Martin, a British subject, sought to recover land confiscated by the State of Virginia in 1789 pursuant to a policy of confiscating all lands belonging to British Subjects. Martin challenged the validity of the confiscation, relying on anticonfiscation clauses in treaties between the US and England. The State trial court had held in Martin's favor, but the Virginia Court of Appeals had reversed on the grounds that the State's title to the land vested before the applicable treaties or, in the alternative, that the claim was defeated by a 1796 compromise between the State and Lord Fairfax, from whom Martin had inherited the land. Without mentioning the compromise, the US Supreme Court, in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cr. (11 US) 603 (1813), had reversed the Virginia Court of Appeals on the ground that Virginia had not perfected its title to the land before the treaties became law. On remand of that case, the Virginia Court of Appeals refused to comply with the instructions of the Supreme Court that it enter judgment in favor of the Appellant. The State Court ruled that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which extended federal jurisdiction over State courts, was unconstitutional. Such a provision, which placed one sovereign (Virginia) under the control of another sovereign (the United States), was repugnant to the notion of state sovereignty. Martin again appealed to the Supreme Court.

Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court:

The third article of the [C]onstitution is that which must principally attract our attention. The first section declares, "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." The second section declares, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity, arising under this [C]onstitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under the grants of different states; and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects." It then proceeds to declare, that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make." ***

*** The language of the article throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative that Congress could not, without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it into operation. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested (not may vested) in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. ***

If, then, it is the duty of Congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all. If it were otherwise, this anomaly would exist, that Congress might successively refuse to vest the jurisdiction in any one class of cases enumerated in the [C]onstitution, and thereby defeat the jurisdiction as to all; for the [C]onstitution has not singled out any class on which Congress are bound to act in preference to others. ***

*** [T]he appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any particular courts. The words are, "the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases," &c., and "in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction." It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the [C]onstitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it depends. [I]f the text be clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the inference be irresistible.

If the [C]onstitution meant to limit the appellate jurisdiction to cases pending in the courts of the United States, it would necessarily follow that the jurisdiction of these courts would, in all cases enumerated in the [C]onstitution, be exclusive of state tribunals. How otherwise could the jurisdiction extend to all cases arising under the [C]onstitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, or to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? If some of these cases might be entertained by state tribunals, and no appellate jurisdiction as to them should exist, then the appellate power would not extend to all, but to some, cases. If state tribunals might exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all or some of the other classes of cases in the [C]onstitution without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States might, as to such cases, have no real existence, contrary to the manifest intent of the [C]onstitution. Under such circumstances, to give effect to the judicial power, it must be construed to be exclusive; and this not only when the casus faederis should arise directly, but when it should arise, incidentally, in cases pending in state courts. This construction would abridge the jurisdiction of such courts far more than has been ever contemplated in any act of Congress. ***

[I]t is plain that the framers of the [C]onstitution did contemplate that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States not only might but would arise in the state courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction. With this view the sixth article declares, that "this [C]onstitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It is obvious that this obligation is imperative upon the state judges in their official, and not merely in their private, capacities. From the very nature of their judicial duties they would be called upon to pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution of the state, but according to the [C]onstitution, laws and treaties of the United States ? "the supreme law of the land." ***

It has been argued that [the Supreme Court's] appellate jurisdiction over state courts is inconsistent with the genius of our governments, and the spirit of the [C]onstitution. That the latter was never designed to act upon state sovereignties, but only upon the people, and that if the power exists, it will materially impair the sovereignty of the states, and the independence of their courts. We cannot yield to the force of this reasoning; it assumes principles which we cannot admit, and draws conclusions to which we do not yield our assent.

It is a mistake that the [C]onstitution was not designed to operate upon the states, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives. The tenth section of the first article contains a long list of disabilities and prohibitions imposed upon the states. Surely, when essential portions of state sovereignty are taken away, or prohibited to be exercised, it cannot be correctly asserted that the [C]onstitution does not act upon the states. The language of the [C]onstitution is also imperative upon the states as to the performance of many duties. It is imperative upon the state legislatures to make laws prescribing the time, place, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, and for electors of president and vice-president. And in these, as well as some other cases, [C]ongress have a right to revise, amend, or supersede the laws which may be passed by state legislatures. When, therefore, the states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the states are, in some respects, under the control of [C]ongress, and in every case are, under the [C]onstitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United States, it is certainly difficult to support the argument that the appellate power over the decisions of the state courts is contrary to the genius of our institutions. The courts of the United States can, without question, revise the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to be contrary to the [C]onstitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely the exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of sovereign power. ***

On the whole, the court are of opinion, that the appellate power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the state courts; and that the 25th section of the judiciary act, which authorizes the exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases, by a writ of error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution. We find no clause in the instrument which limits this power; and we dare not interpose a limitation where the people have not been disposed to create one.

[The decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals is REVERSED]