sacred and static.

In the Subjection, Mill applies his two basic processes of determining the validity of a theory—analysis of first principles and test of experience or utility—to the established system of social subordination of women, in an attempt to prove that this custom is both "wrong in itself" and "one of the chief hindrances to human improvement." His argument is basically that the principle upon which the institution is founded is alien to the modern organizing principle of social relationships. The relationship between the sexes is one of political domination, a virtual tyranny of men over women, and "an isolated fact in modern social institutions: a solitary breach of what has become fundamental law; a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one thing of most universal interest" (S, 450). Mill demonstrates that historically there has been an evolution from barbaric rule of force, which was rooted in the primitive instinct for self-protection, to modern principles of justice and liberty, which are based on the refined Christian virtues of love and sympathy. The change has been progressive, a betterment for society as well as for the individual, and the way in which these new principles of social organization came into being meets Mill's requirements for testing opinions. They were adopted only after all alternatives had been considered and had disastrously failed the test of utility (S, 447). Furthermore, Mill insists that freedom from despotism is an essential requisite for human development and that for the mutual advantage of society and the individual, political, social and economic institutions must be organized on liberal-humanistic principles. The individual must be allowed unrestricted cultivation of his talents, encouraged to develop his educational and professional abilities, and given the political mechanism to insure the protection of his freedom. These opportunities for the individual would result in certain benefit to the general welfare by making available more skilled, capable individuals to help resolve the problems that threaten security and progress.

One of Mill's difficult and crucial tasks is to show how the institution of female subordination is a detriment to both society and the individual. Aware of the intense adherence to custom that the insecurities and chaotic tendencies of the Victorian era created, Mill recognized the special aura of significance generally attached to the institution of marriage. Houghton explains that "as most traditional beliefs and institutions on which stability depends were being questioned and transformed, the Victorian clung harder to the oldest of all traditions and stressed its ordered hierarchy and daily ritual." The home was conceived of as a citadel of uncorrupted traditional values and the last refuge in which man could find peace, stability, and moral restoration. It was supposed to be, in Mill's words, a "school of moral cultivation," especially for the man who could not help but be corrupted by the materialism of the business world. Mrs. Sara Ellis, the author of various manuals for proper wifely behavior and household management, described the model Victorian home as the "place of refuge" from "that fierce conflict of worldly interests, by which men are so deeply occupied as to be in a manner compelled to stifle their best feeling.

7. In Utilitarianism (1863), Mill attempts to resurrect the best of Bentham's mechanical formulae of social utility and happiness.
8. The Victorian enthusiasm for history climaxed in the years 1835-1870; Macaulay's famous third chapter of History of England (1848) may be seen as one manifesto of the popular conception of history as progress. Reinforced by the apparent scientific confirmation of Darwin's evolutionary theory, this progressive view became an essential basis of the widespread Victorian reform impulse. Mill himself worked for practical reform throughout his career. His public advocacy of extension of the franchise to women began in 1866 at which time Helen Taylor became involved in the formation of the National Society for Women's Suffrage. Mill's two speeches to Parliament on women's suffrage were reprinted as pamphlets: Speech on the Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise, 20 May 1867 (London, 1867), and Speech in Favour of Women's Suffrage, 12 January 1871 (Edinburgh, 1875). For a historical study of the women's suffrage movement in England, see Ray Strachey, The Cause: A Short History of the Women's Movement in Great Britain (London, 1928), and Roger Fulford, Votes for Women (London, 1957).
This idealization of the home reinforced the chivalric myth of woman as moral exemplar and led to the insistence that she remain inviolate, protected from the harsh and sin-ridden reality of the world outside the home. The reasoning was that if the wife's purity was defiled, the sanctity of the home would be destroyed, there would be no place left in which to find comfort and regeneration, and eventually man's moral deterioration would be complete. Mill viewed this glorification of woman as "tiresome cant," which often amounted to little more than rationalization of the husband's unjust treatment of his wife; it was a fantasy that fed man's own self-interest and imparted to him a glorified sense of his own importance (the man becomes the knight in shining armor to the heroine) (S, 476).

Mill sardonically pointed out the contradiction between the professed belief that women are moral superiors and their actual social condition as inferiors: "They are declared to be better than men; an empty compliment which must provoke a bitter smile from every woman of spirit, since there is no other situation in life in which it is the established order, and considered quite natural and suitable, that the better should obey the worse" (S, 518). His approach was to reveal the reality of the situation in contrast to these grand idealizations; his object was to prove that these cherished sentimentalities were both untrue and pernicious.

Mill claimed that the home was in principle and often in practice the center of "domestic slavery," in which the wife was not the "angel in the house" but the virtual bond-servant of her husband-despot: "no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word as the wife is." Admittedly, this sounds like an extreme assertion, but he explained that no other slave is so completely under the master's personal, direct power, with no off-time or recourse, and that under the very worst of conditions the institution legalizes rape. The husband "can claim from [his wife] and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations." (S, 468). The stress that Mill placed on such instances of extremity and brutality was in part an attempt to shock his audience into realizing the ugliness that this sacred institution condoned and even encouraged, and in part a reflection of his own indignation and revulsion. As indicated earlier, Mill shared with his reader a marked distaste for human animality and a complementary love of rationality and restraint. Relying on this attitude as well as the commonly held deferential attitude toward the higher social classes, he pointed specifically to the lower classes as the main offenders while noting that most well-educated, upper-class families attempted to act as though the inequality did not exist.

Mill admitted that most marriages were not so bad in practice, but he emphasized that marriage gave every man absolute power over his wife without regard to the man's character. Noting that the law had recently made "feeble attempts to repress ... atrocious extremes of domestic oppression" (S, 468), Mill claimed that these reforms were doomed to ineffectiveness because "it is contrary to reason and experience to suppose that there can be any real check to brutality consistent with leaving the victim still in the power of the executioner" (S, 468). The contemporary chivalric attitude toward women provided a slight improvement over the barbarities that preceded it but was hardly a reliable deterrent, depending as it did on the gratuitous good will of the husband with no means of enforcement other than the sanction of society.

The demoralizing influences of the woman's inferior position on both man and woman Mill found enormous. Far from being the "school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving forgetfulness of self" which the home was supposed to be for the husband, it was more often "a school of willfulness, overbearingness, unbounded self-indulgence and a double-dyed and idealized selfishness" (S, 470). The almost unlimited power that the husband held over his wife and children even countered societal injunctions that would otherwise encourage repression of such antisocial characteristics. For a boy, the family was a school of philistinism that fostered the vices of arrogance, unmerited superiority, and uncritical self-satisfaction. In the demoralizing influences of a family founded on a principle of injustice, Mill saw the possible psychological foundations for other forms of oppression as well: "All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their principle nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and women" (S, 522). For the oppressed sex, Mill argued that every aspect of the feminine character might very well be the result of its experience in bondage and that there was no way of ascertaining from the condition women were now in, what their natural state would be: "What is now called the nature of woman is an eminently artificial thing—the allowing men divorce on the grounds of their wives' adultery, while granting women divorce on the grounds of adultery only when aggravated by cruelty, desertion, or crimes of bestiality, sodomy, or rape.


11. Mill is probably referring here to the Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, which established a special Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. The new law liberalized the grounds for divorce
result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others” (S, 451). Women have traditionally undergone an elaborate process of conditioning, the purpose of which was “to enslave their minds” as well as their bodies so as to insure perfect obedience to the master-class and certify the perpetuation of the status quo (S, 444).

Thus, Mill directly challenged the most telling objection to his proposed reform: the claim that the established system was natural and fitting, each sex being inherently predisposed for their different roles. Mill was highly critical of this myth of nature because it served too often as a pat rationalization for the most insensitive and selfish behavior. It also encouraged a Podsnapian (or perhaps Benthamite) mentality, which dismissed all it did not understand with a simplistic, meaningless generalization:

Of all difficulties which impede the progress of thought, and the formation of well-grounded opinions on life and social arrangements, the greatest is now the unspeakable ignorance and inattention of mankind in respect to the influences which form human character. Whatever any portion of the human species now are, or seem to be, it is supposed, they have a natural tendency to be: even when the most elementary knowledge of the circumstances in which they have been placed, clearly points out the causes that have made them what they are. (S, 452)

Without the benefit of a “sound psychology” nothing valid can be said about the modern condition of women.

