This case arose out of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842. Essentially, the conflict involved rival government competing for sovereignty-an established-government founded on a character issued by the government founded on a charter issued by the English king prior to the American Revolution and a rival government based on a new constitution that had been approved by popular referendum. The charter government declared martial law, called out the state militia, and appealed to President John Ty1er for aid in putting down the rebellion. The president agreed to provide assistance, thus in effect recognizing the charter government, but the insurrection collapsed before federal troops were mobilized. Thomas Dorr, the leader of the rebellion, was captured, convicted of treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Dorr unsuccessfully sought relief on a writ of habeas corpus (see Ex Parte Dorr, 1845), although be was later pardoned and released During the fracas, Borden, a member of the state militia under the charter government, broke into the home of Luther, a supporter of the Dorr movement. Luther brought suit for trespass against Borden in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island. Borden defended on the ground that he was acting pursuant to martial law. Luther countered that the act of the state legislature declaring martial law was invalid, since the charter government was no longer the legitimate government of the state. After a jury trial, the circuit court returned a verdict in favor of Borden, the defendant. Luther appealed to the Supreme Court on a writ of error Daniel Webster, the most famous lawyer of his time, argued the case on behalf of Luther in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision for Borden.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court.

... The Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.

The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.

Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantees to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the actors and representatives of a State are admitted into councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and senators or representatives were elected under the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.

So, too, as relates to the clause in the a mentioned article of the Constitution, providing cases of domestic violence. It rested with Congress too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee. They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which required the federal government to interfere. But Congress though otherwise, and no doubt wisely; and by the act of February 28, 1795, provided, that, "in case of an insurrection in any State against the government therefore it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection."

By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had risen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature, or of the executive, and consequently must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the government, cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. If there is an armed conflict, like the one of which we are speaking, it is a case of domestic violence, and one of the parties must be insurrection against the lawful government. And the President must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed upon him by the act of Congress....

It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may be abused. All power may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of the same State are in arms against each other and the constituted authorities unable to execute the laws, the interposition of the United States must be prompt, or it is of little value. The ordinary course of proceedings in courts of justice would, be utterly unfit for the crisis. And the elevated office of the President, chosen as he is by the people of the United States, and the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when acting in a case of so much moment, appear to furnish as strong safeguards against a willful abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could well provide....

Much of the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned upon political rights and political questions, upon which the court has been urged to express an opinion. We decline doing so. The high power has been conferred on this court of passing judgment upon the acts of the State sovereignties, and legislative and executive branches of the federal government, and of determining whether they are beyond the limits of power marked out for them respectively by the Constitution of the United States.

This tribunal, therefore, should be the last to step the boundaries which limit its own jurisdiction. And while it should always be ready to meet any question confided to it by the Constitution , it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriated sphere of action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly belong to other forums. No one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that, according to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure. But whether they have changed it or not, abolishing an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision and to follow it....

Mr. Justice Woodbury, dissenting....