291 U.S. 502 (1934)
The factual background of this case vividly illustrates how a trivial incident can result in a landmark constitutional decision. In 1933, the New York legislature bad established a milk control board with the power to "fix minimum and maximum ... retail prices to be charged... to consumers." The board set the price of milk at nine cents a quart, but Leo Nebbia, a Rochester grocer, violated this order by selling two quarts of milk and a nickel loaf of bread for eighteen cents. At his trial, Nebbia asserted that the statute and order contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following his misdemeanor conviction, Nebbia renewed this contention unsuccessfully in appeals to the county court and the New York Court of Appeals. He then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
... Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest....
The milk industry in New York has been the subject of long-standing
and drastic regulations in the public interest. The legislative investigation
of 1932 was persuasive of the fact that for this and other reasons unrestricted
competition aggravated existing evils and the normal law of supply and
demand was insufficient to correct maladjustments detrimental to the community.
The inquiry disclosed destructive and demoralizing competitive conditions
and unfair trade practices which resulted in retail price cutting and reduced
the income of the farmer below the cost of production. We do not understand
the appellant to deny that in these circumstances the legislature might
reasonably consider further regulation and control desirable for protection
of the industry and the consuming public. That body believed conditions
could be improved by preventing destructive price-cutting by stores which,
due to the flood of surplus milk, were able to buy at much lower prices
than the larger distributors and to sell without incurring the delivery
costs of the latter. In the order of which complaint is made the Milk Control
Board fixed a price of ten cents per quart for sales by a distributor to
a consumer, and nine cents by a store to a consumer, thus recognizing the
lower costs of the store, and endeavoring to establish a differential which
would be just to both. In the light of the facts the order appears not
to be unreasonable or arbitrary, or without relation to the purpose to
prevent ruthless competition from destroying the wholesale price structure
on which the farmer depends for his livelihood, and the community for an
assured supply of milk.
But we are told that because the law essays to control prices it denies due process. Notwithstanding the admitted power to correct existing economic ills by appropriate regulation of business, even though an indirect result may be a restriction of the freedom of contract or a modification of charges for services or the price of commodities, the appellant urges that direct fixation of prices is a type of regulation absolutely forbidden. His position is that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to hold the challenged statute void for this reason alone. The argument runs that the public control of rates or prices is per se unreasonable and unconstitutional, save as applied to businesses affected with a public interest; that a business so affected is one in which property is devoted to an enterprise of a sort which the public itself might appropriately undertake, or one whose owner relies on a public grant or franchise for the right to conduct the business, or in which he is bound to serve all who apply; in short, such as is commonly called a public utility; or a business in its nature a monopoly. The milk industry, it is said , possesses none of these characteristics, and , therefore, not being affected with a public interest, its charges may not be controlled by the state. Upon the soundness of this contention the appellant's case against the statute depends.
We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility. We think the appellant is also right in asserting that there is in this case no suggestion of any monopoly or monopolistic practice. It goes without saying that those engaged in the business are in no way dependent upon public grants or franchises for the privilege of conducting their activities. But is, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to regulation in the public interest, what constitutional principle bars the state from correcting existing maladjustments by legislation from touching prices? We think there is no such principle. The Due Process Clause makes no mention of sales or of prices any more than it speaks of business or contracts or buildings or other incidents of property. The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago. *** ...
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether
circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion
of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory
.*** The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject
to control for the public good. In several of the decisions of this court
wherein the expressions "affected with a public interest," and "clothed
with a public use," have been brought forward as the criteria of the validity
of price control, it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of
definition and form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of
legislation directed at business practices or prices. These decisions must
rest, finally, upon the basis that the requirements of due process were
not met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and effect.
But there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate
measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including
the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it...
... The Constitution does not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.
Tested by these considerations we find no basis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for condemning the provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law here drawn into question.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds [joined by Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler, dissenting]
... Regulation to prevent recognized evils in business has long been upheld as permissible legislative action. But fixation of the price at which AA," engaged in an ordinary business, may sell, in order to enable "B,@ a producer, to improve his condition, has not been regarded as within legislative power. This is not regulation, but management, control, dictation - it amounts to the deprivation of the fundamental right which one has to conduct his own affairs honestly and along customary lines. The argument advanced here would support general prescription of prices for farm products, groceries, shoes, clothing, all the necessities of modern civilization, as well as labor, when some legislature finds and declares such action advisable and for the public good. This Court has declared that a State may not by legislative fiat convert a private business into a public utility. ***And if it be now ruled that one dedicates his property to public use whenever he embarks on an enterprise which the Legislature may think it desirable to bring under control, this is but to declare that rights guaranteed by the Constitution exist only so long as posed public interest does not require their extinction. To adopt such a view, of course, would put an end to liberty under the Constitution....