In Subjection, Mill offers the framework of a “sound psychology”: a theory of conditioning that should be viewed as one of his most important contributions, one which furnished a basis for modern behavioral psychology. Mill explains that women are commonly subjected to “an education of the sentiments rather than of the understanding” (S, 552), a “hot house and snow” cultivation in which certain parts undergo an exaggerated development, often resulting in morbidity and hypersensitivity, while other parts are stunted and stifled, creating a tendency for hasty generalizations based entirely on intuition (S, 452). In a much quoted section of On Liberty, Mill delineates his organic conception of self-realization: “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing” (OL, 308). This insistence on the natural unfolding of human potential seemingly contradicts Mill’s opposition to reliance on nature as it is expressed in his essay “Nature”: “Nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result, not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct” (N, 890, 895). Mill neatly transcends this apparent paradox by turning to his standard of utility—“the ultimate appeal in all ethical questions” (OL, 16). Thus, in Subjection, Mill effectively concludes his eloquent argument for the freedom and full participation of women in the affairs of society:

The anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of nature, for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its purpose, is an altogether unnecessary solicitude. What women by nature cannot do, it is quite superfluous to forbid them from doing. . . . Whatever women's services are wanted for, the free play of competition will hold out the strongest inducements to them to undertake. And, as the words imply, they are wanted for the things for which they are most fit; by the apportionment of which to them, the collective faculties of the two sexes can be applied on the whole with the greatest of valuable result. (S, 458)

The Subjection of Women is a brilliant and convincing argument against the habitual mistreatment of the female sex. Mill insists that the subjection of women is not only a tyranny to them, but a handicap to society as a whole, a distortion of its nature and an impediment to its improvement. His basic argument is for the extension of the principles of equality, freedom, and justice to the sociopolitical organization of the sexes. Mill's defense of women's rights is only part of his broader defense of the rights of all mankind. Throughout his career Mill fought against the irresponsible use of power, and this essay should be seen as one of his final pleas.

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Carlyle and Ruskin: The Private Side of the Public Coin

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Victorian studies may fairly be said to have experienced a Carlyle revival in the last three or four years. With publication of Philip Rosenberg's *Seventh Hero* (Harvard University Press, 1974), the last major theme of traditional Carlyle scholarship has come under contemporary re-examination. Rosenberg's re-examination of Carlyle's political ideas disputes the conclusions of older scholars, who for many years filled in the line they had traced from Carlyle to Hitler. But not all new studies—of Carlyle's remarkable marriage, of the conflict between his German idealism and his Puritan conditioning, of his rhetorical style and literary province—have produced new positions on old issues.\(^1\)

In one of the most popular areas of Carlyle study, the "question of influence," old and new are instructively juxtaposed in *Carlyle and Dickens* and *Dickens and Carlyle: A Question of Influence*, both published in 1972.\(^2\)

Michael Goldberg's billing reflects the conventional wisdom that Carlyle preceded Dickens ideologically as well as chronologically; his method, adducing parallel passages, is likewise conventional. To William Oddie, on the other hand, the "question of influence" is interrogative rather than declarative, as his subtitle suggests and his argument declares.

The question of Carlyle's influence is of course by no means confined to Dickens, nor has the relationship between Carlyle and other writers always been termed "influence." Older scholars used "debt." Mill, Tennyson, Huxley, Gaskell, Kingsley, Melville—even Meredith, Swinburne, Maeterlinck—have from time to time been held to owe a debt to Carlyle. The moralistic tone of the word sounds throughout David J. DeLauria's argument that Matthew Arnold "accepted Carlyle's influence and yet rejected the man"; Arnold behaved, one infers, if not dishonorably, at least neurotically, by revering Carlyle early on and turning against him later. The course laid out is from admiration to imitation to rejection to refusal to pay up.\(^3\)

In "Carlyle, Arnold, and Literary Justice," D. R. M. Wilkinson subsequently attacks Professor DeLauria on the score of his having "boosted" Carlyle "at the expense of" Arnold.\(^4\) There is, however, another question at issue, one which Professor Wilkinson raises, argues briefly, but then drops as peripheral. That is the extent of Arnold's debt to Carlyle. In two specific instances Wilkinson finds his adversary citing parallel passages as "proof of the pervasive influence of Carlylean ideas and terms on Arnold's writing" when the passages in fact reveal the influence not of Carlyle but of a cultural inheritance common to both writers. One might speculate about a third instance: DeLauria's claim that Arnold's frequent figurative use of the words "mechanical" and "machine" derived from Carlyle's similar use (p. 114). What are Swift's rights in the matter? What are the rights of seventeenth-century writers who commonly used the words metaphorically in exposing the Devil?

The commonplace of Carlyle's wide influence and the consequent debts to him incurred by his contemporaries is as pervasive in Victorian scholarship as Carlyle's influence is assumed to have been among his fellow writers. What one might call the grandfather debt to Carlyle is Ruskin's, and it is a particularly fruitful one to re-examine because of the abundance of external material: diaries, personal letters, and the autobiographical *Praeterita*. If considerable doubt can be raised about Ruskin's indebtedness, scholars may not take for granted the debts of others less closely associated.

The closeness of Ruskin's association with Carlyle is proclaimed by Carlyle's epithet "the minority of two," and no one has dissented from this view of it. Writing in 1921, Frederick William Roe assumes that the two share a single social philosophy, as the title of his book, *The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin*, implies. The philosophy of course originated with Carlyle and passed down to Ruskin, who "had felt the force of Carlyle's teaching in his early years," on reading Sartor and *Heroes* and, later on, *Past and Present*, *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, and the histories, "quoting repeatedly from them ... and referring to them and their creator in words that express the most enthusiastic appreciation."\(^5\) Roe intimates that Ruskin read *The French Revolution* and *Frederick the Great* al-

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5. Roe, p. 144.
most as they came out, and he concludes his discussion with the assertion that "Upon the subject of social and political reform, he came to the conclusion that in these two books [Past and Present and Latter-Day Pamphlets], together with Sartor, Carlyle had 'said all that needs to be said, and far better than I shall ever say it' " (p. 145). This brief summary of Carlyle's influence on Ruskin is supported by several unidentified quotations of two or three words and three whole sentences, including the one quoted in part in the summary. Roe buttresses his argument with a long footnote to the effect that Ruskin's appreciations of Carlyle are too numerous to mention.

The numerous references Ruskin made to Carlyle appear differently in the perspective of Ruskin's own contemporary and retrospective accounts of his experience with his putative mentor. In 1841, the twenty-two-year-old Oxford graduate, writing from Geneva to his editor, W. H. Harrison, inquires casually: "What are these Carlyle lectures [On Heroes]? People are making a fuss about them, and from what I see in the reviews, they seem absolute bombast—taking bombast, I suppose, making everybody think himself a hero, and deserving of 'your wash-up,' at least, from the reverential Mr. Carlyle." Clearly, the tone of his remarks about "the reverential Mr. Carlyle" is most irreverent. It suggests, too, a probably second-hand acquaintance with Carlyle's works—Sartor Resartus, The French Revolution, and the essay on Chartism were all well established by this time—and certainly provides no evidence that Ruskin "had felt the force of" Carlyle in his years before twenty-two. Reference to Ruskin's diaries and to accounts of his early reading in Praeterita yields nothing to contradict such an impression, even though, especially in Praeterita, he refers frequently to other writers and other works. The King James Bible, Scott, Pope, and Byron are the great literary influences he acknowledges in his very young years: Johnson, in his adolescence: "No other writer could have secured me as he did against all chance of being misled by my own sanguine and metaphysical temperament... he secured me, by his adamantine common-sense, forever, from being caught in the cobwebs of German metaphysics or sloughed in the English drainage of them."

In recalling the crucial years between 1840 and 1850, when he was re-examining the dogmatic faith his parents had inculcated and evolving "a deeper and more rational state of religious temper," Ruskin singles out George Herbert as "useful beyond every other teacher: whatever has been wisest in thought or happiest in the course of my following life was founded at this time [1845] on the teaching of Herbert." Ruskin stops along his leisurely way in Praeterita to pay retrospective homage to Shakespeare, whose influence he "cannot the least trace on my mind or work, except as a part of the great reality and infinity of the world itself, and its gradually unfolding history and law." He pauses, too, to salute Rousseau and to name St. Pierre as "an immense influence... amidst my early reading."

Finally, Ruskin arrives at Carlyle, almost accidentally in the course of a tribute to Dr. John Brown. The tone and content of this comment contrast markedly with those of the others: "Lest I should not be spared to write another Praeterita, I will give here, in this place, a few words of Carlyle's, which throw more lovely light on his character than any he has written; and it is a bitter blame and shame to me that I have not recorded those spoken to myself, often with trust and affection, always with kindness." Ruskin is not expressing indebtedness to Carlyle but attempting to defend his old friend from the charge of harshness. He tells two of Carlyle's Scottish anecdotes, interprets them as illustrating that "the strength of Scottish character has always been perfected by suffering," digresses to comment on his beloved Scottish Cousin Joanie, and from her returns to Dr. John Brown without a backward glance at Carlyle. Nor does he throughout Praeterita mention Carlyle significantly again, except to contrast the effect of Scotland's landscape on him and on Scott, a contrast that seems to reflect Carlyle in somewhat less than lovely light: "How salutary the double coast and the mountain border were in withdrawing Scott from the morbid German fancies which proved so fatal to Carlyle."

