Analyzing the Logic of J. S. Mill, On Liberty,
in Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy
eds., Mappes and Zembaty (2002), pp. 214-17

Contact: Dr. Jan Garrett

Revised October 30, 2003

For a reconstruction of Mill's reasoning that carries the process of argument analysis to the next stage, see Reconstruction of Mill's Argument.

1. The main purpose of the Mill excerpt is to defend freedom of speech,
     expression, and assembly. This is part of his larger "object" of showing that
     "the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercise over any member
     of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." (215)

2. The key question he is addressing appears to be:
     Why should we (reasonable people) support freedom of speech,
     expression and assembly? (This presupposes a "yes" answer
     to a prior question: Should we support freedom of speech?)

3a. The most important conclusions seem to be:

     a. Public rules restricting conduct should be limited to issues most directly harmful
          to other human beings; "over himself the individual is sovereign."
          (This is supported by c under 3b.)

3b. Intermediate conclusions in this article include:
     a. Suppression of unpopular ideas can be harmful.
     b. Unpopular ideas should not be suppressed. (b is supported by a)
     c. Liberty of conscience, of pursuits, and combination should be upheld subject
          to limitation by the rule against harming others.
          (This is supported by b and used as support for "a" under 3a.)

4. The most important (basic) premises used to support Mill's conclusion are:
     A suppressed view may be true.
     A suppressed view, though false, may be partly true
          and have something to add to the partly true dominant view.
     Consideration of false views can help us understand and appreciate
          completely true views and deepen our commitment to them.

5a. Some of the key concepts in this text are:
     What affects the self, the personal sphere.
     What directly affects other people.
     The inward domain of consciousness.
     Liberty of conscience.
     Liberty of tastes and pursuits.
     Liberty of combination.

5b. By these concepts the author means: [One should explain these concepts.]

6. The author assumes, without stating explicitly, that:
     It is beneficial to know the truth, and harmful to be ignorant;
     We ought not to risk loss of benefit.
          (An expression of Mill's social consequentialism)
     Whatever helps people understand completely true views is beneficial.
     Allowing false views makes possible a debate between the
          completely true view and the false view.

7. If we take this line of reasoning seriously we would be vigorous supporters of civil liberties (First Amendment rights, in the U. S. context). We would defend the right to publicize and discuss any position that does not directly promote harm to others. We would oppose all attempts to criminalize mere expression of opinion.

8. If we fail to take this line of reasoning seriously, we might support government restrictions on freedom of speech and religion because we are fearful of what people might do if they decided to act upon false ideas (even though we have no evidence that they are planning or starting to do so); we might support such restrictions because we want to live in a culturally and religiously more uniform society, again because we are afraid, this time of people whose values are different from ours but are no threats to our own freedom or well-being.

9. The main point of view present in this article is one of a social consequentialist ("utilitarian") who has a strong (secondary?) commitment to truth and liberty.

Not all social consequentialists will agree with Mill. Some, for instance, might give such emphasis to physical security and property that they are willing to sacrifice many liberties by granting more power to agencies like the FBI and CIA, on the debatable assumption that giving such agencies more powers would add to our security. Mill's and other civil libertarians' differences with such consequentialists would rest partly on a difference about facts: what in fact is the causal relation between giving such agencies additional liberty-limiting powers and the security of the citizens?