Most biographers agree that Ruskin and Carlyle met about 1850. During the ten years intervening between the time of Ruskin's impertinent inquiry about "the reverential Mr. Carlyle" and the year 1852, there is no mention of Carlyle's writings in either the diaries or the published letters; yet both are full of evidence that in the decade Ruskin underwent his soul crisis and worked out his own version of the Victorian compromise. In a letter to his father in 1848, he speaks of having spent six years of patient study of "the difficulties which stand in the way of one's faith." His resolution of the conflict is typical of high Victorianism, but it seems to have originated with him: "Suppose we give up all reasoning about the matter.

6. All references to Ruskin's letters are to the Library Edition of his Works, ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (London, 1909); the letters constitute volumes XXXVI and XXXVII. XXXVI, 25.
and resolutely determine to believe with all our hearts, I fancy that this choice and determination once made, convincing proof will soon be vouchsafed." Equally typical is his accommodation, which he reports in the letter too, the determination to "choose our master and begin our work." 13

One may contend, of course, that even though Carlyle seems to have had no appreciable influence on Ruskin's thought up to the time of his thirty-third year, it is, after all, Ruskin's political and social opinions that Carlyle is supposed to have influenced, opinions not expressed in print until the publication of Unto This Last in 1860. The contention is lent credence by the fact that Ruskin's letters after 1850 indicate that he had begun to read Carlyle, and his diaries record their social acquaintance. In 1852, Ruskin writes to his father of Carlyle's "continually enforcing the necessity of being virtuous and enduring all pain and self-denial, without any hope of reward," 14 a necessity with which Ruskin finds himself altogether out of sympathy. A year later, however, he is in sympathy with Carlyle in controversy with the "practical people" who demand of a writer positive suggestions instead of fault-finding—in sympathy with Carlyle indeed, but also with "Tennyson, Kingsley, and all Thinkers whatsoever, who find fault with 'practical people.' " 15 Carlyle is not singled out.

Nowhere does one find any contemporary account in his private writing of Ruskin's having discovered Carlyle's work or recognized Carlyle as his master. By all means the largest number of letters of the 1850's concern Ruskin's association with the Workman's College. He is full of projects: to give courses to brickmakers, masons, shop decorators, and upholsterers; to explode the printing business; to make copies of thirteenth-century manuscripts and lend them out. His concern is not with theory but with the workers themselves: "All I hope for is to be able to show and to make men understand how they may live more comfortably—get better wages—and be happier and wiser than they are at present." 16 In a very long letter answering the inquiry of the Reverend W. L. Brown about his opinions on education (1853), he illustrates with a capsule account of his own experiences, referring, as always, to his dogmatic religious instruction; his early reading of Johnson, Goldsmith, and Richardson; his interest in mineralogy and drawing; his fondness for mathematics and profitable exercises in Greek and Latin grammar. As for his political opinions, they "have been formed entirely by thinking out in quiet walks," 17 a claim he re-asserts in much greater detail—alluding to his "clear mathematical head," his honest purposes, and his "perfect leisure for inquiry"—in a letter to his friend Dr. Acland, who apparently has reproached him for radicalism. 18

On December 9, 1854, Ruskin delivered the third of a series of lectures on color, in which he quoted from Heroes and Hero Worship. This lecture was not written out, but was reported in newspapers and reviewed by one journalist, who accused Ruskin of plagiarism, citing Emerson particularly. Soon after, Ruskin wrote what is apparently his first letter to Carlyle, which contains a sentence invariably quoted in part by all who allude to the Ruskin debt: "How much your general influence has told upon me, I know not, but I always confess it, or rather boast about it, in conversation about you..." Although the letter is quite long, it is worth quoting rather fully because it is a major document to consider in determining Ruskin's debt to Carlyle:

People are continually accusing me of borrowing other men's thoughts and not confessing the obligation. I don't think there is anything of which I am more incapable than of this meanness; but it is always most difficult to explain to others the degree in which a stronger mind may guide you, without your having at least intentionally borrowed this or the other definite thought. The fact is, it is very possible for two people to hit sometimes on the same thought, and I have over and over again been somewhat vexed as well as surprised at finding that what I really had, and knew I had worked out for myself, corresponded very closely to things that you had said much better. ... How much your general influence has told upon me, I know not, but I always confess it, or rather boast of it, in conversation about you, and you will see what—considering the way malicious people catch at such confessions—is certainly a very frank one, at the close of the lecture... which I send you... I have marked the passage. 19

Ruskin is anxiously eager to be just and to be tactful, but his meaning is unmistakable. When any opinion he expresses derives from Carlyle, he credits his source. Otherwise, his opinions are his own, independently arrived at even when they parallel Carlyle's. His own contemporary record of his interests, reading, and occupations bears out his claim.

That Ruskin was very much disturbed by the accusation is attested by his having added an appendix entitled "Plagiarism" to the third volume of Modern Painters, published the same year he wrote to Carlyle. In it, he first explains that he had not read Emerson when he delivered

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15. Ibid., p. 157.
16. Ibid., p. 185.
17. Ibid., p. 155.
18. Ibid., pp. 238, 239.
19. Ibid., p. 184.
the lecture, then points out that he would be ashamed not
to have been "continually taught by the writers whom I
love," naming Carlyle along with Wordsworth, Helpo,
Dante, and Herbert. It is only after that that he goes on
to say what is also often quoted, "most of all Carlyle." The
troublesome oral lecture has been reconstructed in
the Cook and Wedderburn edition by collating news-
spaper reports and notes taken at the time. Ruskin's words
are summarized; those he quoted from Carlyle are given
verbatim, no doubt copied out by a careful collator. Rus-
kin quotes in order to make a point about the powers of the
grotesque, which he wants to show are of peculiar interest
to people of Northern nations. The quotation is prefaced
by a sentence redacted thus: "The lecturer said that he
owed more to Carlyle than to any living writer"—the
subordinate clause of which is still another set piece in
accounts of the "minority of two." Moreover, the editors
have footnoted it: "This was Ruskin's first public admis-
sion of Carlyle as his 'master.'" What Ruskin said in the
lecture, one cannot be sure; however, the train of events
that followed may have forced him rather to overstate
the case.

There are a great many allusions in Victoriana to the
warm friendship of Ruskin and Carlyle, a friendship
that seems to have begun when Carlyle wrote Ruskin in 1851
to praise The Stones of Venice. Ruskin is reputed to have
been a frequent visitor to the Carlyles, but his letters
reveal that he was on the contrary, a rather remissly
infrequent one. In the first paragraph of the letter regard-
ing plagiarism quoted in part just now, Ruskin apologizes
for not having seen the Carlyles in three years. The letter
from which Frederick Roe quotes Ruskin's remark about
Carlyle's having "said all that needs to be said" is in fact
a Christmas greeting from France, a cordial note in which
Ruskin makes excuses for not having seen the Carlyles
on a recent trip to England. He does not refer at all to Past
and Present, and his reference to Carlyle's having said all
that need be said in Latter-Day Pamphlets is merely a po-
lite rejoinder to Carlyle's reproach to Ruskin for not hav-
ing written anything lately. It is characteristic of all his
specific allusions in letters to Carlyle's work. "All your
work is grandly done," a quotation Roe makes much of,
quite unjustifiably tying it to Ruskin's reaction to The
French Revolution and Frederick the Great, also occurs
in a most personal context. Ruskin, solicitous as ever, is
admonishing the seventy-six year old Carlyle to cease
fretting about his tasks: "All your work is grandly done,
and it is just time for coffee, and pipe and peace." When
he refers to Carlyle's work otherwise, his tone is quite
different.

According to the evidence in his diaries, Ruskin re-
quired as much time to read Frederick the Great as Carlyle
did to write it. It is not until 1875—fifteen years after the
work began to appear—that Ruskin mentions it: "Began
Frederick to purpose and worked well." Later that year,
he notes that he "did some Frederick" and "worked at
Carlyle." In 1877, he speaks of reading Frederick in the
evening, "at once encouraging and dismal in the ex-
treme." His last reference to what is apparently an
arduous task for him occurs in 1886: "I have just been
reading poor Carlyle on last volume of Frederick." As
for The French Revolution, Ruskin refers to it in an
account in his diary of a visit to Carlyle in 1872: "He
told me again what I have often so vilely forgotten, that
the whole first volume of The French Revolution was
burned in manuscript." What is impressive here is not at
all Ruskin's admiration of Carlyle's great book but the
tone of self-reproach. It is typical of many of his references
to Carlyle.

Ruskin probably read Carlyle with any attention at
all only after he had begun to be aware of the "condition
of England" question in the course of following up impli-
cations of his own thinking about art and history. His
initial response to Carlyle's work appears, by comparison
with prevalent enthusiastic reactions to many, many other
stimuli, to have been at most lukewarm. He seems to have
been drawn to Carlyle originally by Carlyle's own recog-
nition of their common interests and perhaps by the
recognition of others, such as the reviewer who inspired
the letter on plagiarism and their mutual friend Froude.
Ruskin endeared himself to Carlyle but, on the whole,
must have been more sought after than seeking in the
early years of their friendship. No doubt it was Carlyle
who first cast Ruskin in the role of disciple, a role which
had been vacated by the death of Sterling and the defec-
tion of Mill. Obviously Ruskin was honored to be chosen,
even flattered. That he always thought of Carlyle as one
of the great men of contemporary letters is not in doubt.
He sometimes cited him as authority, invariably showed
him the greatest respect, and, in later years especially, felt
sincerely affectionate toward him. The rather embarrass-

22. Ibid., p. 428.
23. Works, XXXVII, 45.
24. The Diaries of John Ruskin, ed. Joan Evans and John Howard
25. Ibid., p. 751.
26. Ibid., p. 944.
27. Ibid., p. 1125.
28. Ibid., p. 719.
LaTouche, and Ruskin's own unstable mental health in mind. Ruskin apparently read Carlyle's work with any attention very late, in the glow of their friendship, long after his own ideas were formed. In the formative years his reading of the master seems to have served Ruskin chiefly as fortification of his own opinions and as a rallying point to his readers.

The important thing to remember about Ruskin, as well as about Arnold, is that he differed very much from Carlyle, who was in fact a supporter and defender of personal reform and of the status quo. Ruskin, on the other hand, was a fervent advocate of change. Regulation of marriage, universal education, price and wage controls, conservation of natural resources, old-age pensions, government ownership of railroads, control over means of production, including agriculture, and housing legislation are proposals that did not grow out of a conception of the captain of industry as hero. What Ruskin indisputably has in common with Carlyle is very much what virtually all literary Victorians have in common with him: a strong moral bias and an urgency of tone. It was not the property of Carlyle, but perhaps he assumed that it was and perhaps he managed to convince a great many people that he owned it and that younger writers should acknowledge his propriety.

Perhaps, too, he still persuades Professor DeLaura, whose argument rests chiefly on evidence of Arnold's contempt for Carlyle after the publication of *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. Of Arnold's revealing early admiration for Carlyle, he cites only two instances. In a letter to Clough, Arnold refers to Carlyle as "the beloved man," a phrase that recurs in Professor DeLaura's essay as a reproach to Arnold for subsequent treachery. But "the beloved man" in the context of the whole letter has a tone of irony very much like that of Ruskin's phrase "the reverential Mr. Carlyle." The second piece of evidence comes from Arnold's reminiscences that there were four voices he had heard at Oxford in the early 1840's: Carlyle's, Goethe's, Emerson's, and Newman's. Professor DeLaura considers it significant that when Arnold listed those from whom he had learned, he retained Goethe and Newman but substituted Wordsworth and Sainte-Beuve for Emerson and Carlyle. What is clear is that one can hear a voice without learning from it and that Arnold never felt he had learned from Carlyle.

In fact, Professor Wilkinson's concession to his adversary that "the discrepancy between [Arnold's] early appreciation of and later disappointment in Carlyle . . . accounts for Arnold's behavior" may not be warranted. The reverential Mr. Carlyle, the beloved man, wrote to Arnold concerning the essay "My Countrymen," just as he wrote to Ruskin concerning *The Stones of Venice*. He had misread Arnold, as he perhaps misread Ruskin, but both younger men were flattered and responded politely. Ruskin, perhaps, through a concatenation of circumstances, was forced into a relationship that Arnold avoided.

Donald R. Swanson has argued recently that "Carlyle ceased to be his [Ruskin's] personal hero and master" after Carlyle's correspondence, "full of self-pity," was published posthumously.29 The case as presented is somewhat analogous to Professor DeLaura's against Arnold, though it lacks the accusatory tone. And Professor Swanson can of course offer a great deal more evidence of Ruskin's having admired and owed a debt to Carlyle. His account begins, "As early as 1854 Ruskin publicly acknowledged that he owed more to Carlyle than he owed to any other writer," a dubious but not unfamiliar inference from the redactor's sentence and the editors' footnote in the color lecture affair. And, predictably, it addsuces the partial sentence from Ruskin's plagiarism letter to Carlyle, "How much your general influence has told upon me . . . ," and repeats the claims of Frederick Roe. In fact, Professor Swanson even exceeds Roe in drawing inferences: "Primarily, however, Ruskin viewed Carlyle as his moral preceptor, the master who alone in England was able to guide him towards truth and goodness" (p. 56). Perhaps, but the question of influence is a great deal more complex than scholars have led us to believe. It deserves a considerable place in the Carlyle revival.

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Hard Times, Page One: An Analysis

Stanley Tick

The first few hundred words of Hard Times, which constitute all of Chapter One, are a remarkable bit of writing. By means of lively but most careful rendering, and a pair of fruitful conceits, Dickens expresses both his allegorical means and the polemical end it intends. His narrative distance is measured and his attitude fixed—all this done in a single page of writing. Indeed, if Hard Times disappoints after this notable opening, it is hardly to be wondered at: Dickens so firmly set his stylistic sails at departure that rarely during the course of writing could he deviate into discovery. Instead of opening the story of Hard Times, page one comes near to concluding it.

Here is the page in question:

Book the First—Sowing

Chapter One

The One Thing Needful

"Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts; nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir!"

The scene was a plain, bare, monotonous vault of a schoolroom, and the speaker's square forefinger emphasized his observations by underscoring every sentence with a line on the schoolmaster's sleeve. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows for its base, while his eyes found commodious cellars in two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's mouth, which was wide, thin, and hard set. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's voice, which was inflexible, dry, and dictatorial. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's hair, which bristled on the skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, all covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had scarcely warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside. The speaker's obstinate carriage, square coat, square legs, square shoulders—nay, his very neckcloth, trained to take him by the throat with an unaccommodating grasp, like a stubborn fact, as it was—all helped the emphasis.

"In this life, we want nothing but Facts, sir; nothing but Facts!"

The speaker, and the schoolmaster, and the third grown person present, all backed a little, and swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until they were full to the brim.¹

Hard Times has no preface of any sort, the only one of Dickens' novels besides Great Expectations to lack such authorial commentary (Our Mutual Friend has a postscript "in lieu of a preface"). Since two editions of the novel were published during his lifetime, it was not for lack of opportunity that Dickens forewent his normal practice of introducing the first bound edition in propria persona. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ventured to explain why Dickens failed to write a preface for Hard Times, but remarking on its absence seems a reasonable way to begin this analytic study of Chapter 1: to wit, let us hypothesize that the chapter's extraordinary brevity can be attributed to its functioning as a kind of substitute preface. By and large, this turns out to be a right surmise, as I hope to show, though this "preface" is distinctly unlike any other that Dickens wrote.

Invariably written after the text, Dickens' prefaces generally tell us something about the circumstances in which the novel was composed, or they describe and comment on its subject and characters. Often, the preface does some of both. The opening page of Hard Times, however, seems to be doing none of this. It is deliberately un factual, for reasons we shall soon determine. We are given no names, no location, no time for the scene. And when we pause to consider it, the chapter is oddly nondescriptive. After reading the page, we comprehend a great deal but see little. Indeed, our first clue to the chapter's stylistic mode is its insistent and varied reliance on metaphor: comparatively subtle in the opening paragraph, undisguised in the second, and obtrusive in the short, last paragraph. Even before we analyze and compare these lines, then, we can observe their nondiscursive nature.

The heading "Book the First—Sowing" did not appear in the text as originally published in the weekly Household Words. But we do know that in his working notes for

¹ The text is that established by Sylvère Monod and George Ford in their Norton Critical Edition of Hard Times (New York, 1966). So far as I can determine, this is the only single-page chapter to occur in any of Dickens' novels, and its singularity seems all the more impressive when we consider its aim. The chapter has just over 300 words, whereas the more famous opening chapter of A Tale of Two Cities—which also appeared in a weekly serial—has two-and-a-half pages and is nearly three times as long.
the novel, Dickens wrote out the three section headings (Sowing, Reaping, Garnering) at a very early stage.2 "Sowing" is a highly important word; it might be called the style-setting word for the chapter. Complemented by "plant" in line two, and by "root out" in the line following, "Sowing" introduces the novel's first metaphor. (As section headings, Sowing, Reaping, and Garnering combine to offer a commonplace figure that casts no important light on the novel but the role of "Sowing" here on page one is most arresting.) The introductory figure is put fairly subtly to work, rendering the speaker hollow well before the narrative intervenes. That a Prince of Facts should borrow his imperious verbs from the vocabulary of Arcadian metaphor is revelation indeed. This verbal conceit, introduced by "Sowing" and in which "plant" and "root out" are depended on as imperatives, strikingly underlines the authority of the speaker—and does so not by describing (from without) but by rendering his language-as-thought quite amiss.

This is the most important but not the only work done by the introductory figure. Dickens intends us to keep its particular (floral) basis in mind as we read on, for he will expand its effect into a conceit: the subsequent floral symbols in the novel, of which there are several, are referable to this introductory figure.

Dickens means to demolish "the Factual principle" here on page one, and by means of this immediate rendering alerts us both to his attitude and to the technique he shall employ. By using similes now, as well as metaphors, the hated enemy, Facts, shall be put to flight. And because the narrator realizes that the more bizarre he can make the analogy, the more remote he renders the value of Fact, he will enter in paragraph two thoroughly prepared to turn every phrase to Fancy's account. Which is pretty much what he does: throughout this long, central paragraph we observe a narrator who, by the repeated thrust of metaphor, conquers Fact as Don Quixote ultimately conquers Reality—by recreating it.

The speaker, already rendered hollow by his own language, is now to be reduced to rubble through the narrator's conscious art. As we come to the final, metaphoric line of page one, Chapter One, the champion of Fact is swept entirely into the dust bin. That accomplished, Dickens will have written his preface (but he will also have written too much of his novel).

The narrator begins paragraph two, then, by envisioning the schoolroom as a "vault." Following this, the speaker is introduced to us by the ostensible data of his appearances: descriptions of face, voice, manner. But in each instance, an item of his person is transformed onto the figure that started with "vault." The man is thus revealed to be a configuration; furthermore, his doubtful principle is now linked to its products, or should we say victims, at the school. Specifically, our attention is directed from the "vault" of the schoolroom to the "wall" and "base" of the speaker's forehead, thence to the "cellarage" and "caves" of his eyes, and back to the "wall" once more. This structural conceit is now celebrated rhetorically by our crusading narrator. We are offered a trio of sentences commencing with "The emphasis was helped by. . . ." At the last of these choric lines, the narrator launches himself into his highest metaphoric flight yet, whereby the unexciting fact of the speaker's hair is converted into a vivid "plantation of firs"; thus inspired, the narrator turns to a pair of blatant similes in order to transform the speaker's head even more grotesquely than he did the hair. At this point, the structural image reasserts its presence, and the square forefinger of line two is elaborated on by the "square coat, square legs, square shoulders," thus completing the transformation of speaker Gradgrind into something geometric and hollow. The paragraph concludes with what is meant to be a triumphant show of strength: the narrator now dares to use "a stubborn fact" as the abstract figure representing an animated neckcloth. We are meant to appreciate that the very principle advocated by the speaker has now been inducted into the arsenal of metaphor—and is here ludicrously turned against its philosophical proponent.

Having so thoroughly overwhelmed both the speaker and his principle, Dickens next sees fit to resurrect his target by summarizing his hateful theory: "In this life, we want. . . ." The words are repeated here rather like the final measures of Till Eulenspiegel's theme, the condemned prisoner's last pipings before the executioner strikes.

Composed of a single long sentence, the closing paragraph builds the most arresting figure on the page. The schoolchildren are metamorphosed into empty vessels awaiting their "imperial gallons of facts." Moreover, this figure, like the introductory floral image, is to be expanded upon: it becomes the counter-figure for the novel's pervasive fire imagery. During the great flooding rain Louisa saves herself from degradation, and thereby prepares the way for her father's reformation. Given the opening floral figure, the cyclical headings for each section, and this restorative function of water, we can trace the steps of a triumphant Nature back to the two symbolic sources in page one.

Page one of Hard Times is unlike any other Dickens preface; it is also different from any other of Dickens'

opening chapters. Flights of metaphor and simile, we know, often characterize Dickens' writing. We need think no further than Mr. Pecksniff's moral throat for another notable introductory figure. But in that and every other example, Dickens uses metaphors as they are conventional-ly used: to help us see our subjects. In Chapter I of *Hard Times*, it is the process far more than the effect of meta-phor that Dickens is relying on; metaphor there does not assist or deepen meaning, it is, qua metaphor, meaning. Since he is attacking Gradgrind's "factualism," that is, attacking the spirit of antimetaphor, what better weapon than metaphor itself? Fancy's chief linguistic resource is applied to as a means of vanquishing Fact. And Fancy succeeds admirably—indeed, far too well. Dickens must have considered the battle over and won on this first page, for by holding rigidly to his symbolic formulations, and by metaphorically crippling the exponent of Fact, Dickens prevented himself from testing his page one answers by the rest of his story.

Before he had written a word of *Hard Times*, Dickens sent to John Forster a list of fourteen titles, asking his friend and adviser to select the three he most cared for. Dickens had already chosen his own three favorites, and, as was often his wont, he turned to Forster for assistance. It turned out that "Hard Times" was their only common selection; but I like to think that had Forster been able to read page one—Chapter One before he made his mind up, he would have seconded another of Dickens' favorites, "A Mere Question of Figures." This is certainly a more quintessential phrase by which to announce the novel.

Few if any pages in the manuscript of this novel are so worked over as its opening chapter. The sheet is fairly black with corrections. I cannot help suggesting that Dickens got this opening page too right; composing the remainder of the novel became far too easy.

San Francisco State University

Hardy, Mrs. Oliphant, and *Jude the Obscure*

*Norman Page*

*Hardy’s Autobiography*—customarily but misleadingly referred to as *The Life of Thomas Hardy*, 1840–1928 by Florence Emily Hardy²—contains no reference to Mrs. Margaret Oliphant (1828–1897), prolific novelist and energetic reviewer. Among the surviving typescripts of the *Life* now in the Dorset County Museum,² however, there are two substantial passages referring to her review of *Jude the Obscure* in *Blackwood’s Magazine.*³ There seems every reason to suppose that they were written by Hardy, and it is interesting that the matter was evidently still, some quarter-century after the original appearance of the review and many years after Mrs. Oliphant’s death, a source of bitter resentment to him. The episode seems worth recalling as additional evidence of his acute sensitivity to criticism, and his long memory for what he regarded as an undeserved but deeply wounding attack.

The two appear to have met for the first time at Lady Carnarvon’s on May 15, 1885; and Hardy was not favorably impressed: "I don’t care a bit for her," he wrote to his wife the following day; "she is propriety and prissiness incarnate."⁴ Nearly seven years were to pass before he found himself, for the first but not the last time, a victim of Mrs. Oliphant’s well-developed sense of propriety. Her generally unsympathetic review of *Tess of the D’Urbervilles* in *Blackwood’s* (March 1892) opens by acknowledging uncompromisingly that "Mr. Hardy is not one of our first favourites in fiction" and proceeds to attack the moral basis of the novel.⁵ But the full onslaught was reserved for *Jude the Obscure* nearly four years later when she attacked the "glossiness, indecency, and horror" of Hardy’s last novel, again in *Blackwood’s*, in an article titled "The Anti-Marriage League"—a review that has been described


1. The "biography," still frequently taken at face value, was originally published in two volumes, in 1928 and 1930. All references are to the single-volume edition (London, 1962).

2. The Dorset County Museum possesses two incomplete and largely identical typescripts of the second volume of the *Life* (originally published as *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy*, 1892–1928). Quo-


as "perhaps the most thorough-going condemnation that *Jude* received." It is clear that Hardy read the article as soon as it was published, and reacted to it promptly in a letter to his friend Sir George Douglas; for as early as January 7, 1896, we find Douglas writing what is evidently a sympathetic response to Hardy's comments:

I am amazed to hear of the "rival novelist," as you gallantly call her, presuming I have long had almost an admiration for the lady as a really great mistress of the art of making bricks without straw, and as more than a mistress—a perfect High Priestess indeed—of the Commonplace. But I did not know that she aspired to be a "moralist" as well—I thought that was Ouida's province.  

The phrase "rival novelist" leaves us in no doubt as to the motives Hardy ascribed to Mrs. Oliphant; and it may have been about the same time that he pasted into a scrapbook of press cuttings an extract from the review in question, adding beneath it the observation that the article was "by Mrs. Oliphant, who had novels of her own to sell to magazines."

The death of Mrs. Oliphant in the year following her attack on *Jude* does not seem to have enabled Hardy either to forgive or to forget. When the novel was reissued in 1912 in the Wessex Edition, he recalled its reception in a lengthy postscript to the original preface, including an allusion to "the screaming of a poor lady in *Blackwood* that there was an unholy anti-marriage league afoot": and even later, in the last decade of his life as he worked on the autobiography that was to appear posthumously in the guise of a biography, the pain and bitterness caused by the attack had lost little of their sharpness. Chapter 22 of the *Life* contains, in its final form, a short passage on the reception of *Jude* and the vituperation to which its author was subjected, including the famous anecdote of the Australian reader who sent him an envelope containing the ashes of "his iniquitous novel." The tone of the passage is delicately ironical, and the emphasis rests on Hardy's "quick sense of humor" in relishing the absurdity of such extravagant reactions. A cancelled passage, however, suggests that the criticisms ranked more than the published version of the episode was prepared to admit. The words "The Reviews begin to howl at *Jude*" appear in the typescript, but are omitted from the diary entry dated November 8, 1895 (exactly one week after the publication of the novel in volume form), which is quoted in the *Life*. A little further on (after "... with a quill" in the final text) originally stood the passage quoted below. It is deleted in red ink, which Hardy habitually used for special emphasis; there is a disregarded marginal note in pencil, possibly by a hand other than Hardy's, that reads: 'Leave in until 'untrue'."

However, the booings at "*Jude the Obscure*" drew him back again to the subject of that volume, and his notes during the two or three ensuing months have more or less bearing upon it, though in after years he destroyed the great bulk of them, which at first he had intended to embody in an article of reply to the strictures. The clamour [discussion deleted] is not worth reviving in detail at this distance of time; nevertheless he was called by the most opprobrious names, the criticisms being outrageously personal, unfair, and untrue; for instance, the charge in Blackwood brought by a fellow-novelist that Hardy had published the story in a magazine-version and in volume-version to make a 'shameless' double profit out of it; when the truth was that, having entered into an agreement with the editor of the magazine before he had written the story, and having found on going thoroughly into the plot that it might not suit a family magazine, he had asked to be allowed to withdraw from the contract; as is proved by the following extract from his letter to the editor some months before the story began in Harper's Magazine:

"I have some misgivings as to whether my story will suit the magazine... Unfortunately novels will take shapes of their own as the work goes on, almost independently of the writer's wish."

And the following to the publishers:

"I am quite unable to assure myself that the novel will be suited to the pages of your magazine. I therefore, to avoid any awkward contingency in respect of your magazine, will ask you to relieve me from the agreement entered into concerning it."

To which they replied that such a step would seriously embarrass them because there was no time to get a substitute, the serial fiction in the magazine being arranged for long in advance. Hence he had decided to make laborious changes and fulfill his engagement.

The above passage is followed in the typescript by the paragraph in the *Life* commencing "The onslaught upon *Jude..." (p. 270). It is worth noting that, although Mrs. Oliphant uses the terms "shame" and "shameful" elsewhere in her article, she does not actually apply the epithet "shameless" to Hardy's commercial opportunism, though her observations on the "unsavoury traffic" of the revisions are sufficiently strongly worded.

The subsequent chapter of the *Life* (23) returns to *Jude*, and again there is a revealing omission. The following passage, similarly deleted in red ink in the typescript, comes after the words "... differed from his own" (*Life*, p. 278):


7. Original in Dorset County Museum.
... that is, to be sure, if he were sincere, which was by no means proven. The unkindest cut of all, however, seemed to him at the time to come from his acquaintance and fellow-novelist Mrs. Oliphant, who, after abusing him shamelessly in Blackwood as aforesaid, wrote to the bishop commending his action. And yet shortly before this, on hearing that she was ill, Hardy had wasted an afternoon at Windsor finding her house and seeing her. Now he, no doubt, thought how these novelists love one another!

The bishop is W. W. How, Bishop of Wakefield and notable hymn-writer; "his action" was an attack on Jude in the correspondence columns of The Times that secured the proscription of the novel by W. H. Smith's circulating library. It is curious to find Hardy, in the above passage, throwing back at the shade of Mrs. Oliphant the epithet that he had earlier, and inaccurately, accused her of applying to himself.

It seems that Hardy—or possibly his widow—had second thoughts concerning the wisdom of including the passages quoted in what was to be offered, and was for a long time to pass, as his official biography. Their excision is only one example of the general tendency of the cancellations and revisions revealed by an examination of the typescript, in the direction of softening the harsher features of Hardy's personality and minimizing the strength and turbulence of his feelings.

University of Alberta

“A Good Hand at a Serial”: Thomas Hardy and the Art of Fiction

Audrey C. Peterson

One of the hazards of literary scholarship is that an author may be condemned out of his own mouth. A chance remark uttered in a moment of pique with the reading public, with editors, or with the exigencies of earning a living will be quoted and requoted until it becomes a manifesto of the author's attitude toward his art. Such is the case with Thomas Hardy. Early in 1874, while working on the manuscript of Far from the Madding Crowd, Hardy expressed, in a letter to his editor, Leslie Stephen, a seemingly cavalier attitude toward the writing of fiction:

The truth is that I am willing, and indeed anxious, to give up any points which may be desirable in a story when read as a whole, for the sake of others which shall please those who read it in numbers. Perhaps I may have higher aims some day, and be a great stickler for the proper artistic balance of the completed work, but for the present circumstances lead me to wish merely to be considered a good hand at a serial.¹

I believe that this unhappy remark, often quoted out of context and without attention to the circumstances which prompted it, has been given more emphasis in Hardy criticism than it properly deserves.

In 1874 Hardy was still an apprentice novelist, willing to learn his craft. Only three of his fourteen novels had appeared, and of these Under the Greenwood Tree (1872) alone has enough merit to be ranked even tentatively with the mature novels. Hardy was also at that date eager to earn enough money to be married. His courtship of Emma Gifford had begun four years earlier, and even Hardy, who in his personal life often seemed to be as nonaggressive as his fictional heroes, was becoming restive at the long wait. There was no indication at this time of the unhappiness that in later years plagued the marriage, and Hardy was delighted that his early work was beginning to pay. But most important, Hardy was saying to Leslie Stephen that he was willing to make concessions to the serial form of the novel but not necessarily to its subsequent appearance in book form.

Critical comment on Hardy's remark often fails to take such matters into account, as a few examples will show. Albert J. Guerard, using the phrase to confirm Hardy's very real preference for poetry over fiction, argues that he "did not really conceive of fiction as a difficult and complex art. He thought of himself as 'a purveyor of family fiction' to magazines and wanted to be considered 'a good hand at a serial.' It was as a poet, not as a novelist,

that he hoped and expected to live." Later, Guerard inadvertently alters the chronology by stating that the remark was made "fairly late" in Hardy's career. Samuel Hynes, also reinforcing Hardy's preference for poetry, quotes the full passage of the letter to Stephen, and though acknowledging that "this was written at the beginning of Hardy's career," nevertheless adds that "Hardy never became a 'great stickler' for the art of fiction." So entrenched has the myth become that Charles May declares that "Hardy did not want to write novels, did not even consider the novel a serious art form. Forced by economic necessity to turn from poetry, he wished, for the money, 'merely to be considered a good hand at a serial.'" Richard Carpenter offers perhaps the harshest denunciation of Hardy: "Probably no other comment of Hardy's on writing is so notorious as his saying, after many novels, that he merely considered himself 'a good hand at a serial.' This is a disgraceful remark for a serious writer to make, but Hardy considered the novel an inferior form, a species of journeywork." Carpenter here distorts both the chronology and the meaning of Hardy's remark. His phrase "after many novels" suggests an accomplished novelist in mid-career, not an apprentice learning his craft. More important, Carpenter, like other critics, fails to distinguish between Hardy's attitude toward serial publication and the final book form of his novels.

Now there is no doubt that Hardy preferred the art of poetry to that of fiction. He tells us so, often enough, in journals, letters, and prefaces. Like many of his contemporaries, he regarded the writing of poetry as a "higher" form of art than the writing of novels, which were by common consent addressed to a popular audience. There is also no doubt that Hardy turned to writing novels when his poetry would not sell; he could make an adequate living as an architect but he wanted to be a man of letters, and fiction obviously offered the best chance for literary success. But this does not mean that he never took pains with his fiction, or that indeed he "did not want to write novels" at all.

The point that has been most neglected is that for Hardy, being a "good hand at a serial" was not necessarily the same thing as being a good hand at a "book." He recognized that concessions to public taste and prudery might be necessary for the serial form of a novel but not for the book form. In the letter to Stephen, he writes that he is willing to give up certain points in the story when "read as a whole" (book form) in order to please those who read it "in numbers" (serial parts). He is making a distinction here that remained with him as long as he wrote novels. Hardy simply did not regard the serial form as the "true" novel, much as a writer today may regard a film version of a novel as a commercial enterprise involving gross distortions of his "real" work.

That Stephen understood Hardy's mental separation of the serial from the "true" novel is evident in his letters to Hardy at this time concerning the manuscript of Far from the Madding Crowd. On February 17, 1874, Stephen writes: "When the novel appears as a whole, it may very well come in in its present form. For periodical purposes I think it [the sheepshearing scene] rather delays the action unnecessarily." On March 12 Stephen notes the need to handle in "gingerly" fashion the seduction of Fanny Robin and apologizes for the "wretched shred of concession to popular stupidity" (Purdy, p. 389). A month later, Stephen regrets that he may have to omit all mention of Fanny Robin's infant and have Bathsheba see only Fanny in the coffin: "It certainly rather injures the story, and perhaps if the omission were made it might be restored on republication" (p. 389). All of this is familiar enough in the annals of nineteenth-century serial publication. What has often been overlooked is that Hardy, unlike most of his contemporaries, did not begin by adapting his work to what he conceived to be public taste. Instead he wrote the novel as he wanted it—the "true" novel—and left it to his editors to carp and to alter the text for the serial version. He then restored most of the original material when the novel came out in book form. This is the pattern that Hardy followed not only in Far from the Madding Crowd but in those most notoriously bowdlerized serial versions of The Mayor of Casterbridge, Tess of the d'Urbervilles, and Jude the Obscure. The Hardy novels we read today are not the altered serial versions but the original versions as they appeared in book form.

For book publication Hardy often carefully revised his texts, and the quality of his greatest novels leaves no doubt that he did "have higher aims" later on. Only three years after the much-quoted letter to Stephen, a journal entry indicates his growing regard for the art of fiction:

So, then, if Nature's defects must be looked in the face and transcribed, whence arises the art in poetry

2. Albert J. Guerard, Jr., Thomas Hardy: The Novels and Stories (Cambridge, Mass., 1949); later reprinted, with a chapter on the poetry, as Thomas Hardy (New York, 1964), p. ix.
and novel-writing? which must certainly show art, or it becomes merely mechanical reporting. (Life, p. 114)

Hardy here specifically accords "art" to novel-writing as well as to poetry. He may never have elevated fiction above poetry as an art form, but he plainly developed into a serious and dedicated novelist, not merely a good hand at a serial.

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Irony and Sentimentality:
Conflicting Modes in Martin Chuzzlewit

Richard Hannaford

Contrasting Dickens' earlier books with Martin Chuzzlewit, Forster remarks that Dickens "scrutinized as truly and satirized as keenly; but had never shown the imaginative insight with which he now sent his humour and his art into the core of the vices of the time." 1 Certainly, one of Dickens' achievements in this novel is a multifaceted irony capable of reflecting the matured experience and insight gained from his first American tour. 2 But as Humphry House has cautioned, Martin Chuzzlewit represents "uncertain ground" in the development of Dickens' art. 3 Intruding into the novel is a sentimental mode which weakens the novel's effectiveness.

Steven Marcus has noted that in Chuzzlewit Dickens' style has become "consciously mannered" for the first time: "In a prose of such suggestiveness, compact and sure of stroke, the language itself seems an organ of perception, shaping the experience almost as soon as it is received." 4 By means of this controlled prose a predominating irony develops throughout the first two monthly installments. Besides the ironic opening chapter, 5 subsequent chapters emphasize how thoroughly the novelistic world is imbued with sham expectations and deceitful surfaces. A gleam of sunlight encourages a few "hopeful" robins to believe erringly that winter this year will not arrive. For a passing moment, clusters of autumn berries seem to be like coral beads "as in the fabled orchards where the fruits were jewels." 6 From this description of nature, Dickens moves to the introduction of the Pecksniffs where the false illusion of worth and merit increases.

Even the clothes Mr. Pecksniff wears seem to establish for him that here "there is no deception, ladies and gentlemen, all is peace, a holy calm pervades me" (18). Following chapters multiply the number of Pecksniffian characters inhabiting the novel: Old Martin, young Martin, Tigg Montague, Chevy Slyme, Mark Tapley and Tom Pinch. Each, in varying degrees, poses the postures in an attempt to convince himself and others that the image he projects is authentic, but throughout all, irony punctures illusion. This is especially true in chapter five when Tom Pinch goes to Salisbury to pick up Martin. The opening two paragraphs recount the superficiality and meanness of his employer through a comparison of Pecksniff with his horse ("full of promise, but no performance"). Furthermore, Pecksniff's rig is "more like a gig with a tumour, than anything else." Tom, however, sees nothing of this essential shabbiness because for him the gig is "gallant equipage," and he looks forward to bringing the new student "home in triumph." The ironic hyperbole identifies Tom's clouded judgment and it also creates the comically ironic perspective from which the reader is invited to view him.

Another aspect of Dickens' irony is his technique of reserving special words to undercut pretension and to emphasize the shabbiness beneath a superficial glitter. The following terms reappear in significant speeches and descriptions: "bright" (102 times); "gold" (89 times); "gleam" (14 times); "diamond" (9 times); and "jewel" (10 times). In context their effect is ironical and deflation-

2. The importance of the American tour on Dickens' development has been notably discussed by Steven Marcus in Dickens: From Pickwick to Domby (New York, 1965), pp. 240-252.
5. A. E. Dyson closely examines this chapter noting how it is a "delightful exercise in pseudo-scholarship in the tradition of Swift, Sterne and Peacock" ("Martin Chuzzlewit: Howls the Sublime," CQ, 9 [1907], 234-253).
6. Martin Chuzzlewit, Oxford Illustrated Dickens (London, 1966); page references are hereafter included in the text.
ary; for example, in the second chapter Mercy and Charity recognize in their father's tone a devious plan for making a profit and "they exchanged glances, and brightened very much" (16). Later on, Mrs. Todgers is said to look at the two girls "with affection beaming in one eye, and calculation shining out of the other" (126); the inane conversation at Todgers is called "sparkling pleasantry" (144), and the sentimental Jinkins despairs when Mercy "that bright vision" (184) must finally return home. In America everyone is "bright" and "shines" impressively; the Norises especially are "the bright particular stars of an exalted New York sphere" (291). When Martin listens to Scadder as the latter recites the virtues of Eden, he "glanced with sparkling eyes upon his Co. [Mark] and his Co. saw that the thing was done" (357). Dickens also ironically describes the new Tigg: "He had a world of jet-black shining hair... Flowers of gold and blue... were on his waistcoat; precious chains and jewels sparkled on his breast; his fingers clogged with brilliant rings... The daylight mantled in his gleaming hat and boots as in a polished glass" (428-29). As the novel progresses, then, one's perception of character and mood is continually shaped through words like "shining" and "bright." Moreover, incorporated into the design of the novel, these words underscore the most important themes. The more impressively a character shines, the more likely we are experiencing deceit or hypocrisy; thus, when Mr. Pecksniff speaks like the girl in the fairy tale, if the words falling from his lips are not diamonds, "they were the very brightest paste, and shone prodigiously" (12).

It is well known how the initial readers of *Chuzzlewit* were for the most part dismayed, and I suspect that they were unprepared for a novel in which Dickens acted the part of an eiron forcing them to confront reality and to renounce a romantic sensibility. Much of the vigor of the book depends upon Dickens' ability to sustain the ironic tone, and in the early going of the novel he is relatively successful. But as early as chapter five where Dickens portrays Tom Pinch ironically ("Mr. Pinch had a shrewd notion that Salisbury was a very desperate sort of place...")), he also succumbs to the temptation to intrude; he cannot resist asserting Tom's innate goodness. The immediate effect is perhaps negligible because intrusive apostrophe is balanced by the vitality of Dickens' description of the brisk winter morning and by the more predominant playful irony of the chapter as a whole. But as the novel continues Dickens' control over his ironic mode lapses.

One unfortunate result of Dickens' rhetorical flourishes (such as "Blessings on thy simple heart, Tom Pinch...") has been pointed out by Dyson: Dickens himself sounds Pecksnifian. What has happened is that Dickens, the eiron, has unconsciously become an alazon in his own right and the reader, sensitive to posturing and rhetorical deceit, is jarred by the abrupt shift in narrative style. I think this is why Dickens' sentimental intrusions in *Chuzzlewit* are so distinctly different in their effect from similar flourishes in earlier novels. In an *Oliver* or *Nickleby* the writer and reader participate comfortably in a romantic vision of what the world ought to be like. *Chuzzlewit* demands a far different response which Dickens apparently forgets, and Barbara Hardy justly claims that "Dickens is both careful and slap-happy about some aspects of composition."

In the final paragraph Dickens makes his last apostrophe to Tom: "From the Present, and the Past, with which she [Ruth] is so tenderly entwined in all thy thoughts, thy strain soars onward to the Future." This sentimental glow of fine writing nearly obscures the implicit causal relationship between Past-Present-Future to which Dickens has attached singular importance throughout the novel. Young Martin and Mercy Pecksniff have had to learn to recognize the cause-effect consequences created by their attitudes and actions. From that recognition they begin to develop self-reliance and responsibility, qualities which derive from an accurate judgment of themselves and a careful evaluation of reality. Dickens' fond farewell interrupts this serious movement and development of the novel; furthermore, the farewell fails stylistically because the more Dickens blatantly asserts Tom's goodness, the more one begins to hear (as an echo) a derisive and subversive laughter which carries over from the burlesquing, ironic tone which in the early chapters exposes the limitations and dangers of such sentimental simplicity. However, the ironic mode so effectively handled in the early chapters has disintegrated long before the final paragraph. It may be that Dickens has desperately tried to entice readers back to his serial by reverting to the sentimental rhetoric of *The Old Curiosity Shop*, a plan he later adopts in *Dombey and Son*. Whatever the cause, as Dickens builds toward the happy resolution in chapters 45 and 53 one can see where he thoroughly abandons his ironic narrative mode.

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7. Contemporary readers' reactions to *Martin Chuzzlewit*, as well as a summary of critical appraisals of the novel's near failure as a serial, can be found in George H. Ford's *Dickens and His Readers* (New York, 1965), pp. 43-49.
Stuart Curran suggests that these garden scenes, usually considered "insufferable," are actually metaphorically appropriate. If, after all, simple love is the answer to deceit, then in the Temple garden the Fountain is free from all taint and is "the baptismal font of true love." The Eden metaphor, fulfilled in these chapters, even "constitutes the single most powerful force for unity in the novel." In fact, Dickens has used the Eden metaphor before in Nicholas Nickleby, and his reuse of it is another example of how in the later portions of Chuzzlewit he reverts stylistically to earlier successes. Dickens, then, thinks his prose glowingly affirms Ruth's and John's love and the animated vigor of the prose is almost convincing—almost, that is, until one realizes with a start the peculiar nature of the diction. The Temple fountain brilliantly sparkles; John's eyes sparkle; Ruth smiles and blushes brightly "like the sparkling light upon the jewels" (italics added) with which old Martin has just bedecked her. John looks up at Ruth's window and cherishes the slightest gleam beyond the value of the most brilliant diamond. In short, everything about the romance is bright and shining. Heretofore, Dickens has reserved such words to puncture romantic delusion; to find him now using them to describe this love not only egregiously disrupts an essential ironical pattern in the book, it also undermines, through unconscious parody, the sincerity of the love story itself. Once again Dickens' rhetoric becomes uncomfortably Pecksniffian, and the reader, like Mercy early in chapter two, correctly responds, "Oh Pa... See advertisement."

Martin Chuzzlewit represents Dickens' first attempt at controlled ironic effect, and in the initial stages of the novel he creates a convincing and effective narrative stance, that of the eiron aware of the multiple facades his characters erect in order to preserve their illusory world view. Pecksniff's hypocrisy is the principal facade, but each character in varying degrees is Pecksniffian. This is perhaps what Forster has in mind when he writes that if all Englishmen are not implicitly like Pecksniff, at least "the ruling weakness is to countenance and encourage the race"; moreover, "when people call the character exaggerated... they only refuse... to sanction in a book what half their lives is passed in tolerating if not in worshiping." Dickens' irony is consistently good as long as he exposes this errant worship. When he turns to the solution of Pecksniffery, however, his precision with language and his control over characterization radically diminish, signaled by his reversion to sentimental apostrophe.

University of Idaho

Recent Publications: A Selected List

Arthur F. Minerof

February 1974—July 1974

I

GENERAL


Feltes, N. N. "Community and the Limits of Liability in Two Mid-Victorian Novels." Victorian Studies, June, pp. 355-369. The concept of liability is central to the social and economic history of mid-Victorian England as well as to the distinctive organization of The Mill on the

12. Ibid., p. 54.
13. For example, see Jerome Meckler, "The Faint Image of Eden:

Floss and Little Dorrit.


Reed, John R. "The Public Schools in Victorian Literature." Nineteenth-Century Fiction, June, pp. 58-76. The public schools were treated unfavorably in much of Victorian literature.


Winslow, Donald F. "Francis W. Newman's Assessment of John Sterling: Two Letters." English Language Notes, June, pp. 278-283. To Moncure D. Conway.


Bell, Alan. "Lord Acton Gets His Chair." TLS, 8 February, p. 137. Details behind Acton's appointment as Professor of History at Cambridge.


Woodall, Robert T. "The Ballot Act of 1872." History Today, July, pp. 464-471. The secret ballot at general elections was implemented after much experience of bribery.


II

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS


Siegel, Mark. "The Role of Vivian in Arnold's 'Tristram and Iseult.'" Criticism, Spring, pp. 136-152. Vivian does not represent the experience of either Iseult, but instead embodies the force of passion that precipitates the tragedy.


Bishop, Alan, and John Fersns. "'Art in obedience to laws': Form and Meaning in Browning's 'Abt Vogler.'" *Victorian Poetry*, Spring, pp. 25-32. Art obeys laws but simultaneously achieves freedom and immediacy.


Siegfried, Mark. "Browning's *Red Cotton Night-Cap Country*: The Process of Imagination." *Victorian Poetry*, Summer, pp. 137-152. The poem is a record of the process by which dramatic monologues are created.

—. "Pollyanna or Polyanthus: Clara de Milleflours in Browning's *Red Cotton Night-Cap Country*." *English Language Notes*, June, pp. 283-287. The negative implications of her name suggest possibly treacherous depths to her character.


DICKENS, Diskin, Patrick. "The Literary Background of 'The Old Curiosity Shop.'" *Notes and Queries*, June, pp. 210-213. The origins are more varied and more complex than previously suspected.


Hughes, Felicity. "Narrative Complexity in *David Copperfield*." *ELH*, Spring, pp. 89-105. Complexity as a significant contribution to meaning.


Eliot's concept of crisis helped her write an effectively structured novel.


Wing, George. “The Motto to Chapter XXI of Daniel Deronda: A Key to All George Eliot's Mythologies?” Dalhousie Review, Spring, pp. 16-32. The power of Ignorance is important thematically in all her novels.


HARDY, Hawkins, Desmond. “Tess in the Opera House.” Contemporary Review, July, pp. 26-31. Hardy and composer d'Erlanger were on closer terms than The Life of Thomas Hardy suggests.


Horne, Lewis B. “Hardy's Little Father Time.” South Atlantic Quarterly, Spring, pp. 213-223. Hardy uses the child to help bring Jude into a modern time.

Jarrett, David W. “Hawthorne and Hardy as Modern Romancers.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, March, pp. 458-471. The House of the Seven Gables was a considerable influence on A Laodicean.

Kozicki, Henry. “Myths of Redemption in Hardy's Tess of the d'Urbervilles.” Papers on Language and Literature, Spring, pp. 150-158. Their importance to understanding the novel.


Sutherland, John. “A Note on the Teasing Narrator in Jude the Obscure.” English Literature in Transition, Vol. XVII, No. 3, pp. 159-162. At several points Hardy chooses to be deliberately oblique and teasing.


RUSKIN, Dankert, Clyde E. “Wealth and Ilith—Ruskin Reconsidered.” Dalhousie Review, Spring, pp. 33-47. The contemporary relevance of some of Ruskin's economic and social ideas.

Dellamora, Richard J. “The Revaluation of 'Christian' Art: Ruskin's Appreciation of Fra Angelico 1845-60.”
University of Toronto Quarterly, Winter 1974, pp. 143-150. Ruskin's changing attitude toward the Christian aesthetic in art may be traced in his changing attitude toward Fra Angelico.


Sypher, Francis Jacques. “Swinburne's Debt to Campbell in 'A Forsaken Garden.'” Victorian Poetry, Spring, pp. 74-78. Swinburne's poem is modeled on “Lines Written on Visiting a Scene in Argyshire.”


TENNYSON. Kincaid, James R. “Rhetorical Irony, the Dramatic Monologue, and Tennyson's Poems (1842).” Philological Quarterly, Spring, pp. 220-226. The dramatic monologue as a special case of the ironic rhetoric.


Puckett, Harry. “Subsjective Imagination in In Memoriam.” Victorian Poetry, Summer, pp. 97-124. The poem is the affirmation primarily of will rather than the affirmation of truths or a belief.


Harden, Edgar F. “The Challenges of Serialization: Parts 4, 5, and 6 of The Newcomes.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, June, pp. 3-21. Thackeray found the restraints of the serial form confining but also stimulating to his imagination.


Parker, David. “Oscar Wilde's Great Farce: The Importance of Being Earnest.” Modern Language Quarterly, June, pp. 173-186. The play is a great farce because it transcends the normal limitations of the form.

PROJECTS—REQUESTS FOR AID

CAMELOT IN VICTORIAN FICTION. David Staines wants information or references to Victorian novels using the Arthurian world for their plots or major references. TLS, 7 June, p. 620.

WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY. N. W. M. Pickwood seeks any drawings or unpublished letters relevant to a study of Thackeray's career as an artist. TLS, 22 February, p. 193.

Staten Island Community College
City University of New York
English X News

A. THE NEW YORK MEETING
Chairman, G. B. Tennyson, University of California (Los Angeles)
Secretary, Richard C. Tobias, University of Pittsburgh

I. Business
II. Papers and Discussion: Victorian Fiction
3. "Vision and Form: The English Novel and the Emergence of the Short Story," Wendell V. Harris, Northern Illinois University


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B. THE VICTORIAN LUNCHEON
The 1974 Victorian Group Luncheon will be held on Friday, December 27, in room Nassau B. of the Hilton Hotel, with cocktails at 12 noon and luncheon at 1 p.m. For reservations, please send a check for $9.90 to Barry V. Qualls, Department of English, Scott Hall, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903, by December 15.

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